Goswamy, J.
1. This appeal by the owner-landlord is directed against the order dated 15.1.1985 passed by the Rent Control Tribunal whereby his appeal against the holding of objections to the execution under Section 21 of the Delhi Rent Control Act was also dismissed.
2. The appellant let his property namely house No. D-192, Ashok Vihar Phase I. New Delhi ground floor to the respondent under Section 21 of the Delhi Rent Control Act on 10.7.1979. In the application under Section 21 it was stated that the petitioner at the relevant time was on deputation at Kathmandu and after the expiry of period of deputation in February 1982 he would come to Delhi with his family and would reside in the house in dispute. Since the appellant himself was actually on deputation, a statement to the same effect was made by the general attorney of the appellant. The respondent also agreed to take the property under Section 21 and accepted the reasonings given by the appellant. Consequently the Rent Controller by his order dated 10.7.1979 allowed the application and granted permission to let the property under Section 21 of the Act.
3. After the expiry of the period, the appellant filed a petition for execution. In response to the notice issued to the respondent, the respondent filed his objections to the execution. Though the objection petition runs into several pages but the main objections are to the effect that even at earlier occasions the appellant had been letting parts of his property under Section 21 of the Act and the first floor of the house in dispute had already been let under Section 21 of the Act and this fact was not disclosed to the Rent Controller in the application or in the statement. The objection, regarding non-disclosure of the fact that the first floor of the property had already been let under Section 21, was upheld by the Rent Controller as also by the Tribunal. The main ground being that this was a material fact which had been suppressed and as such the appellant was not entitled to seek eviction. The Rent Controller as also the Tribunal attempted to go into the question of sufficiency of accommodation available to the appellant on the first floor of the house.
4. I have heard the learned Counsel, for the parties, at length. I find, as already stated above, the only point which prevailed with the Tribunal was the suppression of the fact of letting the first floor under Section 21, for the same reason as was stated for letting the ground floor to the respondent. According to the Tribunal, this was a material fact and should have been disclosed by the appellant. After giving my careful consideration, I have not been able to agree with the reasoning given by the Tribunal. A material fact, according to me, is only that which if disclosed would have disentitled the appellant from getting an order under Section 21 of the Act. Even if the appellant had stated in his application or in his statement that he had already let the first floor under Section 21 and he would like to have the entire house on his return from Kathmandu; the Rent Controller, in my opinion, had no jurisdiction to refuse the order under Section 21. In fact Section 21 has been enacted to facilitate the landlords who are placed in such a situation to let the property for a limited period. The Rent Controller or this Court for that reason cannot sit in appeal over the decision of the landlord as to how much accommodation he would need. This may be a relevant consideration if the landlord seeks eviction of the tenant the grounds of bona fide requirements under Section 14(1)(e) but it cannot be a consideration for letting under Section 21 of the Act.
5. The landlord is a very high official and one of his daughters is a doctor and one of the sons is a medical student. The status of the family is such which clearly entitles the appellant to have the whole house if he so requires. The landlord knew at the time of letting that he would be returning after a period of two to three years from deputation and would like to keep the whole house. No exception can be taken to such a desire of the landlord, particularly, when the tenant, who was inducted knew that he was being inducted only for a limited period. No hardship, in these circumstances is caused on the tenant.
6. Section 21 of the Act has already come for interpretation in various cases before Their Lordships of Supreme Court and before this Court. A consistent view has been taken the effect that in a case where correct facts were disclosed and the disclosure of these facts were sufficient to show that the property was available for being let for a limited period, the tenant cannot take any objection at the time of execution. In the present case admittedly the appellant was on deputation and he was to return. This is the only fact stated and the reason given while seeking permission under Section 21. In the circumstances, I hold that the objections filed by the tenant had no merit and deserved to be dismissed.
7. Consequently for the reasons recorded above, the appeal is allowed and the objections filed by the respondent stand dismissed. Mr. Marwah states that the respondent may like to go up in appeal against this order and seeks some time. I grant one months time to the respondent to hand over vacant possession of the premises in dispute to the appellant. The appellant will be entitled to his costs, Counsels fee Rs. 500.