1. The decree sought to be executed in this case was made bythe Court of the Munsif of Nawabganj, but the local jurisdiction in respect ofthe subject-matter of this suit appears to have been subsequently transferred,by order of the Local Government, to the Court of the Munsif of Malda.Nevertheless the decree-holder took out execution of his decree, within thetime fixed by the law of limitation, in the Malda Court, and in the course ofthe execution, a sum of money was paid towards liquidation of that decree. Asecond application for execution was made in February 1899 in the same Court,but the decree-holder was referred to the Nawabganj Court, as being the Courtwhich had passed the decree, and which was alone competent to execute it, inorder that an application might be made for the transfer of the decree forexecution by the Munsif of Malda. When an application for execution was made tothe Munsif of Malda, on a certificate transferring the decree to him, thejudgment-debtor pleaded limitation, The Munsif overruled that plea and gave thedecree holder the benefit of Clause 3 of Section 14 of the Limitation Act,holding that he was entitled to a deduction of the time during which theapplication, erroneously made to the Munsif of Malda, had been pending, as heheld that such proceedings had been taken in good faith. The District Judge, onappeal, expressed a contrary opinion, holding that ignorance of the law on thepart of the decree-holder would not constitute good faith. The District Judge,however, on other grounds, affirmed the order of the Munsif, holding that theproceedings, erroneously taken in the Malda Court, were not absolutely void butvoidable, and that the judgment-debtor having condoned the error committed Bythe decree-holder and having accepted the jurisdiction by making part paymentof the decree, the proceedings were saved under, Section 14 of the LimitationAct.

2. The first question raised before us in this appeal is,what Court was competent to execute this decree, and it is contended that theCourt of the Munsif of Nawabganj was alone competent to execute it, being theCourt which passed it within the terms of Section 223 of the Code of CivilProcedure, and it was also contended that, although the Munsif of Malda mightnow alone have jurisdiction to try the suit by reason of the transfer to hisjurisdiction of the locality in which the subject matter of the suit issituated, he would not be the Court to have jurisdiction to execute the decreepassed by the Munsif of Nawabganj. As authority for this we have been referredto the case of Kalipodo Mukerjee v. Dino Nath Mukerjee I.L.R (1897) . 25 [LQ/PC/1897/25] Cal.315. That case, however, is distinguishable from the present, for it washeld--that the District Judges order under Clause 2 of Section 13 of theBengal Civil Courts Act did not amount to a transfer of jurisdiction, but wasmerely an order for the distribution of business amongst two Courts, eachhaving jurisdiction. In the present case, however, the order of transfer was ofa different character. It was an order by the Local Government which readjustedthe boundaries of two adjoining mouzahs, so as to place the lands, the subjectmatter of the suit, within the jurisdiction of the Munsif of Malda. There was,therefore, no mere re-distribution of business as in the case in I.L. Rule 25Cal. but a removal of jurisdiction over this locality. The case of LutchmanPandeh v. Madan Mohun Shye I.L.R. (1880) Cal. 513. seems to us more appropriatein dealing with the terms of Section 649 of the Code of Civil Procedure. It wasthere held that the terms of that law were permissive and, applying thatjudgment to the facts of the present case, the Munsif of Nawabganj did notcease to have jurisdiction in the matter of the execution of the decree butthat the decree might also be executed by the Munsif of Malda. Thisinterpretation seems to us to be in accordance with Section 17 of the BengalCivil Courts Act. We think, therefore, that the proceedings in the Court of theMunsif of Malda were not without jurisdiction, so as to have the effect ofbarring the present application as not made within the period of limitation.

3. We are also of opinion that the grounds upon which theDistrict Judge has held that the time occupied in the proceedings taken by thedecree-holder in the Malda Court should not be excluded are unsound. He hasheld that ignorance of law, that is to say, ignorance on the part of thedecree-holder that his application for execution could only be made in theCourt of Nawabganj in which the decree was passed and that the Malda Court hadno jurisdiction to execute that decree, prevented his pleading good faithwithin the terms of Section 14 of the Limitation Act. The case of Hiralal v.Budri Dass I.L.R (1180) . 2 All. 729; L.R. 7 IndAp 167. is an authority to thecontrary. It was there held that proceedings taken erroneously in a Court whichhad no jurisdiction, but which was believed by the decree-holder to havejurisdiction, were bona fide. Their Lordships of the Privy Council pointed outin that case that the Judge himself believed he had jurisdiction and actedaccordingly, so also in the present case.

4. The appeal is, therefore, dismissed with costs.

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Jahar vs. Kamini Debi (05.12.1900 - CALHC)