1. Heard Shri Kripa Shanker Singh, learned Senior Counsel assisted by Shri Gaurav Singh, learned counsel for the applicants and Shri Devesh Vikram, learned Addl. Chief Standing Counsel for State respondents.
2. Present application has been filed to review the judgment and order dated 22.8.2022 passed in Writ-C No.21903 of 2022 (Jasvinder Singh & Ors. v. State of U.P. & Ors.), which for ready reference is quoted as under:-
"By means of the present petition, the petitioners herein pray for the following reliefs:
"(a) Issue a writ order or direction in the nature of mandamus directing the respondents to pass supplementary award with regard to trees, crop tubewell and things attached to the acquired land being plot no.11 and 12 within a stipulated period as per the law laid down by Hon'ble Supreme Court;
(b)Issue a writ order or direction in the nature of mandamus directing the respondents to pass the supplementary award in respect of the trees, tubewell and things attached to the acquired land as per provisions of Act No.13 of 2014."
Based on the decision of this Court in First Appeal no.832 of 1991 (Rajendra Singh vs L.A.O And another) dated 22.05.2019 passed in an appeal filed by one Rajendra Singh, stated to be predecessor in interest of petitioner no.1 herein, it is argued by the learned counsel for the petitioners that the issue relating to the preparation of the supplementary award i.e. the award with regard to the things attached to the earth, i.e trees, crops, tubewell etc relating to the acquired land being in plot no.11 and 12, is required to be prepared by the competent authority namely the Special land acquisition officer in view of decision of this Court in First Appeal no.880 of 1993 (Jasvir Singh vs L.A.O & Another) dated 30.05.2014.
The submission of the learned counsel for the petitioners is that the appeal filed by Rajendra i.e predecessor in interest of the petitioner no.1 was decided on 22.05.2019 based on the judgment of this Court in First Appeal no.880 of 1993 (Jasvir Singh vs L.A.O and another) and hence the observation made therein namely Jasvir Singh (supra) about the payment of compensation for trees, and other things attached to the earth would operate in favour of the petitioners.
Dealing with this submission of the learned counsel for the petitioners, we may record that the acquisition in question is of the year 1981 and the award for the land-in-question admittedly was passed in the year 1986 (22.09.1986). It is the case of the petitioner that the original owner of the land-in-question aggrieved by the award passed by the Special Land Acquisition Officer filed a reference which was decided by the District Judge, Rampur by the judgment and order dated 07.12.1988. The matter was, thereafter, taken into appeal which was decided by the judgment and order dated 22.05.2019 in the same terms and conditions of the judgment of this Court in the case of Jasvir Singh (supra).
Relevant is to note that no supplementary award has been passed by the competent officer nor there is any direction to pass a supplementary award with respect to thing attached to the earth such as trees, crops, tubewell etc, to the award dated 22.09.1986.
The observation in the Division Bench judgment of this Court in First Appeal no.880 of 1993 (Jasvir Singh) (supra) dated 30.05.2014 is only with respect to the disbursement of the compensation determined by the competent authority.
While deciding the appeal therein (Jasvir Singh), the submission of the learned counsel for the appellants therein were noted that no compensation for trees, and other assets had been paid to the appellants therein and the award mentioned that the compensation for trees and others shall be separately given after receipt of the valuation report. It was further noted that the reference court did not frame any issue relating to compensation for the trees etc nor any evidence was led before the reference Court nor any material was brought on record to determine the said issue. However, having noted the stand of the State therein that payment for the trees etc would be given on the basis of the valuation report, it was observed that the issue relating to compensation of trees can be agitated before the land acquisition officer, if compensation had not been paid regarding trees.
Only inference which can be drawn from the said observation is that the first appellate court in Jasvir Singh (supra) had directed for payment of compensation determined by the land acquisition officer with regard to trees/other assets/ things attached to the earth based on the valuation report.
There was no direction at all for preparation of a separate or supplementary award with regard to the things attached to the earth such as trees etc.
The submission of the learned counsel for the petitioners to seek a direction in the nature of mandamus commanding the respondents to prepare a supplementary award with regard to the trees and things attached to the earth is, therefore, found misconceived.
It is, however, kept open for the petitioners to seek disbursement of compensation determined by the award dated 22.09.1986 before the Executing Court, for the things attached to the earth based on the valuation report, if not already agitated.
In any case, no mandamus can be issued.
The writ petition is, accordingly, dismissed."
3. We have proceeded to examine the record in question and find that even though the aforementioned writ petition under Art.226 of the Constitution of India was entertained and heard on merits by the Coordinate Bench but the relief as had been asked for under Art.226 was misconceived as the entire proceeding is an offshoot of acquisition proceeding, wherein the matter has been considered by the first appellate court and has been decided relying upon the judgment of this Court in First Appeal No.880 of 1993 (Jasvir Singh v. L.A.O. & Anr.) dated 30.5.2014. We find that the writ Court has decided the matter strictly in accordance with law and there is no infirmity in the judgment and order in question.
4. The scope and ambit of the review under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, in reviewing its own order, is very limited. The review application can be allowed only on (1) discovery of new and important matter of evidence which, after exercise of due diligence, was not within the knowledge of the person seeking review, or could not be produced by him at the time when the order was made, or (2) when some mistake or error on the face of record is found, or (3) on any analogous ground. Review is not permissible on the ground that the decision was erroneous on merits as the same would be the province of an Appellate Court.
5. In the case of Shivdeo Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1963 SC 1909, Hon'ble Apex Court took the view that there is nothing under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, which precludes High Court from exercising the power of review, which inheres in every Court of plenary jurisdiction to prevent miscarriage of justice or to correct grave and palpable errors committed by it. It was held that the power of review under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, in reviewing its own orders, every Court including High Court inheres plenary jurisdiction, to prevent miscarriage of justice or to correct grave and palpable errors committed by it.
6. Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Aribam Tuleshwar Sharma v. Aribam Pishak Sharma and others, 1979 (4) SCC 389, has cautioned that power of review of the High Court is not the same as appellate powers and review on the ground that certain documents have not been considered, which formed the record, cannot be ground of Review. Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Meera Bhanja v. Nirmla K. Chaudhary, 1995 (1) SCC 170, has taken the view that review must be confined to error apparent on the face of record, error must be such as would be apparent on mere looking without any long drawn process of reasoning, and reappraisal of evidence on record for finding out error would amount to exercise of appellate jurisdiction, which is not at all permissible.
7. In the case of Satyanarayan Laxminarayan Hegde v. Mallikarjun Bhavanappa Tirumale, AIR 1960 SC 137, Hon'ble Supreme Court has made the following observations in connection with an error apparent on the face of the record :-
"An error which has to be established by a long drawn process of reasoning on points where there may conceivably be two opinions can hardly be said to be an error apparent on the face of the record. Where an alleged error is far from self-evident and if it can be established, it has to be established, by lengthy and complicated arguments, such an error cannot be cured by a writ of certiorari according to the rule governing the powers of the superior Court to issue such a writ. In our view the aforesaid approach of the Division Bench dealing with the review proceedings clearly shows that it has overstepped its jurisdiction under Order 47, Rule 1, C.P.C. By merely styling the reasoning adopted by the earlier Division Bench as suffering from a patent error. It would not become a patent error or error apparent in view of the settled legal position indicated by us earlier. In substance, the review Bench has re appreciated the entire evidence, sat almost as Court of appeal and has reversed the findings reached by the earlier Division Bench Even if the earlier Division Bench findings regarding C.S. Plot No. 74 were found to be erroneous, it would be no ground for reviewing the same, as that would be the function of an appellate Court. Learned counsel for the respondent was not in a position to point out how the reasoning adopted and conclusion reached by the Review Bench can be supported within the narrow and limited scope of Order 47, Rule 1, C.P.C. Right or wrong, the earlier Division Bench judgment had become final so far as the High Court was concerned. It could not have been reviewed by reconsidering the entire evidence with a view to finding out the alleged apparent error for justifying the invocation of review powers. Only on that short ground, therefore, this appeal is required to be allowed. The final decision dated 8th July, 1986 of the Division Bench dismissing the appeal from appellate decree No.569 of 1973 insofar as C.S. Plot No. 74 is concerned as well as the review judgment dated 5th September, 1984 in connection with the very same plot, i.e. C.S. Plot No. 74 are set aside and the earlier judgment of the High Court dated 3rd August, 1978 allowing the Second Appeal regarding suit plot No. 74 is restored. The appeal is accordingly allowed. In the facts and circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs."
8. In Parsion Devi and others v. Sumitri Devi and others, 1997 (8) J.T. SC 480, Hon'ble Supreme Court has taken the view that review proceeding has to be strictly confined to the ambit and scope of Order 47, and therein the two earlier judgments referred to above have been relied upon. Again in Smt. Meera Bhanja v. St. Nirmala Kumari Choudhary, 1985 (1) SCC 170, while quoting this approval a passage from Aribam Tuleshwar Sharma v. Aribam Pishak Sharma & Ors. (1979 (4) SCC 389, Hon'ble Supreme Court once again held that review proceedings are not by way of an appeal and have to be strictly confined to the scope and ambit of Order 47 Rule 1 CPC.
9. Hon'ble Apex Court, in the case of Lily Thomas v. Union of India, AIR 2000 SC 1650, after considering the dictionary meaning of word "review" has taken the view that power of review can be exercised for correction of mistake and not to substitute a view. Such powers can be exercised within the limits of the statute, dealing with exercise of power; the review cannot be treated as an appeal in disguise, and mere possibility of two views on the subject is not a ground of Review.
10. Hon'ble the Apex Court in Subhash Vs. State of Maharastra & another, AIR 2002 SC 2537, the Apex Court emphasized that Court should not be misguided and should not lightly entertain the review application unless there are circumstances falling within the prescribed limits for that as the Courts and Tribunal should not proceed to re-examine the matter as if it was an original application before it for the reason that it cannot be a scope of review. In State Haryana v. Mohinder Singh, JT 2002 (1) 197, the Apex Court disapproved the judgment of High Court,wherein earlier writ petition was disposed of by High Court being infructuous and giving some directions, and subsequent to the same, Review was sought, which was allowed, same was clearly termed to be overstepping of jurisdiction, and amounting to giving of one more chance of hearing.
11. In the case of Union of India v. B. Valluvar, 2006 (8) SCC 686, Hon'ble Apex Court has again considered the parameters of review jurisdiction of High Court, that same shall be exercised within the limitations as provided under Section 114 read with Order 47 Rule of C.P.C.,and without recording finding as to there existed error apparent on the face of the record, merit cannot be gone into. Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of State of Haryana and others v. M.P. Mohila, 2007 (1) SCC 457, has taken the view that in the garb of clarification application, recourse to achieve the result of review application, cannot be permitted, as what an not be done directly,cannot be done indirectly.
12. In Kamlesh Verma Vs. Mayawati and others 2013 (8) SCC 320, the Apex Court said:
"19. Review proceedings are not by way of an appeal and have to be strictly confined to the scope and ambit of Order 47 Rule 1 of CPC. In review jurisdiction, mere disagreement with the view of the judgment cannot be the ground for invoking the same. As long as the point is already dealt with and answered, the parties are not entitled to challenge the impugned judgment in the guise that an alternative view is possible under the review jurisdiction.
Summary of the Principles:
20. Thus, in view of the above, the following grounds of review are maintainable as stipulated by the statute:
20.1. When the review will be maintainable:-
(i) Discovery of new and important matter or evidence which, after the exercise of due diligence, was not within knowledge of the petitioner or could not be produced by him;
(ii) Mistake or error apparent on the face of the record;
(iii) Any other sufficient reason.
The words "any other sufficient reason" has been interpreted in Chhajju Ram vs. Neki, AIR 1922 PC 112 and approved by this Court in Moran Mar Basselios Catholicos vs. Most Rev. Mar Poulose Athanasius & Ors., AIR 1954 SC 526, to mean "a reason sufficient on grounds at least analogous to those specified in the rule". The same principles have been reiterated in Union of India vs. Sandur Manganese & Iron Ores Ltd. & Ors., 2013 (8) SCC 337.
22.2. When the review will not be maintainable:-
(i) A repetition of old and overruled argument is not enough to reopen concluded adjudications.
(i) A repetition of old and overruled argument is not enough to reopen concluded adjudications.
(iii) Review proceedings cannot be equated with the original hearing of the case.
(iv) Review is not maintainable unless the material error, manifest on the face of the order, undermines its soundness or results in miscarriage of justice.
(v) A review is by no means an appeal in disguise whereby an erroneous decision is reheard and corrected but lies only for patent error.
(vi) The mere possibility of two views on the subject cannot be a ground for review.
(vii) The error apparent on the face of the record should not be an error which has to be fished out and searched.
(viii) The appreciation of evidence on record is fully within the domain of the appellate court, it cannot be permitted to be advanced in the review petition.
(ix) Review is not maintainable when the same relief sought at the time of arguing the main matter had been negatived." (emphasis supplied)"
13. On the touchstone of the dictum noted above, the review is permissible only when there is error apparent on the face of record i. e. error should be grave and palpable, and the error must be such as would be apparent on mere looking of record, without requiring any long drawn process of reasoning, and reappraisal of entire evidence for finding the error, as same would amount to exercise of appellate jurisdiction. Further, the review lies only on the grounds mentioned in Order 47, Rule 1 read with Section 141 CPC. The party must satisfy the Court that the matter or evidence discovered by it at a subsequent stage could not be discovered or produced at the initial stage though it had acted with due diligence. A party filing a review application on the ground of any other "sufficient reason" must satisfy that the said reason is analogous to the conditions mentioned in the said provision of C.P.C.
14. Perusal of judgment under review passed by us shows that each and every aspect of the matter has been considered and thereafter, the writ petition in question was dismissed and there appears no apparent mistake in the judgment under review. Neither review court can examine the merits of the judgment as an appellate court nor in the garb of review petition, a re-hearing of the matter can be permitted by this Court.
15. Consequently, the review application is rejected.
