R.S. Chauhan, J.

The plaintiff-appellant, Jitendra Kumar, is aggrieved by the judgment and decree dated 26.2.2008 passed by the Civil Judge (Jr. Div.) No.1, Alwar whereby the learned Magistrate has dismissed the civil suit filed by the appellant. The appellant is equally aggrieved by the judgment and decree dated 9.10.2012 passed by the Additional District Judge No.1, Alwar whereby the learned Judge has dismissed the appeal filed by the appellant, and has affirmed the judgment and decree dated 26.2.2008.

2. The brief facts of the case are that the appellant had filed a civil suit for permanent injunction and declaration wherein he had claimed that he is resident of Village Devkhera, Tehsil and District Alwar. Mohanlal also lives in the same village. On 21.8.1993, he and Mohanlal had entered into an exchange agreement whereby the possession of the plot belonging to Mohanlal was given to him and in turn, the appellant gave the possession of his plot to Mohanlal. He further claimed that since 1993, he has been in peaceful possession of the said plot. According to the appellant, on 27.5.1980, and on 26.5.1980 Mohanlals father, Chunnilal, was served with a notice by the Tehsildar, Alwar. However subsequently, the proceedings were dropped by the UIT, Alwar. Therefore, he further claimed that Chunnilal, his son, Mohanlal, and through them, the appellant himself has been peacefully enjoying the possession of the said plot. Therefore, he has been in adverse possession of the said plot for over thirty years. Prior to filing of the civil suit, he had also constructed a house in the plot. But despite his peaceful possession, the defendants, the UIT, Alwar, plans to construct a road through his plot. Therefore, he needs to be protected from being dispossessed and from his land as it is being taken by the UIT. Lastly, that on 13.8.2001, the UIT issued a notice to him directing him to vacate the plot and threatened him that in case he does not, his house shall be demolished. Hence, the suit for declaration and permanent injunction.

3. On the other hand, the UIT submitted its written statement and claimed that the plot in question is shown as part of Siwai Chak Abadi land in the revenue records. It further claimed that it has a duty to construct a road for the benefit of the public at large. Since the land is Siwai Chak, it belongs to the government. Moreover, according to the defendants, the plaintiff has not been able to prove the ownership or the possession over the said land for over thirty years. Thus, he is not entitled to a declaration or permanent injunction.

4. The learned trial court initially framed six issues, including the issue of relief. Subsequently after amendment was made in the plaint, it framed issue No.3A. In order to support his case, the plaintiff examined four witnesses, and the defendants examined two witnesses. Both the sides submitted certain documents. However, after going through the oral and the documentary evidence, by judgment dated 26.2.2008, the learned trial court dismissed the civil suit as mentioned above.

5. Since the appellant was aggrieved by the said judgment and decree, he filed a Regular First Appeal before the learned Judge. But by judgment and decree dated 9.10.2012, the learned Judge has dismissed the first appeal. Hence, this second appeal before this court.

6. Mr. R.K. Daga, the learned counsel for the appellant has raised the following contentions before this court: firstly, both the learned courts below have ignored the Exchange Deed dated 21.8.1993 (Ex. 2). The learned courts below have opined that the said deed cannot be looked into as it is an unregistered instrument. However, once the document was exhibited and no objection was taken by the defendants about its admissibility, during the course of the trial, the court should have treated the document as gospel truth, and should have considered the document while passing the impugned judgments and decrees. Moreover, even if it is an unregistered document, it could be considered for collateral purpose. Therefore, both the courts below have erred in not relying upon Exhibit-2.

7. Secondly, the appellant was in settled possession of the said plot since 1993. Therefore, the learned courts below should have considered the fact that he could not be ousted from the said plot without the defendants following the due process of law. However, there is no evidence to show that the defendants were following the procedure established by law.

8. Thirdly, although the learned trial court had framed the issue No.3A, although the appellant had challenged the entire judgment before the learned First Appellate court, the First Appellate court erred in holding that the finding on issue No.3A was not challenged before it. Therefore, the learned First Appellate court has erred in not giving any finding with regard to issue No.3A.

9. Fourthly, both the courts below have wrongly shifted the burden of proof on the appellant to show as to what became of the notices issued by the UIT to Chunnilal. Hence, both the courts below have illegally placed the burden of proof upon the appellant, when, in fact, the burden of proof should have been on the defendant, the UIT.

10. Fifthly, since the defendants had claimed that the land was duly transferred by the Collector to them and belongs to them, this was a fact that the UIT ought to have proven. However, the defendants have failed to prove the said fact.

11. Sixthly, both the courts below have ignored Exhibit-7, the Jamabandi for the Samvat 2018-20. According to the Jamabandi, the land in dispute has been shown as Abadi. Therefore, the learned trial court was unjustified in relying on the statement of Ramesh Chand (P.W.3) who, in his cross-examination, had claimed that the land was Siwai Chak. For, once a document has been submitted, any oral evidence contrary to the document cannot be given. Moreover, both in his plaint as well as in his examination-in-chief, the appellant had clearly stated that the land is Gair Mumkin Abadi land. Yet, both the courts below have ignored the Exhibit-7. Thus, a perversity is writ large on the impugned judgments.

12. Seventhly, since the defendants had claimed that the land was Abadi, it was for them to prove the nature of the land. However, the defendants have failed to prove this fact.

13. Lastly, even according to D.W.1, Ashok Kumar Dhingra, there was no acquisition, no compensation, and no rehabilitation proposed by the defendants before ousting the appellant from his peaceful possession. Therefore, according to the learned counsel, both the courts below have committed an illegality. Since substantial questions of law do arise in this appeal, the appeal should be admitted by this court.

14. On the other hand, Mr. B.K. Sharma, the learned counsel for the respondent, UIT, has contended that the entire case is based on factual matrix. Therefore, no substantial questions of law, in fact, arise. Therefore, the appeal deserves to be dismissed.

15. Secondly, both the courts below had examined Exhibit 2, the Exchange Deed. In Exhibit-2, neither the location of the plot, nor the fact that Mohanlal happens o be the owner of the plot has been mentioned. Moreover, the said Exchange Deed was submitted in order for the appellant to plead and to prove his title to the land. Yet, as the said document was not registered, both the court below were justified in concluding that the said document is neither admissible, nor has any evidentiary value.

16. Thirdly, the UIT was not trying to dispossess the appellant from his residence without following the due process of law. In fact, issuance of the notice dated 13.8.2001 itself was the first step for implementing the procedure established by law. Thus, the appellant is unjustified in claiming that he is being forcefully dispossessed in violation of law.

17. Fourthly, since it was a case of the appellant that although two notices were issued to Chunnilal, the UIT had dropped the case against him, it was for the appellant to substantiate his plea. Hence, both the courts below were justified in placing the burden of proof upon him, and not upon the defendants.

18. Fifthly, it is for the appellant to first establish his case. If the appellant fails to prove his case, he cannot rely upon the weakness of the defendants case to strengthen his own case.

19. Sixthly, once the appellants witness, Ramesh Chand (P.W.3), has himself admitted that the land in dispute falls within the Siwai Chak area, there was no need for the defendants to prove the said fact. Moreover, the contention raised by the learned counsel for the appellant that once a document is submitted, no oral evidence contrary thereto can be given, is inapplicable in a case of Jamabandi. For, Sections 91 and 92 of the Evidence Act deal with a contract, and do not deal with government or official records. Therefore, both the courts below were justified in concluding that the land was Siwai Chak and it belonged to the State. Hence, the defendants had power to construct a road for the benefit of public at large.

20. Lastly, since the land was a government land, the question of acquisition, of payment of compensation, or of rehabilitation of the appellant does not even arise. Therefore, the learned counsel has supported the impugned judgments and decrees.

21. Heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the material on record, including the impugned judgments.

22. A bare perusal of both the judgments clearly reveals that the entire case is based on factual matrix. Therefore, no substantial questions of law actually arise in this case. Thus, this appeal deserves to be dismissed on this ground alone.

23. But even if one were to consider the merits of the case, as argued by the learned counsel for the appellant, the contentions raised before this court by him are misplaced.

24. Firstly, the appellant has taken a self-contradictory stand. On the one hand, he has claimed that he has a clear title to the plot on the basis of the Exchange Deed dated 21.8.1993. Yet, on the other hand, he claimed that having been in possession of the plot in question, for over thirty years, he has a right of adverse possession over the plot. But the moment he has taken the plea of adverse possession, obviously, he pleads that he is not the owner of the land; the owner is the State itself. Furthermore it is through the Exchange Deed that he has tried to establish his case for the title over the land in dispute. According to him, the land was transferred from Mohanlal to him through the Exchange Deed. Since the property has been conveyed through this instrument, naturally it had to be registered. Since it is an unregistered instrument, both the courts below were justified in concluding that it cannot be read in evidence. Hence, it looses all its evidentiary value.

25. Secondly, the contention raised by the learned counsel that once a document is exhibited, and no objection has been raised about its admissibility, hence the document becomes a reliable one is a contention which is clearly untenable. For, a distinction has to be made between tendering of an evidence, admissibility of an evidence, and the evidentiary value of that evidence. Even if an objection were not raised with regard to admissibility of a documentary evidence, it does not transform the contents of the document into a gospel truth. The court would still be free to assess the evidentiary value of the said document. In case there is a bar to its admissibility as a piece of evidence, the court would also be free to consider the bar as placed by the law. Hence, both the courts below were certainly justified in concluding that since the Exchange Deed (Ex. 2) was an unregistered one, it could not be relied upon and it had no evidentiary value.

26. Thirdly, as far as the use of this document for collateral purpose is concerned, the entire case of the appellant is that he is in possession of the plot for over thirty years. As mentioned above, the plea of adverse possession would oust the plea of ownership based on the Exchange Deed. Therefore, reliance on the Exchange Deed itself contradicts the second stand being taken by the appellant. Thus, even for collateral purpose, the said document cannot be relied upon by the appellant.

27. Fourthly, undoubtedly, it is true that a person cannot be ousted from his possession without the defendants following the procedure established by law. However, the notice dated 13.8.2001 itself was the first step that the defendants were required to take before ousting the appellant from his possession. It is not as if they had given him no notice, and they had denied an opportunity of hearing to him. Since a notice was served, naturally, an opportunity of hearing was being given to the appellant. But instead of taking recourse to an opportunity of hearing, the appellant rushed to the civil court and sought permanent injunction. Hence, the learned counsel for the appellant is unjustified in claiming that the appellant is being dispossessed through sheer muscle power by the defendants.

28. Fifthly, he learned counsel is equally unjustified in claiming that the learned First Appellate court is incorrect in observing that the appellant has not challenged the issue No.3A. Issue No.3A was with regard to the fact whether the plaintiff is in peaceful possession of the plot, in question, for over thirty years without any interruption, and thus has a right to claim adverse possession over the land belonging to the State, or not In the judgment dated 26.2.2008, the learned trial court has given a finding in Para-22 that Exhibits-5 and 6, the notices issued to Chunnilal, clearly reveal that even the appellants predecessor did not have a peaceful possession of the plot in question without interference by the UIT. Moreover, since their possession was neither peaceful nor legal, the possession of the appellant was, equally, neither peacefully, nor without any interruption. A same finding has also been given by the learned First Appellate court. Therefore, a stray observation by the learned First Appellate court, that the issue No.3A has not been agitated before it, would not deter from the fact that even the First Appellate court has given a finding on the said issue. Hence, the stray observation made by the First Appellate court is absolutely immaterial to the merits of the impugned judgment dated 9.10.2012.

29. Sixthly, it was the case of the appellant that on two occasions, the UIT had served Chunnilal with two different notices. It was further his case that on both the occasions, the UIT had dropped the proceedings. According to Section 101 of the Evidence Act, a fact stated by the plaintiff needs to be proved by the plaintiff. Since it was the appellant who had claimed that the proceeding was dropped, naturally the burden of proof lay upon him. Therefore, both the learned courts below were justified in placing the burden upon the appellant and not upon the defendant, the UIT, to prove the said fact. Hence, the contention raised by the learned counsel for the appellant in this regard is unacceptable.

30. Seventhly, the contention raised by the learned counsel that it was for the defendants to prove as to when the land was transferred by the Collector to the UIT, a fact which was never proved by the defendants, is equally misplaced. For, it is a settled principle of law that the case of the plaintiff has to stand upon its own two legs. Weakness of the defendants case does not strengthen the case of the plaintiff.

31. Eighthly, The learned counsel has relied upon Sections 91 and 92 of the Evidence in order to plead that once a document is submitted and admitted, no oral evidence can be given contrary to the contents of the document. Suffice it to say that Sections 91 and 92 deal with contracts. These two provisions do not deal with the official records maintained by the government. Therefore, even if Exhibit-7, the Jamabandi, shows the land to be Abadi, it would not preclude an oral testimony to the contrary. Most importantly it is the appellants witness, Ramesh Chand (P.W. 3) who admits that the land in dispute falls in the Siwai Chak area. Once an admission has been made by a witness belonging to the plaintiff, obviously there is no need for the defendants to prove the said fact. Therefore, the contention that it was for the defendants to prove that the land was Siwai Chak in nature is misplaced. Hence, looking to the fact that the learned trial court had relied upon the evidence of Ramesh Chand (P.W. 3) to conclude the nature of the land as being Siwai Chak, the findings cannot be faulted.

32. Lastly, since the land belonged to the State, the very question of its acquisition by the government, or the question of payment of compensation by the government, or the rehabilitation of the appellant by the government does not even arise.

For the reasons stated above, this court does not find any merit in this second appeal. It is hereby, dismissed. The stay application also stands dismissed.

Second Appeal Dismissed.