Sudhir Agarwal, J.

1. Heard Sri M.A. Qadeer, learned Senior Advocate, assisted by Sri P.C. Srivastava, Advocate for petitioners and Sri S.K. Srivastava, Advocate for respondents. This is landlords writ petition who is aggrieved by judgment and order dated 11.11.2005 passed by Additional District Judge/Special Judge (E.C. Act), Jaunpur in Rent Control Appeal No. 19 of 1986 and has come up. to this Court in this writ petition under Article 226/ 227 of the Constitution, seeking a writ of certiorari for quashing the same.

2. Mohammad Musa, father of petitioners, filed Release Application under Section 21(1)(a) of U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 (hereinafter referred to as "Act, 1972") seeking release of accommodation in question, which is a shop, on the ground that his son Janual Abdin is unemployed and needs be employed in a separate business, therefore, shop in question should be released. Respondent No. 1, Govind Lal, contested the Release Application, filing his written statement disputing the need of petitioners father and also claimed that he had enough alternative accommodation to accommodate his son.

3. Prescribed Authority vide judgment and order dated 16.10.1986 allowed Release Application, holding that need set up by petitioners father Mohammad Musa was genuine and bona fide and question of comparative hardship also lies in his favour.

4. Respondent-tenant preferred Rent Appeal No. 19 of 1986 which was allowed by Additional District Judge/Special Judge (E.C. Act), Jaunpur vide judgment and order dated 11.11.2005 reversing and setting aside the judgment of Prescribed Authority, and as a result thereof, it rejected Release Application of the Landlord.

5. Since in the meantime landlord Mohammad Musha died when appeal was pending and the legal heirs were substituted, therefore, this writ petition has thus been filed by his legal heirs, i.e., his three sons, including Janual Abdin for whose benefit the Release Application was filed.

6. The finding, which has been concurred by both the Courts below, is that shop in dispute was owned by Mohammad Musa, the landlord; and, respondent No. 1 is tenant therein on a monthly rent of Rs. 30/-. The shop in dispute, though a waqf property, but since Release Application was filed before 1995 amendment of Section 2 of Act, 1972, therefore, it was not barred in view of Apex courts decision in M/s. Ambalal Sarabhai Enterprises Ltd. Vs. M/s. Amrit Lal and Co. and Another, followed by Division Bench of this Court in Smt. Champa Devi and Another Vs. Rent Control and Eviction Officer (1st), Allahabad and Another, and also by this Court in Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 45578 of 2000 (Pooran Chandra v. 6th A.D.J. & others) decided on 1.11.2012.

7. The Lower Appellate Court has held that since during pendency of appeal, Mohammad Musa died, therefore the shop which was being run by him is now available to be run by his son Janual Abdin and this changed situation has changed the entire circumstances, therefore, the matter is liable to be reconsidered by Prescribed Authority as to whether the claim set up by landlord is still open and not rendered infructuous.

8. It is no doubt true that subsequent events can be taken into account to consider whether the cause of action still survive or not but each and every subsequent event, even without placing on record serious consequences flowing therefrom so as to render the entire cause of action futile cannot be visualized to non suit a landlord in respect of a claim. When and in which circumstances, the subsequent events can be looked into and in what manner, has been considered in various cases.

9. A three-Judge Bench of Apex Court in Pasupuleti Venkateswarlu Vs. The Motor and General Traders, permitted cognizance of subsequent events, though very cautiously, and said:

"We affirm the proposition that for making the right or remedy claimed by the party just and meaningful as also legally and factually in accord with the current realities, the court can, and in many cases must, take subsequent cautious cognizance of events and developments subsequent to the institution of the proceedings provided the rules of fairness to both sides are scrupulously obeyed."

10. Again in Hasmat Rai and Another Vs. Raghunath Prasad, , the cognizance of subsequent events was held permissible provided it wholly satisfies the requirement of petitioner/landlord who petitioned for eviction on the ground of personal requirement. The Court said:

"Therefore, it is now incontrovertible that where possession is sought for personal requirement it would be correct to say that the requirement pleaded by the landlord must not only exist on the date of the action but must subsist till the final decree or an order for eviction is made. If in the meantime events have cropped up which would show that the landlords requirement is wholly satisfied then in that case his action must fail and in such a situation it is incorrect to say that as decree or order for eviction is passed against the tenant he cannot invite the court to take into consideration subsequent events."

(Emphasis added)

11. In Ramesh Kumar Vs. Kesho Ram, a two-Judge Bench of Apex Court said that normal rule is that rights and obligations of the parties are to be determined as they were when the lis commenced. The only exception is that the Court is not precluded from moulding reliefs appropriately in consideration of subsequent events, provided such events had an impact on those rights and obligations. Honble M.N. Venkatachalia, J. (as his Lordship then was) observed:

"The normal rule is that in any litigation the rights and obligations of the parties are adjudicated upon as they obtain at the commencement of the lis. But this is subject to an exception. Wherever subsequent events of fact or law which have a material bearing on the entitlement of the parties to relief or on aspects which bear on the moulding of the relief occur, the court is not precluded from taking a cautious cognizance of the subsequent changes of fact and law to mould the relief."

12. In Gaya Prasad Vs. Sh. Pradeep Srivastava, , the Court said that for the malady of judicial system of delayed justice, a landlord should not suffer. Every day may result in some kind of development and, therefore, every subsequent development would not deny claim of landlord on the pretext of a subsequent development since no one can be expected to stay idle for all times to come till a litigation is going on. It may happen that the lifetime of litigation may be more than that of litigant-landlord himself. Therefore, the judicial tardiness should not cause an irreparable loss to a landlord. It would be unjust to shut the door of justice to a landlord on the end of litigation after passing through various levels of litigation to deny him justice and relief sought only on the ground of certain developments occurred pendente lite because the tenant has been successful in prolonging litigation for an unduly extended long period. However, if the cause of action is submerged in such subsequent events, in other words, if the subsequent events are such as to satisfy the very requirement of landlord in its entirety, the same can be seen and there is no allergy in considering and taking note of subsequent events of importance which may justify remoulding of relief not on account of mere pendency of litigation but on account of the position and status of landlord and other relevant factors.

13. This matter was further examined in detail in Kedar Nath Agrawal (Dead) and Another Vs. Dhanraji Devi (Dead) by LRs. and Another, and having considered a number of authorities on the subject, the Apex Court, in para 16 of judgment, crystallized three aspects when subsequent events can be taken note by a Court of Law, namely:

(i) The relief claimed originally has, by reason of subsequent change of circumstances, become inappropriate; or

(ii) It is necessary to take notice of subsequent events in order to shorten litigation; or

(iii) It is necessary to do so in order to do complete justice between the parties.

14. In the present case, the landlord, admittedly, has three sons. He himself has given details of his property and business owned by him as under:

i) Shop No. 185, Mohalla Makhdoom Shah Adhang, in which Quamruddin, son of Mohammad Musa, is carrying on business of Suji, Maida, Sugar etc.

ii) House No. 160, 161/1 and 160/2 in Mohalla Makhdoom Shah Adhang. In House No. 160, Mohammad and in House No. 160/1 and 160/2 Parmeshwar Sav are tenants.

iii) House No. 188, Mohalla Makhdoom Shah Adhang, which is a residential house in which landlord Mohammad Musa and his sons etc. are residing.

iv) House No. 188/1 in Mohalla Makhdoom Shah Adhang which was let out to Abdul Vahid and 188/2 let out to Mohammad Anif since long.

v) A two tier shop in Mohalla Khawajgi Tola in which Mohammad Musa himself is looking after business under the name and style "Mohammad Musa and sons" carrying on business of general merchandise.

vi) Shop No. 30 in Mohalla Nasibkhan, let out to Abdul Kalam.

15. Therefore, from the aforesaid description, it is evident that one son Quamruddin of Mohammad Musa was already running his own business in Shop No. 185, Mohalla Makhdoom Shah Adhang but his two sons were there amongst whom, Janual Abdin at that time, was already major and unemployed while the third one was minor, undergoing education and, therefore, his need was not separately set up. Respondent-tenant in the written statement filed and from the evidence adduced before the Court below could not contradict details given by landlord. It only said that since Janual Abdin is also sitting with Mohammad Musa in his shop in Khawajgi Tola, therefore, he is not unemployed. This fact has not been found correct by Trial Court. Before Lower Appellate Court also, no finding has been recorded by it that Janual Abdins unemployment is over since he is involved in his own business succeeding Mohammad Musas business being carried out at Khawajgi Tola. On the contrary, it simply says that since Mohammad Musa is not available to run the shop, therefore, it can be run by Janual Abdin. It cannot be said that mere death of Musa would render the proceedings infructuous. In respect of Janual Abdins unemployment, no finding has been recorded by Lower Appellate Court that unemployment of Janual Abdin has come to an end after death of his father. On the contrary, petitioners have categorically stated that third son is also now major and he is also unemployed, therefore, the requirement set up by Musa is continuing. On this aspect, Lower Appellate Court has said nothing.

16. A judgment of reversal ought to have been passed after considering the findings of fact recorded by Trial Court and showing the same to be incorrect, after discussing the same, and not in a casual fashion. The Lower Appellate Court, in the case in hand, has not been able to find out any factual, legal or otherwise error in the judgment of Trial Court, yet has set aside the same by simply referring to subsequent event of death of applicant-landlord and, that too, without looking into other aspects and also the circumstances. All these aspects have not been considered. The Lower Appellate Courts judgment, therefore, cannot sustain.

17. In the result, the writ petition is allowed. Lower Appellate Courts judgment dated 11.11.2005 is hereby set aside and matter is remanded to Lower Appellate Court to decide the appeal afresh. Petitioners shall also be entitled to cost which I quantify to Rs. 5,000/-.