Shiv Kumar Sharma, J.

1. Beni Das Agarwal (for short BDA) respondent herein, in the writ petition filed before the learned Single Judge sought following reliefs:

(i) to quash the order dated July 10, 1995 of Member Secretary Building Plan Committee II (for short BPC-II) as well as the minutes drawn on July 10, 1995 by BPC-II Jaipur Development Authority (JDA).

(ii) to direct JDA not to act contrary to the approved maps.

(iii) to direct JDA not to demolish construction made by BDA.

2. Learned Single Judge vide order dated November 25, 1997 allowed the writ petition in terms of prayer made by BDA.

3. Challenge in this appeal is to the aforequoted order of learned Single Judge.

4. The writ petition was filed in the backdrop of the facts that the plot No. H-19 Subhash Marg C-scheme Jaipur owned by BDA was a sub-divided plot of original land situated at Mirza Ismile Road Jaipur. The plot came to be allotted to M/s. Chunni Lal Ramgopal & Sons on June 7, 1994 for commercial use. The measurements of plot were 210 ft. x 200.ft. In due course of time the original land was sold through sub-division in favour of different persons. BDA moved application for construction of a Commercial Complex in the name of his father. The then Urban Improvement Trust granted permission and handed over approved maps through letter dated April 18, 1970. However, the construction could not be started. In the year 1992 BDA again applied for permission to raise construction of commercial complex. In the meeting of BPC-II held on October 15, 1993 the permission was accorded. The information was sent to BDA vide letter dated December 6, 1993. BDA raised construction according to parameters and the map approved by JDA on October 15, 1993. In June, 1995 JDA issued show cause notice to BDA stating therein that since the permission was accorded on wrong parameters, why not it be revoked. JDA also intended to demolish the construction already raised. BDA approached JDA Tribunal and interim order was issued by the Tribunal in favour of BDA. Despite interim order BDA was asked to appear before JDA on June 26, 1995. The counsel of BDA was also informed that the case of BDA was covered under Regulation 11.5 of Jaipur Development Authority Regulations, 1989 (for short Regulations). Counsel for BDA sought time to explain as to how Regulation 11.5 was not applicable. However the case was fixed for June 13, 1995. On that day BDA was informed that the permission granted on October 15, 1993 had been revoked. BDA under these circumstances preferred the writ petition.

5. The JDA filed reply raising preliminary objections in regard to the maintainability of writ petition. It was stated that under Section 83 of Jaipur Development Authority Act, 1982 the order dated July 10, 1995 could be challenged by filing of appeal before the JDA Tribunal. The second ground was that copy of order assailed in the writ petition was not filed and the third objection was that the writ petition involved umpteen disputed questions of facts. It was also averred that BDA was guilty of submitting documents with material change. According to JDA subdivision in itself meant creation of separate property. The JDA had legal authority to revoke the permission granted by it. Lok-Aayukta after due enquiry pointed out applicability of wrong parameters in granting permission to BDA. Since the plot in question situated on Subhash Marg, parameters applied to the plot situated on MI Road were not applicable to it.

6. Learned Single Judge after having considered the submissions of both the parties and relying on the ratio indicated by Apex Court in Express Newspapers Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India : AIR1986SC872 , made following observations in para 34 of the impugned order:

In view of above observations of Honble Apex Court, I am of the view that once the permission of construction of commercial complex has been granted by the JDA and on that permission the petitioner has acted upon and raised construction as per parameters stipulated by the JDA, that cannot be revoked, subsequently on the basis that while the permission was given the Authority of JDA has not properly considered the provisions in respect of parameters before approving the map of building.

7. Mr. Bharat Vyas, learned Additional Advocate General, appearing for JDA criticised the impugned order from various angles. Submission of Mr. Vyas may be summarised thus:

(i) Writ petition of BDA was not maintainable in view of alternative remedy of appeal provided under Section 83 of JDA Act.

(ii) Writ petition was not maintainable since the order under challenge was not placed on record.

(iii) Learned Single Judge did not properly consider the relevant statutory provisions.

(iv) Since permission was not granted in accordance with law, its revocation was just and reasonable.

(v) Order of learned Single Judge is based on misapplication of facts. The JDA Tribunal never stayed revocation of permission but learned Single Judge stated in the impugned order that the Tribunal has stayed the proceedings of revoking the permission.

8. Having pondered over the submissions we find that before revoking the permission, reasonable opportunity of hearing was not afforded to BDA. Learned Single Judge took notice of certain admitted facts and observed in para 13 of the impugned order thus:

In the case in hand the facts are not in dispute that permission for construction of commercial complex has been granted by JDA in December, 93, thereafter the petitioner has acted upon on that permission and raised construction of commercial complex and invested a huge amount. Before the BPC-II there was no concealment on the part of the petitioner. The Tribunal has stayed the proceeding of revoking the permission, Inspite of that show cause notice has been issued to petitioner as to why the permission should not be revoked and why the building already raised should not be demolished. Not only that the petitioner was directed to appear before the BPC-II on 10.7.95. On 10.7.95, the petitioner was out of station, his counsel appeared and prayed for time. Instead of allowing him time and giving reasonable opportunity, the decision has been taken to revoke the permission granted to petitioner in December, 93. That was communicated to petitioner only 13.7.95, on a hearing date in JDA Tribunal. The JDA officer has informed the counsel for petitioner that permission has been withdrawn. This is clearly in violating of principles of natural justice and in such matters this Court cannot dismiss the writ petition on the ground of availability of alternative remedy, but should interfere in such arbitrary actions of executive authorities, keeping in view the facts of original plot, I find no force in the submission of Mr. Vyas that the writ petition is not maintainable. Not only this the writ petition was filed as back as in July, 1995 and now all pleadings are completed and after two and a half years, this petition cannot be dismissed on the ground of availability of alternative remedy.

9. Since principles of Natural Justice had been violated by the JDA, in our opinion/the writ petition was maintainable and it could not have been dismissed on the ground of alternative remedy.

10. So far as objection in regard to not placing on record the copy of impugned order is concerned, we find that it was incorporated in para 22 of the writ petition. Thus this objection also fails.

11. Mr. Vyas, learned Counsel, vehemently canvassed construction was never raised by BDA prior to revocation of permission and he had mislead the Court. A request is made to appoint a Commissioner. We declined the request as we have before us the order dated August 19, 1998 passed by Division Bench (Presided by Honble P.P. Naolekar J., as his Lordship then was) in this appeal. The order reads as under:

Heard on the application for modification of stay order. It is submitted by the counsel for the respondent that the building in question is practically complete and he has only to carry out the white washing, flooring, plumbing, electricity fitting and the fittings of the doors and windows. If the permission is not granted to him and ultimately the appeal is dismissed, he shall suffer irreparable injury in as much as considering the rising cost every day, he shall suffer financial loss. We have considered the argument of the learned Counsel for the respondent and direct that the respondent shall be permitted to carry out white washing, flooring, plumbing, electricity fitting and fitting of doors and windows in the building in question.

It is made clear that these works carried out by the respondents would not create any additional right in favour of the respondent. It is further directed that the respondent is hereby restrained from creating any third party rights in the building until the disposal of appeal.

12. Afore quoted order dated August 19, 1998 was assailed by the JDA before Honble Supreme Court in SLP (Civil) No. 19117/1998 but it was dismissed in limine on December 16, 1998.

13. That takes us to the other submissions advanced by Mr. Vyas learned Counsel. Section 30 of JDA Act which gives power of revocation and modification of permission to development reads as under:

30. Power of revocation and modification of permission to development-(1) If it appears to the Authority that it is expedient, having regard to the plan prepared or under preparation that any permission to develop land granted under this Act or any other law, should be revoked or modified, the Authority may after giving the person concerned an opportunity of being heard against such revocation or modification, by order, revoke or modify the permission to such extent as appears to it to be necessary:

Provided that-

(a) where he development relates to the carrying out of any building or other operation, no such order shall affect such of the operations as have been previously carried out; or shall be passed after these operations have substantially progressed or have been completed;

(b) where the development relates to a change of use of land, no such order shall be passed at any time after the change has taken place.

Provided further that where the revocation or modification of the permission is necessary in public interest, the provisions of the first proviso shall not apply.

(2) Where permission is revoked or modified by an order made under Sub-section (1) and any owner claims within the time and in the manner prescribed, compensation for the expenditure incurred in carrying out the development in accordance with such permission which has been rendered abortive by the revocation or modification, the Authority shall, after giving the owner reasonable opportunity of being heard by the officer, appointed by it in this behalf and after considering his report assess and offer reasonable compensation to the owner.

(3) If the owner does not accept the compensation and gives notice, within thirty days of his refusal to accept, the Authority shall refer the matter for the adjudication of the Tribunal and the decision of the Tribunal shall be final and be binding on the owner and the Authority.

14. The word Authority mentioned in Section 30, has been defined in Section 2(3) of JDA Act thus:

Authority means the Jaipur Development Authority constituted under Section 3.

15. Section 4(1) of JDA Act provides as to the persons who shall constitute Authority established by the State Government under Section 3 of JDA Act. This consists of a Chairman who shall be Minister-Incharge of Urban Development of the State or a nominee of the Governor during Presidents Rule. Apart of the Minister Incharge, the Authority consists of the State Minister of Urban Development, Secretary to the Government UDH, Jaipur Development Commissioner and other members named in the Section. Thus the above body alone is the Authority as contemplated under Section 30 of JDA Act. Admittedly the impugned order whereby permission was revoked, was not issued with the approval of Authority. This exercise in the present case has been done by the Commissioner with the approval of BPC-II

16. We do not see any merit in the submission of Mr. Vyas that JDC being the Chief Executive of the Authority, was empowered under Section 8(1)(v) of JDA Act to grant or refuse permission on behalf of the Authority. The initial power of granting or refusing permission could undoubted be. exercised by the JDC but the power of revocation and modification of any permission to development having already been granted by one Commissioner could not be exercised by another Commission. Power given to the Authority under Section 30 could not be exercised by the Commissioner.

17. Even Regulation 3.14 of 1989 Regulations given power to JDA to revoke permission obtained by concealing facts or by practicing fraud. This power is not vested in the Commissioner. There is nothing on record to show that the Authority delegated power vested in it to the Commissioner.

18. Mr. Vyas, learned Counsel for the JDA invited our attention to the report of Lokayukta. We do not see any justification to place reliance on the proceedings taken before Lokayukta against BDA since he was neither a party nor had any notice of the proceedings taken by Lokayukta. BDA had no opportunity to put forth his case before the Lokayukta. Even otherwise, any investigation or report made by Lokayukta can be used for taking action against delinquent public servant only.

19. In State of UP v. Maharaja Dharmendra Prasad Singh : [1989]1SCR176 , Honble Supreme Court indicated that in exercise of powers of revoking or cancelling the permission is akin to and partakes of a quasi-judicial complexion and in exercising such power the authority must bring to bear an unbaised mind, consider impartially the objection raised by the aggrieved party and decide the matter consistent with the principles of natural justice. The authority cannot permit its decision to be influenced by the dictation of other as this would amount to abdication and surrender of its discretion. It would then not be the authoritys discretion that is exercised by someone else. If the authority hands over its discretion to another body, it acts ulra vires.

20. It is next contended by Mr. Vyas, learned Counsel that there are errors apparent on the face of the impugned order. It is no doubt true that certain facts were not properly noticed by the learned Single Judge but such mistakes are insignificant and they do not affect the finding arrived at by learned Single Judge. In view of what has been stated above the inevitable result is dismissal of the appeal which we direct. There shall be no order as to costs.