Devinder Gupta, J.

1. Plaintiff No. 1 is the brother of defendant No. 2 and defendants 3 and 4 are the wife and son respectively of defendant No. 2. Defendant No. 1 is a society registered under the Societies Registration Act, 1860 and it is not disputed that the society is a non-political, non-profit making and non-sactarian society. Its aims and objects, inter alia, are to establish, maintain, control and run Medical Research Centres in various systems of medicine and to render medical aid or relief and for the purpose aforesaid to open, establish, maintain, manage, control and conduct dispensaries, hospitals etc.

2. The suit has been filed by the plaintiff under Section 92 C.P.C. claiming a decree for declaration to the effect that the suit property is a public trust property, namely, Khosla Hospital, situated at Shalimar Bagh (West), Delhi, which is run by defendant No. 1 society as a public trust and neither defendant No. 1 nor its Board of Directors including defendants 2 to 4 can transfer or sell the property or change the management of the hospital through any means. Simultaneously, while filing the suit, a prayer was made seeking leave of the Court to institute the suit under Section 92 C.P.C.

3. On 22nd June, 1994, summons were directed to be issued to the defendants. On 4th July, 1994, it was clarified that permission sought for by the plaintiff to sue under Section 92 C.P.C. had been granted. In I.A. 7351/94, plaintiff has prayed for addition of certain defendants and for carrying on amendments to the plaint. In I.A. 8008/94, the defendants have sought the rejection of the plaint under Order 7 Rule 11 C.P.C. In the same application by necessary implication, the defendants have sought the revocation of the leave granted to the plaintiff for filing the suit under Section 92 C.P.C.

4. I have heard learned Counsel for the parties at length, who have taken me through the entire record.

5. It is plaintiffs case that he is the founder member of defendant No. 1 society and is also its Vice Chairman. Defendant No. 2 is the President, defendant No. 3 is the Treasurer of the society and defendant No. 4 is a member of the Board of Directors. A plot of land was allotted to defendant No. 1 by the Delhi Development Authority at nominal lease money on which a building for hospital, namely, Khosla Hospital was raised for which donations of the public were used, which is a double storeyed building providing 125 beds facility and is well equipped with the latest equipment. According to the plaintiff, the hospital run by defendant No. 1 and other properties of defendant No. 1 society are public trust properties. The purpose for which defendant No. 1 is running a hospital is a public charitable purpose. The hospital is, therefore, a public trust. Plaintiff has further averred that hospital being a public trust cannot be sold. He happened to come across an advertisement in newspaper due to which necessity arose for filing the suit claiming a decree for declaration that the hospital which is being run by defendant No. 1 society is a public trust and that the same cannot be transferred, alienated or parted with in any manner whatsoever.

6. Simultaneously, along with the suit, an application was also moved under Order 39, Rules 1 and 2 C.P.C. praying for an interim order restraining the defendants from transferring, alienating or parting with possession of the suit property. According to the plaintiff, the defendants in violation of the ad interim order of injunction, which was granted on 22nd June, 1994, have transferred the management of the hospital and thus necessity arose for seeking addition of the parties to whom transfer had been made.

7. In the application moved under Order 1 (Rule 10 C.P.C. read with Order 6) Rule 17 C.P.C. (I.A. 7351/94), it has been averred that defendants 2 to 4 have illegally and in disregard to the orders of the Court transferred the management to defendants 5, 6 and 7. As such, besides being granted permission to add them as parties, plaintiff may be permitted to add a prayer in the suit that the sale or transfer of the hospital or management of the hospital in favour of defendants 5 to 7 is of no legal consequence and confers no right on defendants 5 to 7.

8. In the application moved by the defendants for rejection of the plaint (I.A. 8008/94), it has been alleged that suit filed is false, frivolous, speculative, motivated and out of personal vengeance against defendants 2 to 4. Defendants have been carrying on a lot of philanthropic activities and have set up various social and educational institutions. Defendant society is managed and controlled by a Board of Directors. Lot of times and energy have been devoted by the defendants to help the society in acquiring its assets.

9. It is further alleged that plaintiff No. 1 and defendants 2 to 4 have been residing together in property bearing No. 11, Prithvi Raj Road, New Delhi, which is jointly owned and possessed by them. Plaintiff No. 1, who is a bachelor was being attended by defendants 2 to 4 and their family members. The parties were having a common kitchen till December, 1993 when Col. Khosla, who is the third brother of plaintiff No. 1 and defendant No. 2, who has nothing to do with property No. 11, Prithvi Raj Road, New Delhi, instigated plaintiff No. 1 to separate his kitchen and file false and frivolous cases against the defendants. Col. Khosla wants to effect a partition of the property amongst the co-owners and then surreptiously to usurp plaintiffs share. His motive, actions and intentions are mala fide. Defendants have also made mention of the three litigation brought about at the behest of Col. Khosla. In this background, defendants state that suit of the plaintiff, apart from being false is frivolous and vexatious, disclose no cause of action and that none of the reliefs claimed in the suit falls within the ambit of Section 92 C.P.C. Proper Court fee has also not been affixed. Plaintiff No. 2 has no direct interest with the affairs of the society. Leave of the Court has been obtained by mis-representing material facts and thus leave granted deserves to be revoked and in the alternative the plaint deserves to be rejected.

10. In the amendment sought for as also in the original plaint, it may be noticed that the only relief claimed by the plaintiff is of declaration that suit property, namely, the hospital which is being run by a society is a public trust and that the defendants or the directors of defendant No. 1 have no right to sell, transfer, alienate the same in any manner and in the amendment additional prayer claimed is that the transfer effected by defendants 2 to 4 in favour of proposed defendants is of no consequence.

11. Section 92 of the Code of Civil Procedure intended to provide proceedings of a special nature is applicable to cases in which there has been a breach of trust in relation to a public trust, whether express or constructive, of a charitable or religious nature. The aim of Section 92 is to protect the rights of public in such trust and to enable the public to stop the misuse of the income of charitable institutions. For the applicability of Section 92 of the Code, certain conditions must be satisfied, namely: there must exist a trust for public purposes of a charitable or religious nature; the plaintiff must allege that there is a breach of such trust, or that directions of the Court are necessary for the administration of the trust; the suit must be a representative one on behalf of the public and not by individuals for vindicating their own interest; and the reliefs claimed in the suit must be the reliefs mentioned in the section.

12. The entire reading of the plaint in the instant case would show that the relief claimed in the suit is not the one which is mentioned in the section. In Pragdatji Guru Bhagwandasjiv.Ishwarlalbhai Narsibhai and Others, AIR 1952 SC 143 [LQ/SC/1952/17] , it was held that in a suit framed under Section 92 C.P.C., the only reliefs which the plaintiff can claim and the Court can grant are those as are enumerated specifically in the different clauses of the section. A relief prayed for declaration that the property involved in the suit is a trust property does not come under any of these clauses. A suit under Section 92 C.P.C. is a suit of special nature, which presupposes the existence of a public trust of a religious or charitable character. When the defendant denies the existence of a trust, a declaration that the trust does exist might be made as ancillary to the main relief claimed under the suit if the plaintiff is held entitled to it; but when the case of the plaintiff fails for want of cause of action, there is no warrant for giving him a declaratory relief under the provisions of Section 92 C.P.C.

13. In the instant suit, plaintiff has not made any prayer as enumerated in different clauses of Section 92 C.P.C. As such, there is no question of even granting any ancillary relief of declaration. Plaintiff in fact wants a declaration in the suit, which is outside the scope of Section 92 C.P.C.

14. In view of the above, there is also no question of the plaintiff being permitted to add new defendants or to carry out amendment to the plaint, in view of the fact that the leave granted to the plaintiff ought to be revoked. Accordingly the prayer made in the application of the plaintiff for amendment (I.A.7351/94) is rejected and the defendants application (I.A.8008/94) is allowed. Leave granted to the plaintiff to sue is revoked. Since leave has been revoked, there is no suit before the Court, which be de-registered and file consigned to the record.

I.As. 1854 and 1855195

15. I.A. 1855/95 is an application under Order 1 Rule 8(1) C.P.C. seeking leave of the Court to sue the defendants in representative capacity and I.A. 1954/95 is an application seeking amendment of the plaint to convert the suit into one being filed in representative capacity.

In view of the fact that leave under Section 92 C.P.C. granted to the plaintiff earlier has been revoked, plaintiff cannot be permitted to amend his suit since the proposed amendment will change the entire nature and complexion of the suit. Moreover, I find that necessary averments as are required to be made seeking leave under Order 1, Rule 8 C.P.C. for filing suit in representative capacity have not been made out in the application or in the body of the proposed plaint. When the proposed amendments are likely to change the entire nature of the suit, amendments cannot be allowed. Plaintiff has other adequate efficatious remedies available to him instead of seeking amendment to file such other suit as may be permissible in law. Both these applications are dismissed.

I.As. 6386/94, 7348/94, 7349/94 and 7350/94

16. In view of the fact that the leave granted has been revoked, these applications are dismissed as infructuous.

I.A. 7614/94

List for directions on 2nd August, 1995.