1. The instant petition has been filed by the Petitioner for initiating proceedings under the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, against the Respondent herein for wilfully disobeying the Judgment/Order dated 24.07.2018, passed by this Court in RFA No. 567/2018 and for wilful breach of the undertaking given to this Court on 09.08.2018 in compliance of the Order dated 24.07.2018.

2. The case has a chequered history. The Petitioner states that he is the owner of a built up property bearing No. F-163, Laxmi Nagar, Delhi-92, admeasuring 223 Sq. Yards (hereinafter referred to as „the premises in question‟), which he had purchased vide a registered sale deed dated 17.10.1970. It is stated that in 1973, the Petitioner herein permitted the husband of the Respondent herein to occupy an area of 50 Sq. Yards (marked in red colour in the site plan enclosed with the petition) in the premises in question at a license fee of Rs.550/- per month. It is stated that the Petitioner was posted in Nepal as a Government employee. It is stated that when the Petitioner returned to India in 1982, he would be posted in different parts of the country and he used to collect the licence fee from the husband of the Respondent herein at an interval of 2-3 months. It is stated that the Petitioner retired from service in 1996 and shifted to the premises in question. It is stated that the Petitioner herein asked the husband of the Respondent to vacate the portion of the premises in question that was in possession of the husband of the Respondent, i.e. 50 Sq. Yards in 2002. It is stated that when the husband of the Respondent refused to vacate the premises in question, the Petitioner herein filed a Suit, being Suit No.408/2008 (New No.17074/2016), before the learned Additional District Judge, Tis Hazari Courts, Delhi with the following prayers:

“(a) Decree of possession against the defendant in respect of 50 sqr. yards land in property no. F-163, Laxmi Nagar, Delhi-92, on which the defendant is living in unauthorized occupation in a jhuggi (hutment) since March, 2002.

(b) Decree of permanent injunction to restrain the defendant from selling or alienating the portion of the property no. F-163, Laxmi Nagar, Delhi-92, which is in her occupation, as shown in red colour in the site plan attached with the plaint.

(c) Decree of mandatory injunction for directions to the defendant to pay damages of Rs.34,600/- for unauthorized user of the portion in her use and occupation in property no. F-163, Laxmi Nagar, Delhi92, w.e.f. March, 2002.”

3. At this juncture it is pertinent to mention that the Respondent herein had filed a Suit, being Suit No. 385/1996, against the Petitioner herein for a declaration that she was the owner of the premises in question by way of adverse possession. In the said suit, it was stated that the Respondent was in occupation of 100 Sq. Yards of the premises in question and the Respondent had perfected the title of the premises in question by way of adverse possession as she had been staying at the premises for over twenty years. The Respondent herein withdrew the said Suit on 07.02.2002 in view of the statement made by the Petitioner herein that the Respondent would not be disposed from the premises in question without following the due process of law.

4. In the Suit filed by the Petitioner herein, i.e. Suit No.408/2008, the Defendant, i.e. the Respondent herein, has stated that the Petitioner herein is not the owner of the premises in question, and that the Respondent is the owner and is in occupation of an area measuring 100 Sq. Yards of the premises in question. It is further stated that out of 223 Sq. Yards, the Petitioner herein forcibly occupied 100 Sq. Yards of the premises in question. The Trial Court vide Order dated 04.04.2018 held that though the Petitioner herein has proved that he is the owner of the premises in question, it also held that the Petitioner had been unable to prove that the Respondent or her husband were liable to pay the licence fee at the rate of Rs.550/- per month or that there were any arrears. The Trial Court held that the Respondent herein had accepted that she did not have any title document of the premises in question. The Trial Court, therefore, decreed the Suit in favour of the Petitioner herein and directed the Respondent herein to handover the peaceful and vacant possession of 50 Sq. Yards of the land in the rear portion of the premises in question to the Petitioner herein within two months from the date of that Order, i.e. 04.04.2018.

5. It is stated that the Respondent herein challenged the said decree by filing an appeal, being RFA No.567/2018, before this Court. This Court vide Order dated 24.07.2018 disposed of the appeal by sustaining the decree dated 04.04.2018. However, it held that, as agreed between the parties, the decree for mesne profits against the Respondent herein was waived off provided that the Respondent herein vacate the premises in question on or before 15.10.2018. This Court also directed the Respondent herein to file an undertaking to this effect within one week from the date of the Order, i.e. 24.07.2018. The undertaking was filed by the Respondent on 09.08.2018 wherein the Respondent undertook to vacate the portion of land in her possession of the premises in question on or before 15.10.2018.

6. It is further pertinent to mention that on 22.09.2018, i.e. after this Court passed the Order in RFA No.567/2018, the Respondent herein filed a Suit, being CS No.760/2018 under Section 6 & 9 of Specific Relief Act for restoration of possession admeasuring 100 Sq. Yards of the premises in question. The said Suit was withdrawn on 03.01.2019.

7. It is stated that since the Respondent had not vacated the premises in question, the instant contempt petition has been filed.

8. Before this Court, a plea has been taken by the Respondent that on 04.06.2018, the Petitioner herein had forcibly occupied the portion of the premises in question that had been under the occupation of the Respondent herein and, therefore, the consent Order dated 24.07.2018 stood complied with. It is further contended by the Respondent that since the Petitioner has already forcibly taken the possession of the portion of land of the premises in question that was under the occupation of the Respondent, on 04.06.2018, there was nothing left to be complied with and, therefore, contempt is not made out. It is also stated in the affidavit filed by the Respondent that Police complaints have been given by the Respondent stating that the Petitioner herein has taken the possession of a portion of land in the premises in question, that was under the occupation of the Respondent.

9. Learned Counsel for the Petitioner submits that the Respondent has deliberately violated the Order dated 24.07.2018, passed by this Court in RFA No.567/2018 as well as the undertaking dated 09.08.2018 given to this Court. He states that the Respondent is raising a bogey that she was in possession of 100 Sq. Yards of the premises in question and the Petitioner has forcibly taken 50 Sq. Yards from her possession. It is stated by the learned Counsel for the Petitioner that the story of the Respondent is prima facie wrong because had the Petitioner herein taken 50 Sq. Yards of the portion of land of the premises in question, that was under the occupation of the Respondent, the Respondent would have stated so before this Court in the RFA proceedings. He further states that had this been the situation, an undertaking would also not have been given by the Respondent stating that she would hand over the possession of 50 Sq. Yards of the land in the premises in question to the Petitioner herein on or before 15.10.2018. Learned Counsel for the Petitioner further submits that a reading of the police complaint does not indicate that the Petitioner has, at any time, forcibly occupied any portion of the land in the occupation of the Respondent herein in the premises in question.

10. Per contra, learned Counsel for the Respondent has taken this Court through various averments made by the Respondent in CS No.385/1996, which was filed by the Respondent herein stating that she was the owner of 100 Sq. Yards of land in the rear portion of the premises in question and the Respondent has perfected the title of the premises in question by way of adverse possession. He states that as per the said plaint, the Petitioner is in possession of 50 Sq. Yards of the land in the premises in question which he has forcibly acquired on 04.06.2018. He further states that the Respondent is an illiterate lady and that the undertaking dated 09.08.2018 was given only to the Petitioner herein and not to the Court. He further states that the remedy of the Petitioner lies in filing an execution petition for execution of the Order dated 24.07.2018 and the instant contempt petition is not maintainable.

11. Heard Mr. Shekhar Preet Jha, learned Counsel for the Petitioner, Mr. Mohd.Ali, learned Counsel for the Respondent, and perused the material on record.

12. Material on record discloses that the Respondent had filed a Suit bearing CS No.385/1996 wherein she prayed for a declaration that she was the absolute owner of the premises in question consisting of one Jhuggi on the land measuring 100 Sq. Yards and had perfected the title over the premises in question by way of adverse possession. The said Suit was withdrawn by the Respondent on the statement of the Petitioner herein that he would not dispossess the Respondent from the premises in question without due process of law. The said Order along with the statements of the Petitioner and the Respondent herein are reproduced as under:

13. A perusal of the plaint in Suit No.385/1996 does not bring out the areas of which the Respondent claims to be in possession. In any event, there is no finding that the Respondent is in occupation of 100 Sq. Yards of land of the premises in question out of a total area of 223 Sq. Yards. In the present Suit from which the present proceedings emanate, the Trial Court has accepted the sale deed filed by the Petitioner herein that the Petitioner has purchased the premises in question admeasuring 223 Sq. Yards from the erstwhile owner. The Respondent has not produced anything to show her title other than stating that she is in possession of 100 Sq. Yards of the premises in question. The Respondent has also not been able to prove the extent to which she was in possession of the premises in question. A decree of possession was, therefore, passed by the Trial Court in favour of the Petitioner herein for possession of 50 Sq. Yards of the premises that was in possession of the Respondent. There is no mention in the Order that the Respondent herein was in occupation of 100 Sq. Yards, and the Petitioner herein was declared to be entitled to 50 Sq. Yards. Paragraph No.9 (c) of the Order reads as under

"9.(c) The plaintiff as well as the defendant both have proved that they are residents of property no. F-163, Laxmi Nagar, Delhi-92. As per sale deed Ex.PW1/A, the property measures 223 sq. yards. Plaintiff claimed that the defendant occupied only 50 sq. yards thereof, as his licensee. The defendant did not mention any measurement of the portion in her occupation. PW1l relied upon the site plan Ex.PW1/B, which depicts that the suit property i.e. the portion in occupation of the defendant, was located in the rear comer of property no. F-163, Laxmi Nagar, Delhi-92. PW1 replied that he himself prepared the site plan EX.PWl/B as per measurement of the suit property. The defendant offered no site plan of her own to contradict the claim of the plaintiff. DW1 admitted in cross-examination that in her earlier suit no. 385/96 instituted by her against the plaintiff, she claimed to be owner of only 50 sq. yards of land. In view thereof, defendant failed to rebut the claim of plaintiff that she was in occupation of only 50 sq. yards of property no. F-163, Laxmi Nagar, Delhi-92.”

14. A reading of the Suit proceedings shows that the Respondent is in occupation of only 50 Sq. Yards which the Petitioner is already claiming in the Suit.

15. The appeal filed by the Respondent was disposed of on the basis of a consent decree wherein the Respondent has given an undertaking that she would vacate the premises in question on or before 15.10.2018. The undertaking dated 09.08.2018 given by the Respondent reads as under:

“1. That I am the appellant in the above said matter and in compliance of the above said order dated 24.07.2018 passed by this Hon'ble Court I will hand over the possession of land area measuring 50 sq.yds.of House bearing No.F-163 LAXMI NAGAR NEW DELHI within three months i.e. 15.10.2018 to the Respondent.”

16. The Respondent herein thereafter filed CS No.760/2018 claiming that she had been dispossessed from 100 Sq. Yards of the premises in question by the Petitioner herein and, therefore, she had filed CS No.760/2018 under Section 6 of the Specific Relief Act for restoration of possession. The said Suit was dismissed as withdrawn vide Order dated 03.01.2019. The said Order reads as under:

17. As rightly contended by the learned counsel for the Petitioner that had the decree been complied with, the Petitioner would have stated so in the appeal and then the undertaking would have had no meaning. This clearly indicates that the Respondent is only taking advantage of the fact that no measurement of Jhuggi has been given in the plaint or the site plan annexed to the Plaint. The Respondent is undoubtedly a rank encroacher on the premises in question. Her defence of adverse possession has not been accepted by the Trial Court in the decree dated 24.07.2018. The Respondent is, therefore, not entitled to be in the possession of the property at all.

18. The police complaints given by the Respondent also do not indicate that the Petitioner had forcefully occupied any portion of the premises in question. Annexure P-18 of the RFA is the police compliant dated 06.05.2018, however, it mentions the events that have transpired on 04.06.2018. Even assuming that the said date is a typographical error, then also the compliant does not indicate that the Petitioner had taken forceful possession of any part of the premises in question. Even the complaint dated 16.08.2018, which has also been filed with the RFA, does not show that the Petitioner had taken possession of any portion of the premises in question.

19. The ingenuity of the Respondent in filing a suit under Section 6 of the Specific Relief Act for her to be put in possession of some portion of the suit property also failed because the Respondent withdrew the same. The contention of the learned counsel for the Respondent that the Petitioner is an illiterate lady also cannot be accepted. She has given the undertaking dated 09.08.2018 stating that she will hand over the possession of land area measuring 50 Sq.Yds. to the Petitioner on or before 15.10.2018. Had the Petitioner forcefully occupied the premises in question, no undertaking would have been given by the Respondent and the Appeal would also have been dismissed as infructuous. The Petitioner was made to waive off the mesne profits on the condition that the Respondent would vacate the premises in question.

20. The contention of the learned counsel for the Respondent that the undertaking was given by the Respondent only to the Petitioner cannot be accepted because the undertaking is unambiguous and states that the Respondent will hand over the possession of the land measuring 50 Sq.Yds. of the premises in question to the Petitioner on or before 15.10.2018. The Respondent has failed to prove in any forum that she was in possession of the land measuring 100 Sq.Yds. of the premises in question. Furthermore, the fact that the Respondent has withdrawn Suit, being CS No.385/1996 and CS No.760/2018, shows that the Respondent has failed to prove that she was in occupation of land measuring 100 Sq.Yds. in the premises in question.

21. The Apex Court has repeatedly held that all decrees and orders are executable under the CPC, including consent decrees and orders, but merely because an order or decree is executable, it would not take away the jurisdiction of the Court to deal with the matter under the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971. Furthermore, the Apex Court has also held that in view of the purpose of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, i.e. preventing interference in the course of administration of justice, it would not be in consonance with the statute, judicial authority, principle or logic to draw any distinction between the wilful violation of the terms of a consent decree and violation of a decree that has been passed on adjudication.

22. In Rama Narang v. Ramesh Narang, (2006) 11 SCC 114, [LQ/SC/2006/328] the Supreme Court had observed as follows:

“18. The Act has been duly widened. It provides inter alia for definitions of the terms and lays down firmer bases for exercise of the court's jurisdiction in contempt. Section 2(b) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 defines civil contempt as meaning “wilful disobedience to any judgment, decree, direction, order, writ or other process of a court or wilful breach of an undertaking given to a court”. (emphasis supplied) Analysed, the definition provides for two categories of cases, namely, (1) wilful disobedience to a process of court, and (2) wilful breach of an undertaking given to a court. As far as the first category is concerned, the word “any” further indicates the wide nature of the power. No distinction is statutorily drawn between an order passed after an adjudication and an order passed by consent. This first category is separate from the second and cannot be treated as forming part of or taking colour from the second category. The legislative intention clearly was to distinguish between the two and create distinct classes of contumacious behaviour. Interestingly, the courts in England have held that the breach of a consent decree of specific performance by refusal to execute the agreement is punishable by way of proceedings in contempt (see C.H. Giles and Co. Ltd. v. Morris [(1972) 1 All ER 960 : (1972) 1 WLR 307 (Ch D)] ).

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23. The question which was before the Court in Babu Ram Gupta case [(1980) 3 SCC 47 [LQ/SC/1979/238] : 1980 SCC (Cri) 527] [LQ/SC/1979/238] was limited to the issue whether the appellant had given any undertaking to the Court, either expressly or impliedly, which he had violated. In other words it was limited to the second category of cases mentioned under Section 2(b) of the. The Court was not called upon to decide whether there was any contumacious conduct as envisaged by the first category of cases under that section. The observations made in that regard, are strictly speaking, obiter. The Court was not called upon to consider nor did it construe the language of Section 2(b) of the. If we were to accept the observations of the Court as an enunciation of the law, it would run contrary to the express language of the statute. As we have earlier noted, the section itself provides that wilful violation of any order or decree, etc. would tantamount to contempt. A compromise decree is as much a decree as a decree passed on adjudication. It is not as has been wrongly held by the Calcutta High Court in Nisha Kanto Roy Chowdhury [AIR 1948 Cal 294 [LQ/CalHC/1947/113] : 49 Cri LJ 567] merely an agreement between the parties. In passing the decree by consent, the court adds its mandate to the consent. A consent decree is composed of both a command and a contract. The Bombay High Court's view in Bajranglal Gangadhar Khemka [AIR 1950 Bom 336 [LQ/BomHC/1950/13] : 52 Bom LR 363] correctly represents the law that a consent decree is a contract with the imprimatur of the court. “Imprimatur” means “authorised” or “approved”. In other words by passing a decree in terms of a consent order the court authorises and approves the course of action consented to. Moreover, the provisions of Order 23 Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure require the court to pass a decree in accordance with the consent terms only when it is proved to the satisfaction of the court that a suit has been adjusted wholly or in part by any lawful agreement.

24. All decrees and orders are executable under the Code of Civil Procedure. Consent decrees or orders are of course also executable. But merely because an order or decree is executable, would not take away the court's jurisdiction to deal with a matter under the provided the court is satisfied that the violation of the order or decree is such, that if proved, it would warrant punishment under Section 13 of theon the ground that the contempt substantially interferes or tends substantially to interfere with the due course of justice. The decisions relied upon by the respondents themselves hold so as we shall subsequently see.

25. In such circumstances it would neither be in consonance with the statute, judicial authority, principle or logic to draw any distinction between the wilful violation of the terms of a consent decree and wilful violation of a decree which is passed on adjudication. The decision in Babu Ram Gupta case [(1980) 3 SCC 47 [LQ/SC/1979/238] : 1980 SCC (Cri) 527] [LQ/SC/1979/238] must, therefore, be limited to its own peculiar facts.”

23. This Court is of the opinion that the Respondent herein has only come up with the false claim that she was in possession of land measuring 100 Sq.Yds. in the premises in question without adducing any evidence to this effect in any of the suits. Despite categorical directions rendered by the learned Trial Court and this Court, the Respondent has remained obstinate in her stance that the premises in question is possessed by her by way of adverse possession. This extent of disobedience of law can be stated to be nothing less than contempt of Court, thereby, bringing down the majesty of law and making a mockery of the temple of justice.

24. The Respondent has prima facie committed contempt of Court and, being an encroacher, is liable to be evicted from the premises in question.

25. List on 05.07.2022 for Order on sentencing. However, it remains open to the Respondent to take necessary steps to purge the contempt.