Sushil Harkauli and G.P. Srivastva, JJ.

1. By this writ petition the petitioner, who was compulsorily retired from the post of Additional District & Sessions Judge, Jaunpur, under Fundamental Rule 56(c) by the order of the Appointing Authority, i.e. the Governor, dated 17.5.2005 (Annexure 12 to the writ petition), has challenged the said order.

2. Counter and rejoinder affidavits have been exchanged in this case.

3. Undisputedly, the order of compulsory retirement was passed by the Governor on the report of a Screening Committee consisting of five Senior Judges of this Court. The report was approved in a Full Court meeting, and accordingly the recommendation was made to the Appointing Authority, i.e. the Governor, for compulsory retirement of the petitioner.

4. Before entering into the facts justifying the compulsory retirement, as mentioned by respondent No. 2 in the counter affidavit, it may be stated here that the order of compulsory retirement is based on subjective satisfaction of the Authority, in this case the High Court, as has been repeatedly held by the Supreme Court, and the scope of judicial scrutiny in such matters under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is limited to cases where the compulsory retirement order is (a) mala fide, or (b) based on no evidence, or (c) arbitrary - in the sense that no reasonable person would form the requisite opinion on the given material, i.e. where the order is perverse. These principles have been spelt out in paragraph 34 of the case of Baikuntha Nath Das v. Chief District Medical Officer : (1992)ILLJ784SC .

5. The case of Baikuntha Nath Das (supra) also holds that even uncommunicated adverse remarks can be taken into consideration for deciding whether an employee should or should not be compulsorily retired. Compulsory retirement is not a punishment. It does not imply any stigma. The dominant consideration is public interest and the object is to weed out the dead wood.

6. The above law has been reiterated repeatedly by the Supreme Court several times and we do not consider it necessary to refer to all those decisions on that point which have been placed before us by both the sides.

7. The counter affidavit of the High Court filed in this case, in paragraphs No. 25 to 36, indicates that the petitioner was giving lower disposal than expected right from the beginning of his appointment after training on 21.1.1979. In some of the A.C.R. entries made as far back as for the year 1982-83 it was said that the petitioner was required to make determined effort to improve his disposal. Similar was the situation in 1984-85 and 1987-88.

8. In 1988-89, the petitioner was advised not to be liberal in granting adjournments, especially in those cases which are part-heard.

9. In 1989-90 again, his disposal, both as Munsif and as Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, was found to be much below standard. Again in 1996-97 the explanation for low disposal furnished by the petitioner was not accepted. Again for 1998-99 it was found that the petitioner decided a very little contested cases and no old cases and his output was found much below standard. In the same year his Confidential Record refers that he was warned time and again but without any effect. Again in 1999-2000 the disposal of the petitioner was found low.

10. In the given situation if the Screening Committee and thereafter the Full Court have arrived at the subjective satisfaction that the petitioner was a dead wood and deserved to be weeded out by way of compulsory retirement, the decision cannot be said to be arbitrary or perverse and it cannot be said that no reasonable person could have possibly arrived at this conclusion on the existing material.

11. In the circumstances, in exercise of our jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, we find ourselves unable to interfere with the said subjective satisfaction. The petitioner, therefore, cannot be granted any relief in this writ petition, which is accordingly dismissed.