Agarwala, J.During the pendency of a partition suit instituted on 27th February 1931, by Gobind Saran, the deceased husband of defendant 1, against his elder brother, defendant 2, and the latters son, defendant 3, Gobind incurred debts to obtain funds for the litigation and to pay for medical attendance necessitated by an accident which occurred to him. For these debts and for a further advance of Rs. 289 he executed, on 5th June 1931, a handnote for a thousand rupees bearing interest at two per cent, per mensem. The partition suit was dismissed for default on 21st November 1931. Gobind Saran died on 15th January 1934. Defendant 2 thereon obtained registration of his own name in place of defendant 1 in the Land Registration Department in respect of the property for which Gobind had been registered, alleging that Gobind had died in a state of jointness with himself and his son, defendant 3. On 22nd May 1934, plaintiffs instituted the present suit on the handnote to recover a sum of Rs. 1710-10-0 alleging that Gobind was separate from defendants 2 and 3 and that his widow, defendant 1, was his heir. The first Court dismissed the suit holding that Gobind was joint with defendants 2 and 3.

2. In appeal to the Subordinate Judge of Muzaffarpur, the plaintiffs contended that the institution of the suit for partition effected a disruption of the joint family. The Appellate Court held that, in the circumstances of the case, the institution of the partition suit did not evidence an unequivocal intention on Gobinds part to separate from his brother and nephew. The suit was accordingly dismissed. The circumstances referred to by the Appellate Court were that at the time of the institution of the suit Gobind was under the influence of profligate persons who were bent on his ruination and in effect that the institution of the suit for partition was their act rather than the act of Gobind himself.

3. In second appeal it is contended by the plaintiffs-appellants that the Court was going beyond its jurisdiction in considering the motive which led Gobind to institute the partition suit and that the decisions of the Privy Council are conclusive on the question that the institution of a suit for partition is sufficient to effect the separation in status of the plaintiff from the other members of the joint family. The decisions referred to are Appovier v. Rama Subba Aiyan (1866) 11 M.I.A. 75, Girija Bai v. Sadashiv Dhundiraj AIR 1916 P.C. 104 Kawal Nain v. Budh Singh AIR 1917 P.C. 39 and Syed Kasam v. Jorawar Singh A.I.R 1922 P.C. 353.

4. In Kawal Nain v. Budh Singh AIR 1917 P.C. 39, the plaintiffs suit for partition was dismissed by the trial Court on the ground that the plaintiff had instituted it under a misapprehension. Their Lordships of the Privy Council pointed out that the ground for dismissal was not sustainable in law, but they held that the plaintiff, by assertion of his right to separate, effected a separation of his status, whether a judgment followed on the plaint or not.

5. In Girija Bai v. Sadashiv Dhundiraj AIR 1916 P.C. 104, their Lordships observed that the conduct of the plaintiff in indicating, by a notice in a registered letter, his intention to separate himself and enjoy his share in severalty, coupled with a suit for partition, was as unequivocal and clearly expressed an intention as could be made, and that it amounted to a separation with all its legal consequences. In that case their Lordships also observed:

Once the decision of separation has been unequivocally expressed and clearly intimated to his cosharers, the plaintiffs right to obtain and possess the share, to which he admittedly has a title is unimpeachable; and neither the cosharers can question it nor can the Court examine the plaintiffs conscience to find out whether his reasons for separation were well founded or sufficient.

6. In an earlier decision however namely in Kedar Nath v. Ratan Singh (1910) 32 All. 415 it was held by the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in a case in which a member of the joint Hindu family had filed a plaint claiming partition and then had withdrawn the plaint, that severance of joint status was not effected.

7. That decision was cited by the Board in the more recent case in Palani Ammal v. Muthuvenkatachala Moniagar AIR 1925 P.C. 49 where it was held that mere filing of a plaint is not evidence of separation although it affords evidence that an intention to separate had been entertained. The argument of the appellants in this case arises, it seems to me, from a tendency to view pronouncements of their Lordships of the Judicial Committee as enactments of the Legislature. The Courts in India are bound by the decisions of the Privy Council on questions of law and no Court in this country would ever entertain an argument that a view of the law expressed by the Privy Council should not be strictly followed. It has to be remembered, however that whereas the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council are not bound by findings of fact and are not confined to considering questions of law, this Court, in dealing with second appeals u/s 100, Civil P.C., is confined strictly to questions of law and is bound to accept the lower Courts findings of fact. The finding of the facts has been entrusted to the Subordinate Courts and this Court in second appeal has no power to interfere with those findings.

8. Their Lordships of the Privy Council themselves have on various occasions pointed out this limitation on the power of the High Courts in second appeals. In one of their recent pronouncements, namely Secretary of State v. Rameswaram Devasthanam AIR 1934 P.C. 112 they stated that u/s 100, Civil P.C., the High Court has no juris, diction to reverse the findings of fact arrived at by the lower Appellate Court however erroneous, unless they are vitiated by some error of law. Now the law which we are administering in the present appeal is the Hindu law, and it is not disputed that according to the Hindu law the expression of an intention to separate effects severance of the joint status; but that expression of intention has to be proved in a Court of justice by evidence.

9. The evidence may consist of a notice, as in Girija Bai v. Sadashiv Dhundiraj AIR 1936 P.C. 104 or of the filing of a plaint claiming partition as in Kawal Nain v. Budh Singh AIR 1917 P.C. 39 or it may take some other form; but it is no more tharji the evidence of intention to separate. All that their Lordships of the Judicial Committee have said with regard to this question is that the filing of a plaint may be considered as unambiguous evidence of an intention to separate. Their Lordships, in dealing with the question of fact whether there has been a separation or not, may be prepared (as in some cases they have been) to regard the filing of a suit for partition as such conclusive proof of the intention to separate that it is not necessary to consider other circumstances. It is impossible to conceive that their Lordships intended anything more than that.

10. The argument of the learned advocate for the appellants really amounts to this: although the Hindu law requires an unequivocal expression of an intention to separate in order to effect a severance in joint status, the Privy Council have amended the law by stating that separation may be effected by filing a suit for partition. ; This would be legislating and not a mere explanation of what the law is. The intention which the Hindu law requires may in appropriate cases be evidenced by the filing; of a plaint from which it may be inferred that there was an intention to separate.

11. The decision in Kedar Nath v. Ratan Singh (1910) 32 All. 415 supports that view and, as I have already indicated, that case has been followed in the more recent case in Palani Ammal v. Muthuvenkatachala Moniagar A.I.R.1925 P.C. 49. The question raised in this second appeal therefore is conclude by the finding of fact of the lower Appellate Court.

12. It is clear that the lower Appellate Court, in the circumstances of the case, was not prepared to look upon the filing of the plaint by Gobind Saran as a clear indication of his intention to separate from his brother and nephew. It may be that if we were dealing with this case as a> Court of fact, we might have taken a different view of that evidence; but as our powers in second appeal do not enable us to disregard the finding of fact of the Appellate Court, we must accept it.

13. The result is that this second appeal fails and must he dismissed with costs.

Varma, J.

I agree.