Sushil Harkauli, J.

1. This is an appeal under Section 35-G of the Central Excise Act, 1944 (as it stood before its repeal by the National Tax Tribunal Act, 2005). The appeal has admittedly been filed beyond the period of limitation. The delay is 141 days. There is an application under Section 5/14 of the Limitation Act, 1963 seeking condonation of the delay in filing of this appeal.

2. A preliminary objection has been raised from the respondents side that the delay in filing of the present appeal cannot be condoned by this Court. The first objection based upon the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of L.S. Synthetic Ltd. v. Fir Growth Financial Services Ltd. : (2004)11SCC456 , must be overruled as it relates to the question of non-applicability of the Limitation Act exclusively to Courts and not to quasi-judicial Authorities including Tribunals. Because Section 35-G says that an appeal under that section will lie to the High Court, therefore the High Court even while dealing with an appeal under Section 35-G is acting as a High Court which is a Court; the High Court is not acting in the capacity of a tribunal or persona designata.

3. However, in support of the preliminary objection that Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 is not available in appeals under Section 35-G, reliance has been placed by the respondents upon the following decisions of the Supreme Court:

I. Singh Enterprises v. Commissioner of Central Excise : 2008(221)ELT163(SC) , (decided on 14-12-2007 by a Bench of two Honble Judges)

II Commissioner of Customs v. Punjab Fibres Ltd. : 2008(223)ELT337(SC) , (decided on 14-2-2008 by a Bench of two Honble Judges) and

III Unreported judgment dated 14.2.2008 in Appeal (Civil) 699-700 of 2006 Goodearth Steels Pvt. Ltd. v. Commissioner of Central Excise, Kanpur. (by a Bench of two Honble Judges)

4. The appellants side has tried to counter the preliminary objection by placing reliance upon Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act, 1963. The said provision states that where any special or local law prescribes a period of limitation "different" from the period prescribed by the Limitation Act, the provisions of Sections 3 of the Limitation Act shall apply; and Sections 4 to 24 (both inclusive) of the Limitation Act shall also apply to the extent to which the said Sections 4 to 24 are not expressly excluded by such special or local law.

5. The appellant has submitted that in the decision of a Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in the case of Vidyacharan Shukla v. Khubchand Baghel : [1964]6SCR129 (in paragraphs 21 to 24 of that law report) it has been laid down that where the Limitation Act does not provide any limitation for a particular legal proceeding and a limitation is provided for the same by a special or local law, it would also be treated as if the special or local law has provided a limitation "different" from the limitation prescribed (though actually not prescribed) by the Limitation Act.

6. It has then be urged that though the Limitation Act does not prescribe any limitation for the same but Section 35-G of the Central Excise Act prescribes a limitation of 180 days for the appeal and that Section 35-G (or for that matter any other section of the Central Excise Act) does not expressly exclude the applicability of all or any of the Sections 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act, 1963 and, therefore, by virtue of Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act, Section 5 of that Act will apply for the purpose of condonation of delay.

7. In support of this, reliance has been placed upon the following decisions of the Supreme Court:

The Commissioner of Sales Tax v. Madan Lal Das & Sons : [1977]1SCR683 ,(by a Bench of three Honble Judges) Mangu Ram v. Municipal Corporation of Delhi : 1976CriLJ179 , (by a Bench of two Honble Judges), and Mukri Gopalan v. Cheppilat Puthanpurayil Aboobacker : AIR1995SC2272 (by a Bench of two Honble Judges).

8. Reliance has also been placed upon a Full Bench decision of the Bombay High Court in the case of Commissioner of Income Tax v. Velingkar Brothers : [2007]289ITR382(Bom) .

9. Learned Counsel for the appellant has urged that we should hold that the three decisions of the Supreme Court, relied upon by the respondents, which are by smaller Benches of two Honble Judges, do not lay down the correct law and that we should follow the decision of earlier larger Bench in Commr. of Central Excise v. Madan Lal Das (supra) which, according to learned Counsel for the appellant, has not been taken into consideration in any of the three decisions relied upon by the respondents. Reliance has been placed upon paragraph 12 of the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Union of India v. K.S. Subramanian : (1977)ILLJ5SC .

10. Learned Counsel for the appellant has also urged that the original decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Singh Enterprises (supra), which has been followed in the subsequent two decisions of Punjab Fibres and Gopdearth Steels (supra) has not considered the provision of Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act, 1963. We may point out here that lack of specific mention in a decision, does not necessarily mean complete oversight of a legal provision. The last but one sentence of paragraph 8 of the law report : 2008(221)ELT163(SC) in the case of Singh Enterprises (supra) reads as follows:

Therefore, there is complete exclusion of Section 5 of the Limitation Act.

11. These words indicate that the Supreme Court was conscious of the exclusion contemplated by Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act. When the proviso to Section 35(1) limits the period for which delay can be condoned, it may amount to virtually express exclusion of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, which does not have any such time limit which is permissible to be condoned upon sufficient cause being shown.

12. It has been held by a Bench of three Honble Judges of the Supreme Court in Hukum Dev Narain Yadav v. Lalit Narain Mishra : [1974]3SCR31 that the words "expressly excluded", as used in Section 29(2), may include exclusion by necessary implication in certain circumstances given below, and do not necessarily require exclusion by use of specific words to that effect or specific reference to the Limitation Act. According to the Supreme Court it has to be seen whether having regard to the scheme of the special law, the nature of remedy provided is such that the Legislature intended the Special Law (Act) to be a complete code by itself which alone should govern the several matters provided by it. If on an examination of the relevant provisions it is clear that the provisions of the Limitation Act are necessarily excluded then the benefits conferred therein cannot be called in aid to supplement the provisions of the (Special) Act. Even in a case where the special law does not exclude the provisions of Sections 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act by an express reference, it would nonetheless be open to the Court to examine whether and to what extent the nature of those provisions or the nature of the subject matter and scheme of the special law exclude their operation. Such examination of the scheme of the Statute or nature of the remedy in question, is not necessary in this case because of what has been mentioned below in paragraphs 13 to 15 of this order.

13. It was urged by learned Counsel for the appellant that in the case of Singh Enterprises (supra) the exclusion of Section 5 of the Limitation Act was inferred because of the proviso to Section 35(1) which limited the time of delay which was permissible to be condoned. In Section 35-G of the Central Excise Act there is no such proviso and the said Section 35-G merely mandates a time period for filing the appeal under that provision. The contention from the side of the appellant is that in view of this difference between Section 35 and Section 35-G, the exclusion of Section 5 of the Limitation Act should not be inferred in appeals under Section 35-G. So far as this Court is concerned, the argument cannot be accepted because of the two subsequent decisions of the Supreme Court in the case of Punjab Fibres (supra) and Goodearth Steels (supra) both of which are in respect of Section 35-H of the Central Excise Act (as it stood after its substitution by Section 128 of the Finance Act, 1999 and before its repeal by the National Tax Tribunal Act, 2005) which also merely mandated the period within which a reference application can be made without anything further, that is without the restriction similar to that placed by the proviso to Section 35(1).

14. The principle of interpretation of Statutes which has been applied to the interpretation of Section 35, inclusive of its proviso, has been extended and applied by the Supreme Court to the interpretation of Section 35-H which does not contain words similar to the said proviso limiting the period of delay which is permissible to be condoned. Therefore, in view of the said two decisions in the case of Punjab Fibres and Goodearth Steels (supra) we find ourselves unable to accept the submissions of the appellant, inasmuch as the suggested interpretation would be directly contrary to the law laid down by the Supreme Court in respect of Section 35-H of the same Statute which is in pari materia with the Section 35-G. Both these sections relate to different kinds of remedies in the course of finalisation of adjudication under the Central Excise Act 1944.

15. When a particular provision of a Statute has been given a particular interpretation by the Supreme Court, it would require exceptionally strong reasons for the High Court to given a different interpretation to another identical (in pari materia) provision of the same Statute. No such major differentiating feature between Section 35-G and Section 35-H, in respect of the limitation part, has been shown to us during the arguments. It was urged from the appellants side that the issue under consideration has been referred to larger Bench by a Division Bench of this Court by order dated 20-8-2007 in Income Tax Appeal No. 78 (defective) of 2002, and we should await the decision of that larger Bench. The precise question referred by that order is whether the period of limitation prescribed for filing an appeal under Section 260-A(2) of the Income Tax Act, 1961 is subject to the provisions contained in Section 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act, 1963 as provided under Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act, 1963. On the date of that order dated 20-8-2007 of the referring Division Bench, the three decisions of the Supreme Court, one dated 14-12-2007 and two dated 14-2-2008 were not delivered. After these decisions of the Supreme Court, at least in respect of Sections 35 and 35-H of the Central Excise Act 1944, it seems wholly unnecessary to await the opinion of the larger Bench in respect of appeals under Section 260-A of the Income Tax Act.

16. We, accordingly, uphold the preliminary objection of the respondents that the delay in filing an appeal under Section 35-G of the Central Excise Act cannot be condoned.

17. In this view of the matter, the application seeking condonation of delay is rejected. The appeal having been filed beyond the limitation prescribed, under Section 35-G of the Central Excise Act is dismissed on the ground of limitation.