Edward Chamier, C.J.This appeal arises out of a suit brought by the respondent Jagannath Das for possession of 6 bighas 8 cottahs 18 dhurs of land, which were held by the appellant and another under a lease for a term of nine years which expired on May 31st, 1912. It was found by the Court of first appeal and it is now admitted that the land in question is zirat, that is, the proprietors private land within the meaning of Chapter XI of the Bengal Tenancy Act. The suit was brought on December 5th, 1912, a little more than six months after the expiration of the term of the lease. The only question which we have to decide in this appeal is whether the suit is barred by limitation. The Munsif and Subordinate Judge held that the suit had been brought within time and their view was accepted by a learned Judge of this Court. Article 1(a) of Schedule III to the Bengal Tenancy Act provides that a suit to eject a non-occupancy raiyat on the ground of the expiration of the term of his lease shall be brought within six months from the expiration of the term. The appellant contends that the suit is governed by this provision and is, therefore, barred by limitation. The plaintiff-respondent contends that the appellant was not a non-occupancy raiyat at all within the meaning of the Bengal Tenancy Act and secondly, that even if he was a non-occupancy raiyat, Article 1(a) of Schedule III does not apply to the present case.

2. I am unable to hold that the appellant was not a non-occupancy raiyat of the land in question. He was admittedly a tenant within the meaning of Section 3, Sub-section (3), of the Bengal Tenancy Act. Section 4 of the Act provides that there shall be for the purposes of the Act certain classes of tenants, namely, tenure-holders, raiyats and under-raiyats and the following classes of raiyats, namely, raiyats holding at fixed rates, occupancy raiyats and non-occupancy raiyats. The appellant was certainly not a raiyat holding at a fixed rate or an occupancy raiyat. Prima facie he was a non-occupancy raiyat. I am aware that it has been held in some casses that Section 4 of the Bengal Tenancy Act is not exhaustive, but it appears to me that there can be no doubt that the appellant was a non-occupancy raiyat. There are provisions in the Bengal Tenancy Act outside Chapter VI which refer to non-occupancy raiyats" and which appear to apply to raiyats of zirat land. Chapter VI deals exclusively with non-occupancy raiyats The framers of the Act evidently intended that Chapter VI should be applied to raiyats holding zirat land, but as it was part of the policy of the Act to enable a landlord to prevent raiyati from acquiring rights against him in his zirat land, they provided by Section 116 of the Act that nothing in Chapter VI shall apply to a proprietors private land known in Bengal as khamar, nij, and nijjot and in Bihar as zirat, nij, sir, or kawiat, where any such land is held under a lease for a term of years or under a lease from year to year. Previous to 1907 there was in Chapter VI of the Act a section, 45, which provided that notice should be served upon a non-occupancy raiyat whom the landlord wished to eject and that a suit for ejectment should be instituted within six months after the expiry of the term for which the non-occupancy tenant held the land. Section 116 of the Act excluded the operation of Section 45 in the case of a proprietors private land, with the result that the period of limitation prescribed by Section 45 did not apply to a suit like the one now before us. By Bengal Act I of 1907 Section 45 was repealed and the second part of it, that is to say, the part relating to limitation, was replaced by Article 1(a) of Schedule III. The result of the amendment appears to be that the operation of Article 1(a) of Schedule III is not excluded by Section 116 in the case of zirat land. This view was taken by Mookerjee and Beachcroft, JJ. in Ganpat Mahton v. Rishal Singh 33 Ind. Cas. 978 : 20 C.W.N. 14 and by Newbould, J. in Dwarkanath Chowdhury v. Tafazar Rahman Sarkar 39 Ind. Cas. 64 : 20 C.W.N. 1097 : 41 C. 267. In the last mentioned case Newbould, J., said: By taking the provisions of Section 4i out of Chapter VI and putting them into the Schedule, the Legislature, whether intentionally or not, has compelled the landlord to bring a suit for ejectment of a tenant of khas khamar land on the termination of his lease within six months." The decision of Newbould, J., was reversed on appeal under the Letters Patent by Woodroffe and Chaudhuri, JJ. The judgment of the Court was delivered by Woodroffe, J., who said: "Reliance also is placed on the amendment of the heading under Chapter XI of the Bengal Tenancy Act. In that heading there has been inserted "non-accrual of occupancy and non-occupancy rights. I think we may look at this heading for the purpose of interpreting the sections mentioned above, and on this it is contended on behalf of the appellants that the defendants holding khamar lands are not included in the term non-occupancy raiyat within the Schedule. I think that this argument has force and I hold that the suit is accordingly not barred."

3. I take it that the learned Judge intended to hold that a raiyat of a proprietors private land could not be a non-occupancy raiyat within the meaning of Chapter VI or Schedule III of the Act. I am unable to accept this view, for Section 116 of the Act prevents the application of Chapter VI to raiyats of a proprietors private land in two cases only, namely, where such land is held under a lease for a term of years and where it is held under a lease from year to year. In my opinion it is reasonably clear that except in those two cases Chapter VI of the Act was intended to apply to raiyats of a proprietors private land, and that such raiyots may be non-occupancy raiyats within the meaning of the Act.

4. It was contended, however, that even if a raiyat of a proprietors private land is a non-occupancy raiyat, Article 1(a) does not apply to such a suit as the one now before us. It was urged that the only provision in the Act entitling a landlord to eject a non-occupancy raiyat on the ground of the expiration of the term of his lease is contained in Section 44 of the Act, that Article 1(a) applies only to a suit brought u/s 44 (c) and that as the present suit cannot have been brought u/s 44 (c), Article 1(a) does not apply at all. It must be conceded that the present suit was not brought u/s 41 (c) of the Act, but no provision of this kind was required to enable a landlord to bring a suit to eject his tenant on the expiration of the term for which the tenant held his land. Those provisions of the Act which apply to non-occupancy tenants appear to apply to raiyats holding a proprietors private land, except where the application of those provisions is excluded by the Act, as for instance by Section 113. The Bengal Tenancy Act applies to a proprietors private land, and it appears to me that a suit by a landlord to eject a non-occupancy raiyat of a proprietors private land on the ground of the expiration of the term of his lease is governed by Article 1(a) of Schedule 111 of the Bengal Tenancy Act. In this connection I would refer to Article 3 of Schedule III, which provides a special period of limitation for a suit to recover possession of land claimed by the plaintiff as a raiyat or under-raiyat. There is no special provisions in the Act expressly authorising a raiyat, who has been wrongly ejected by his landlord, to bring a suit to recover possession of the land. But no such provision was required to enable a tenant to bring a suit to recover possession. It has never been suggested that Article 8 of Schedule III is a dead letter merely because there is no express provision in the Act authorising a tenant to sue for recovery of possession of land from which he has been wrongly ejected by his landlord. Similarly I am unable to hold that Article 1(a) does not apply to the present suit merely because there is no express provision in the Act authorising a landlord to sue to eject; a non-occupancy raiyat of his private land on the expiration of the term of a lease. I think it is doubtful whether the Legislature intended by the amendments made in 1907 to compel a landlord to sue for ejectment of a tenant of his private land within six months of the termination of the lease held by the tenant, and it may be that the result of holding that a raiyat of zirat land in or may be a non occupancy raiyat will be that landlords will be placed in a less favourable position than the framers of the Act intended, but we must take the Act as we find it; and on a consideration of the Act as it now stands, it appears to me that the only possible conclusion is that Article 1(as) of Schedule III applies to such a suit as the one now before us. I would, therefore, allow this appeal, set aside the decisions of the Courts below, and dismiss the suit with costs in all Courts.

Chapman, J.

5. Prior to the Rent Act of 1859 raiyats were divided into two classes, khudkasht and paikasht, corresponding roughly to the present classes of occupancy and non-occupancy raiyats. Neither class included tenants of the zemindars zirat or demesne Phillips Land Tenures, page 2 i9, and Thakooranae Dossee v. Bisheshur Mookerjee B.L.R. Sup. Vol. 202 at p. 260 : 3 W.R. A 29. The Act of 1852 did not abolish the names khudkasht and paikasht [see Bengal Act VIII of 18t5]. The Act of 1859, defined for the first time the manner in which a right of occupancy could be acquired and the vernacular terms gradually fell into disuse. The Bengal Tenancy Act of 1885 with which we are now concerned provided the new term non-occupancy raiyat" as a convenient symbol for the remainder of the raiyats for whom it was desired for the first time then to create rights.

6. In my opinion a tenant in zirat is prima facie not a raiyat, (1) because he has never been so regarded, and (2) because he neither has rights of occupancy nor has been vested with the new non-occupancy rights.

7. The classification of tenants in Section 4 of the Bengal Tenancy Act is "for the purpose of the Act." The purpose referred to is apparent from the headings of Chapters III to VII which immediately follow. The purpose for which the classification is made is to introduce the definition of the rights of the various classes of tenants, and that purpose is exhausted when the definition of these rights is completed in Chapters III to VII. Chapter XL is headed "Non-accural of occupancy and non-occupancy rights", and deals therefore with the circumstances in which such rights shall not accrue. A consideration of the provisions of the Act would make it clear that no purpose of the Act is served by placing a temporary cultivator who is not to have the rights of a non-occupancy raiyat under any of the classes mentioned in Section 4. If, however, it is thought desirable to classify tenants in zirat, they may be called tenure-holders as was done by the Calcutta High Court in Second Appeal No 2526 of 1904 in the case of a cultivator holding fakirana land and in Bandhu Acharja v. Nathni Bahar Singh 7 C.L.J. 460 in the case of a cultivating tankidar.

8. For "the purpose" of saying that non-occupancy rights shall not accrue in the case of a tenancy in zirat, Section 116 merely says that Chapter VI shall not apply and some difficulty no doubt arises from the fact that there are one or two scattered provisions on the subject of non-occupancy raiyats which are not in Chapter VIII do now, however, attach importance to this in the present connection, having regard to the heading of Chapter XI, "non-accrual of non-occupancy rights", which indicates "the purpose" of the Chapter. The heading of Chapter VI and the first section, Section 41, indicates that Chapter VI was designed to be exhaustive on the subject of non-occupancy raiyats. I hold by reference to the heading of Chapter XI that, by saying in Section 116 that Chapter VI does not apply, it was meant that the tenant should not be regarded as a non-occupancy raiyat. A heading may be used with considerable freedom to extend the meaning of a section which follows it.

9. The significance of the words "non-accrual of non- occupancy rights" is enhanced when it is remembered that these words were added to the heading in Chapter XI at the time that Article 1(a) was added to the Schedule. The object of the simultaneous change in the heading must have been to make it clear that the reference to non-occupancy raiyats in Article 1(a) was not meant to include the tenants dealt with in Chapter XI.

10. It should be noted in this connection that the classification in Sections 4 and 5 was not intended to be scientific or precise.

11. For instance, the classification does not include the case of a co-sharer holding land subject to payment to his co-proprietor u/s 22. There are several other kinds of tenants not easily placed under any of the classes. If the classification be treated as a series of precise definitions, the Act will be misinterpreted. As an example I may refer to the case of Bhut Nath Naskar v. Surendra Nath Dutt Bhutnath Naskar v. Monmotho Nath Mitra 2 Ind. Cas. 675 : 13 C.W.N. 1025 : 11 C.L.J. 98 in which by the application of precision the result was obtained by one of the Judges that a raiyati at fixed rates is not a protected interest, a conclusion which I am entirely unable to accept. It is obvious that in order to render the Act intelligible Sections 4 and 5 must be applied with a reasonable amount of elasticity and this is apparent from the use of the word "primarily" and the reference to custom in Section 5.

12. To apply Article 1(a) to the tenants referred to in Section 116 would clearly tend to defeat the obvious purpose of Chapter XI, which is to afford some substantial protection to the proprietors of zirat.

13. That this purpose will be defeated will be evident if the result of applying Article 1(a) to Section 116 is considered. Under the law as it stood before the amendment of 1907 which introduced Article 1(a), the main protection conferred by Section 115 in respect of zirat was that on the expiry of an oral or written lease the tenant in zirat could ipso facto be ejected at any time up to twelve years after the expiry of the lease. If the effect of Article 1(a) is to reduce the limitation from twelve years to six months, there remains little, if any, special protection for the proprietor of zirat. The only distinctions remaining between a tenant in zirat and a tenant in land not zirat will be the following: (1) To enable the proprietor of zirat to eject on the expiry of a lease--the lease need not be written or registered; (2) an agreement to enhance will not require registration; but, on the other hand, (3) a tenant in zirat will not be liable to ejectment for failure to pay rent, unless this remedy is provided for in his lease; and (4) will not be liable to ejectment for refusal to agree to enhancement. I cannot believe that the elaborate provisions of Chapter XI would have been framed if the only privilege it was intended to confer on the proprietor of zirat was the use of unregistered documents.

14. The view I have taken is also consonant with what has always been held in regard to zirat [Regulation VIII of 1793]. True zirat belongs to the zemindar [section 6, Act X of 1859] as distinguished from the rest of his estate, his rights in which are subject to the rights of his raiyats see Regulation VII of 1799 Section 15 and Thakooranae Dossee v. Bisheshur Mookherjee B.L.R. Sup. Vol. 202 at p. 260 : 3 W.R. Act X Rullings 29. Zirat land is not raiyati land although the zemindar may lose his rights in it by treating it as if it was raiyati. But if he lets it for a term or from year to year, it remains his own and the tenant of it is not a raiyat. The custom under which a tenant of zirat is not a raiyat is a custom recognised in the Act of 1859. It was again recognised in the Act of 1885 by the expedient of placing all raiyati rights in two Chapters and then saying that those Chapters shall not apply to zirat. It was recognised in the statement of the objects and reasons of the Act of 1885 and in the account of that Act given in the Bengal Administration Report, 1892-93 [see page 93]. It is recognised in Mr. Finucanes Tenancy Act, published in 1904. The custom is recognised also by a series of decisions both of the Sadar Diwani Adalat and of the High Court, a series which includes The Great Bent Case of 1865 Thakooranae Dossee v. Bisheshur Mookerjee B.L.R. Sup. Vol. 202 at p. 260 : 3 W.R. Act X Rullings 29 and continues till the decision of the present question by Woodroffe and Chaudhuri, JJ., in 1916 Dwarkanath Chowdhury v. Tafazar Rahamian Sarkar 39 Ind. Cas. 64 : 20 C.W.N. 1097 : 41 C. 267. The series of precedents is unbroken save for the obiter dictum of Mookerjee, J., in 1914 Ganpat Mahton v. Rishal Singh33 Ind. Cas. 978 : 20 C.W.N. 14 a dictum which it is impossible to reconcile with his considered judgment in Jonab Ali v. Rakibuddin Mallik 1 C.L.J. 303 : 9 C.W.N. 571 in 1905 where he held that a tenant in zirat is neither an occupancy nor a non-occupancy raiyat.

15. Again, it is impossible to apply Article 1(a) as it stands to tenants in zirat in a satisfactory manner. There is no difficulty in applying the Article to a non occupancy raiyat who enjoys the rights provided for in Chapter VI. Six months after the expiry of his registered lease, though he cannot be ejected upon the ground of the expiry of the lease, he can be ejected upon other grounds provided for in Section 44, for instance, upon the ground that he has failed to pay arrears of rent. The application of Article 1(a) in the case of a tenant of zirat would be by no means so simple. The following views are possible as to his status after the expiry of six months from the end of his lease if Article 1(a) applies to him:

First, there is the view that Chapter VI then becomes applicable to him. I am unable to concur with this view Bhugwan Bhagut v. Jug Mohun Roy 20 W.R. 308. There is in the alternative the view that he then becomes entirely immune from ejectment, a view which would defeat the express provision in Section 116 that he shall not have a right of occupancy. There is another possible view that he is liable to ejectment upon any grounds provided for in his lease, and there is a fourth possible view that he is a tenant from year to year upon the terms of his lease and that the right to eject continues to recur at the end of every year, and to expire at the end of six months from the end of every year. I am confident that if the Legislature had intended Article 1(a) to apply to a tenant in zirat they would not have left the matter in this nebulous condition.

16. I would, therefore, hold that Article 1(a) does not apply to the present case and dismiss the appeal.

17. This judgment is merely an amplification of the judgment of Woodroffe, J., in Dwarkanath Chowdhury v. Tafazar Rahaman Sarkar 39 Ind. Cas. 64 : 20 C.W.N. 1097 : 41 C. 267 with which Chaudhuri, J., concurred.

Mullick, J.

18. I agree with the view taken by the learned Chief Justice.

19. I think the first point for consideration is whether the Bengal Tenancy Act applies at all to the proprietors private lands. I am quite satisfied that the answer to this is in the affirmative. Under the Permanent Settlement Regulation [Regulation VIII, 1793, Sections 37 and 39] no land was recognized as a proprietors private land which was not such on the 12th August 1765, the date of the assumption of the diwani, and there is no law recognising the creation of such lands since that date. Although the distinction between these lands and the raiyati lands of the country was at the time of the settlement a well-established one and, although there may. be some doubt whether these lands as well as chakran lands [section 41 of the Regulation], were taken into account for assessing the revenue of the zemindari, yet it is quite clear that both these classes of land were annexed to the malguzari lands and were made responsible for the revenue [see Sections 37 to 4l]. What reason is there for holding that it is not open to a zemindar to create raiyati interest in his private lands There is nothing in Act VIII of 1885 to support such a view, on the contrary Section 116 of the Act clearly contemplates the acquisition of occupancy rights under certain circumstances and, if of occupancy rights, then why not of non-occupancy rights also

20. It is urged that Section 4 of the Bengal Tenancy Act is not exhaustive and that a raiyat of zirat lands belongs to a class by himself, who is not covered by the classification into raiyats at fixed rates, occupancy-raiyats and non-occupancy-raiyits. Now, although there are authorities which say that the definition of a raiyat is not exhaustive, there is to my knowledge no authority which says that the classification is not exhaustive. All that the authorities say is that Section 4 rather describes than defines a raiyat and that it is not exhaustive only to the extent that a cultivator who may prima facie answer the qualifications of a raiyat may really turn out to be a tenure-holder. The scheme of the Act is to determine the relations between cultivator and landlord in every inch of agricultural land, and for that purpose it divides the former into classes set out in Section 4 and declines to recognise any rights or liabilities in relation to the landlord except those enjoyed by or imposed upon those classes. For this reason the Act omits settled raiyats from the classification although by Section 20 it defines such a raiyat. The Act intends that as a settled raiyat must be either an occupancy or non-occupancy-raiyat, or a raiyat at fixed rates, it is unnecessary to make a separate class for him. A cultivator may be a settled raiyat on zirat lands, but as Such he has no rights.

21. Reliance has been placed upon Sheo Nandan Roy v. Ajodh Roy 26 C 546 : 3 C.W.N. 336 : 13 Ind. Dec. (N.S.) 950 and on Jonah Ali v. Rakibuddin Mallik 1 C.L.J. 303 : 9 C.W.N. 571 for the purpose of showing that there can be no occupancy or non-occupancy-raiyats in zirat or chakran lands. Now although at page 542 of the first of these cases there is an observation to the effect that occupancy or non-occupancy rights cannot be acquired in zirat lands, that expression of opinion was clearly obiter and not necessary to the decision of the case. Indeed as an absolute proposition of law it is incorrect. The point which their Lordships were concerned to decide was that no tenant brought upon the land by a thikadar holding under the proprietor under a lease for a term of years can acquire rights of occupancy, for the reason that the thikadar could not create any interest greater than his own; and in coming to this conclusion their Lordships declined to extend the doctrine of Binad Lal Pakrashi v. Kalu Pramanik 20 C. 708 (F.B.) : 10 Ind. Dec. 477 to zirat lands and held that a tenant inducted by such a thikadar could not claim raiyati rights in zirat lands, the primary character of which was that the proprietor should be in khas possession. In the other case too a like view was expressed by Harington, Bodilly and Mookerjee, JJ., in regard to chowkidari chakran lands. It is obvious that the learned Judges never intended to lay down the rule that non-occupancy rights cannot be acquired in zirat lands; for in Ganpat Mahton v. Rishal Singh 33 Ind. Cas. 978 : 20 C.W.N. 14 one of these same learned Judges, namely, Mookerjee, J., expressed the clear opinion that a non-occupancy raiyati interest could be acquired in zirat lands and was subject to the operation of Article 1(a) of Schedule III of the Bengal Tenancy Act.

22. There is, therefore, in my opinion no ground for the contention that the nature of the land will bar the operation of Section 4 of the Bengal Tenancy Act.

23. This view is also supported by the history of the legislation on the subject. The classification of raiyats into raiyats at fixed rates, occupancy raiyats and non-occupancy-raiyats was made for the first time by Act X of 1859, but Section 6 of that Act provided that the rule that a raiyat who has cultivated land for a period of twelve years has a right of occupancy in the land so long as he pays the rent payable on account of the same does not apply to khamar, nij-jot or sir lands belonging to the proprietor when let by him on a lease for a term of years or from year to year. The Act nowhere stated that a raiyat cultivating a proprietors private land was not a non occupancy raiyat, and in this respect the Amending Act of 1889 [Act VIII (B. C.) of 1869] does not appear to have made any substantial alteration. Such a raiyat was apparently liable to ejectment any time within twelve years on expiry of his lease. He was also liable to have his rent enhanced upon service of notice. So in Janoo Mundur v. Brijo Singh 22 W.R. 548 it was held that a landlord, seeking to obtain an enhanced rate of rent on account of nij-jot land held by a tenant without a right of occupancy had no right to obtain a judicial enhancement upon the footing of a notice under Act VIII (B. C.) of 1869. His right -according to Section 8 was to make his own terms with his tenant, or to turn him out of occupation.

24. Considerable diversity of opinion, however, began to arise on the point whether the raiyat was entitled to ask for an adjudication of fair and equitable rent, and one of the purposes of enacting Act VIII of 1885 was to put the status of non-occupancy-raiyats on a more satisfactory basis in this and other matters. To this end the two principal changes introduced were (1) that a non-occupancy raiyat could be ejected at the will of his landlord only if he was admitted into occupation under a registered lease and then only after service of six months notice to quit, and upon suit being brought within six months after the expiration of the lease and (2) that a non-occupancy-raiyat who objected to pay an enhanced rent could have his rent fixed by the Court; if he refused to pay he could be ejected.

25. The position of raiyats in zirat lands was not materially altered, for we find that the provisions of the old Act were practically reproduced in Section 116, which was enacted in the following terms:

Nothing in Chapter V shall confer a right of occupancy in, and nothing in Chapter VI shall apply to, a proprietors private lands known in Bengal as khamar, nij or nij-jot and in Bihar as zirat, nij-sir, or kamat where any such land is held under a lease for a term of years or under a lease from year to year.

26. And it is to be observed that the beneficial provisions of Chapter VI, which ameliorated the position of non-occupancy raiyats, were excluded from operating in zirat lands held under a lease for a term of years or from year to year.

27. In 1907 the section was amended and the heading "record of proprietors private lands" was changed into "non-accrual of occupancy and non-occupancy rights and record of proprietors private lands." In the body of the section the area saved from the operation of Chapters V and VI was widened by the inclusion of lands acquired under the Land Acquisition Act, and lands belonging to the Government within a Cantonment. At the same time Section 45, which was one of the sections in Chapter VI, was wholly repealed, That section provided for the service of notice and six months limitation. The result of its repeal was that in suits for ejectment of non-occupancy raiyats on expiry of their leases service of notice was done away with on the ground that it was unnecessary and difficult to prove and the provision as to limitation was put into Schedule III of Article 1(a).

28. The question is, what is the effect of the repeal on the words nothing in Chapter VI shall apply to a proprietors private lands"

29. In order to construe the words it is certainly not necessary to read them as meaning no raiyats shall acquire non-occupancy rights in proprietors private lands held for a term of years, The amendment of the heading does to some extent assist the contention of the respondent before us, but in the absence of any authority I do not think the words of the heading should be allowed to affect the construction of the section.

30. In my opinion the body of the section means that the rights and liabilities of non-occupancy raiyats in the matter of paying the rent agreed between them and their landlord (section 42), enhancement by registered agreement (section 43), ejectment (section 44), conditions of ejectment on the ground of refusal to agree to enhancement (section 46) shall not be enforced in the case of raiyats of private lands. But there are other rights and liabilities enjoyed by and imposed upon non-occupancy raiyats by other parts of the Act and there is nothing in Section 116 which excludes the operation of those parts of the Act from the holdings of non-occupancy raiyats in zirat lands held on a lease for a term of years or from year to year. It is quite clear that Section 116 itself contemplates that in zirat lands both occupancy and non-occupancy rights can be acquired under certain circumstances, and if it was the intention of the framers of the Act that in zirat lands held for a term of years or from year to year the cultivator should not acquire the status of non-occupancy raiyats they have signally failed to carry out that intention. If again their intention was to recognize the non-occupancy status of such a cultivator and to leave him in the same position as that in which he was before 1885 then, too, has the intention failed. Regarded from whatever point of view the result can scarcely be called satisfactory, and this class of cultivator, while excluded from the operation of Chapter VI, remains within the purview of the remainder of the Act and therefore also of Article 1(a) of Schedule III. The position appears to be this. Now, as before 1885, the landlord can make successive enhancements but the tenant can no longer take advantage of the protection offered by Section 13 of Act X of 1859 or Section 14 of Act VIII (B. C.) of 1869: on the tenants failure to pay an arrear of rent he can only be ejected after decree now, though it was otherwise before 1885, and a suit for the ejectment of the tenant on expiry of his lease must now be brought within six months and not twelve years as before.

31. The learned Counsel for the respondent has somewhat ingeniously contended that Article 1(a) is a necessary and inseparable part of Section 44, and if that section is excluded the Article must be also excluded. In my opinion this contention is not well-founded. Article 1(a) is applicable to every suit in which it is sought to eject a non-occupancy raiyat. It is not limited to suits u/s 44 which are suits brought under the provisions of the Bengal Tenancy Act. A non-occupancy raiyat whose lease has expired is liable to ejectment on the general law as one who has become a trespasser.

32. Finally a reference to Section 180 of the Act which deals with utbandi raiyats and raiyats of biara lands does, I think, assist us in elucidating the effect in Section 116 of the words nothing in Chapter VI shall apply to a proprietors private lands." Section 180, Clause (2), runs thus:

Chapter VI shall not apply to raiyats holding land under the custom of uthandi in respect of land held by them under the custom.

33. Although the section does not in terms say that the raiyat in this case is a non-occupancy raiyat the reference to Chapter VI implies that he is such a raiyat and the framers of the section therefore considered it necessary to provide that his rent is liable to be fixed by agreement with his landlord without the protections of Chapter VI. If in respect of such a raiyat Article 1(a) applies, and I see no reason why it should not, the Article must also apply to the case of the appellant before as. Whether the Legislature in repealing Section 45 and removing the provision as to limitation to the Schedule intended to cut down the period of limitation and to apply it to a larger class of tenants it is not our province to speculate. The Schedule was introduced for the first time in 1885, before which the special provisions as to limitation were few and for the most part contained in Section 30 of Act X of 1859 and Section 27 of Act VIII (B. C.) of 1869. We must interpret the law as we find it, and if the result of the amendment to Act VIII of 1885 is to place the landlord in a worse position than was intended, then the only remedy is to amend the law. I am of opinion, therefore, that the appeal should be allowed.

Roe, J.

34. Any one having no previous knowledge of the Subject would say upon reading Section 4 that for the purposes of the Bengal Tenancy Act there are three classes of raiyats: (a) raiyats holding either at a rent fixed in perpetuity or at a rate of rent fixed in perpetuity; (6) raiyats having a right of occupancy in the land held by them; (c) raiyats not having such a right of occupancy, and would note that these three classes are for the saving of ink and paper called thereafter raiyats holding at fixed rates, occupancy raiyats, and non-occupancy raiyats. On reading Section 5 he would note that any one who (i) cultivates with his own ploughs, etc., and (ii) holds directly under a proprietor is a raiyat. He would further note on reading. Chapter VI that non-occupancy raiyats have certain privileges, and on coming to Chapter XI would note that those privileges do not prevail over a definite contract made for the cultivation of proprietors private lands for a term of years, or a definite contract renewed from year to year. If asked what might be the position of a raiyat holding under such a definite contract, he would reply that he was a non-occupancy raiyat not protected by Chapter V I. On reading Schedule III it would be clear to him that for a suit to evict a non-occupancy raiyat who had, by holding over without permission, become a trespasser the limitation was six months from the date of the trespass, Q his attention being drawn to the fact that Section 45 had been repealed and Schedule III, Clause I (a), substituted for it, he would say that this had been deliberately done with the purpose of removing the limitation clause from Chapter VI.

35. But for the high reputation of those learned Judges who have taken an opposite view I should have felt that there was no more to be said. Their view is, I venture to think, born of a misconception of the Legislatures jealousy of encroachment upon private lands. More than twenty-five years experience of the working of Section 120 in the Settlement, Sub Divisional and Civil Courts has taught me that when once a proprietor has let out what he claims to be private lands it is almost impossible for him to prove that they are private lands.

36. The old law (section 6, Act X of 1859) gave a loophole to the proprietor to deny occupancy rights to raiyats holding over after the expiry of a lease for a term of years. It ran:

But this rule does not apply to sir land let on lease for a term or year by year.

37. To prevent the argument that a holdover was equivalent to a letting year by year the Act of 1885 deliberately re-cast the phrase and Section 116 runs:

When any such land is held under a lease for a term of years or under a lease from year to year.

38. Section 8 of Act X of 1859 ran:

Raiyats not having rights of occupancy are entitled to pattahs only at such rates as may be agreed on between them and the persons to whom the rent is payable.

39. That was the position of non-occupancy raiyats until the Act of 1885 gave to all, save those inducted under a definite contract to cultivation of private lands, the protection of Chapter VI. Even for those cultivating private lands Section 8 was further cat down and a proviso added that not only the rates but also the term must be a matter of agreement.

40. It cannot be suggested that in these amendments of the law there was any desire to keep sacred lands claimed as zirat, nij, sir, or kamat. On the contrary, it was deliberately made as difficult as possible to prove that the lands were zirat, and deliberately enacted that a tenant taking lands proved to be zirat should have a clear understanding with the proprietor of the term for which he would be permitted to cultivate them. Believing this to have been the temper of the Legislative Council in 1885 I can see no reason for holding that the Council in 1907 would, if it had intended to nullify in favour of the proprietor the taking of the limitation clause out of Chapter VI into a Schedule, have been content to make this intention apparent by such a clumsy expedient as the changing of the heading of Chapter VI. Anyone not on the look-out for veiled intentions would imagine that the change was merely an-amplification made because the old heading referred only to Sections 117--120. The new heading refers also to Section 116, and is now complete,

41. It is only when words are of doubtful meaning that the Courts should look to probable intention. Granting that the arguments of Woodroffe, J., give reason to believe that the Act is open to an interpretation different to that apparent on its surface, I, am of opinion that the most probable intention in placing the limitation clause in the Schedule was to limit the exercise of the proprietors right to evict a raiyat cultivating private lands to six months. It is a fallacy to suppose that there is a hard. ship in reducing the proprietors limitation from twelve years to six months. The moment the proprietor accepts rent without taking a new agreement, the raiyat is holding over without a lease and is protected by Chapter VI. No proprietor could be so, foolish as to leave his private lands in the possession of a stranger for twelve years without accepting rent. Even the most exorbitant decree for mesne profits for three years would not balance the loss of twelve years rent. No sane proprietor would fail to sue within three years In the interest of the raiyat the proprietor should not be allowed to tempt him to continue cultivation without a title and then not only take from him by a claim for mesne profits the whole produce of his labour, but also ruin him by the costs of the inevitable litigation. If a proprietor has any love for his private lands he should be able to make up his mind in six months as to what he will do with them. If he is uncertain of his love for them it is open to him to enter into a new agreement with regard to them. If he cares so little about them that he cannot be troubled to make definite arrangements for their cultivation he deserves that they cease to be his private lands.

42. In considering the intention of the Legislature we have to consider not the intention of the Select Committee but those of the Council. In the Bill of 1907, as laid before the Council, there was a clause taking the procedure for commutation of rent out of Chapter V into Chapter VIII. The intention was clearly said in the statement of objects and reasons to be: "Under Section 40 only occupancy-raiyats are allowed to apply for commutation. It seems reasonable that the same privilege should be conferred on all classes of raiyats."

43. This proposal was vetoed by the Council. Surely the Councils attention having been drawn to the effect of the proposal to repeal Section 40, we must presume that it was also drawn to the effect of repealing Section 45.

44. I am of opinion that the amendment made by the Act of 1907 indicates a general intention to prevent suits for mesne profits against raiyats not having a right of occupancy holding over after the expiry of the term of their agreement; and, having regard to the conditions of agriculture in this Province, feel strongly that this intention has been well expressed by the limitation of a suit in ejectment to a period of six months from the expiry of the agreement. I can find nothing in the Act to indicate that proprietors private lands are to be protected from this general intention.

45. I would decree this appeal, and dismiss the plaintiffs suit with costs in all Courts.

Jwala Prasad, J.

46. This appeal arises out of a suit in ejectment. The Courts below have decreed the plaintiffs suit, holding that the lands were the kamat or zirat lands of the plaintiff-landlord and were settled with the defendants for a term of nine years under a registered kabuliyat dated 6th May 1903, and that the defendants have no right to remain in possession of the lands after the expiry of the term of the lease.

47. The term of the lease expired on 31st May 1912. The suit was instituted on the 5th December 1912, that if, more than six months by four days after the expiry of the term of the lease.

48. The Courts below have held that six months limitation prescribed by Article 1(a) of Schedule III of the Bengal Tenancy Act does not apply to the case, as the lands held by the defendants are the proprietors private lands described as kamat or zirat in Section 120 of the Act.

49. On appeal to this Court by defendant No. 1 Mr. Justice Atkinson See Ind. Cas. 389.-Ed. has confirmed the view of the Courts below, holding that the "defendant No. 1 in point of law could not acquire in the zirat lands of the plaintiff the non occupancy right."

50. The defendants have preferred a further appeal to this Court under the Letters Patent and repeat their contention that the suit is barred by Article 1(a) of Schedule III.

51. The question raised is of the utmost importance and is by no means free from doubt or difficulty.

52. Article 1(a) of Schedule III requires that a suit to eject a non-occupancy raiyat on the ground of the expiration of the term of his lease" should be brought within six months from the expiration of the term. This Article was for the first time introduced in the Schedule by the Bengal Tenancy Amendment Act [I (B.C.) of 1907] and has taken the place of Section 45 of the Act, repealed by the Amending Act. Section 45 of the Act ran as follows:

A suit for ejectment on the ground of the expiration of the term of a lease shall not be instituted against a non-occupancy raiyat unless notice to quit has been served on the raiyat not less than six months before the expiration of the term and shall not be instituted after six months from the expiration of the term.

53. The provisions in Section 45 were twofold--(1) that a notice shall have been served not less than six months before the expiration of the term, and (2) that the suit for ejectment should be brought within six months from the expiration of the term.

54. The Amending Act repealed the provision regarding the notice to quit but retained the provision regarding the limitation for a suit for ejectment of non-occupancy raiyats on the ground of the expiration of the term of the lease. By the amendment in 1907 Section 45 was reduced to a simple clause providing limitation for a suit for ejectment and was, therefore, rightly transferred to and included in Schedule III as Article 1(a) of the Act, read with Section 184 of the Act, which deals specially with limitation for suits.

55. Section 45 occurred prior to its repeal in 1907 in Chapter VI headed "Non-occupancy raiyats." Section 116 excludes the application of Chapter VI to the proprietors private lands if any such land is held under a lease for a term of years or under a lease from year to year. So there was no question before 1907 that the limitation of six months then provided by Section 45 did not apply to a suit for recovery of possession of zirat lands held under a lease for a term of years.

56. The question is whether the aforesaid Clause 1(a) in Schedule III would apply to kamat or zirat lands held under a lease and the period of twelve years limitation, which prior to 1907 applied to a suit for recovery of possession of zirat land, would now be curtailed to six months applicable to suits for ejectment of non occupancy raiyats.

57. There is a conflict in the decisions of the Calcutta High Court passed since the aforesaid Amendment of 1907 [vide Ganpat Mahton v. Rishal Singh 33 Ind. Cas. 978 : 20 C.W.N. 14, Mookerjee and Beachcroft, JJ., Dwarkavath Chowdhury v. Tafazar Rahaman Sarkar 39 Ind. Cas. 64 : 20 C.W.N. 1097 : 41 C. 267; Woodroffe and Choudhuri, JJ.

58. Woodroffe, J., who delivered the judgment in the last case referred to the insertion in 1907 of the words Non-accrual of occupancy and non occupancy rights" in the heading of Chapter X[ as one of the grounds for the purpose of holding that no rights of occupancy or non-occupancy can accrue in kamat or zirat lands when let out for a term of years.

59. Formerly the heading of Chapter XI was Record of proprietors private lands"--The words non-accrual of occupancy and non-occupancy rights" were added in the heading at the same time that the limitation clause in Section 45 was transferred to Schedule III.

60. It has been said that the heading of a Chapter cannot control an enactment in a Statute. The authorities quoted in Maxwells Interpretation of Statutes [82 (1912)] will show that the headings prefixed to sections or sets of sections have been frequently used for the purpose of interpreting the meaning, scope and intention of Statutes.

61. Lord Coke (1 Inst. 79) laid down the well-known canon that the recital or preamble of an Act of Parliament is a key for opening the meaning and intent of the Act. This canon has been applied in Bex v. Bigg (1717) 24 E.R. 1127 at p. 1132 : 3 P. Wms. 419 at p. 434; Hughes v. Chester and Holyhead Ry. Co. (1861) 31 L.J.Ch. 97 : 3 Dec. F. & J. 352 : 7 L.T. 197 : 8 Jur. (N.S.) 221 : 10 W.R. 219 : 130 R.R. 166 : 45 E.R. 914; Rayson v. South London Tramways Co. (1893) 2 Q.B. 304 : 62 L.J.Q.B. 593 : 4 R. 522; 69 L.T. 49 : 42 W.R. 21 : 17 Cox C.C. 691 : 58 J.P. 20; West v. Gwynne (1911) 2 Ch. 1 : 80 L.J.Ch. 578 at p. 587 : 104 L.T. 759 : 55 S.J. 519 : 27 T.L.R. 444 and Union Steamship of New Zealond v. Melbourne Harbour Commissioners (1884) 53 L.J.P.C. 59 : 9 A.C. 365 : 50 L.T. 337 : 5 Asp. M.C. 222.

62. Baron Channell in Eastern Counties etc., Companies v. Marriage (1860) 11 E.R. 639 : 6 H.L.C.32 at p. 41 : 31 L.J. Ex. 73 : 7 Jur. (N.S.) 53 : 3 L.T. 60 : 8 W.R. 748 : 131 R.R. 17 observed as follows:

As might have been expected, the enactments contained in the Statute embrace various objects or purposes. In different parts of the Act there are to be found classes of enactments applicable to some special object.

Such enactments are in many instances preceded by a heading, special no doubt in one sense, as addressed to the object or purpose, but, where not otherwise provided for, general in its application to enactments passed to accomplish the object.

These...headings are not to be treated as if they were marginal notes, or were introduced into the Act merely for the purpose of classifying the enactments. They constitute an important part of the Act itself.

They may be read, I think, not only as explaining the sections which immediately follow them, as a preamble to a Statute may be looked to, to explain these enactments, but as affording, as it appears to roe, a better key to the constructions of the sections which follow than might be afforded by a mere preamble.

63. In the present case where there is an intentional alteration of the heading it is impossible to ignore it for the purpose of interpreting the meaning, intention and scope of the Legislature in inserting Article 1(a) to Schedule III and in adding at the same time the heading to Chapter XI of the Act. If there was any purpose in the alteration in the heading, it was absolutely to bar the accrual of occupancy or non-occupancy rights in the zirat or khudkasht lands, provided such lands are let out by the proprietor under a lease for a term of years or under a lease from year to year.

64. The alteration in the heading does not appear to have been considered in the case of Ganpat Mahton v. Rishal Singh 33 Ind. Cas. 978 : 20 C.W.N. 14 referred to above. To my mind the heading was intended to safeguard against possible misapprehension in the application of Article 1(a) of the Schedule, which did not apply prior to the amendment, by expressly adding the words to the heading of Chapter XI, "Non-accrual of occupancy and non-occupancy rights." The intention of the Legislature can well be gathered by the express words in the heading of Chapter XI as being to exclude kamat or zirat lands from the operation of Article 1(a) of the Schedule. I am, therefore, of opinion that the limitation of 12 years is not curtailed by Article 1(a) prescribing six months limitation and that the Article has no application to the present case.

65. The condition prescribed by Section 116 of the Act, namely, the letting out of the zirat lands for a term of years is fulfilled in this case according to the findings of the Court below, so that the defendants were not non-occupancy raiyats under Article 1(a) of the Schedule but were mere trespassers upon the land after the expiry of the term of the lease.

66. Even irrespective of the heading the result to my mind is the same, namely, that a person holding the proprietors private land such as kamat or zirat would not be a non-occupancy raiyat within the meaning of Article 1(a) of the Schedule provided the land is let under a lease for a term of years, or under a lease from year to year. In order to arrive at this result one has to look at the history of the legislation on the subject.

67. As pointed out by my learned brother Mr. Justice Chapman, prior to the Rent Act of 1859 there was no such classification of raiyats as occupancy and non-occupancy and the raiyats were divided into two classes, namely, resident cultivators" and "non-resident cultivators." The Regulations relating to the Decennial and Permanent Settlements scrupulously protected the right of landlords or zemindars with regard to the lands in their khas possession. In Act X of 1859 and in Act VII of 1869 the manner in which a right of occupancy could be acquired was for the first time defined. Section 6 of the Act ran as follows:

Every raiyat who shall have cultivated or held land for a period of 12 years shall have a right of occupancy in land so cultivated or held by him whether it be held under a patta or not, so long as he pays the rent payable on account of the same: but this ruling does not apply to kamat, nij-jote, or sir land belonging to the proprietor of the estate or tenure and let by him on a lease for a term or year by year.

68. It was pointed out in Bhugwan Bhagut v. Jug Mohun Roy 20 W.R. 308 "that the express purpose of the Legislature in the section was to prevent the zemindars rights in this particular class of land from being invaded or restricted by the growth of the occupancy rights on the part of a raiyat to whom he had let it for periods equal to or exceeding twelve years." (Phear and Morris, JJ.) The same Judges in Janoo Mundur v. Brijo Singh 22 W.R. 548 held that a landlord has a right to make his own terms with the tenants of nij-jote lands as to enhancement of the rent and that he has no right to have a judicial assessment at an enhanced rate and that he can turn out the tenant of the occupation if the tenant does not agree to the rent proposed by him. They farther held that a tenant who holds over after the expiry of the lease does so on the terms on which the land was let to him.

69. Similar was the view taken recently by Stephen and Doss, JJ. in Syed Khalilur Rahman v. Rupan Mahton 12 C.W.N. 436 where they held that the tenant-defendant had no defence to the landlords action for recovery of lands after the expiration of the lease in 1896, as he was a mere trespasser on the lands which were kamat. In short, the view taken in that case appears to be that a tenant of kamat land does not acquire a right of occupancy by holding it over after the expiry of the lease.

70. From the above it is clear that the kamat or zirat lands of the landlord were protected under the Acts of 1859 and 1869 from the accrual of occupancy rights by tenants holding for a term. Non-occupancy rights were not dealt with or defined in those Acts. In 1885 for the first time non-occupancy rights were introduced.

71. Tenants under the Act of 1885 are classified under the following heads "for the purposes of the Act," namely: (1) Tenure-holders, (2) raiyats, (3) under-raiyats; and raiyats again have been divided into three classes:

(a) raiyats holding at fixed rates, (6) occupancy raiyats, that is to say, raiyats having a right of occupancy in the land held by them, and (c) non-occupancy raiyats, that is to say, raiyats not having such a right of occupancy.

72. The classification of tenants in Section 4 is not exhaustive. As an instance may be mentioned the class of tenants known as settled raiyats u/s 20.

73. It was pointed out in Kuldip Singh v. Chhatur Singh Roy 3 C.L.J. 285 that every occupancy raiyat is not necessarily a settled raiyat, though every settled-raiyat is a raiyat of occupancy as the status of a settled raiyat cannot be transferred, and can only be acquired by holding some land as a raiyat in the village for twelve years, whereas an occupancy right may be acquired by purchasing a transferable occupancy holding.

74. Chapter III deals with tenure-holders; Chapter IV deals with raiyats at fixed rates; Chapter V with occupancy raiyats,; and Chapter VI with non-occupancy raiyats. Thus the rights and incidents of each class of raiyats have been dealt with in a separate Chapter, those of non-occupancy in Chapter VI.

75. Section 116 of the Act is intended to exclude the proprietors private lands from the operations of Chapters V and VI provided the proprietor has taken the precaution indicated by the concluding words of the section, i.e., when any such land is held under a lease for a term of years, or under a lease from year to year.

76. The words in Section 116, namely, "nothing in Chapter VI shall apply to the proprietors land" can bear one and only one interpretation, that no right of non-occupancy can arise in lands known as zirat or kamat where such land is let out by the proprietor for a term of years; for in excluding such lands from the operation of Chapter VI it was intended that the rights and incidents of non-occupancy raiyats as defined or described in Chapter VI shall not apply to such lands. There does not appear to be any other interpretation.

77. While introducing the occupancy rights in the Act of 1885 the Legislature intended that these rights shall not accrue with respect to the proprietors private lands in the same way as the occupancy rights did not accrue in respect of these lands prior to 1885 This protection is expressed in Section 116 of the Act.

78. The history of land tenures in the Province clearly shows that the lands in the khas possession of the zemindars or proprietors were protected by the Legislature from any rights of occupancy and non-occupancy accruing thereon under certain conditions as set forth in Section 116. The Decennial and the Permanent Settlement recognized the distinction between the proprietors khas lands and the lands which may be said to be the raiyati stock,

79. Khamar lands denote proprietors private lands as distinguished from those let out to tenants. The khamar lands have always been recognized as being in a special and exclusive sense a private property of the zemindar as distinguished from all the rest, cultivated or cultivable, which may be called raiyati land, and in respect of which the zemindors rights were merely to receive a share of the produce or equivalent in money [Finucane and Ameer Ali, Bengal Tenancy Act, 2nd Edition, pages 533-534]. It was to protect the latter class of lands that in Section 8 of Regulation I of 1793 (Permanent Settlement) it was declared as follows:

The Governor-General in Council will, whenever he may deem it proper, enact such regulations as he may think necessary for the protection and welfare of the dependent taluqdars, raiyats, and other cultivators of the soil.

80. In Section 39 of the Decennial Settlement Regulation [VIII of 1793] the khamar lands were understood to signify lands appropriated to the subsistence of zamindars and their families. The distinction between such lands and the malguzari or raiyati lands was recognized and the former was annexed to and assimilated with the latter for the purposes of the security of the revenue and for such security only Jonab Ali v. Rakibuddin 1 C.L.J. 303 : 9 C.W.N. 571.

81. The raiyati lands in the Regulation were the lands cultivated by residents of village known as khudkasht raiyats and those cultivated by the non-residents known as paikasht tenants. The enactments passed since the Permanent Settlement are all in accordance with the declaration in Section 8 of Regulation I of 1793, referred to above, and were directed to the protection of the raiyats with regard to the raiyati lands as distinguished from the khamar lands [Rampini, Bengal Tenancy Act, page xii, Introduction].

82. The expression in Section 116 has also been held to mean as barring the acquisition of non occupancy rights in proprietors private lands. Vide Sheo Nandan Roy v. Ajodh Roy 26 C 546 : 3 C.W.N. 336 : 13 Ind. Dec. (N.S.) 950 where it was held that a person brought on the maliks zirat lands by a lease for a term of years cannot acquire any right of occupancy or non-occupancy on the said lands and that be is a trespasser only on the expiry of the lease and is liable to ejectment.

83. In Damodar Narayan v. Dalgliesh 9 Ind. Cas. 913 : 38 C. 432 : 15 C.W.N. 345 : 9 M.L.T. 364 : 8 A.L.J. 441 : 13 C.L.J. 512 : 13 Bom. L.R. 396 : (1911) 2 M.W.N. 182 (P.C.) their Lordships of the Privy Council, disagreeing with the Calcutta High Court, upheld the decree of the Court below for possession claimed by the landlord in respect of zirat lands which were leased to the defendants for a term. The Subordinate Judge had expressly held that u/s 116 the defendant is neither an occupancy or non-occupancy-raiyat in respect of the lands." This statement of the law has not been taken exception to by their Lordships of the Privy Council while dealing with and affirming his judgment. The effect of all the decisions is. that the clause in Section 116, nothing in Chapter VI shall apply to the proprietors private lands" is to bar the acquisition of non-occupancy rights in respect of zirat lands.

84. A Court is required to have regard to custom in determining whether a person is a raiyat or not (section 5 of the Act). No custom is more certain than that a tenant in zirat is not a raiyat. This custom has been recognized in every text book and in a multitude of enactments and decisions [vide also Sir Courtenay Ilberts speech on the Tenancy Act].

85. The Bengal Tenancy Act does not purport to be a complete and exhaustive Code even in respect of the law of landlord and tenant Kripa Sindhu Mukerjee v. Annada Sundari Debi 11 C.W.N. 983 : 6 C.L.J. 273 : 35 C. 34 (F.B.). A person holding under a lease for a term of years the zirat land is not a raiyat and will not be governed by the Bengal Tenancy Act but by general law. He does not become a non-occupancy raiyat after the expiry of the lease and is a trespasser only. Article 1(a) of the Schedule, which applies expressly to non-occupancy raiyats, does not apply to persons holding under a lease the proprietors private lands. Thus apart from the heading added to the section the history of the Legislation, the object and scope of the Act and the meaning and true interpretation of the actual words used in the Act lead to the conclusion that the general limitation of twelve years applicable to trespassers under the general Limitation Act will apply and that the new Article 1(a) does not apply to the case.

86. It cannot be contended that the provisions barring the acquisition of non-occupancy rights cease to apply when the tenant holds over after the expiry of the term of the lease. Section 51 of the Bengal Tenancy Act clearly lays down that when a tenant holds over, the conditions under which he held the land in the last pretending agricultural year shall be presumed to continue. This is also the general principle of holding over.

87. The authorities on the point noticed above both under the old and the new Act clearly support the view that when the tenant has been brought on the land for a term of years under the lease, he is a trespasser on the land after the expiry of the lease and can be ejected if the suit is brought under the ordinary law applicable to the eviction of trespassers, i.e., twelve years from the expiry of the lease.

88. For the above reasons I hold that the suit is not barred by Article 1(a) of Schedule III of the Act and that the appeal should be dismissed.