Tulzapurkar, Ag. C.J.

1. These petitions raise common questions as to constitutional validity of the Maharashtra Private Forests (Acquisition) Act, 1975, being Act No. 29 of 1975, as amended by Act No. 72 of 1975. The constitutional validity of the said Act has been mainly challenged on three grounds: (a) that the State Legislature of Maharashtra lacks legislative competence to enact the measure, particularly Section 3 thereof, to the extent to which it purports to vest in the State Government the forest produce while acquiring all private forests in the State, (b) that the said enactment, particularly Sections 3 and 5 thereof, contravene the freedom of trade, commerce and intercourse guaranteed under Article 301 of the Constitution and (c) that the enactment, particularly Section 3 thereof, which purports to acquire not merely of mines and minerals, major as well as minor but also mining leases, licences and other rights in mines and minerals conflicts with and trenches upon the occupied field under the Central Act 67 of 1957 -- Mines end Minerals (Regulation and Development) Act, 1957 -- passed by Parliament under Entry 54 of List I and therefore is void. The validity of Section 3 of the said enactment to the extent to which it purports to acquire and vest the forest produce in the State Government was also sought to be challenged on the ground that such acquisition was violative of Article 31(2) of the Constitution but in view of the fact that the said enactment has now been put in the 9th Schedule of the Constitution by the 40th Constitutional Amendment Act, the said challenge no longer survived. But the 40th Constitution Amendment Act itself was also challenged as being invalid and ultra vires the powers of the Parliament on certain grounds, but the said challenge was not pressed by the petitioners at the hearing. The challenge to the constitutional validity of the said Act on the three grounds mentioned above arises in the following circumstances:

2. The aforesaid bunch of three petitions have been referred to this larger Bench as they involve common grounds of challenge to the constitutional validity of the aforesaid Act but it will be sufficient if facts pertaining to Special Civil Application No. 1553 of 1974 in which common questions were raised for the first time are set out in detail. The first petitioner (Janu C. Waghmare) was the proprietary Jagirdar and owner of the private forest comprised in Section Nos. 3, 16/1, 19, 42 and 147 situate in village Ambatha, Taluka Surgana, District Nasik. The said jahagir stood abolished under Section 3 of the Bombay Merged Territories and Areas (Jagirs Abolition) Act, 1953 (Bombay Act 39 of 1954) and thereafter the let petitioner continued to be the owner and occupant of the said private forest. A dispute had arisen as regards the exact nature of rights of Jagirdar including the 1st petitioner which was finally resolved by judgment and order bearing No. WTN/US/2680/69 dated 11-9-1969 passed by the Collector of Nasik by which the nature of jahagir of the 1st petitioner was held to be a proprietary one and he got physical possession of the private forest on or about 21-1-1974. By a registered agreement of sale dated 7-2-1974 the 1st petitioner and other male members of joint Hindu family of which he was the Karta, agreed to sell all the teak and injaili trees (10,700 teak trees and 12,000 injaili trees) grown in the said private forest to the 3rd petitioner-firm of which the 2nd petitioner was a partner. The said contract for sale of the trees and the benefits thereunder were subsequently assigned with the consent of the 1st petitioner and the members of his joint family, to the 5th petitioner-firm of which the 4th petitioner was a partner. No sooner the agreement for sale of trees was entered into by the 1st petitioner on 7-2-1974 with the 3rd petitioner-firm the 1st petitioner made an application to the Tehsildar of Surgana Taluka for permission to fell the teak trees under S. 3 of the Maharashtra Felling of Trees (Regulation) Act, 1964 being Act No. 34 of 1964; no permission was necessary for felling injaili trees under the said Act as it then stood. On 28-3-1974 permission was granted by the Tehsildar to the 1st petitioner for felling 9719 teak trees. The 1st petitioner being an Adivasi, the said agreement for sale required permission/approval of the Collector under S. 5 of the Maharashtra Sale of Trees by Occupants belonging to Scheduled Tribes (Regulation) Act, 1959 being Act No. 23 of 1969 (hereinafter referred to as-I the Scheduled Tribes Act) under which the Collector had to be satisfied that the agreement for sale was voluntary and the price, as determined on valuation, was reasonable. Since for such approval valuation of the felled trees was required to be made the 1st petitioner moved the Range Forest Officer on 29-3-1974 for valuation of the felled material. In April 1974 orders for valuation were passed and by 7/8-5-1974 valuation of the part of the felled material was made by the Forest authorities and the panchanama dated 8-5-1974 made in that behalf recited that from Survey No. 42, 2494 teak trees had been felled and teak wood logs numbering 6795 admeasuring 825.280 cubic meters of approximate value of Rs. 2,56,675 were lying there. Valuation of the trees that were subsequently felled was however delayed in spite of the 1st petitioners attempt to get the same done. However, indisputably by June 1974 all 9719 teak trees and all injaili trees had been felled by the petitioners. On 27-6-1974 the 1st petitioner applied to the Assistant Collector of Nasik under S. 5 of the Scheduled Tribes Act for approval of the contract dated 7-2-1974 which had in the meantime been assigned in favour of the 5th petitioner-firm. He also made an application for transit passes for removing the felled material of teak and injaili trees. As no reply was received Special Civil Application No. 1553 of 1974 was filed on 5-7-1974 for a writ directing the State of Maharashtra and its officers to approve the aid contract and to issue transit passes for the felled material.

3. During the pendency of the petition the Scheduled Tribes Act was amended on 16-7-1974 by Maharashtra Ordinance No. 15 of 1974 whereby Section 5 of the parent Act was deleted, Section 6 was amended and injaili trees were included within the purview of the Act. The Ordinance was repealed and replaced by the Maharashtra Act 31 of 1974 under which the amendments made in the parent Act were made effective from 16-7-1974. The result was that whereas under the unamended Scheduled Tribes Act the sale of trees could be effected by-a member of the Scheduled Tribe in one of the two alternative ways viz. by private contract, subject to approval of the Collector under Section 5 or by the official machinery of seeking the assistance of the Collector under Section 6, under the amendment only one mode of effecting sale of trees by a member of the Scheduled Tribe remained available to him viz. by using the official machinery of seeking the assistance of the Collector under Section 6 and further that even the injaili trees had to be disposed of in accordance with the provisions of Section 6. It appears that while the application dated 27-6-1974 for approval of the contract was still pending, another application in continuation of earlier application was made on 20-7-1974. The earlier application was rejected on the ground that it was not in the prescribed form, while the second application was rejected on the ground that the same was not maintainable and did not survive after the amendment effected in the Scheduled Tribes Act on 16-7-1974 and the 1st petitioner was directed to apply for the Collectors assistance for selling the trees under Section 6 of the Scheduled Tribes Act as amended. This order rejecting the second application was passed on 28-10-1974. On 14-5-1975 the State Government issued a notification under Section 35(1) of the Indian Forest Act, 1927 in respect of the 1st petitioners said private forest.

4, Further, during the pendency of the petition the Maharashtra Private Forests (Acquisition) Act, 1975 being Act No. 29 of 1975 was passed on 29-8-1975 and it came into operation on 30-8-1975 (being the appointed day under Section 2 (a) of the Act). Under Section 3 thereof all private forests were compulsorily acquired and stood vested in the State with effect from the appointed day (30-8-1975). The Act 29 of 1975 as it then stood did not define the expression Forest but Section 2 (f) thereof defined the expression private forest as meaning any forest which is not the property of the Government and further including six heads specified in Clauses (i) to (vi), but significantly enough the expression forest produce was neither defined in Section 2 nor was referred to in Section 3 under which all private forests stood vested in the State Government with effect from the appointed day. During the hearing of the petition the principal contention of the petitioners before the Division Bench was that the process of cutting, dismembering and converting trees (9719 teak trees and 12,000 injaili trees as also other trees of minor importance) into logs had been completed and such cut logs of wood had been stored in the godowns in the forest long prior to the coming into force of Act 29 of 1975, that such forest produce (felled material} was an independent and distinct species of property, that the legislative head forest in Entry 19 of List II of the 7th Schedule to the Constitution would not cover such forest produce and therefore the same would not vest in the State Government under Section 3 of the said Act. In other words, the contention was that under Section 3 of the said Act all private forests had been acquired and became vested in the State Government but not the aforesaid forest produce and since acquisition of private forest under Section 3 of the said Act did not cover acquisition of the forest produce, nothing in the said Act could prevent the petitioners from claiming title to such forest produce and removing the felled material which, had already become theirs and had been lying therein before the enactment was brought into force. The Division Bench (consisting of Vimadalal and Sapre JJ.) at the end of the hearing gave an indication that it was inclined to accept the aforesaid contention of the petitioners. The delivering of the judgment by Vimadalal J, commenced in Court on 30-9-1975. The next day being an admission day the Bench could not devote any time to the further delivery of part-delivered judgment. On 2-10-1975 the Bench, which was thus half-way through its judgment, was informed that by Maharashtra Ordinance No. 13 of 1975 passed on 1st Oct. 1975 Act No. 29 of 1975 had been amended. A definition of the expression forest which was not there at all in the Act was supplied for the first time under an added Clause (c-1) and by Clause (c-2) a definition of expression forest produce was also introduced and that expression, it was stated, would have the same meaning as assigned to it in the Indian Forests Act, 1927. In the definition of the expression private forest contained in Section 2(f) a new clause being Clause (vii) was introduced with the result that the said expression included all the forest produce therein, whether standing, felled, found or otherwise. The attention of the learned Judges of the Division Bench was drawn to these amendments which were made retrospectively effective from the date of commencement of the Act viz. 30-8-1975. The Division Bench first completed the delivery of its judgment in regard to the finding which It had arrived at before the Ordinance was promulgated and indicated that it would have allowed the application by directing the respondents to issue transit passes in favour of the 5th petitioner-firm in respect of timber cut from injaili trees and in favour of the 1st petitioner in respect of timber cut from teak trees. In view of the amendments effected by the Ordinance the petitioners, after obtaining permission from the Division Bench, amended their petition and included appropriate grounds to attack the constitutional validity and effect of the amendments made by the Ordinance. Then the Bench heard the arguments of counsel on either side as to the effect of the Ordinance on the controversy raised before it. The learned Judges of the Division Bench differed on the question of construction as to whether logs cut and fashioned by the petitioners would be covered by the fresh definition of the expression forest according to which trees, whether standing, felled, found or otherwise were included within the expression forest. Vimadalal J. by his judgment dated 21-10-1975 held on construction of the new Clause (c-1) of Section 2 that felled and cut timber (logs cut and fashioned by the petitioners) would not come within the artificial definition of the expression forest while Sapre J. held that the same did, The two learned Judges also differed on the question as to whether Act 29 of 1975 and the Amending Ordinance were beyond the legislative competence of the State Legislature, inasmuch as, they sought to acquire felled and cut timber lying in the forest on 30-8-1975 and also on the question whether the Amending Ordinance was ultra vires the provisions of Article 31(2) of the Constitution, inasmuch as, it sought to acquire felled and cut timber without fixing any principles for determining the amount to be paid for the same and .also because the said felled and cut timber was sought to be acquired without any public purpose merely for augmenting the State revenue. Vimadalal J. upheld the contentions of the petitioners, namely that the Acquisition Act and the Amending Ordinance were beyond the competence of the State Legislature and that the Amending Ordinance was ultra vires Article 31(2), while Sapre J. rejected the said contention of the petitioners. Both the learned Judges, however, were agreed on the point that the addition of Clause (vii) to the definition of the expression private forest could not improve the matter in the absence of the expression forest itself including such forest produce in its definition. In view of this difference, points of difference were formulated and referred to a third Judge for decision under Clause 36 of the Letters Patent.

5. While the matter was pending he-fore Deshmukh J. as the third Judge, Ordinance 13 of 1975 was replaced by Maharashtra Act 72 of 1975 under which the parent Act 29 of 1975 was further extensively amended with effect from the date of its original commencement (30-8-19-75). The definition of the expression forest produce in Section 2(c-2) was deleted, obviously because it was superfluous in view of the original Clause (h) of Section 2 under which it had been provided that words and expressions used in this (parent) Act but not defined therein shall have the meanings assigned to them in the Forest Act, 1927. Clause (vii) of Section 2 (f) introduced under the Ordinance was deleted therefrom and was now introduced as Clause (v) in the definition of expression forest under Section 2(c-1). Further one more clause was added viz. Clause (iv) in the inclusive part of the definition of forest in Section 2(c-1). Apart from these amendments made in the definition section of the parent Act, the preamble and Section 4 and 5 of the parent Act were also extensively amended. . When the matter was taken up for hearing by Deshmukh J., counsel appearing for the State requested the learned Judge to take into consideration the amendments introduced by the Amending Act 72 of 1975 while answering questions referred to him. The learned Judge declined to do so holding that such a course was not permissible on. a reference made to him under Clause 36 of the Letters Patent. Out of four points that were referred to him, Deshmukh J. agreed with Vimadalal J. on three points and disagreed with him on the fourth point, which is not material to the disposal of this petition. The three points on which Deshmukh J, agreed with Vimadalal J. were: (i) that felled and cut timber lying in the private forest could not be regarded as trees and could not fall within the definition of forest under Section 2(c-1) of the Act; (ii) that Act 29 of 1975 and the Amending Ordinance were beyond the legislative competence of the said legislature, Inasmuch as, they sought to acquire felled and cut timber lying in the forest on 30-8-1975 and (iii) that the Amending Ordinance to the above extent was ultra vires Article 31(2) because (a) acquisition was not for the public purpose and (b) acquisition was without fixing any principles for determination of the amount payable therefore ,or alternatively, (c) the so-called compensation had no relation whatsoever to the property acquired. The matter was then placed before the Division Bench on 8-3-1976 and the petition was allowed in accordance with the majority opinion on the material point It may be stated that before the Division Bench on 8-3-1976 the petitioners insisted that the case should be decided in the light of amendments introduced in the parent Act by amending Act 72 of 1975, but curiously enough counsel for the State opposed the move and accordingly the Bench disposed of the petition without taking into account the amendments effected in the parent Act by Amending Act 72 of 1975.

6. The State of Maharashtra preferred an appeal to the Supreme Court, being Civil Appeal No. 343 of 1976 but by this time the Acquisition Act 29 of 1975 as amended by Act 72 of 1975 was Included in the 9th Schedule under the Constitution (40th) Amendment Act, 1976. By consent, the order of the High Court dated 8-3-1976 was set aside by the Supreme Court on 1-11-1976 and the case was remitted to the High Court "to hear the parties on Maharashtra Private Forests (Acquisition) (Amendment) Act, Act 72/75, and after hearing the rival contentions of the parties the High Court will pronounce its judgment". When the matter came up for hearing before the Division Bench, it was realised that the Constitution (42nd) Amendment Act, 1976 was being made effective from 1st Feb. 1976 and the hearing by the Division Bench was not likely to be concluded before that date and since the constitutional validity of the enactment was challenged the matter was referred to this Bench of five Judges so that the hearing as well as decision of the Court could comply with Article 228A of the Constitution.

7. It was noticed that several other petitions are also pending in this Court on the Appellate side in which validity of this very enactment has been challenged and the petitioners therein are Interested in the common questions of law. At the instance of some of them their petitions have been placed for hearing along with the above petitions for decision of common questions only. Similarly, several miscellaneous petitions are pending on the original side the petitioners in which are interested in the common questions of law that arise before us and hence on an application being made on their behalf to intervene they have been permitted to intervene. However, as in their petitions other disputed questions have been raised as to whether quarry lands and other lands concerned in each are forest or not, an agreed statement was filed by counsel appearing for the petitioners and counsel appearing for the respondents that the decision on the constitutional points will not prejudice the rights of either party to agitate before the appropriate authority or authorities the disputed question as to whether the said quarry lands and other lands are or are not forest in the ordinary natural meaning of the word forest and all factual questions already raised or which may be raised have been kept open.

8. We have already indicated at the commencement of the judgment that constitutional validity of the Maharashtra Private Forests (Acquisition) Act, 1975 being Act 29 of 1975 as amended by Act 72 of 1975 (hereinafter referred to as the Acquisition Act) has been challenged principally on three grounds, namely (a) lack of legislative competence, (b) contravention of Article 301 of the Constitution and (c) trenching done by the enactment upon the field occupied by or under the Central Act 67 of 1957 -- Mines and Minerals (Regulation and Development) Act, 1957 -- and we shall deal with each of these grounds separately. But before we do so, it would be necessary and desirable to consider the object and purpose for which the enactment has been put on the statute book as well as its main provisions and salient features in order that the rival submissions that have been made on each one of the grounds of challenge should be properly appreciated.

9. At the outset we may point out that the Acquisition Act as its name would show was enacted on 29th Aug. 1975 for the purpose of acquiring private forests in the State and to provide for certain other matters. According to preamble, which was extensively amended by the Amending Act 72 of 1975, it was noticed that the forest land in the State of Maharashtra was inadequate, that, private forest in the State was generally in a highly degraded and over-exploited state and was adversely affecting agriculture and agricultural population and that therefore it was expedient "to acquire private forests in the State of Maharashtra generally for conserving their material resources and protecting them from destruction or over-exploitation by their owners and for promoting systematic and scientific development and management of such forests for the purpose of attaining and maintaining ecological balance in the public interest, for improving the socio-economic conditions of the rural population, and particularly of the adivasis and other backward communities who generally live in forest areas, for developing as pasture the forest suitable for the purpose, for assigning a part of the private forest to the rural community, for controlling the soil erosion both in the forest areas and in the lower level agricultural lands, for conserving soil moisture, for improvement of the water regime and raising the water table, for retarding the salutation of dams and tanks, for distribution of forest produce for the common good and preventing the concentration of forest wealth to the common detriment, for distribution of the mature exploitable forest produce as best to subserve the common good, for promoting employment opportunities based on forest, for meeting the requirements of forest produce including fire-wood with a view inter alia to decrease the dependence on cow-dung, and in particular, for afforestation of private forest wherever feasible on scientific lines, and thereby create conditions for the preservation of soil, conservation of water, prevention of erosion of soil and for improvement of land and underground water resources to the best interests of agriculture and agriculturists in such private forests and other lands in the State and for undertaking schemes for these and other purposes as hereinafter provided and to provide for matters connected therewith". The Act has been brought into force on 30-8-1975 which has been regarded as the appointed day under Section 2 (a) of the Act. Section 2 of the unamended Act 29 of 1975 contained definitions of several expressions. As stated earlier, there was no definition of the expression forest or forest produce therein at all. The expression private forest was defined in Section 2 (f)which ran as follows:--

"Private forest means any forest which is not the property of Government and includes-

(i) any land declared before the appointed day to be a forest under Section 34A of the Forest Act;

(ii) any forest in respect of which any notification issued under Sub-section (1) of Section 35 of the Forest Act, is in force immediately before the appointed day;

(iii) any land in respect of which a notice has been issued under Sub-section (3) of Section 35 of the Forest Act, but excluding an area not exceeding two hectares in extent as the Collector may specify in this behalf;

(iv) land in respect of which a notification has been issued under Section 38 of the Forest Act;

(v) in a case where the State Government and any other person are jointly interested in the forest, the interest of such person in such forest;

(vi) sites of dwelling houses constructed in such forest which are considered to be necessary for the convenient enjoyment or use of the forest and lands appurtenant thereto." By the Ordinance No. 13 of 1975 Clause (vii) was added to the aforesaid definition of private forest which ran thus:

"(vii) all the forest produce therein, whether standing, felled, found or otherwise."

Section 2 (h) is material and it runs as follows:--

"Words and expressions used in this Act but not defined therein shall have the meanings assigned to them in the Code or, as the case may be, in the Forest Act."

By Ordinance No. 13 of 1975 the definition of the expression forest was introduced in Section 2 Of the parent Act (29/75) by insertion of Clause (c-1) and it ran thus:

"(c-1): forest means a tract of land covered with trees .(whether standing, felled, found or otherwise), shrubs, bushes, or woody vegetation whether of natural growth or planted by human agency and existing or being maintained with or without human effort, or such tract of land on which such growth is likely to have an effect on the supply of timber, fuel, forest produce, or grazing facilities, or on climate, stream flow, protection of land from erosion or other such matters, and shall include,--

(i) land covered with stumps of trees of a forest;

(ii) land which is part of a forest or lies within it or was part of a forest or was lying within a forest on the 30th day of Aug. 1975;

(iii) such pasture land, waterlogged or cultivable or non-cultivable land, lying within or adjacent to, a forest, as may be declared to be a forest by the State Government." By the Amending Act 72 of 1975 the definitions of the expressions forest and forest produce were further amended and toy these amendments Clause (vii) which had been added in the inclusive part of the definition of the expression private forest was deleted therefrom and the same was with one more additional clause introduced in the definition of the expression forest. The definitions of the two expressions forest and private forest as finally amended run thus:

"(c-1): forest means a tract of land covered with trees (whether standing, felled, found or otherwise), shrubs, bushes or woody vegetation, whether of natural growth or planted by human agency and existing or being maintained with or without human effort or such tract of land on which such growth is likely to have an effect on the supply of timber, fuel, forest produce, or grazing facilities, or on climate, stream flow, protection of land from erosion, or other such matters and includes,--

(i) land covered with stumps of trees of a forest;

(ii) land which is part of a forest or lies within it or was part of a forest or was lying within a forest on the 30th day of August 1975;

(iii) such pasture land, water-logged Or cultivable or non-cultivable land, lying within or linked to a forest, as may be declared to be forest by the State Government;

(iv) forest land held or let for purpose of agriculture or for any purposes ancillary thereto;

(v) all the forest produce therein, whether standing, felled, found or otherwise."

"2 (f): private forest means any forest which is not the property of Government and includes-

(i) any land declared before the appointed day to be a forest under Section 34A of the Forest Act;

(ii) any forest in respect of which any notification issued under Sub-section (1) of Section 35 of the Forest Act, is in force immediately before the appointed day;

(iii) any land in respect of which a notice has been issued under Sub-section (3) of Section 35 of the Forest Act, but excluding an area not exceeding two hectares in extent as the Collector may specify in this behalf;

(iv) land in respect of which a notification has been issued under Section 38 of the Forest Act;

(v) in a case where the State Government and any other person are jointly interested in the forest, the interest of such person in such forest;

(vi) sites of dwelling houses constructed in such forest which are considered to be necessary for the convenient enjoyment or use of the forest and lands appurtenant thereto." On reading of these two definitions it will appear that each one has some artificiality in it and the question will be whether the artificiality in these definitions introduces something over which the State Legislature has no legislative competence and if so to what extent

10. The most material provision of the Acquisition Act is contained in Section 3 which provides for vesting of all private forests in the State Government and that section runs thus:

"3. (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in any law for the time being in force or in any settlement, grant, agreement, usage, custom or any decree or order of any Court, Tribunal or authority or any other document, with effect on and from the appointed day, all private forests in the State shall stand acquired and vest, free from all encumbrances, in, and shall be deemed to be, with all rights in or over the same of appertaining thereto, the property of the State Government, and all rights, title and interest of the owner or any person other than the Government subsisting in any such forest on the said day shall be deemed to have been extinguished.

(2) Nothing contained in Sub-section (1) shall apply to so much extent of land comprised in a private forest as is held by an occupant or tenant and is lawfully under cultivation on the appointed day and is not in excess of the ceiling area provided by Section 5 of the Maharashtra Agricultural Lands (Ceiling on Holdings) Act, 1961, for the time being in force or any building or structure standing thereon or appurtenant thereto.

(3) All private forests vested in the State Government under Sub-section (1) shall be deemed to be reserved forests within the meaning of the Forest Act." The aforesaid provision is the key provision in the entire enactment. Two or three things become clear on a reading of this section. Sub-section (1) thereof provides for compulsory acquisition of all private forests by the State Government and vesting of such private forest in the State with effect on and from the •appointed day i.e. 30-8-1975; secondly such vesting of private forest takes place notwithstanding anything contained in any law for the time being in force or in any settlement, grant, agreement, usage, custom or any decree or order of any Court, Tribunal or authority or any other document; and thirdly such vesting of private forest in the State shall be free from all encumbrances and all rights, title and interest of the owner or any person other than the Government subsisting in any such forest on the said day shall be deemed to have been extinguished. Sub-section (2) thereof is a saving clause which says that in the case of an occupant or tenant of a private forest so much of land as is under his lawful cultivation on the appointed day shall not vest in the State Government provided such land does not exceed the ceiling area provided by Section 5 of the Maharashtra Agricultural Lands (Ceiling on Holdings) Act, 1961. Sub-section (3) thereof declares that all private forests vested in the State Government under Sub-section (1) shall be deemed to be reserved forest within the meaning of the Forest Act, 1927.

11. Under Section 4 it is provided that on acquisition of private forests the State Government shall take steps for afforestation of forest lands on scientific basis for developing the lands and utilising them according to their capability including pastures, for regulating the felling of trees on scientific lines, for promoting soil and water conservation as would best subserve agriculture, for distribution of the mature exploitable forest produce as to best subserve the common good and for securing those purposes undertake schemes, particularly in the best interest of the agriculture and agricultural population of the State; the said section then goes on to indicate what several other matters may be provided for by such schemes. Original Section 5 created an obligation upon a person in possession of private forest to surrender and hand over the same to the Collector forthwith, but under the amended Section 5 it has been provided that no sooner any private forest would stand acquired and vested in the State Government the person authorised by the State Government or Collector in that behalf shall enter into and take over possession thereof and any person resisting taking over of such possession will be liable to be removed by use of such force as may be necessary. Section 6 provides machinery for determining whether a particular piece of property is private forest or not and whether the same has vested in the State Government or not and the Collectors decision oft the point, subject to an appeal to the Tribunal or revision to the State, has been made final. Sections 7 to 11 provide for a scheme and procedure for determination by the Collector of the amount payable to the owner of private forest and the manner of making payment to him and deductions of amounts of encumbrances to be made therefrom. Section 12 provides for payment of amount to a person other than the owner of the private forest for extinguishment of his right, if any, qua private forest enjoyed by him otherwise than as a member of the public and it further provides that if any amount is awarded to such a person, the same will be liable to be deducted from the amount determined as payable to the owner of such private forest. Section 13 provides for an appeal against an order of the Collector under Sections 9, 11 and 12 while Section 14 lays down the procedure for hearing of such appeal by the Tribunal and Section 15 deals with limitation for preferring such an appeal. Sections 17 and 18 provide for finality of the Collectors award subject to appeal to the Tribunal and revision to the State Government under certain circumstances. The provisions of Section 21 enable the State Government to make declaration of certain lands as private forest and the effect that would follow after such a declaration is made. Section 22 casts an obligation on the owners of private forests to deliver records relating to such private forests which have vested in the State Government under the provisions of the Act to an officer authorised by the State Government. Section 23 confers rule making power upon the State Government for carrying out the purposes of the Act while Section 24 repeals some of the sections including Sections 34A and 35 of the Indian Forest Act, 1927 as it is made applicable to the State of Maharashtra with effect from the appointed day viz. 30-8-1975.

12. It will appear clear from the aforesaid broad survey of the provisions of enactment as also its title and preamble that the Act was mainly put on the statute book for the purpose of acquisition of private forests in the State of Maharashtra. In other words, the pith and substance of the enactment Ss acquisition of private forests.

13. We shall now proceed tp deal with the challenge to the constitutional validity of the Acquisition Act, particularly Section 3 thereof based on lack of lative competence. Before setting out the contentions urged in support of the aforesaid ground of attack, we would like to refer to certain admitted factual position to which our attention was drawn by Mr. Singhvi appearing for the petitioners in Special Civil Application No. 1553 of 1974. According to Mr. Singhvi, the process of cutting dismembering and converting trees (9719 teak trees, 12000 injaili trees and other trees of minor importance) into logs and stacking of such cut logs of wood in the godowns in the forest had been completed long prior to 30th Aug. 1975 (the day when the Act came into force); in other words, cut timber had been fashioned into logs and stacked. In that behalf reference may be made to certain admissions made by Mr. B. D. Mirchan-dani, Divisional Forest Officer (East), Nasik in his affidavit dated 27-3-1975, which is on record. In that affidavit Mr. Mirchandani has admitted that certain material viz. (i) converted, logs of, teak wood admeasuring 2453.486 cubic metres (ii) converted logs of Hed, Kalam, Tiwas and Bibla trees admeasuring 144.051 cubic metres, (iii) unmeasured quantity of logs of tops and. hollow wood from teak, Hed, Kalam, Tiwas and Bibla trees yet to be converted, into- fire, wood: and (iv) partly converted and partly unconverted logs from 9500 injaili trees, was lying hi the Jagir area. He has further admitted that the value of the material under categories (i) and. (ii) above could be Rs. 16,52,781 and, the value of the material under categories (iii) and (iv) could be about Rs. 1,50,000; that is to say, the total material, lying in the Jagir area would be to the tune of Rs. 13,02,781 and he has further stated that in view of rising trend of prices in timber, the upset price (reserve bid) for auction sale of such material should be fixed at Rs. 21 lacs. Further in his affidavit dated 4-12-1975 Mr. Mirchandani has admitted that by then he had completed the inventory of felled material lying in the said forest area and the total felled material lying in the forest as per the inventory admeasured 2788.650 cubic metres of teak wood and 726 cubic metres of fire wood and that in addition to the aforesaid material indicated in the inventory some more felled material had, earlier to coming into force of the Act on 30th Aug. 1975, been dragged by the petitioner and collected in the adjacent private malki survey number and that such felled material comprises of 960 teak and injaili timber pieces having approximate outturn of 131.215 cubic metres. Mr. Singhvi also invited our attention to e clear finding of fact that has been recorded by Mr. justice Deshmukh in his judgment after referring to the pleadings and affidavits of parties to the effect that the teak trees and injaili trees as also the other trees of minor importance had been converted into logs and stacked in the godowns long prior to coming into force of the Acquisition Act on 30-8-1975. The learned Judge has recorded his aforesaid finding in these words:

"On a proper reading of the allegations in the petition together with those references, I am satisfied that all the teak trees and injaili trees as also the other trees of minor importance referred to in the affidavit of Mr. Mirchandani have been converted into logs and stacked in the godowns, which is nothing but a part of the forest land itself.........

It is, therefore, clear that the process of cutting, dismembering and converting trees ;into log was complete at a stage when Act No. 29 of 1975 came into force."

Belying upon this factual position which indisputably arises on record, Mr, Singhvi i or or the petitioners has raised the question about legislative competence of the State Legislature to enact Section 3 of the Acquisition Act to the extent to which it purports to vest the aforesaid forest produce in the form of timber cut and fashioned into logs in the State Government. Mr. Singhvis argument challenging the legislative competence of the State Legislature to enact Section 3 of the Acquisition Act runs thus: According to him, the pith and substance of the Acquisition Act is acquisition of private forests; the topic forests falls under Entry 19 in List II while the topic acquisition and requisitioning of property falls under Entry 42 in List III of the 7th .Schedule to the Constitution and as such under Entry 19 in List II read with Entry 42 in List III it would be perfectly competent to the State Legislature to legislate upon the subject of acquisition of private forests which it has done under Section 3 of the Act. However, neither in Article 366 of the Constitution nor in the General Clauses Act, 1897 (which has been made applicable for interpretation of the Constitution under Art, 367) has the expression forest been defined nor was there any legislative practice prior to enactment of the Constitution throwing any light on the precise meaning of the expression forest inasmuch as neither the Government of India Act, 1935 (legislative practice prior to the introduction of federal structure accompanied by distribution of legislative powers being irrelevant) nor any other Indian enactment had defined forest and therefore the topic forests appearing under Entry 19 in List II must be given its plain dictionary meaning. He pointed out that out of the three meanings given in Oxford English Dictionary the applicable meaning of the expression forest is an extensive tract of land covered with trees end undergrowth, sometimes intermingled with pasture; also the trees collectively a forest which shows that forest is essentially or basically land of certain description, namely land covered with trees etc. and that forest produce in the form of cut and fashioned logs of wood or cut timber would not come within that concept as it is a separate and distinct species of property end therefore the State Legislature exercising its legislative powers under Entry 19 in List II read with Entry 42 in List III lacks competence to legislate on acquisition of such forest produce. No doubt it is true, he has argued, that while legislating on forests the State Legislature can legislate on matters necessarily incidental to effectuate legislation on forests but according to him acquisition of forest produce would not be incidental to the main purpose of the Act, namely acquisition of private forests themselves. He has further contended that the State Legislature cannot obtain legislative competence under Entry 19 in List II to legislate for acquisition of forest produce by giving to the expression forest an artificial meaning which it does not bear as a matter of plain language, even taking the widest meaning which is given to that expression in standard dictionaries. He has pointed out that the expression forest has been artificially defined in Section 2(c-1) of the Act by including within its compass all forest produce therein, whether standing, felled, found or otherwise and further since the said definition includes certain lands which are deemed forests, even the forest produce of such deemed forest would also be included in the definition of forest, which would be beyond the competence of the State Legislature, inasmuch as, under Entry 19 in List II read with Entry 42 in List III the Stat Legislature is entitled to legislate only upon the topic of acquisition of private forest, the expression forest receiving its ordinary dictionary meaning. Mr. Paranjpe appearing for some of the interveners has contended that both the definitions of forest and private forest have been artificially extended by including in them lands as well as forest produce, which by no stretch of imagination can be included therein according to the normal connotation of forest o* private forest; for instance, according to him, by artificially extending the meaning of the forest the State Legislature has brought within its fold lands where quarrying of stones would be in operation and that. the definition of private forest in Section 2 (f) is made so large and extensive that it would include quarries and mines and other lands, which may not be described as forests by the device of (a) issuing a notification under Section 34A of the Forest Act, 1927 or (b) by issuing a notification under Section 35(1) of the said Act or (c) by giving a notice under Section 35(3) of the said Act or (d) by issuing a notification under Section 38 of the said Act and as such these definitions would be beyond the legislative competence of the State Legislature. Looking at the question from another angle counsel for the petitioners have contended that by the device of enacting artificial definitions of the expressions forest and private forest the State Legislature has enacted this measure for the purpose of acquiring forest produce under the guise of legislating on acquisition of private forest under Entry 19 in List II read with Entry 42 in List III, but since the legislature can be said to have transgressed its limits, the enactment to the extent to which it purports to vest forest produce in the State is a piece of colourable legislation and as such the same is, to that extent, liable to be struck down as being beyond its competence. (Vide K.C. Gajapati Narayan Deo v. State of Orissa : [1954]1SCR1 ). Counsel for the , petitioners have also urged that since the topic of forest produce is a distinct and independent species of property, and the same is not covered by any other specific entry in any of the three Lists in the 7th Schedule it will fall hi the residuary Entry 97 in List I and as such Section 3 of the Act will be trenching upon that Union entry and therefore to the extent that it purports to vest forest produce in the State Government will have to be struck down. Lastly, counsel have contended that in any event on its proper construction Section 3 of the Act vests in the State Government all private forests and the expression private forest occurring in the operative part of Section 3 must mean private forest as defined in Section 2 (f), in which definition forest produce is not included and as such on a strict construction of Section 3 read with Section 2 (f) forest produce of the private forests would not vest in the State; the contention is that by the Amending Act 72 of 1975 Clause (vii) which spoke of all forest produce there-in, whether standing, felled, found or otherwise which had been initially added to the definition of private forest was deleted therefrom and the same has-been inserted as Clause (v) in the definition of the expression forest in Section 2(c-1) and as such the amending measure has misfired.

14. On the other hand, Mr. Gursahani appearing for the Advocate General and State of Maharashtra and counsel for the other respondents have refuted the challenge to Section 3 of the Acquisition Act based on the ground of lack of legislative competence. Mr. Gursahani has urged that the entries in the three lists are legislative heads or fields of legislation, that they demarcate the area over which appropriate legislation can operate and as per the well settled rules of interpretation widest amplitude is required to be given to the language of the entries and therefore, according to him, the legislative head forest under Entry 19 in List II if liberally construed would include forest produce, a kind of property that owes its origin to forest; in other words, according to him, the concept of forest in its natural and popular connotation includes forest produce as a part and parcel thereof. He has urged that the dictionary meaning of the word forest would not be the correct guide while interpreting or construing a legislative head under any particular entry in any of the three Lists of the 7th Schedule. He has therefore contended that Section 3 of the Act even when it seeks to vest forest produce in the State Government along with private forests that are acquired by the State thereunder would be within the legislative competence of the State Legislature under Entry 19 in List II read with Entry 42 in List III of the 7th Schedule to the Constitution. Alternatively, he has contended that Section 3 in so far as it seeks to vest forest produce in the State Government along with private forests would also fall within the legislative competence of the State Legislature on the basis of doctrine of ancillary and incidental .powers, inasmuch as, according to him, acquisition of forest produce would be incidental to the main purpose of the Act, namely acquisition of private forests themselves. As regards the so-called artificiality to be found in the definitions of the two expressions forest and private forest and the submissions based thereon, he has in the first place contended that if the legislative head forest is construed liberally so as to include forest produce also, then, there will be no question of the State Legislature having obtained legislative competence by resorting the device of giving an artificial meaning to the expressions forest and private forest and secondly, according to him, even if there be some artificiality in the definitions of the two expressions, that artificiality does not introduce any matter over which the State Legislature lacks legislative competence and as such Section 3 along with the definitions would be valid. He has disputed that the State Legislature has transgressed its limits or on that account the Act is liable to be struck down as a piece of colourable legislation. Further, apart from contending that the Acquisition Act and Section 3 thereof properly falls under Entry 19 in List II read with Entry. 42 in List III, Mr, Gursahani and counsel for the other respondents have also suggested that the said Act would fall within the legislative competence of the State Legislature either under Entry 42 (Acquisition and Requisitioning of Property) in List III simpliciter or under Entry 18 (Lands etc.) in List II read with Entry 42 (Acquisition and Requisitioning of Property) in List III or under Entry 20 (economic and social planning) in List III of the 7th Schedule. It was emphatically disputed by them that the Act and Section 3 thereof to the extent to which it seeks to vest forest produce in the State Government along with private forests impinges on the residuary Entry 97 in List I or that on that account the same is liable to be struck down. Lastly counsel for the respondents have also refuted the contention that the Amending Act 72 of 1975 has misfired in the manner suggested.

15. Counsel for the petitioners have rejoined to the contention urged on behalf of the State and other respondents that the impugned Act would fall within the legislative competence of the State Legislature either under Entry 42 in List III simpliciter or under Entry 18 in List II read with Entry 42 in List III or under Entry 20 in List III of the 7th Schedule. It has been contended on behalf of the petitioners that Entry 42 in List III by itself would not be sufficient to cover the impugned Act for Entry 42 in List HI will have to be read along with some other entry in List II or List III over which the State Legislature has competence to legislate and for diverse substantial reasons such a limitation will have to be read into Entry 42 in List III; according to counsel for the petitioners, the State Legislature would have power to acquire property provided such property falls under any other head of the legislation either in List II or List III over which the State Legislature has power to legislate; in other words, just as topics like Land or Forests falling in Entry 18 or 19 by themselves do not carry with them the power to legislate for their acquisition, that is to say, these entries by themselves do not confer power on the State Legislature to acquire them without recourse to Entry 42 in List III, so also Entry 42 in List III by itself is not sufficient to confer power on the legislature to acquire any property but the property sought to be acquired by the State Legislature must fall in some entry in either List II or List III over which it has competence to legislate. Counsel for the petitioners have also urged that the avowed object of the enactment being acquisition of private forests the measure cannot be justified under Entry 18 in List II which refers to land and rights in and over land read with Entry 42 in List III. As regards Entry 20 in List III counsel for the petitioners have contended that the said Entry is too vague to sustain the impugned enactment and in any case no materials have been placed by the respondents before the Court on the basis of which the enactment can be justified under that Entry.

16. Having regard to the rival contentions that have been summarised above in regard to the ground of legislative competence of the State Legislature, it will be clear that the principal question that arises for our determination is whether the impugned Act and Section 3 thereof to the extent to which it seeks to vest forest produce in the State Government along with private forests are within the legislative competence of the State Legislature under Entry 19 (Forests) in List II read with Entry 42 (acquisition and requisitioning of property) in List III of the 7th Schedule to the Constitution As indicated earlier, the gravamen of attack of Messrs Singhvi, Seervai, Paranjpe, Rana and other counsel for the petitioners has been that the expression forests in Entry 19 in List II does not include forest produce and therefore the main question is : What is the true scope of Entry 19 when it uses only one word forests What would it properly include Before we address ourselves to this question, it will be desirable to notice in brief the scheme of our Constitution pertaining to distribution of legislative powers and to refer to the general principles governing the construction of the entries in the three Lists of the 7th Schedule which are well settled.

IT. Under our constitutional scheme the entire legislative power is distributed between the Parliament and the State Legislatures; the framers of the Constitution have divided all conceivable topics or subjects, being 209 in number, in three legislative lists, the division between Parliament and State Legislatures depending broadly on their national and local importance, with the third list containing subjects of common interest. List I being Union List comprises 96 heads or subjects; List II being the State List comprises 66 heads or subjects while List III comprises 47 heads or subjects and ordinarily all the Entries in the three Lists in between them exhaust all conceivable subjects of legislation. By way of abundant caution, residuary power in regard to unforeseen topics or subjects is vested in the Parliament under residuary Entry 97 in List I. The Lists merely contain enumeration of subjects while the actual distribution of legislative powers has been made by Articles 245 and 246 and under the scheme of these two articles the position becomes clear that Parliament as well as State Legislatures are sovereign legislative bodies possessing plenary legislative powers within the ambit of Entries assigned to them, subject to primacy being given to the laws made by Parliament over the State laws with respect to any of the matters enumerated in the Concurrent List. Article 248 confers exclusive residuary powers of legislation upon Parliament to make any law with respect of any matter not enumerated in the Concurrent List or State List and this article has to be read with Entry 97 [n the Union List. In connection with the aforesaid scheme pertaining to distribution of legislative powers two things appear to be well settled. First, every effort having been made to make the three Lists as comprehensive and exhaustive as .possible, the specific Entries in the three Lists in between them must be held to exhaust all conceivable topics or subjects of legislation and therefore whenever any matter is dealt with by any particular Act, an attempt will have to be made to allocate such matter to one or the other of the Entries in these Lists and secondly, it is only when such attempt fails that the Court can fall back upon the residuary Entry 97 in List I, for, resort to residual power should be the last refuge. It has been so held by the Federal Court In the case of Subrahmanyan Chettiar v. Muttuswami , in the context of the scheme of distribution of legislative powers under the Government of India Act, 1935, which scheme has been substantially borrowed by the Constitution-makers in the Constitution. Head-note (d) which is relevant runs thus:

"For the purpose of determining the category in Lists I, II and III into which the matters with which a particular Act of the Provincial Legislature deals, fall resort to the residual power under Section 104 should be the very last refuge. It is only when all the categories in the three Lists are absolutely exhausted that the Court should fall back upon a nondescript."

18. We may now refer to a few decisions in which the general principles governing interpretation or construction of Entries in the legislative Lists in a Federal Constitution have been laid down. In the leading case of United Provinces v. Mt. Atiqa Begum , the question that arose before the Court was whether the power to legislate in regard to collection of rents in Entry 21 in List II of the 7th Schedule to the Government of India Act, 1935 (corresponding to present Entry 18 in List II in 7th Schedule to the Constitution) could include the legislative power to grant remission of rents and the Court answered the question in the affirmative after holding that none of the items in the Lists should be read in a narrow or restricted sense and that each general word should be held to extend to all ancillary and subsidiary matters which can fairly and reasonably be said to be comprehended in it. Chief Justice Maurice Gwyer at p. 25 of the report has observed thus:

"The subjects dealt with in the three legislative lists are not always set out with scientific definition. It would be practically impossible for example to define each item in the Provincial List in such a way as to make ii exclusive of every other item in that list and Parliament seems to have, been content to take a number of comprehensive categories and to describe each of them by a word of broad and general import...... I think however that none of the items in the lists is to be read in a narrow or restricted sense, and that each general word should be held to extend to all ancillary or subsidiary matters which can fairly and reasonably be said to be comprehended in it."

In Calcutta Gas Company (Proprietary) Ltd. v. State of West Bengal : AIR1962SC1044 , the question before the Court was whether the West Bengal Oriental Gas Company Act, 1960 was within the legislative competence of West Bengal State Legislature and while discussing the scope of the expression industry occurring in Entries 7 and 52 in List I and also occurring in Entry 24 in List II and the limits introduced thereon by the wording of the Entries 25, 26 and 27 in List II, Subba Rao J. referred to certain well settled rules of interpretation governing the construction of Entries in the Lists given in Schedule 7 of the Constitution, which have been succinctly summarised in head note (c) of the report which runs thus:

"In the matter of construing entries in the Lists given in Schedule VII of the Constitution, the following rules of interpretation are now well settled, The power to legislate is given to the appropriate Legislatures by Article 246 of the Constitution, The entries in the three Lists are only legislative heads or fields of legislation, they demarcate the area over which the appropriate Legislatures can operate. It is also settled that widest amplitude should be given to the language of the entries. But some of the entries in the different lists or in the same list may overlap and sometimes may also appear to be in direct conflict with each other. It is then the duty of the Court to reconcile the entries and (bring about harmony between them. The underlying principle in such cages is that a general power ought not to be so construed as to make a nullity of a particular power conferred by the same Constitution and operating in the same field, when by reading the former in a more restricted sense effect can be given to the latter in its ordinary and natural meaning Thus, every attempt should be made to harmonize the apparently conflicting entries not only of different Lists but also of the same List and to reject that construction which will rob one of the entries of its entire content and make it nugatory."

In the case of Harakchand Ratanchand Banthia v. Union of India : [1970]1SCR479 , the question before the Court was whether preparation and manufacture .of gold ornaments by goldsmith in India, though it involved personal skill .and craft, would fall within the connotation of the word industry in Entry 52 in List I and Entry 33 in List II and the same was answered in the affirmative and the Court held that such manufacture could properly come within the purview of the Gold (Control) Act, 1966 enacted by Parliament Hamaswaroi J. reiterated some of the principles enunciated by Subba Rao J. in Calcutta Gas Co. case : AIR1962SC1044 and observed thus:

"...... The entries in the three Lists are only legislative heads or fields of legislation; they demarcate the area over which the appropriate legislatures can operate. It is well established that the widest amplitude should be given to the language of the entries." (Para 6)

"...... The legislative entries must be given a large and liberal interpretation, the reason being that the allocation of subjects to the lists is not by way of scientific or logical definition but is a mere enumeration of broad and comprehensive categories." (Para 7) In Second Gift Tax Officer, Mangalore v. D.H. Hazareth : AIR 1970 SC 999 [LQ/SC/1970/177] , the Court while coming to the conclusion that the Gift Tax Act enacted by the Parliament well within the residuary Entry 97 of List I read with Article 248 Of the Constitution and was therefore validly enacted, has made certain general observations which are material. In paragraph 5 Hidayatullah C.J. observed thus:

"It will, therefore, be seen that the sovereignty of Parliament and the Legislatures ig a sovereignty of enumerated entries, but within the ambit of an entry, the exercise of power is as plenary as any legislature can possess subject, of course, to the limitations arising from the Fundamental Rights. The entries themselves do not follow any logical classification or dichotomy As was said in State of Rajasthan v. G. Chawla, : 1959CriLJ660 , the entries in the lists must be regarded as enumeration simplex of broad categories. Since they are likely to overlap occasionally, it is usual to examine the pith and substance of legislation with a view to determining to which entry they can be substantially related, a slight connection with another entry in another list notwithstanding. Therefore, to find out whether a piece of legislation falls within any entry, its true nature and character must be in respect to that particular entry. The entries must of course receive a large and liberal interpretation because the few words of the entry are intended to confer vast and plenary powers......"

It may be stated that Article 246 of the Constitution confers power upon the Parliament as well as the State Legislatures to make laws with respect to any of the matters enumerated in their respective Lists as well as in the Concurrent List. Similar expression with respect to also occurred in the corresponding Section 100 of the Government of India Act, 1935 and Sulaiman J. has explained the impact of that expression in the case of Subrahmanyan Chettiar v. Muttuswami Goundan the learned Judge has observed thus:

"No doubt, every effort appears to have been made to make the three lists as comprehensive and exhaustive as well as exclusive as possible......... Nevertheless, in view of the large number of items in the three lists, it is almost impossible to prevent a certain amount of overlapping. Absolutely sharp and distinct lines of demarcation are not always possible, Rigid and inflexible watertight compartments cannot be ensured. A hard and fast rule of exclusion derived from the strict literal language of Section 100 may therefore, be quite impracticable and unworkable. To avoid such difficulties the Imperial - Parliament has thought fit to use the expression with respect which obviously means that looking at the legislation as a whole, it must substantially be with respect to matters in one list or the other. A remote connexion is not enough."

19. A few decided cases may be referred to for illustrating how widely and broadly some of the Entries have been construed in spite of their limited dictionary connotation. Entry 11 of List II deals with education and runs thus: "Education including universities subject to the provisions of Entries 63, 64, 65, 66 of List I and Entry 25 of List III". The expression education including universities occurring in this Entry has been interpreted in the case of Gujarat University v. Krishna Ranganath Mudholkar : AIR1963SC703 , by Shah J. (as he then was) who spoke for the majority as to include all matters relating to imparting and controlling education as also medium of instruction. Subba Rao J. who delivered a dissenting judgment on other points, observed at p. 722 as follows:

"To illustrate: education cannot be imparted effectively without books, professors, students, equipment, buildings, finance, proper medium of instruction, etc. All the said matters admittedly are comprehended by the word education, for they are the necessary concomitants of education."

In the case of Katra Education Society, Allahabad v. State of Uttar Pradesh : [1966]3SCR328 , legislative power under this very Entry Education (Entry 11 of the List II) has been held to include power to impose restrictions on the management of educational institutions in matters relating to education. In the case of Manikkasundara Bhattar v, R. S. Nayudu AIR 1947 FC 1 [] , the Madras Temple Entry Authorisation and Indemnity Act of 1939 was held to be within the legislative competence of the State Legislature under the expression charities occurring in Entry 34, List II of the Government of India Act, 1935. The Court held that the word charities was "an appropriate generic term of wide scope and meaning apt to include all public secular charitable and religious trusts and institutions recognised as such by British Indian Law and a power to legislate in respect of charities will include a power to legislate in respect of all matters connected with religious charities and institutions." In the State of Bombay v. F. N. Balsara AIR 1951 SC 318 [LQ/SC/1951/43] , the expression intoxicating liquor in Entry 31 of List II of Government of India Act, 1935 was interpreted to in elude all liquids containing alcohol irrespective of whether it was used for beverage purposes and produced intoxication or not, though the ordinary popular or dictionary meaning of liquor was not so wide and was confined to beverages. Of course, it must be stated that this was so held because of legislative practice in the country, ,but all the same dictionary meaning was not regarded as conclusive, in Kesavananda Bharatis case, : AIR1973SC1461 Justice Chandrachud while considering the true meaning and scope of words like amending in Article 363 or law in Article 13(2) of the Constitution (at p. 2027) has observed thus:

"It is useful to have a dictionary by ones side and experience has it that a timely reference to a dictionary helps avert many an embarrassing situation toy correcting ones inveterate misconception of the meaning of some words. But I do not think that mere dictionaries will help one understand the true meaning and scope of words like amendment in Article 368 or law in Article 13(2). These are not words occurring in a school text-book so that one can find their meaning with a dictionary on ones right and a book of grammar on ones left. These are words occurring in a Constitution and one must look at them not in a schoolmasterly fashion, not with the cold eye of a lexicographer, but with the realization that they occur in "a single complex instrument, in which one part may throw light on another", so that "the construction must hold a balance between all its parts". Per Lord Wright in James v. Commonwealth of Australia (1936) AC 578 Such words, having so significant an impact on a power as important as the power to amend the Constitution cannot fee read in vacuo." These observations clearly show that in construing the words occurring in a document like the Constitution either in its Articles or in the Entries obtaining in the three Legislative Lists, dictionaries may not afford an infallible guide.

20. From the above discussion the following general principles would be clearly deducible: (a) Entries in the three Lists are merely legislative heads or fields of legislation, they demarcate the area over which the appropriate legislatures can operate; (b) Allocation of subjects in the Lists is not by way of scientific or logical definition but is a mere enumeration of broad and comprehensive categories; dictionary meaning of the words used, though helpful, is not decisive; (c) Entries should be interpreted broadly and liberally, widest amplitude being given to the words employed, because few words of an entry ere intended to confer vast and plenary powers; (d) Entries being heads of legislation, none of the items in the Lists is to fee read in a narrow and restricted sense but should be read broadly so as to cover or extend to all cognate, subsidiary, ancillary or incidental matters, which can fairly and reasonably be said to be comprehended in it; (e) Since the specific entries in the three Lists between them exhaust all conceivable subjects of legislation, every matter dealt with by an enactment should as far as possible be allocated to one or the other of the Entries in the Lists and the residuary Entry 97 in List I should be resorted to as the last refuge; and (f) If entries either from different Lists or from the same List overlap or appear to conflict with each other, every effort is to be made to reconcile and bring out harmony between them by recourse to known methods of reconciliation. It is by reference to these general principles that the question about the true scope and ambit of Entry 19 of List II which deals with forests will have to be decided.

21. Entry 19 of List II consists of only one word or expression forests and the principal question is whether as a legislative head that expression takes within its sweep forest produce so as to render Section 3 valid as falling within the States legislative competence. In order to decide this question, we will have to answer two queries: (1) What is really meant by expression forest produce and (2) What is it that the State Legislature has intended to include in the concept of forest produce for the purpose of vesting the same in the State Government along with private forests under Section 3 of the impugned Act It is these two queries which form the crux of the problem before us and the answers to these queries will furnish a satisfactory solution to the problem. Dealing first with the expression forest it cannot be disputed that that expression in its normal and popular connotation includes all that goes with it, such as, trees with fruits on them, shrubs, bushes, woody vegetation, undergrowth, pastures, honey-combs attached to trees, juices dried on trees, things embedded in the earth like mines and quarries with their produce locked up in the land, wild and stray animals (excluding domestic animals like cows, buffalos, goats, sheep etc.) living in the forest; in other words, forest produce in its primary and natural state lying in the forest as well as wild animals living therein unquestionably go with the forest and there can be no dispute that such forest produce and such wild animals would be included in the concept of forest and the expression forests as a legislative head would surely include within its compass all these things. The next question is whether when such forest produce gets severed from its place of birth or origin it ceases to be a part of the forest Standing trees laden with fruits, shrubs, bushes, honey-combs, etc. may get uprooted or may fall by forces of nature like strong gale, hail-storms, etc. but may continue to lie in a fallen condition in the forest. It is true that ordinarily fallen trees cease to be trees due to loss of connection with land that provides them sustenance and nourishment but surely fallen trees if they continue to lie there in the same condition form part of the forest and similarly uprooted shrubs and bushes and even fruits and honeycombs that have fallen if these continue to lie in the same condition in the forest they would form part of the forest. Therefore, such forest produce though severed from its place of birth or origin will certainly continue to. form part of the forest and as such will be included in the concept of forest. The further question is what happens if the severance occurs by the intervention of a human agency In our view, even if any forest produce is severed from its place of birth or origin through the intervention of a human agency, if such severed forest produce continues to lie in the forest in its primary or predominantly primary state without anything being done to it for altering or changing its natural condition, the same will still form part of the forest. In our view, in principle there is no difference between the forest produce that has naturally fallen and the forest produce that has been felled or detached from its place of birth or origin by human agency so long as it continues to lie in the forest in its primary or predominantly primary state; for instance, if the standing trees are felled and such felled trees continue to lie in the forest in the same condition without anything being done to them in the direction of converting or fashioning them into logs, these would still form part of the forest; similarly, if honey-combs are detached from trees by a human agency but continue to lie in the forest in the same condition without the process of extracting honey therefrom in containers being undertaken, they would form part of the forest. Similarly, if mines and quarries remain beneath the surface of the earth with minerals, stones and other products locked up in the land, these will form part of the forest. What types of processes undertaken will make such forest produce, severance whereof from its place of birth or origin has been effected by a human agency, ceases to be in its primary or predominantly primary state will depend upon the nature or kind of the produce and the degree of sophistication done to it and will have to be decided on the facts of each case, but so long as any such forest produce, whether attached to or detached from its place of birth or origin, is lying in the forest in its primary or predominantly primary state, it will form part of the forest and the expression forest will include it within its compass.

22, Looked at from this angle, it is difficult to accept the broad proposition urged by counsel for the petitioners that the expression forests in Entry 19 in List II because of its dictionary meaning will not include forest produce on the ground that the forest produce is a distinct and separate species of property. In our view, even the dictionary meaning of the word forest does not lend support to such a contention. It is true that in Oxford English Dictionary, Vol. IV, at p. 422 three meanings of the word forest have been given viz. (i) an extensive tract of land covered with trees and undergrowth, sometimes intermingled with pasture; also the trees collectively of a forest; (ii) (legal meaning) a woodland district, usually belonging to the King, set apart for hunting wild beasts and game etc and (iii) a wild uncultivated waste, wilderness. Relying on the first of the three meanings which would be applicable, counsel for the petitioners have contended that the dictionary meaning shows that a forest is basically a land of a particular description viz. land covered with trees and undergrowth etc.; and therefore the further contention is that the expression forest cannot as a matter of plain language apply to forest produce in the form of moveable property lying on the land; in other words, forest produce being a distinct and separate species of property the same is not covered within the expression forest. In our view, to say that forest is basically a land of particular description and that it does not include forest produce as it is a distinct species of moveable property is to adopt a technical and an erroneous approach. The words covered with trees and undergrowth, sometimes intermingled with pasture which follow the expression an extensive tract of land cannot be regarded as mere words of description, describing a particular type of land, but are words which show what is included in the forest. In other words, even the dictionary meaning clearly shows that forest means an extensive tract of land together with the trees and undergrowth which covers such tract and also includes pastures which intermingled with such tract. That a forest includes trees becomes very clear from the second part of the applicable meaning where it is stated: forest means also the trees collectively of a forest. In our view, therefore, even the dictionary meaning of the expression forest makes the position clear that forest means not only an extensive tract of land but includes the trees, undergrowth and pastures grown or found lying on such tract of land. The expression forest produce need not and cannot be confined only to that type of produce which has got severed or detached from its place of birth or origin and has become moveable property as is sought to be suggested but includes both types of produce, severed as well as unsevered from its place of birth or origin. In other words, the aspect whether a particular forest produce has become moveable property or not by reason of either physical severance from its place of birth or origin or legal severance, as in the case of standing trees under a contract of sale where property has passed to the purchaser, is not of much consequence, but the test would be whether the forest produce, even if it were severed from its place of birth or origin either physically or legally, is lying in the forest in its primary or predominantly primary state and if it is so lying, it will form part of the forest and the expression forests as a legislative head under Entry 19 of List II will include the same within its compass but if such produce has ceased to be in its primary or predominantly primary state by reason of any sophistication done to it the same will not form part of the forest and the legislative head forests under Entry 19 of List II will not include it within its scope.

23. Having answered the first query in the aforesaid manner, we shall now deal with the second question as to what is it that the State Legislature has intended to include in the expression forest produce for the purpose of vesting the same in the State Government under Section 3 of the Act, for, having regard to our aforesaid conclusion on the first query if the State Legislature has attempted to vest in the State Government only such forest produce as lies in its natural or primary condition in the private forest concerned, Section 3 would be within its competence, but on the other hand, if the State Legislature has attempted to include forest produce which has ceased to be in its natural or primary condition or in its predominantly natural or primary condition by reason of any processes being applied to it, such attempt would obviously be beyond its legislative competence and Section 3 to that extent will have to be struck down. In order to decide this question we will have to consider the true effect of the artificial definitions of the two expressions forest and private forest given in Section 2(c-l) and Section 2(f) read with Section 3 of the impugned Act. Two or three contentions have been urged before us by counsel for the petitioners in this behalf. In the first place, it is contended that the expression forest has been so artificially defined in Section 2(c-1) that besides including within its compass a natural forest as per dictionary meaning (vide meaning part of the definition), the expression includes certain types of lands (vide Sub-clause (i) to (iv) which are not natural forests but are regarded as deemed forests and by the inclusive sub* Clause (v) all the forest produce not merely of the natural forest but of such deemed forests has been included in the definition of forest; that even where the definition seeks to define a natural forest (in the meaning part of the definition) an artificiality is introduced, inasmuch as, trees which form part of natural forest are qualified by the words whether standing, felled, found or otherwise and that even in Sub-clause (v) when it artificially includes all the forest produce in the definition of forest, the same type of artificiality is introduced toy qualifying the expression forest produce by the words whether standing, felled, found or otherwise. Secondly, it is contended that the expression private forest has been similarly artificially defined so as to include within its compass six heads under Sub-clauses (i) to (vi) out of which the first four sub-clauses at any rate refer to lands in respect of which some action has been taken by Government under Sections 34A, 35(1), 35(3) and 38 of the Indian Forest Act, 1927 and by such device mines and quarry lands, which may not be properly described as forest have been included and it has been urged that at least in respect of lands covered by Sub-clause (iii) these would become forest by mere issuance of a notice under Section 35(3) without any inquiry or hearing, since with effect from 30-8-1975. Section 35 of the Forest Act has been repealed and what is more, all the produce of such lands as would fall within Sub-clauses (i) to (iv) is sought to be vested in the State Government irrespective of whether such lands are truly forests in the natural sense of the term or not; in other words, both these artificial definitions are beyond the legislative competence of the State Legislature. Thirdly, it has been contended that the expression forest produce has not been defined in the impugned Act but by reason of Section 2 (h) that expression will have the same meaning as has been assigned to it in Section 2(4) of the Forest Act, 1927 and it is further pointed out that under Section 2(4) of the Forest Act forest produce includes under Sub-clause (a) timber and under Sub-clause (b-i) trees and these two expressions timber and trees ere further defined in Section 2(6) and Section 2(7) of the Forest Act and the contention is that these definitions contained in Section 2(4), 2(5) and 2(7) of the Forest Act will have to be read into the expression forest produce occurring in Section 2(c-1)(v) and if that is done, forest produce under Section 2(c-1)(v) would include several items of forest produce wherever found and in whatever form (natural or sophisticated) and irrespective of whether they belong to the concerned private forest or not and that would certainly be beyond the legislative competence of the State Legislature.

24. At the outset it may be pointed out that we are not concerned in this case with forest produce that may grow or would be found lying in the private forests after 30th Aug. 1975, for, it was not dispute before us that all forest produce in future after the private forests have vested in the State Government under Section 3 of the impugned Act would belong to the State Government and in these petitions we are merely concerned with forest produce of these private forests already grown therein or which was lying there prior to 30th Aug. 1975 and the question is how much such forest produce vests in the State Government under Section 3 of the Act, particularly having regard to the artificial definitions of forest and private forest having been incorporated in the enactment. Now, it cannot be disputed that it is permissible to the State Legislature to introduce artificial definitions in an enactment and even to direct that assumptions of facts be made for the purpose of the enactment, which facts may not in reality exist. However, such device obviously cannot be resorted to for enabling it to legislate on matters over which it has no legislative competence. Therefore, if it is found that an enactment seeks to cover under such artificial definition something over which the legislature has no competence, the enactment to that extent is liable to be struck down as invalid. The question in the instant case that arises for our consideration is whether by introducing artificial definitions of the two expressions forest and private forest in Section 2(c-1) and Section 2 (f) respectively in the Acquisition Act, the State Legislature has sought to cover or provide for something over which it has no competence. A detailed examination of these definitions, therefore, becomes necessary. 25. Dealing first with the definition of forest in Section 2(c-1) it consists of the main clause indicating what the expression means according to legislature and five other clauses indicating what the expression includes according to legislature. The main (meaning) clause is again in two parts; the first part refers to what can be described as natural forest except to the extent that the parenthetical words whether standing, felled, found or otherwise describe trees in an artificial manner. for. it, is obvious that fallen or felled trees ordinarily cease to be trees with the loss of their connection with the land that nourishes them it is true that the parenthetical words introduce some sort of artificiality. Further in connection with the trees the expression standing, felled and found are understandable but the expression or otherwise appears to be a little inapt and it is difficult to understand what is sought to be conveyed thereby. However, it appears that the expression or otherwise seems to have been used out of abundant caution for describing some condition of trees which is not covered by the earlier expressions. It is true that fallen or felled trees ordinarily cease to be trees but as discussed earlier, these without anything more being done to them, do not cease to be part of the forest if they are lying there in their primary or natural state and therefore it cannot be said that the artificiality introduces something over which the State Legislature has no competence. The second part of the main (meaning) clause refers to another tract of land on which the growth of trees, shrubs, bushes and woody vegetation is found but not as thick as is ordinarily found in the natural forest and even such tract of land is brought within the purview of the expression forest because such growth is likely to have effect on certain aspects or matters as any natural forest would have and diverse aspects or matters have been enumerated on which such growth is likely to have effect, such as, (i) on the supply of timber, fuel, forest produce, or grazing facilities, (ii) on climate, stream flow, protection of land from erosion, and (iii) on such other matters. The effect of the growth on the aforesaid matters is made the determinative factor for bringing in such tract of land within the purview of forest. Unfortunately this clause is not happily worded, but it does appear clear that the word such in the expression such tract of land refers to another tract of land and the word such occurring in the expression such growth refers to similar growth of the type mentioned in the first part of the main clause but not as thick and the expression other such matters occurring at the end of the clause will have to be read ejusdem generis with matters or aspects which precede that expression. In our view, this is the only reasonable manner in which the second part of the main clause can be interpreted. In other words, the second part of the main clause, seems to be intended to bring within the definition of forest such other tracts of land on which growth of trees, shrubs, bushes etc. is less thicker than that of natural forest, conceived under the first part of the main clause, but where the growth is still capable of having the effect on the aspects or matters enumerated therein. It is clear that a reasonable nexus exists between the tract of land covered by this second part of the main clause with natural forest and the tract of land covered by this part of the main clause has ensured the existence of essential attributes of natural forest and therefore cannot be regarded as artificial. Turning to the inclusive part of the definition, Sub-clauses (i) to (iv) refer to lands of particular description viz. land covered with stumps of trees of a forest; land which is part of a forest or lies within it or was part of a forest or was lying within a forest on 30th Aug. 1975; such pasture land, water-logged or cultivable or non-cultivable land, lying within or linked to a forest, as may be declared to be forest by the State Government; and forest land held or let for purpose of agriculture or for any purposes ancillary thereto; while Sub-clause (v) includes within the definition of forest "all the forest produce therein, whether standing, felled, found or otherwise". Items of land included in the first four sub-clauses unquestionably have some nexus with the natural forest. Actually lands sought to be covered by Sub-clauses (i), (ii) and (iv) present no difficulty whatsoever, (or, these sub-clauses in terms refer to pieces of lands which were essentially forests or parts thereof but have undergone some changes and alterations indicated; for instance, in Sub-clause (i) trees have been cut or dismembered and merely stumps have been left and in Sub-clause (iv) land which is essentially forest is used for the purpose of agriculture and other ancillary purposes. The changed or altered user indicated cannot alter the basic character of land being a forest. Sub-clause (iii) gives an impression as if the State Government can declare any land, even non-cultivable land, as forest and that too without leaving any remedy to an aggrieved person to demonstrate to the contrary. It is true that there its no separate section in the Act authorising the State to make such a declaration or indicating any criteria for that purpose. Even so, it seems to us clear that Sub-clause (iii) cannot be regarded as conferring unregulated authority on the State Government to make such declaration. In th first place, pasture land mentioned in Sub-clause (iii) falls within the normal dictionary meaning of the expression forest but that apart, the types of land mentioned in this sub-clause viz. pasture lands water-logged or eruptive-able or non-cultivable land must either lie within or be linked to a forest and it is only when this condition is satisfied that the State Government can make a declaration that such land is a forest. Therefore, it cannot be said that there exists no criteria for making a declaration with regard to type of land covered by this sub-clause; its (lands) lying within or being linked to forest affords the basis ,and obviously it is left to the State Government to decide to what extent or degree such pieces of land should be closely linked with forest. Objections of persons interested in such land can be adjudicated under Section 6; It is true that in the enquiry and adjudication of disputes contemplated by Section 6 the objections that are required to be considered by the Collector are whether any forest is a private forest or not and whether any private forest or portion thereof OT dwelling houses constructed therein stands acquired or vested in the Government or not. But, in our view, the objection that the land is not a private forest would also include the objection that it is not forest at all. This position, it may be stated, was conceded by Counsel appearing for the State of Maharashtra. The types of land that are sought to be included within the definition of forest under Sub-clauses (i) to (iv) of the inclusive part of the definition therefore cannot be said to be remotely connected with the natural forest but are- such as possess reasonable nexus, close connection with and attributes of a natural forest and therefore, in our view, the artificiality, if any. cannot be said to introduce such matters over which the State Legislature has no competence.

26. Turning to the most material sub-clause of inclusive part of the definition viz. Sub-clause (v) whereby all the forest produce therein, whether standing, felled, found or otherwise is sought to be brought within the compass of the definition, it may be stated that the expression forest produce is again described in an artificial manner by qualifying the same with words whether standing, felled, found or otherwise -- the same type of artificiality as is to .be found in the first part of the main (meaning) clause where natural forest is defined but trees whereof are qualified by similar words whether standing, felled, found or otherwise. Here again, in connection with forest produce, which among others would include trees, fruits honeycombs, etc., the expressions standing, felled and found are understandable, but the expression or otherwise seems to be a little inapt, but also the expression or otherwise must be taken to have been used out of abundant caution for describing some condition of forest produce which is not covered by the earlier expressions. Here also, as, discussed earlier, the fallen or felled forest produce without any changes being brought about by any process of sophistication and lying in its primary] or natural state in the forest would form part of forest and as such the; aforesaid artificiality cannot be said to I introduce something over which the State Legislature has no competence.

27. The next contention with regard to expression forest produce occurring in Sub-clause (v) of Section 2(c-1) has been that the expression has not been defined in the impugned Act and by reason of Section 2 (h) the meaning that has been assigned to it in Section 2(4) of Forest Act, 1927 will have to be read into it and according to Counsel for the petitioners reading the definition of forest produce in the Forest Act, 1927 in Sub-clause (v) of Section 2(c-1) of the impugned Act would lead to consequences which would be clearly beyond the legislative competence of the State Legislature It is pointed out that Section 2(4) of the Forest Act gives merely an inclusive definition of that expression and is in two parts. Under Sub-clause (a) forest produce includes several enumerated items, such as, timber, charcoal, caoutchouc, catechu, wood-oil resin, natural varnish bark, lac, rauwalfia, serpentina, etc. Whether found in, or brought from, a forest or not; and under Clause (b) forest produce includes several enumerated items, such as, trees end leaves, flowers and fruits, plants not being trees (including grass, creepers, reeds and moss) and all parts or produce or such plants, wild animals and skins, tusks, horns, bones, silk, cocoons, honey, wax and all other parts of produce of animals, peat, surface, soil, rock and minerals and all products of mines or quarries, when found in, or brought from, a forest. It is further pointed out that timber which is one of the items included in Section 2(4)(a) is separately defined in the Forest Act in Section 2(6) thereof and it includes trees when they have fallen or have been felled and all wood whether cut up or fashioned or hollowed out for any purpose or not; similarly, tree which is one of the items enumerated in Section 2(4)(b) is separately defined in Section 2(7) as including palms, bamboos, stumps, brushwood and canes. According to Counsel for the petitioners reading these three definitions given in Sections 2(4), 2(6) and 2(7) of the Forest Act, into the expression forest produce occurring in Sub- Clause (v) of Section 2(c-1), it will appear clear that forest produce under Section 2(c-1)(v) would include several items of forest produce wherever found and in whatever form, natural or sophisticated and irrespective of whether they belong to concerned private forest or not and this would certainly be beyond the legislative competence of the State Legislature. It is not possible to accept this contention for the reasons which we shall presently indicate.

28. In the first place, notwithstanding Section 2 (h) of the Acquisition Act, the (definition of forest produce given in Section 2(4) of the Forest Act together with two ancillary definitions of timber and trees given in Section 2(6) and Section 2(7) cannot be read into the expression forest produce occurring in Section 2(c-1)(v), not because one definition cannot be read into another as has been the contention of Counsel for the petitioners in different context, but principally for the definition of forest produce in two or three reasons. In the first place, Section 2(4) of the Forest Act as also the definitions of timber and tree in Sections 2(6) and 2(7) occurring in the Forest Act have been given there for the purposes of Forest Act and the aims and object intended to be served by the Forest Act, 1927 are entirely different from the aims and object intended to be served by the Acquisition Act before us. The Forest Act was put on the Statute Book for the purpose of consolidating the law relating to forests the transit of forest produce and the duty leviable on timber and other forest produce and it was with a view to carry out the aforesaid purposes of that enactment that certain expressions, particularly forest produce, timber and tree have been defined in the manner done in the definition Section 2. Width of the definitions under Sections 2(4), 2(6) and 2(7) was necessitated by the legislative anxiety to ensure prevention of thefts, proper transportation across custom frontiers and evasion of leviable duty. In contrast the aim or object of the Acquisition Act is nothing more and nothing less than the acquisition of private forests along with its produce, and the enactment has nothing to do with thefts or transportation of produce or levying of any duty thereon. The aims and objects of the two enactments being different, it would be unreasonable to read the definitions of Sections 2(4), 2(6) and 2(7) of the Forest Act into the expression forest produce occurring in| Section 2(c-1)(v) of the Acquisition Act. Secondly, if so read, it would lead to incongruous and absurd results. Thirdly, Sub-clause (v) runs all the forest produce therein, and the juxtaposition in which the two expressions forest produce and therein occur clearly suggests that the context requires that the definitions in Section 2(4), 2(6) and 2(7) of the Forest Act should not be read into Section 2. It is, therefore, not possible to read these definitions of the Forest Act, 1927 into Section 2(c-1)(v) of the Acquisition Act.

29. What then would be the true connotation of the expression forest produce occurring in Sub-clause (v) In the first place, the expression forest produce occurs in Sub-clause (v) which is in the inclusive part of the definition of the expression forest itself and the effect is that Forest includes "all the forest produce therein". Secondly, toe-sides defining the expression forest as above, the Act also defines the expression private forest and thirdly, under the operative part of Section 3 of the Act all private forests have been acquired and stand vested in the State Government on and from 30th Aug 1975. This scheme of the enactment in the context of its main aim and object together with the language employed in Sub-clause (v) gives rise to certain implications, the first implication is that the produce must necessarily be the growth in and produce of the private forest concerned which is to vest in the State; the second implication is that such produce must be found or must lie in such private forest on the appointed day; and the third implication is that such produce even if severed from its place of birth (whether standing, felled or found) must be capable of being called forest produce and hence must be in its primary or predominantly primary state. The word therein following immediately after the words forest produce in Sub-clause (v) is not without significance and, in our view, produce removed out of the concerned forest would be outside the definition and only such produce which is still lying in the concerned forest even after severance from its place of birth or origin on 30th August 1975 is alone liable to be included provided such produce so lying there carries with it the imprints of its primary or natural condition. No sooner such produce has ceased to be in its natural or primary or predominantly natural or primary state by reason of any processes of sophistication being undertaken, the same even if it is lying there would be outside the definition. In our view, the scheme of Section 3 read with the two definitions and the word therein occurring in Sub-clause (v) which is full of significance clearly bring out the legislative intent to include within expression forest produce such produce which satisfied three conditions viz., (i) it must be the produce of the private forest concerned, (ii) it must be lying in the forest in normal course on the appointed day and (iii) irrespective of whether it is attached or embedded or severed from its place of birth or origin, it must be found in its primary or predominantly primary state or condition without any process of sophistication having been undertaken in regard to it. As stated earlier what types of processes undertaken will make such forest produce cease to be in its primary or predominantly primary state will depend upon the nature or kind of the produce and the degree of sophistication done to it and will have to be decided on the facts of each case. If this is the true meaning of the expression forest produce occurring in Sub-clause (v) which is the inclusive part of the definition forest in Section 2(c-1), in our view, the artificiality that is to be found in this part of inclusive definition the expression forest cannot be said to introduce anything over which the State Legislature has no competence. Having regard to the above discussion, we have no hesitation in coming to the conclusion that Section 2(c-1) which defines forest, notwithstanding some amount of artificiality therein, is within the legislative competence of the State Legislature.

30. Turning to the definition of private forest given in Section 2 (f), it will appear clear that even this definition consists of two parts; the first part indicating what the expression means according to the Legislature and the second part indicating what the expression includes according to the Legislature. In the first part private forest has been defined to mean any forest which is not the property of the Government while under the inclusive part six items or heads mentioned in Sub-clauses (i) to (vi) have been included in the definition. The meaning part presents no difficulty and the question is about the inclusive part of the definition. The true impact of this inclusive part of the definition cannot be realised without bearing in mind the provisions of Chapter V of the Forest Act, 1927. It may be stated that the Indian Forest Act, 1927 deals with different types of forest, such as, (i) Reserved forests, (ii) Village forests, (iii) Protected forests and (iv) Forests which are not the property of Government; Chapter V deals with the fourth category of forest and contains Sections 34-A, 35 and 38. Under Section 34A it has been provided that for the purposes of that Chapter forest includes any land containing trees and shrubs, pasture lands and any other land whatsoever which the State Government may, by notification, declare to be a forest. Section 35(1) enables the State Government to issue a notification regulating or prohibiting certain acts, such as, breaking up or clearing of the land for cultivation, pasturing of cattle, firing or clearing of the vegetation, girdling, tapping or burning of any tree or the stripping off the bark or leaves from any trees, cutting, sawing, conversion and removal of trees and timber; or quarrying of stone or the burning of lime or charcoal, etc., when such regulation or prohibition appears necessary for any forest not belonging to Government, for the purpose of conservation of trees and forests, preservation and improvement of soil, improvement of grazing, maintenance of a water supply In springs, rivers and tanks, maintenance, increase and distribution of the supply of fodder, leaf manure, timber or fuel, maintenance of reservoirs or irrigation works, protection of roads, bridges, railways and other lines of communication and preservation of the public health, etc. Under Sub-section (3) of Section 35 it is provided that no notification under Sub-clause (1) shall be issued until after a show cause notice to the owner of such forest has been issued and until his objections, if any are heard and considered by Government. Section 38 provides for protection of private forest at the request of the owners and states that upon a request in that behalf being made by the owners the State Government can apply the provisions of the Forest Act to such private forest by means of a notification. If Sub-clauses (i) to (iv) of Section 2(f) are read in the light of the aforesaid provisions of Sections 34A, 35 and 38 of the Forest Act, 1927, it will appear clear that these Sub-clauses bring within the definition of private forest four types of land in respect of which action has been taken by the State Government under Sections 34A, 35(1), 35(3) and 38 of the Forest Act. Sub-clause (i) brings within the definition of private forest any land declared before the appointed day to be a forest under Section 34A of the Forest Act and Sub-clause (ii) brings any forest in respect of which a notification under Section 35(1) of the Forest Act has been issued immediately before the appointed day within the category of private forest. Both the sections viz. 34A and 35 of the Forest Act have been repealed with effect from 30th Aug. 1975 after the coming into force of the Acquisition Act and in view of such repeal no fresh declaration by issuing a notification under Section 34A or fresh issuance of a notification under Section 35(1) is now possible. As regards action taken either under Section 34A or under Section 35(1) prior to 30-8-1975 our attention was not drawn to any defective declaration or defective notification issued under either of these provisions. Moreover, it would be reasonable to assume that such prior declaration under Section 34A was in respect of such land as possessed the essential attributes of a forest. Prior action under Section 35(1) must have been merely regulatory or prohibitory of certain acts specified in the section and that too in respect of forest inasmuch as the power to issue such regulations or prohibitions is confined to forests. No grievance can be made with regard to action taken by means of a notification under Section 38 of the Forest Act in respect of land mentioned in Sub-clause (iv), inasmuch as, such action is taken with a view to formation or conservation of forest over such land at the request of the owners of land. It is thus clear that Sub-clauses (i), (ii) and (iv) of Section 2(f) deal with declared, adjudicated or admitted instances of forests. Sub-clause (iii) of Section 2(f) no doubt seeks to cover land in respect of which merely a notice has been issued to the owner of a private forest under Section 35(3) and his objections may have remained unheard till 30-8-1975 as Section 35 has stood repealed on the coming into force of the Acquisition Act. Here also, as in the case of owners of land falling under Sub-clause (iii) of Section 2(c-1), his objections, if any, including his objection that his land cannot be styled as forest at all can be heard and disposed of under Section 6 of the Acquisition Act, and this position was conceded by Counsel appearing for the State of Maharashtra. Sub-clause (v) includes within the definition of private forest the interest of another person who along with Government is jointly interested in a forest, while Sub-clause (vi) includes sites of dwelling houses constructed in such forest which are considered to be necessary for the convenient enjoyment or use of forest and lands appurtenant thereto. In our view, the artificiality involved, if any, in the definition of private forest in Section 2(f) is indeed of a very minor nature and does not introduce anything over which the State Legislature has no competence. The contention of Mr. Singhvi and Mr. Paranjpe that under the artificial definitions even lands which cannot by any stretch of imagination be regarded as forest in its normal or natural connotation have been brought within that concept as well as their apprehension that lands which may be barren tracts where quarrying operations may be carried on may be included in the artificial definitions under the power of declaration conferred on the State without any hearing are misconceived. In the first place, the artificial parts of the two definitions of forest and private forest do not do anything of the kind as suggested and secondly under Section 6 of the Act owners of such land which is sought to be declared as forest would have an opportunity of raising objections to the proposed declarations and of satisfying the Government that their lands are not and cannot be treated or declared as forests.

31. We may now deal with two more submissions that have been urged by Counsel for the petitioners in support of the contention that the forest produce, of the private forests which vest in the State Government under Section 3 of the Act, was not intended to pass to the State Government, one based on the construction of Section 3 read with the two definitions of forest and private forest given in Sections 2(c-1) and 2(f) respectively and the other based on the absence of any provision for payment of compensation or amount for acquisition of forest produce in the Act. Dealing with the first aspect Mr. Seervai has contended that on its proper construction Section 3 of the impugned Act vests in the State Government all private forests and the expression private forest occurring in the operative part of that section must mean private forests as defined in Section 2 (f) in which definition forest produce is not included and therefore on a strict construction of Section 3 read with Section 2 (f) no forest produce of the private forests which have vested in under Section 3 would vest in the State. He has urged a two-fold argument in support of this construction. In the first place the word forest in the composite expression private forest must mean natural forest according to the dictionary meaning and that word cannot be given the artificial meaning which has been assigned to it in Section 2(c-1), for, according to him, one definition cannot be read into another definition and as such though the definition of forest in Section 2(c-1) includes forest produce under Sub-clause (v) of that definition, the same cannot he read into or form part of private forest under Section 2 (f). Secondly, when Act 29/75 was initially amended by Ordinance 13 of 1975 Sub-clause (vii) which spoke of all the forest produce therein was added in the definition of private forest in Section 2 (f) but when the Act was further amended by the Amending Act 72 of 1975 (which replaced the Ordinance) that Sub-clause (vii) was deleted from Section 2 (f) and was added as a new Sub- Clause (v) to the definition of forest under Section 2 (c-1) and as such the amending measure (Act 72 of 1975) must be held to have misfired. The net result, according to Mr. Seervai, is that the forest produce would not vest in the State Government along with private forests on a proper construction of Section 3 of the Act. It is not possible to accept this contention for the reasons which we shall presently indicate.

32. In the first place, the scheme clearly shows that under Section 3 all private forests vest in the State Government and since both the expressions --forest as well as private forest --have been defined in the Act what vests in the State Government is private forest as per Section 2 (f) and in order to be private forest under Section 2 (f) it must be forest under Section 2 (c-1) in the first instance and read in this manner the expression all the private forests occurring in Section 3 will include forest produce. it is not possible to accept the argument that the word forest occurring in the composite expression private forest should not be given the meaning which has been assigned to it in Section 2 (c-1). It has been urged that the function of a definition section or Interpretation Clause is to define the words so that when they are used in the enacting parts of the Act they have the meaning assigned to them in the definition section unless the context otherwise requires and it is pointed out that the words in the opening part of Section 2 viz. unless the context otherwise requires are inapplicable to the definition sections themselves, for, the definitions in Interpretation Clauses have no context and the question of context only arises when the words defined are used in a section (enabling part of the Act) and it is possible that the context of that section by itself or read along with other sections may require a different meaning being given to that word than the meaning assigned to it by the definition section. No authority was cited for the proposition that one definition cannot be read into another definition in an enactment. In fact, such proposition runs counter to the mandate contained in the opening words of Section 2 itself, which directs in this Act unless the context otherwise requires, the words defined shall be given the meanings assigned to them. The definition section, it cannot be disputed, is a part of the Act and as such pursuant to the direction or mandate the word forest occurring in the composite expression private forest in Section 2 (f) must be given the meaning assigned to that word in Section 2(c-1). Reference to context and the submission based on the words unless the context otherwise requires occurring at the commencement of Section 2 appears to us to be irrelevant. The function of the words unless the context otherwise re-quires occurring at the commencement of Section 2 is merely to direct that wherever context otherwise requires a different meaning and not the meaning assigned to the word by the definition should be given. These words do not have any bearing on the mandate which is to be found in Section 2. Definitions in Interpretation Clauses may have no context (though this may not be true of all definitions) but therefore, all the more reason, why the word forest in the composite expression forest-produce in Section 2 (f) should be given the meaning assigned to it in Section 2 (c-1). Moreover, as stated earlier, the scheme itself suggests that what vests in the State under Section 3 are private forests as defined by Section 2 (f) but such private forests must in the first instance be forests as defined by Section 2 (c-1) and read in that manner the forest produce would vest in the State Government along with the private forest under Section 3 of the Act.

33. On the question whether the amending measure viz. Act 72 of 1975 has misfired, a little legislative history will be material. From the outset the intention of the Legislature has been very clear, namely to include forest produce lying in all private forests for the purpose of vesting the same in the State Government along with the private forests themselves. As stated earlier. Act 29 of 1975 initially did not define the expression forest nor forest produce but merely defined the expression private forest. When during the hearing of Special Civil Application No. 1553 of 1974 it became clear that the contention of the petitioners that the forest produce in the form of cut timber or felled material would not be includible in the concept of forest and therefore would not pass to the State Government under Section 3 was likely to succeed before the Division Bench the Ordinance 13 of 1975 was promulgated which supplied the definition of forest as also of the expression forest produce and in the definition of private forest Clause (vii) was added which spoke of all the forest produce therein and on the strength of these amendments the State sought to include forest produce including the cut timber or felled material within the expression forest but both the learned Judges of the Division Bench unanimously took the view that the definition of private forest was subordinate to the main definition of forest and as such the addition of Clause (vii) to the definition of private forest could not improve the matter in the absence of the expression forest itself including such forest produce in its definition. It was as a result of such unanimous expression of opinion on the part of the learned Judges of the Division Bench that the State Legislature while replacing the Ordinance by the Amending Act 72 of 1975 effected the necessary change by deleting Sub-clause (vii) from the definition of private forest in Section 2 (f) and adding it as Sub-clause (v) to the definition of forest in Section 2 (c-1). This legislative history is a clear pointer to the legislative intention of including forest produce and vesting the same in the State Government along with all the private forests that vest in the State Government under Section 3 of the Act. The amending measure, therefore, when it was introduced in conformity with the unanimous judicial opinion expressed by the Division Bench of this Court cannot be said to have misfired. Moreover, as stated above, if the definition of forest including Sub-clause (v) thereof is read into the definition of private forest in Section 2 (f) it will be clear that forest produce was intended to and does actually vest in the State Government along with private forests that are vested in the State Government under Section 3 of the Act.

34. The next aspect that has been pressed into service is the absence of a provision for payment of compensation or amount for acquisition of forest produce, particularly felled timber, in the Act, which it is contended, clearly indicates a legislative intent that the forest produce of private forests should not vest in the State Government under Section 3 of the Act. In this behalf reference was made to Section 7 of the Act and the following sections which make a provision for payment of amount to the owners of private forests and the machinery for determination of that amount. It is pointed out that Section 7 contemplates payment of amount only for land and the basis of such payment is land revenue assessment actual or notional and the contention is that if felled trees and other forest produce had been intended to be acquired payment therefore would have been separately provided for and the absence of such provision indicates that forest produce, particularly felled timber, was not intended to pass to the State Government. We are unable to draw such an inference from the mere fact that there is absence of separate provision for payment of compensation or amount in respect of forest produce, in the first place, as we have held above, it is only such forest produce which satisfies the three conditions mentioned earlier that vests in the State Government along with private forest and it is conceivable that since the forest produce which the Legislature intends to vest in the State Government is the one which is lying in the private forest in its primary or predominantly primary state, the Legislature may not have thought fit to provide for payment of separate compensation or amount in respect of such produce, compensation or the amount for the land being considered sufficient. In any case, this circumstance of absence of separate provision for compensation in respect of such forest produce may render the provision invalid as being violative of Article 31(2) of the Constitution (which challenge is not open, the enactment having been put on the 9th Schedule) but it has certainly no relevance to the question of legislative, competence of the State Legislature. Both these submissions are, therefore, liable to be rejected.

35. The next contention of Mr. Seervai has been that in several petitions the owners of private forests have agreed to sell the trees under written contracts of sale authorising the contractors to cut and remove them and even property in the standing trees under such agreements for sale has passed to the contractors. According to him, at least in such cases where the property has become goods and third partys rights have intervened, such trees are liable to be excluded from the definition of forest and such produce must be held to have not vested in the State Government under Section 3 of the Act. It is not possible to accept this contention for two or three reasons. In the first place, the contention loses its force in view of the conclusion which we have reached above that even severed forest produce -- be it a physical severance or legal severance -- so long as it is lying in the forest in its primary or predominantly primary condition would form part of the forest and would vest in the State Government under Section 3 of the Act. Secondly, it is irrelevant for the purpose of Section 3 as to in whom the title in the forest produce vests. Apart from these aspects of the matter the only foundation for the aforesaid contention of Mr. Seervai lies in the wide definition of the expression goods given in Section 2(7) of the Sale of Goods Act where that expression has been defined to include standing trees (being things attached to or forming part of the land) which are agreed to be severed before sale or under the contract of sale. But in our view, this special definition intended for Sale of Goods Act will have no relevance for the purposes of the impugned Act.

36. On the question of Legislative competence Mr. Singhvi has faintly argued that even if our view happens to be different from Vimadalal and Deshmukh JJ. their decision will operate as res judicata as far as Special Civil Application No. 1553 of 1974 is concerned and we will have no option but to hold that forest does not and cannot include forest produce that has become move-able property like felled material etc. According to him, the Supreme Court has not set aside the findings recorded by them by reference to Ordinance 13 of 1975 and Act 72 of 1975 has not made any material difference to the legal position. We fail to see any merit in this contention. The final order passed by this Court on 8th March 1976 in accordance with the majority view of the two learned Judges has been set aside by the Supreme Court and this Court is in terms directed to decide the case afresh in the light of rival contentions of the parties in regard to the effect of Amending Act 72 of 1975. In other words, the validity of Act 29 of 1975 as amended by Act 72 of 1975 is expressly remitted to us for our determination. Impliedly therefore the finding of the Division Bench rendered in the context of Ordinance 13 of 1975 is open for reconsideration. But apart from this aspect of the matter, a larger Bench of five Judges cannot be said to be bound by the view of two Judges of this Court. The contention is thus untenable.

37. Having regard to the aforesaid discussion, we are clearly of the view that challenge to the legislative competence of the State Legislature in regard to two artificial definitions of forest and private forest fails and must be rejected. Furthermore, since on construction we have taken the view that all that the Legislature has intended to include within the concept of forest produce which it has sought to vest in the State Government is the forest produce which satisfies three conditions mentioned above, the Acquisition Act and Section 3 there-: of fall within the legislative competence of the State Legislature under Entry 19 of List II read with Entry 42 of List III of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution.

38. In view of our aforesaid conclusion that the provisions of Section 3 of the impugned Act read with the two definitions forest and private forest -- given in Section 2(c-1) and Section 2(f) directly fall within the legislative Entry 19 of List II read with Entry 42 of List III, there is no necessity for us to discuss and/or to invoke the doctrine of ancillary and incidental powers on the basis of which Mr. Gursahani wanted to support the validity of Section 3 and the impugned Act, Similarly, there will be no question of the impugned enactment being regarded as a colourable piece of legislation as, in our view, in enacting the measure the State Legislature has not transgressed its limits. Further since we have come to the conclusion that the impugned Act and Section 3 thereof properly fall within the legislative competence of the State Legislature under Entry 19 of List II read with Entry 42 of List III, it is unnecessary for us to consider whether the said enactment and the provisions of Section 3 fall or can be justified under alternative legislative heads suggested by Mr. Gursahani viz. under Entry 42 of List III simpliciter or under Entry 18 of List II read with Entry 42 of List III or under Entry 20 of List III of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution. Further we may also observe that in view of our aforesaid conclusion, there will be no question of the impugned Act or Section 3 thereof trenching upon the residuary Entry 97 of List I of the Seventh Schedule.

39. The second ground of challenge to the constitutional validity of the Acquisition Act is that the said enactment and particularly Sections 3 and 5 thereof contravene or violate the freedom of trade, commerce and intercourse throughout the territory of India guaranteed under Article 301 of the Constitution. Mr. Seervai and other counsel for the petitioners have pointed out that the owners of private forests grow forest produce, particularly trees and the contractors purchase such forest produce for the ultimate purpose of selling the same in the market and according to them, right from the time the owners of forests proceed to enter into contracts of sale and further proceed to make applications for cutting trees in pursuance of and towards fulfilment of such contracts, the process of trade and commerce conceived in Article 301 of the Constitution must be said to have commenced and acquisition by the State Government under Section 3 of the Act of such forest produce which, sO to speak, constitutes the stock-in-trade interferes directly with the freedom of trade and commerce assured to the owners and contractors under Article 301. It has been pointed out that in Special Civil Application No. 1553 of 1974 teak and injaili trees had been cut and fashioned into logs of wood and these had been stocked in godown long prior to appointed day and that under the registered contract of sale dated 7-2-1974 such felled timber and firewood had to be transported from village Ambatha in Surgana Taluka in Maharashtra State, to Gujarat State and similarly in the other petitions standing trees were the subject-matter of contracts for sale which had been agreed to be severed and transported from the concerned forest to outside places for their ultimate sale in markets, but by reason of the provisions of Section 3 read with the provisions of Section 5 of the Acquisition Act, the petitioners have been deprived of their right to take away the said material out of the concerned forest and as such the enactment which thus provides for compulsory acquisition of stock-in-trade directly interferes with the inter-State trade as also intra-State trade in timber and fire-wood in contravention of Article 301 of the Constitution and is not protected by Clause (b) of Article 304 of the Constitution, inasmuch as, restrictions imposed on freedom of trade and commerce within and without the State of Maharashtra are highly unreasonable and not in public interest and also for the reason that neither the original enactment nor the amendments made therein were introduced or moved in the Maharashtra State Legislature with the previous sanction of the President of India. In support of this contention counsel for the petitioners have placed reliance principally upon three decisions of the Supreme Court (viz. the Atiabari case : [1961]1SCR809 , the Automobile case : [1963]1SCR491 and the Krishnan case : [1975]2SCR715 ) which lay down the law on the topic of freedom of inter-State and intra-State trade, commerce and intercourse under Part XIII and the tests to be applied for determining the violation of freedom guaranteed by Article 301 of the Constitution as also on several decisions of Australian High Court and Privy Council on similar provisions contained in Section 92 of the Australian Constitution.

40. On the other hand, counsel for the State of Maharashtra and other respondents have contended that impugned Act is a law of acquisition simpliciter having been enacted in exercise of power of eminent domain and as such would be outside Part XIII which includes the relevant Articles 301 to 307 on the topic of freedom of trade, commerce and intercourse within the territory of India. It is further contended that the impugned Act is not a part of any scheme to control, restrict or adversely affect trade and commerce, that it applies to all traders as well as non-traders alike--, that the object and purpose of the enactment is acquisition of all private forests in the State and that therefore the total divesting of all such private forests including all their produce lying therein free from encumbrances being a normal incident of such acquisition, the enactment, if at all, indirectly and remotely affects or interferes with the forests produce belonging to the owners of private forests or their contractors. Since the Act or the provisions thereof do not directly and immediately affect or interfere with the trade or commerce, the same are not violative of Article 301. It is pointed out that the direct and immediate effect test laid down in the Supreme Court decisions holds the field for the purpose of determining as to whether the impugned legislation offends Article 301 of the Constitution. In support of these pleas counsel relied upon some of the Australian decisions and the decisions of the Privy Council rendered in the context of Section 92 of the Australian Constitution. It is also contended that in substance the petitioners are making the grievance of violation of their fundamental right under Article 19(1)(g) and since the grievance of violation of that fundamental right is not available, the petitioners are indirectly making such grievance by alleging violation of Article 301 of the Constitution, in the alternative counsel for the respondents have raised a contention at the hearing, though no such specific plea has been raised in the affidavits in reply, that if Article 301 is attracted, then, the restrictions contained in the impugned Act are in public interest and the same are reasonable and as such the enactment is saved under Article 304(b). The submission that the impugned Act as well as the amendments made therein were not moved in the State Legislature with the previous sanction of the President of India has been denied.

41. Since the contention on behalf of the petitioners is based on violation of Article 301, it will be desirable to set out the provisions of that article which occurs in Part XIII of the Constitution as well as the scheme of that Part in brief. Part XIII which comprises Articles 301 to 307 deals with the topic of Trade, Commerce and Intercourse within the territory of India. Article 301 guarantees freedom of trade, commerce and intercourse throughout the territory of India while the remaining articles principally deal with restrictions which could be imposed either by Parliamentary law or by State law on" such freedom. Article 301 which has for the marginal note: Freedom of trade, commerce and intercourse runs thus:

"Subject to the other provisions of this Part, trade, commerce and intercourse throughout the territory of India shall be free."

It is clear that the above article assures freedom of inter-State as well as intra-State trade and commerce, inasmuch as, the Articles states that trade, commerce and intercourse shall be free throughout the territory of India. This conclusion is further supported by the language employed in Articles 302 and 304(b) where the restrictions contemplated are on freedom of trade, commerce and intercourse between one State and another or within a State. Under Article 302 power has been conferred upon the Parliament to impose by law restrictions on freedom of trade, commerce and intercourse between one State and another or within any part of territory of India and the only qualification is that such restrictions must be in public interest. Article 303(1) imposes restrictions on the legislative powers of Parliament and under this Article it is provided that notwithstanding anything in Article 302 Parliament shall not have the power to make any law giving any preference to any one State over another or discriminating between one State and another by virtue of any Entry relating to trade and commerce in Lists I and III of the Seventh Schedule. Article 303(1), which thus places a ban on the Parliament against the giving of preferences to one State over another or of discriminating between them, is again made subject to an exception which is carved out in Sub-Article (2) which provides that nothing in Sub-Article (1) shall prevent Parliament from making any law giving preference to one State over another or discriminating between one State and another, if it is necessary, to do so for the purpose of dealing with a situation arising from the scarcity of goods in any part of the territory of India. Article 304 confers power on the State Legislature to impose by law restrictions on trade, commerce and intercourse amongst States. It comprises of two clauses and each clause operates as a proviso to Articles 301 and 303. Clause (a) of that Article provides that the State Legislature may by law impose on goods imported from other States or the Union territories any tax to which similar goods manufactured or purchased in that State are subject, so however, as not to discriminate between goods so imported and goods so manufactured or produced. This clause therefore permits the levy on goods imported from sister States or the Union territories any tax which similar goods manufactured or produced in that State are subjected to under its taxing laws; in other words, in the matter of levy of tax on goods imported no discrimination is to be made. Clause (b) of Article 304 provides that notwithstanding anything contained in Article 301 or Article 303 the State Legislature may by law impose such reasonable restrictions on the freedom of trade, commerce and intercourse with or within that State as may be required in the public interest and the proviso to Clause (b) says that no Bill or amendment for the purpose of Clause (b) shall be introduced or moved in the Legislature without the previous sanction of the President. This provision appears to be the State analogue to the Parliaments authority defined by Article 302. However, three qualifications are required to be complied with before a State Legislature can by law impose restrictions on freedom of inter-State or intra-State trade, commerce or intercourse, namely (a) restrictions must be reasonable, (b) they must be in public interest and (c) requisite Bill or any amendment thereof can be introduced or moved in the State Legislature with the previous sanction of the President. In contrast, it will be noticed that Parliaments power to impose restrictions under Article 302 upon freedom of trade and commerce is subject to only one qualification, namely the restrictions must be in public interest and is not subject to requirement of reasonableness as is the case with the States power. Article 305 saves existing laws and laws provided for State monopolies. Article 306 has been repealed. Under Article 307 power has been conferred on the Parliament to appoint by law such authority as it considers appropriate for carrying out the purposes of Articles 301 to 304.

42. It may be stated that Article 19(1)(g) guarantees to a citizen fundamental right to practice any profession or to carry on any occupation, trade or business but this right is subject to reasonable restrictions as specified in Article 19(6). The two Articles 19(1)(g) and 301 apparently deal with different aspects of trade and commerce though to some extent overlapping is inevitable. The contrast between the two articles has been clearly indicated by S.K. Das J. in the Automobile case : [1963]1SCR491 thus:

"The first contrast between Article 19 end Article 301 is that Article 19 guarantees the right to freedom to a citizen whereas freedom granted by Article 301 is not confined to citizens. Another distinction which has been drawn is that Article 19 looks at the right from the point of view of an individual, whereas Article 301 looks at the matter from the point of view of freedom of the general volume of trade commerce and intercourse. We do not think that this distinction, if any such distinction at all exists, is material in the present cases, because an individual trader may complain of a violation of his freedom guaranteed under Article 19(1)(g) and he may also complain if the freedom assured by Article 301 has been violated. In a particular set of circumstances the two freedoms need not be the same or need not coalesce."

That an individual trader adversely affected by any enactment or executive order can challenge the validity thereof by reference to Article 301, though that article looks at the matter from the view point of freedom of general volume of trade, commerce and intercourse, has been reiterated by the Supreme Court in the case of District Collector of Hyderabad v. Ibrahim and Co. : [1970]3SCR498 where the court has referred to Article 301 in these words (see H. N. Pt. C): "The guarantee under Article 301 which imposes a restriction upon legislative power of the Parliament or the State Legislature and the declaration of freedom is not merely an abstract declaration. There is no reason to think that while placing a restriction upon legislative power the Constitution guaranteed freedom in the abstract and not of the individuals."

In fact, in this case the State had not enacted any legislation impairing the fundamental right of the firm (Ibrahim & Co.) under Article 19(1)(g) but had proceeded to make an executive order which Ibrahim & Co. had challenged by a petition on the ground that their freedom under Article 301 had been violated and the Supreme Court not merely held that the petition was maintainable but quashed the impugned executive order as being violative of Article 301. The two freedoms, one under Article 19(1)(g) and the other under Article 301 are thus separately available to an individual trader and therefore prima facie there is no substance in the respondents contention that because the right under Article 19(1)(g) is not available to them the petitioners herein cannot seek redress by alleging violation of Article 301 but it is unnecessary for us to decide this contention in view of our ultimate decision on merits of the contention based on Article 301.

43. At this stage the difference between our Article 301 and Section 92 of the Australian Constitution may also be pointed out. In the Atiabari case : [1961]1SCR809 Shah J. has no doubt observed that the basic principle underlying Art 301 appears to have been adopted from Section 92 of the Australian Constitution and in fact in the case of Ibrahim & Co. : [1970]3SCR498 he has observed that "Article 301 of the Constitution is borrowed almost verbatim from Section 92 of the Commonwealth of Australian Constitution Act 63 and 64 Vict. c. 12 of 1900." However, since decisions of the Australian High Court and of the Privy Council under Section 92 have been referred to and relied upon by counsel on either side it will be desirable to note the differences between these two similar provisions. In the first place, the setting of Section 92 of the Australian Constitution is different from our Constitution under which individual right as to freedom of trade is also guaranteed separately under Article 19, apart from the general freedom of trade, commerce and intercourse in Article 301. Secondly, whereas by Section 92 of the Australian Constitution freedom of trade, commerce and intercourse is guaranteed among the States i.e. at inter-State level, our Constitution has made trade, commerce and intercourse free throughout the territory of India; in other words, freedom guaranteed by our Constitution under Article 301 is more pervasive in the sense that it is available at both levels, inter-State as well as intra-State. Thirdly, restrictions that could be imposed on this freedom are expressly codified in Article 19(6) and Articles 302 to 307 unlike the Australian Constitution under which the Courts have been left to work them out. We feel that these differences may have to be borne in mind while considering the applicability of the ratios of several decisions of the Australian High Court and of the Privy Council rendered under Section 92 of the Australian Constitution to the problem that has arisen before us. In this context our attention was invited by Mr. Dhanuka to a few decisions of the Federal Court and Supreme Court where a note of warning has been struck against indiscriminate reliance being placed on Australian and American decisions while interpreting our Constitution : vide in the matter of the Central Provinces and Berar Sales of Motor Spirit and Lubricants Taxation Act ; M P V Sundararamier & Co. case : : [1958]1SCR1422 ; the Atiabari case: : [1961]1SCR809 and the Automobile case: : [1963]1SCR491 . Therefore, our endeavour shall be to see if the Australian cases cited on either side can be of any assistance in the solution of problem arising in the instant case bearing in mind the aforesaid differences as well as the said warning.