1. Leave granted.
2. The appellant was a Senior Inspector in Railway Protection Special Force (RPSF). He had worked on deputation with New Okhla Industrial Development Authority (hereinafter referred to as "the Authority") from 4-6-1992 to 5-1-1993. The Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of the Authority by communication dated 26-2-1993 addressed to the Inspector General of RPSF stated that the services of the appellant on deputation during the aforesaid period were found to be exceptionally good. It was also stated in the said communication that the association of the appellant with Export Processing Zone of the Authority for over four years dealing with general administration and personnel matters, law and order, security, excise and custom and other related issues led to his development as a well balanced officer and that he held charge of Security Officer, Administrative Officer and Estate Manager in the said Export Zone. The Authority, under the aforesaid circumstances, proposed RPSF the permanent absorption of the appellant in the Authority expressing its willingness to protect his pay and other perks in the parent department. In terms of letter dated 18-3-1993, the appellant communicated his willingness to be permanently absorbed in the Authority. In the said communication addressed to his parent department it was stated that if permanently absorbed in the Authority, the appellant will sever his lien from the Railways and submit resignation. The Authority by letter dated 13th April informed the Inspector General, RPSF, that the permanent absorption of the appellant in the Authority has been accepted and requested RPSF to relieve him at the earliest so that he may join the Authority.
3. With reference to Railway Boards letter, considering the resignation which the appellant had tendered from railway service on 28-4-1993, the Authority was informed by the Railways that the appellant has been relieved on 28th April so as to report in the Authoritys office for permanent absorption. The office order dated 7th May issued by the Authority records that the appellant has joined the Authority with effect from 28-4-1993. The Personnel Department of the Authority also issued an order dated 7-1-1994 fixing the pay of the appellant consequent upon his permanent absorption with effect from 28-4-1993.
4. After nearly eight years, by office order dated 6-6-2002, the Authority took a unilateral decision that the order dated 7-1-1994 regarding permanent absorption of the appellant is ineffective due to non approval of the Board of the Authority. The said order seems to have been passed on account of letter dated 5-6-2002 having been received by the Authority from the Industrial Development Department of the U.P. Government. Besides, the absence of Board approval, the other reason stated in the order dated 6-6-2002 is that the approval of the U.P. Government prior to absorption of the appellant had not been sought as per the Absorption Rules, 1984. Further the appellant was relieved from the Authority and directed to report back to the Director General, RPSF, Railway Board.
5. The aforesaid order dated 6-6-2002 was challenged by the appellant in a writ petition filed before the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad. The writ petition was partly allowed. As the order dated 6-6-2002 had admittedly been passed without giving any opportunity to the appellant who had been permanently absorbed, the High Court held that the permanent absorption cannot be cancelled without giving opportunity of hearing to the appellant. The High Court in the judgment and order under appeal, while quashing the order dated 6-6-2002, observed that it would be open to the Authority to pass fresh order after hearing the appellant. The appellant is aggrieved by that part of the impugned judgment and order which directs and permits the Authority to pass a fresh order recalling the permanent absorption. According to the appellant, the direction and permission to the Authority in the impugned judgment for passing fresh order is not legally sustainable, on the facts and circumstances of the case, as there was no allegation of any misconduct on the part of the appellant; the Absorption Rules, 1984 had no applicability; his appointment was legal and valid and on the basis of the absorption he had resigned from the railway service which resignation had been accepted and he had been relieved from the said service about eight years earlier. It is submitted that the effect of the impugned order passed by the Authority, if allowed to stand, would be that the appellant would neither be employee of the Authority nor of the Railways. The submission is that both the reasons for recalling permanent absorption of the appellant are untenable.
6. As noticed above, the order dated 6-6-2002 recalling the permanent absorption of the appellant, has been passed for two reasons, namely, (i) the Boards approval having not been obtained, and (if) approval of the U.P. Government under the Absorption Rules, 1984 having not been obtained.
7. We have perused the U.P. Absorption of Government Servants in Public Undertaking Rules, 1984. It is evident therefrom that the said Rules have no applicability insofar as it concerns the absorption of an employee other than that of the State of U.P. Under R.2(d) "government servant" means a person appointed to a public service or a post in connection with the affairs of the State of U.P. in permanent capacity in a pensionable establishment. It cannot be seriously contended and has rightly not been contended on behalf of the respondents that the said Rules would have no applicability when the absorption of a non U.P. government servant is involved. The approval of the parent department before permanent absorption is understandable and that seems to have been the reason that before considering the case of the appellant for his permanent absorption, the Authority took up the matter with his parent department i.e. the Railways and it is only after the Railways agreed, the question of permanent absorption of the appellant was considered by the Authority, order of absorption made and consequently the appellant severed his relationship from the parent department by resigning from the Railways. The resignation of the appellant having been accepted by the Railways about eight years back, the appellant is not the employee of the Railways and, therefore, could not be directed to report for duty to the Railways. It is not the case of the respondents that they took up the matter with the Railways and the Railways had agreed to accept the appellant as their employee.
8. The second reason is the non approval from the Board before passing orders in the year 1994 for permanent absorption of the appellant. Our attention has been drawn by the learned counsel for the appellant to the New Okhla Industrial Development Authority Service Regulations, 1961 and in particular to Rules 15 and 16(1) which read as under:
"15. The Authority shall specify the appointing officer for different posts or categories or classes of posts under it and until so directed the Chief Executive Officer shall be the appointing officer in relation to all posts under the Authority.
16. (1) Recruitment to any post under the Authority may be made from any of the sources:
(a) by direct recruitment;
(b) from promotion from amongst the employees occupying posts carrying a lower scale through a departmental test or an interview or selection or in any other manner specified by the Authority;
(c) by deputation or reemployment or on contractual basis;
(d) from any other source as approved by the Authority."
Our attention has also been drawn to the minutes of the meeting of the Authority held on 10-12-1988. The said minutes show that the powers of appointment on all the posts in the Authority have been delegated to the Chairman of the Authority. With reference to the aforesaid Rules and documents it is submitted by learned counsel for the appellant that the Chairman of the Authority was fully empowered to pass an order in respect of permanent absorption of the appellant as under R.16(1)(d), the recruitment from any other source is permissible. The submission is that reading of Rules 15 and 16(1) together with the minutes of the meeting dated 10-12-1988 clearly show that the Chairman had the power to appoint the appellant and, therefore, there was no substance also in the second reason about the Boards approval before absorption having not been obtained. On the other hand, it is contended by the learned counsel for the respondents that R.16(1)(d) postulates the approval of the Authority if the recruitment to any post is sought to be made from any other source although it could not be disputed that the Chairman had the power to make the appointment in view of delegation as contained in the minutes above referred.
9. On the facts and circumstances of this case, we need not go in depth into the question sought to be urged on behalf of the Authority, for, we are of the view that the appellant having resigned from the Railways and having been absorbed in the Authority eight years back, cannot be put in a position, for no fault of his, which results in his being an employee neither of the Authority nor of the parent department. The appellant cannot be made to suffer for the discrepancy, if any, assuming there is any such discrepancy which is now pleaded as a reason by the Authority. It is not the case of the respondents in the order dated 6-6-2002 that the appellant sought to enter the Authority from back door. Therefore, the question of cases, if any, where back door entry into the service of the Authority may have been obtained, is of no consequence insofar as the facts and circumstances of the present case are concerned. Both the reasons stated in the order dated 6-6-2002, are, therefore, untenable.
10. For the aforesaid reasons, we set aside the impugned judgment and order of the High Court to. the extent it permitted the Authority as noticed above. The order dated 6-6-2002 passed by the Authority is set aside. The appeal is allowed. The appellant would be entitled to all consequential benefits as a permanently absorbed employee of the Authority. The appellant would also be entitled to his costs.