Vikramajit Sen, J.

1. The prayer in this writ petition is for the passing of a writ of certiorari quashing the Orders of the Central Government dated 10.6.2005 directing adherence to Rule 59(ii) of The Mineral Concession Rules, 1960. For facility of reference Rule 59 of Mineral Concession Rules, 1960 is reproduced below:

59. Availability of areas for regrant to be notified:

(1) No area

(a) which was previously held or which is being held under a reconnaissance permit or a prospecting licence or a mining lease; or

(b) which has been reserved by the Government or any local authority for any purpose other than mining; or

(c) in respect of which the order granting a permit or licence or lease has been revoked under Sub-rule (1) of Rule 7A or Sub-rule (1) of Rule 15 or Sub-rule (1) of Rule 31, as the case may be; or

(d) in respect of which a notification has been issued under the Sub-section (2) or Sub-section (4) of Section 17; or

(e) which has been reserved by the State Government or under Section 17A of the Act;

shall be available for grant unless

(i) an entry to the effect that the area is available for grant is made in the register referred to in Sub-rule (2) of Rule 7D or Sub-rule (2) of Rule 21 or Sub-rule (2) of Rule 40 as the case may be; and

(ii) the availability of the area for grant is notified in the Official Gazette and specifying a date (being a date not earlier than thirty days from the date of the publication of such notification in the Official Gazette) from which such area shall be available for grant:

Provided that nothing in this rule shall apply to the renewal of a lease in favour of the original lessee or his legal heirs notwithstanding the fact that the lease has already expired:

Provided further that where an area reserved under Rule 58 or under Section 17A of the Act is proposed to be granted to a Government Company, no notification under Clause (ii) shall be required to be issued:

Provided also that where an area held under a reconnaissance permit or a prospecting licence, as the case may be, is granted in terms of Sub-section (1) of Section 11, no notification under Clause (ii) shall be required to be issued.

(2) The Central Government may, for reasons to be recorded in writing, relax the provisions of Rule (1) in any special case.

2. Even a cursory perusal of the provision will immediately disclose that in normal course the availability of any area for the grant of a mining lease is subject to such availability being notified in the Official Gazette. Publication is the precondition; every citizen should be empowered with requisite knowledge to participate in the enjoyment of national wealth. A few exceptions to this general principle have been enumerated in the Rules, namely, that where the renewal of a lease in favour of the original lessee is to be transferred to his legal heirs, or where the reserved area is to be granted to a Government company or if the subject area is held under a reconnaissance permit or a prospecting licence, a notification is not required. Under Sub-rule (2) the Central Government possesses the power to depart from the salutary provisions of Sub-rule (1), but this power must be based on good and compelling reasons which are duly recorded in writing. It must be kept in mind that waiving the requirement of publicising the availability for exploiting national natural resources is the exception; therefore, it is fallacious to contend that the reasons for falling in line with the first sub-clause have either not been given or if articulated are not adequate. Logically, these tests have to be applied where the second Sub-rule is traversed.

3. The facts of the case are that the petitioners were the erstwhile lessees of the land in question for almost quarter of a century, but the mining lease was in respect of a mine and mineral. In 1996 it was discovered that a major mineral, namely, Pyroxinete Magnesium Sillicate was available on the land and consequently Government of the State of Jharkhand on 6.2.1996 terminated the then existing lease in favour of the petitioners.

4. The petitioners applied for a fresh grant of lease of Major Minerals and also laid seize to the termination Order by initiating writ petition No. 4187-189 of 1996 before the High Court of Patna, Ranchi Bench. That writ petition was dismissed on 27.4.1987. On 14.11.2000 the State Government processed the Petitioners application and granted them a fresh mining lease for the said Major Mineral. This Order was challenged before the Mines Tribunal by M/s. Bharat Mining Company, which has filed an impleadment application in the present proceedings. The Mines Tribunal vide its Order dated 23.7.2001 directed the State Government to follow the provisions of Rule 59 of the Mineral Concession Rules, 1960 viz. to issue a Notification in the Official Gazette or in the alternative to seek a relaxation of the aforesaid procedure from the Central Government under Sub-rule (ii) of the Mineral Concession Rules, 1960. The petitioners thereupon filed Writ Petition No. 3782 of 2001 in the High Court of Patna, Ranchi Bench which was dismissedvide Orders dated 13.8.2002. The same fate was encountered in Letters Patent Appeal No. 459 of 2002 which came to be rejected by the Division Bench on 9.4.2003. A Special Leave Petition was filed in the Honble Supreme Court which was subsequently withdrawn on 15.9.2003. The effect is that the Orders of the Mines Tribunal have attained finality. Therefore, either a Notification in the Official Gazette has to be published or the Central Government must arrive at the conclusion that it is appropriate to relax this requirement.

5. At this juncture the Jharkhand Government had forwarded its proposal to the Central Government for relaxation of the provisions of Rule 59(i) of the Mineral Concession Rules, 1960 in terms of its letter dated 12.8.2003. A month later the Central Government had sought clarification/information about the aforesaid proposal from the Jharkhand Government. It is the contention of Mr. Rajiv Shakdher, learned Counsel for Union of India, that on the failure of the Jharkhand Government to supply requisite clarification/information the proposal was returned to the Jharkhand Government on 18.3.2004. It was in these circumstances that the present petitioners had instituted Writ Petition No. 8371-73 of 2005 in this Court which was disposed of on 13.3.2005 by directing the Central Government to decide the Representation of the Jharkhand Government in terms of its letter dated 12.8.2003. By the impugned order dated 10.6.2005 the Central Government has declined to relax the provisions of Rule 59(i) as it has arrived at the conclusion that the Jharkhand Government has failed to make out a special case for exercising the relaxation powers in Rule 59 of the Mineral Concession Rules, 1960. It is indeed significant and perhaps indicative of the background interests, that the Jharkhand Government has not assailed the rejection of its proposal. Instead it is the erstwhile lessees, being the petitioners herein, who have filed these petitions challenging the legality of the impugned Order. While it cannot be denied that the petitioners will be indirectly affected in pecuniary terms by the impugned Order they nevertheless lack locus standi to prosecute the present Petition since it is the proposal of the Jharkhand Government which has been rejected by the Central Government. In the present case it is not the contention of the petitioners that the Jharkhand Government is inimical towards it; in fact the situation is clearly to the contrary. Locus standi may well take on a contrary complexion if the Central Government were to depart from the normal situation envisaged by the Rules.

6. The territorial jurisdiction of this Court has been assailed by way of preliminary objection. The contention of learned Counsel for Union of India is that the mines are situated in Jharkhand and, therefore, the writ petitions, assuming them to be maintainable at the instance of the petitioners, ought to have been filed in the High Court of Jharkhand. As has already been seen there has been protracted litigation in that Court already. Mr. Parag P. Tripathi, learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner, vehemently contends that the impugned decision is of the Central Government, and since it is based in New Delhi this Court indubitably possesses territorial jurisdiction to adjudicate the disputes.

7. It is too late in the day to contend that merely because the Union of India has its headquarters in Delhi, Courts located in the Capital can invariably properly exercise jurisdiction over every dispute where it has been impleaded as a party. Assuming for the sake of arguments that a part of the cause of action has arisen in New Delhi, I favour the opinion that this Court should abjure from exercising jurisdiction since there are other High Courts which are better suited to entertain the disputes that have been raised in this Petition (see Gupta Sanitary Stores v. Union of India and Another, 27 (1985) DLT 2 (SN) (FB)=AIR 1985 Delhi 122). The decision in Patel Roadways Limited Bombay v. M/s. Prasad Trading Company, AIR 1992 SC 1514 [LQ/SC/1991/361] is that if a Corporation has a subordinate office in the place where the cause of action arises, litigation must be commenced in that place alone, regardless of apparently wider enabling provision in Section 20. The Court adopted a realistic, businesslike and expedient approach in opining that, It would be a great hardship if, in spite of the Corporation having a subordinate office at the place where the cause of action arises (with which in all probability the plaintiff has had dealings), such plaintiff is to be compelled to travel to the place where the Corporation has its principal place. That place should be convenient to the plaintiff; and since the Corporation has an office at such place, it will also be under no disadvantage. The significance of this judgment is that it restricts jurisdiction, whether a contractual clause of this nature exists or not, to the particular place where the cause of action has substantially arisen, overruling other places which may have jurisdiction under Section 20 of the CPC. This rationale commends itself even in the context of Article 226 of the Constitution.

8. In Sector Twenty-one Owners Welfare Association v. Air Force Naval Housing Board, 65 (1997) DLT 81 (DB), a Division Bench of this Court has held that a trivial or insignificant part of the cause of action arising at a particular place would not be enough to confer writ jurisdiction on the Court to entertain the lis. The Division Bench deduced from various precedents that the emphasis had shifted from the residence or location of the person or authority sought to be proceeded against, to the situs of the accrual of cause of action. There is no reason why the observations pertaining to writ petitions should not be extrapolated and inter- changed between suits and writ petitioners. The Bench held as follows:

13. The law as reflected by the abovesaid decisions is that the emphasis has shifted from the residence or location of the person or authority sought to be proceeded against to the situs of the accrual of cause of action wholly or in part. It is also clear that a trivial or insignificant part of the cause of action arising at a particular place would be not enough to confer writ jurisdiction; it is the cause of action mainly and substantially arising at a place which would be determinating factor of territorial jurisdiction. So also it shall have to be kept in view who are the real persons or authorities sought to be proceeded against or against whom the writ to be issued by the Court would run. Joining to proforma or anciliary parties and certainly not the joining of unnecessary parties, would be relevant for the purposes of Article 226(1).

14. Reverting back to the case at hand, it is clear that the cause of action has wholly arisen in NOIDA within the State of U.P. The principal and substantial grievance of the petitioner-association is against the respondent Nos. 2 and 3 though incidentally, the respondent No. 1 may also be required to be bound by the writ. The reverse is not correct. The writ, if any, to be issued by the Court would not serve any purpose if issued against respondent No. 1 alone. In the matter of registration of the sale deed-cum-sub-lease deed merely because a document can be registered at Delhi by virtue of Section 30(2) of the Registration Act, territorial jurisdiction in the Courts at Delhi cannot be inferred. Moreover, the petitioner-association is already having some litigation before the Courts of U.P. And at one point of time the Delhi High Court had declined to entertain the petitioner-associations writ for want of territorial jurisdiction in Delhi.

9. In Oil & Natural Gas Commission v. Utpal Kumar Basu and Others, JT 1994 (5) SC 1 [LQ/SC/1994/575] , the action of ONGC rejecting the tender was challenged before the Calcutta High Court by way of a writ petition, which was entertained by the High Court. The Supreme Court held that the Calcutta High Court had no jurisdiction to deal with the matter. While setting aside the impugned decision, the Supreme Court observed as follows:

8. From the facts pleaded in the writ petition, it is clear that NICCO invoked the jurisdiction of the Calcutta High Court on the plea that a part of the cause of action had arisen within its territorial jurisdiction. According to NICCO , it became aware of the contract proposed to be given by ONGC on reading the advertisement which appeared in the Times of India at Calcutta. In response thereto, it submitted its bid or tender from its Calcutta Office and revised the rates subsequently. When it learnt that it was considered ineligible it sent representations, including fax messages, to EIL, ONGC, etc. at New Delhi, demanding justice. As stated earlier, the Steering Committee finally rejected the offer of NICCO and awarded the contract to CIMMCO at New Delhi on January 27, 1993. Therefore, broadly speaking, NITCO claims that a part of the cause of action arose within the jurisdiction of the advertisement in Calcutta, it submitted its bid or tender from Calcutta and made representations demanding justice from Calcutta on learning about the rejection of its offer. The advertisements itself mentioned that the tenders should be submitted at New Delhi and that a final decision whether or not to award the contract to the tenderer would be taken at New Delhi. Of course, the execution of the contract work was to be carried out at Hazira in Gujarat. Therefore, merely because it read the advertisement at Calcutta and submitted the offer from Calcutta and made representations from Calcutta would not, in our opinion, constitute facts forming an integral part of the cause of action. So also the mere fact that it sent fax messages from Calcutta and received a reply thereto at Calcutta would not constitute an integral part of the cause of action. Besides the fax message of January 15, 1993, cannot be construed as conveying rejections of the offer as that fact occurred on January 27, 1993, We are, therefore, of the opinion that even if the averments in the writ petition are taken as true, it cannot be said that a part of the cause of action arose within the jurisdiction of the Calcutta High Court.

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12. .... Notwithstanding the strong observations made by this Court in the aforesaid decisions and in the earlier decisions referred to therein, we are distressed that the High Court of Calcutta persists in exercising jurisdiction even in cases where no part of the cause of action arose within its territorial jurisdiction. It is indeed a great pity that one of the premier High Courts of the country should appear to have developed a tendency to assume jurisdiction on the sole ground that the petitioner before it resides in or carries on business from a registered office in the State of West Bengal. We feel all the more pained that notwithstanding the observations of this Court made time and again, some of the learned Judges continue to betray that tendency only recently while disposing of appeals arising out of SLP Nos.10065-66 of 1993, Aligarh Muslim University & Anr. v. M/s.Vinny Engineering Enterprises (P) Ltd. & Anr., this Court observed

We are surprised, not a little, that the High Court of Calcutta should have exercised jurisdiction in a case where it had absolutely no jurisdiction.

In that case, the contract in question was executed at Aligarh, the construction work was to be carried out at Aligarh, the contracts provided that in the event of dispute the Aligarh Court alone will have jurisdiction, the arbitrator was appointed at Aligarh and was to function at Aligarh and yet merely because the respondent was a Calcutta based firm, it instituted proceedings in the Calcutta High Court and the High Court exercised jurisdiction where it had none whatsoever. It must be remembered that the image and prestige of a Court depends on how the members of that institution conduct themselves. If an impression gains ground that even in cases which fall outside the territorial jurisdiction of the Court, certain members of the Court would be willing to exercise jurisdiction on the plea that some event, however trivial and unconnected with the cause of action had occurred within the jurisdiction of the said Court, litigants would seek to abuse the process by carrying the cause before such members giving rise to avoidable suspicion. That would lower the dignity of the institution and put the entire system to ridicule. We are greatly pained to say so but if we do not strongly deprecate the growing tendency we will, we are afraid, be failing in our duty to the institution and the system of administration of justice. We do hope that we will not have another occasion to deal with such a situation.

10. Primacy has been given to the place where the cause of action has substantially arisen, as is evident from the decision of the Supreme Court in South East Asia Shipping Co. Ltd v.Nav Bharat Enterprises Pvt. Ltd., II (1996) CLT 68 (SC)=(1996) 3 SCC 443 [LQ/SC/1996/583] . The admitted position was that performance of the obligations and liabilities under the contract was to be carried out in Bombay. The Apex Court found it wholly irrelevant that the subject Bank Guarantee had been executed at Delhi and transmitted for performance to Bombay and held that Delhi Courts did not possess jurisdiction to decide the dispute.

11. An analysis of the various pronouncements of the Supreme Court reveals that even though the express terms of Section 20 of the CPC permit the filing of a suit against a Corporation at its principal office, primacy and pre-eminence has been accorded to the place where the cause of action had substantially arisen, as against those places where it has incidentally or partially arisen. Whilst the Supreme Court has indubitably enumerated in ABC Laminart v. A.P. Agencies, AIR 1989 SC 1239 [LQ/SC/1989/152 ;] ">AIR 1989 SC 1239 [LQ/SC/1989/152 ;] [LQ/SC/1989/152 ;] = 1989(2) SCC 163 the several places where the cause of action could be seen to have arisen, this was done primarily to investigate and determine whether the place to which jurisdiction had been restricted, by ousting all others, itself enjoyed jurisdiction. Otherwise, as is trite, such a clause would become legally unefficacious since it is not possible to infuse by contract jurisdiction on Court which does not otherwise possess it. The position that obtains today is that primacy is accorded to the place where the cause of action substantially arises. The following passage of ABC Laminart is extremely instructive:

15. In the matter of a contract there may arise causes of action of various kinds. In a suit for damages for breach of contract the cause of action consists of the making of the contract, and of its breach, so that the suit may be filed either at the place where the contract was made or at the place where it should have been performed and the breach occurred. The making of the contract is part of the cause of action. A suit on a contract, therefore, can be filed at the place where it was made. The determination of the place where the contract was made is part of the law of contract. But making of an offer on a particular place does not form cause of action in a suit for damages for breach of contract. Ordinarily, acceptance of an offer and its intimation result in a contract and hence a suit can be filed in a Court within whose jurisdiction the acceptance was communicated. The performance of a contract is part of cause of action and a suit in respect of the breach can always be filed at the place where the contract should have (been) performed or its performance completed. If the contract is to be performed at the place where it is made, the suit on the contract is to be filed there and nowhere else. In suits for agency actions the cause of action arises at the place where the contract of agency was made or the place where actions are to be rendered and payment is to be made by the agent. Part of cause of action arises where money is expressly or impliedly payable under a contract. In cases of repudiation of a contract, the place where repudiation is received is the place where the suit would lie. If a contract is pleaded as part of the cause of action giving jurisdiction to the Court where the suit is filed and that contract is found to be invalid, such part of cause of the action disappears. The above are some of the connecting factors.

12. This question has been considered in detail by the Supreme Court in Union of India v. Adani Exports Ltd., VII (2001) SLT 612=IV (2001) CLT 186 (SC)=AIR 2002 SC 126 [LQ/SC/2001/2506] . In its opinion each and every fact pleaded in the application does not ipso facto lead to the conclusion that those facts give rise to a cause of action within the Courts territorial jurisdiction unless those facts pleaded are such which have a nexus or relevance with the lis that is involved in the case. Facts which have no bearing with the lis or the dispute involved in the case do not give rise to a cause of action so as to confer territorial jurisdiction on the Court concerned.

13. In the case of Kusum Ingots & Alloys Ltd. v. Union of India, 111 (2004) DLT 480 (SC)=III (2004) SLT 565=III (2004) BC 56 (SC)=(2004) 6 SCC 254 [LQ/SC/2004/631] the Honble Supreme Court has held that

19. Passing of a legislation by itself in our opinion does not confer any such right to file a writ petition unless a cause of action arises therefor.

20. A distinction between a legislation and executive action should be borne in mind while determining the said question.

21. A parliamentary legislation when it receives the assent of the President of India and is published in the Official Gazette, unless specifically excluded, will apply to the entire territory of India. If passing of a legislation gives rise to a cause of action, a writ petition questioning the constitutionality thereof can be filed in any High Court of the country. It is not so done because a cause of action will arise only when the provisions of the Act or some of them which were implemented shall give rise to civil or evil consequences to the petitioner. A writ Court, it is well settled, would not determine a constitutional question in a vacuum.

....

30. We must, however, remind ourselves that even if a small part of cause of action arises within the territorial jurisdiction of the High Court, the same by itself may not be considered to be a determinative factor compelling the High Court to decide the matter on merit. In appropriate cases, the Court may refuse to exercise its discretionary jurisdiction by invoking the doctrine of forum conveniens.

In this landmark judgment, which overruled the earlier opinion in U.P. Rashtriya Chini Mill Adhikari Parishad, the enunciation of the law in paragraph 30 above came after the Court had observed that a part of the cause of action arises at the place where the impugned Order is passed by the executive Authority. In Ansal Buildwell Ltd. v. North Eastern Indira Gandhi Institute of Health and Medical Science, 118 (2005) DLT 274 [LQ/DelHC/2005/766] this Court has held that by invoking the doctrine of forum conveniens a Court may refuse to exercise its discretionary jurisdiction notwithstanding that some part of cause of action had arisen within the territorial jurisdiction of the Court. Reliance has rightly been placed on the observations contained in Harshad Chiman Lal Modi v. DLF Universal, 125 (2005) DLT 790 (SC)=VIII (2005) SLT 849= and subsequent Order between the same parties in Harshad Chiman Lal Modi v. DLF Universal decided on 14th December, 2005.

14. In view of the above discussion it is clear to me that the umbilical cord which joins the High Court of Jharkhand with the disputes which has been raised in this litigation is to be found in Jharkhand and not at New Delhi. The most substantial connection with the fundamentals of the cause of action is with the Jharkhand High Court, which indubitably also possesses the power and jurisdiction to rule on the legality of the impugned Order. Had detailed arguments not been heard by me and assuming that the petitioners possess the power to challenge the orders of the Central Government rejecting a proposal of the Jharkhand Government, I would have considered it proper to direct the petitioners to approach the High Court of Jharkhand.

15. Reverting back to Rule 59 of the Mineral Concession Rules, 1960 it justifies reiteration that what is postulated is the publication of a Notification in the Official Gazette before any lease in respect of the mining of a Major Mineral can be granted. The termination of the petitioners lease has unsuccessfully been challenged right upto the Honble Supreme Court and, therefore, the first Proviso to Rule 50(i) does not apply; I am obviously not dealing with the renewal of a lease on its expiry in favour of the original lessee. The petitioner is also not a Government company. Although it has been argued en passant that the petitioners possess reconnaissance or prospecting rights, in my view, neither of these apply Reconnaissance or prospecting activity has not arisen in the present case for the simple reason that it is not the petitioners who have found the major mineral in question. The termination of the previous lease was on the grounds that a major mineral had been found in the land in question. Reconnaissance or prospecting rights would ordinarily come into play where a licence did not previously exist, and owing to the efforts of the claimants a mineral is to be exploited and excavated for the first time. In Shri Saligram Khirwal v. State of Orissa, AIR 1991 Orissa 211 it has been opined that if the lessee finds the new mineral in the area and wants to raise it, he has to inform the Competent Authority and apply for taking lease in respect of its mining; if on the other hand the Authority wants to grant a lease for a new mineral it has to notify an existing lessee so as to give him an opportunity to apply for it. This decision is not a precedent for the proposition that the mandates of Rule 59(i) have not to be followed. It is not as if the petitioner has been shut out to consideration for a fresh grant of lease. Some degree of preference to the petitioner may conceptionally be permissible. If the petitioners can demand dispensing with the salutary requirement of notifying the availability of a lease of major mineral, it would, to all intenets and purposes, vest a right to the continuance or automatic renewal of their lease. This debate stands foreclosed because of the dismissal of CW 4187-89 of 1996 filed by the petitioners in the Patna High Court, Ranchi Bench. Great emphasis has been laid by learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners on the decision of the Division Bench in J.C. Rishi v. Union of India, 1967 M.P.L.J. 632. Incidently, the petitioners had prayed for a writ of certiorari for quashing the order of the Central Government before the High Court of Madhya Pradesh, which as has already been seen, is the proper procedure to be employed; on parity, in the present case the petitioners ought to have approached the High Court of Jharkhand. The Bench had noted that the purpose of Rules 58 and 59 is to give notice to the people in general that the land, which was already covered under a mining lease or a prospecting licence, or was reserved for any other purpose has become available for the grant of a mining lease. The provision of notice is made because it is almost impossible for a person to know the details as to when the lease expires or when it has expired prematurely or when the land, which was reserved, has become available. If this procedure is followed, everyone gets a fair opportunity of applying for grant of a lease, no one can take any surreptitious advantage of his special knowledge that the land has become available. These observations in fact destroy the case of the Petitioners. It has been vehemently urged by Mr. Tripathi, but contested by Mr. Kaul, that the Intervenor, namely, Bharat Mining Company had been found not to enjoy locus standi even in the Revision proceedings before the Mines Tribunal. This clearly underscores and emphasises the need for the public to be notified before a lease is granted, especially so in the case of a major mineral. The present case manifests that consistently there has been a meeting of the minds between the petitioners and the State Government. The object behind Rule 59 is clearly to eradicate any possibility of surreptitious dealing with national wealth. Having said that the reliance of learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner on subsequent passage needs to be considered. The aforementioned Bench thereafter observed that if Rules 58 and 59 are not meticulously followed it would not render the lease void. In the present case finality to the termination of the petitioners lease has obtained finality and a fresh lease has not been awarded in its favour. These observations are, therefore, of no avail to the petitioners. The fulcrum of the dispute is whether the Central Government was wrong in refusing to apply the exception to the Rule set down in Rule 59.

16. Learned Counsel for the petitioner has next contended that the principles of natural justice have been violated and in this regard the petitioner has been strenuously vehemently supported by Ms. Anand the learned Counsel for the State of Jharkhand. In the first place the State of Jharkhand ought to have directly assailed the decision of the Central Government. A proxy war should not be countenanced by the Writ Court. The argument is that the State of Jharkhand has not been granted a full opportunity of being heard. Learned Counsel for the Central Government has emphasised the fact that queries/clarifications had been solicited from the State Government and, therefore, it cannot be contended that no hearing was granted. The State of Jharkhand has not assailed the impugned Order and it does not lie in the mouth of a third party to complain that the rules of natural justice have not been followed in dealings between third persons. The observations in Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, (1978) 2 SCR 621 [LQ/SC/1978/27] and S.L. Kapoor v. Jagmohan, AIR 1981 SC 136 [LQ/SC/1980/396] do not advance the case of the petitioners. In Madhya Pradesh Industries Ltd. v. Union of India, (1966) 1 SCR 466 [LQ/SC/1965/193] , it has been held that a personal hearing before the Central Government under Rule 55 is not a legal entitlement of the appellant. Reliance has also been placed on Mangilal v. State of M.P., I (2004) SLT 222=I (2004) CCR 1 (SC)=(2004) 2 SCC 447 [LQ/SC/2004/5] , which is to the effect that even if a statute is silent and there are no positive words in the Act or the Rules made thereunder, there could be nothing wrong in spelling out the need to hear the parties whose rights and interest are likely to be affected by the orders that may be passed. As has already been seen the Central Government had required clarification/information from the State Government and it is not the State Government which has assailed the impugned order. The tenets of natural justice have not been violated.

17. The conduct of parties should not be viewed in isolation. I am presently concerned with the application of Rule 59 of the Mineral Concession Rules, 1960. It lays down a salutary procedure to be followed, which would directly obviate and reject any cloak and dagger method of granting concessions or licences for exploitation of our national and natural wealth. While exercising its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution, the Court should concentrate on ensuring that the purpose of the law as well as the mandates of equity and good conscience are adhered to. In the conspectus of the facts and arguments I cannot detect any infraction of the principle of natural justice that fall for adjudication before this Court. What the petitioner seeks to achieve is that public notice should not be given prior to the awarding of the lease. Its consequential concomitant is that even if an unjustified preference is obtained by the petitioner no other citizen can assail it. The Petition is without merit and is dismissed.