R.K. ABICHANDANI, J.

(1). The petitioner who is suspended Sarpanch of Aedla Gram Panchayat challenges the orders made under Section 59 (1) and 59 (3) of the Gujarat Panchayats Act 1993 suspending him from office of the Sarpanch on the ground that criminal proceedings in respect of offences involving moral turpitude have been instituted against him.

(2). The allegation is made against the petitioner in the F. I. R. lodged on 7th July 1993 a copy of which at Annexure C is that the petitioner armed with a dharia along with other persons who were also armed with dharia and sticks came to the house of the complainant-Gopalbhai so Naranbhai and started abusing Gopalbhai on the issue of his nephew having not withdrawn the complaint of the theft of buffalo and attacked Gopalbhai and his daughter. It is alleged in the complaint that the petitioner and Amu Jora who had dharia and others who had sticks attacked the complainant and gave a blow on his head as a result of which he had fallen down. Others who had tried to intervene were also attacked by these persons. It was also alleged that they were threatened that they would be finished if the complaint regarding theft of a buffalo instituted by the complainants nephew was not withdrawn. The petitioner was given a show-cause notice on 16th August 1993 under the earlier corresponding provisions of Section 51 (1) of the Act 1961 Special Civil Application No. 13290 of 1993 was filed by the petitioner against that show-cause notice which was ultimately withdrawn on 10th July 1994. After the Gujarat Panchayat Act 1993 came into force a fresh notice was given under Section 59 (1) of that Act. Sufficient opportunity was given to the petitioner to the proposed action and the District Development Officer on 27th October 1994 finding the petitioner who was charged with the offences under Sections 148 149 324 504 451 and 307 of the I. P. C. and 135 of the Bombay Police Act guilty of offences involving moral turpitude suspended him under Section 59 (1) of the said Act. The petitioner appealed against that decision under Section 59 (3) of the said Act and the Additional Development Commissioner of the State of Gujarat after giving adequate opportunity to the petitioner of putting up his case held that criminal proceedings were initiated against the petitioner for offence involving moral turpitude and that the suspension of the petitioner was justified. The appeal was therefore rejected.

(3). It was contended on behalf of the petitioner that persons who had lost election in the year 1992 have succeeded in ousting the petitioner and the Upa- Sarpanch by implicating them in a false complaint. It was also contended relying upon the decision of this Court in Thakor Bhagabhai v. D. D. O. Surat and Anr. reported in 21 G. L. R. 966 that the offences which the petitioner was alleged to have committed were not the offences involved moral turpitude.

(4). A person elected as Sarpanch of a Panchayat holds an important office and the executive powers for the purposes of carrying out the provisions of the Panchayats Act and the Resolutions passed by the panchayat vest in the Sarpanch who is directly responsible for the fulfilment of duties imposed upon the panchayat by or under the as provided by Section 55 of the said Act. Therefore it would be a duty of a Sarpanch to safeguard the welfare of the village. The offences of attempted murder rioting causing injuries with sharp edged instrument if committed by Sarpanch who is the Chief Executive of the village panchayat would shock the general conscience of the society and render him unfit to become Sarpanch. The question whether an offence involves moral turpitude or not cannot always be judged in isolation and merely with reference to the ingredients of an offence. The person who commits the offence the person against whom it is committed the manner and the circumstances in which it is alleged to have been committed and the values of the society are some of the important factors which are required to be kept in mind before concluding whether the offence alleged to have been committed by the person involves moral turpitude. An offence of simple injury under Section 323 IPC on the face of it may not involve moral turpitude but it might assume a different colour when for instance it is committed against ones own teacher or parent which might shock the conscience of the right thinking persons. Therefore the observations which have been made by the Honble Mr. Justice B. K. Mehta in Thakorbhai Bhagabhai (supra) to the effect that it cannot be said that the alleged offence under Sections 323 324 149 147 of IPC and 135 of the Bombay Police Act were offence involving moral turpitude in the sense that the alleged acts can be said to be a conduct which is contrary to honestly good morals or unethical since at the most it was on incident of some scuffle between the petitioner and other persons alleged to be involved in the incident are to be read in context of the facts of that case and did not lay down a strait-jacket formulae that irrespective of the manner in which these offences are committed or against whom they are committed and the circumstances under which they are committed i. e. even without reference to the facts of the case they should be treated as offences not involving moral turpitude. In the present case the Sarpanch is charged with attempt to murder being a member of unlawful assembly and causing injury with lethal weapon dharia to a citizen of the village. The truth of the allegations is not required to be gone into in a proceeding under Section 59 (1) and the only question which is required to be decided by the authority under that provision is whether a criminal proceeding is instituted against the Sarpanch in respect of offences involving moral turpitude. It is not necessary that the offence should have been committed in connection with the duties of a Sarpanch. It can be any offence involving moral turpitude which would make him unfit to continue in the office of Sarpanch and the suspension would be justified. The authorities who have passed the orders under Section 59 (1) and 59 (3) have therefore acted within the bounds of their jurisdiction and have made the orders after giving appropriate opportunity of hearing to the petitioner. Their conclusion that the offences which are alleged against the petitioner are offences involving moral turpitude cannot be said to be wrong in view of what has been stated above. The petition is therefore summarily rejected.