1. Subject matter of both the application(s) filed by the applicant namely Jagdish Singh @ Jagdish Kumar Singh relates to Case Crime/FIR No. 0271 of 2020, under Section 323, 504, 506, 307, 332, 353, 188, 270 IPC, P.S.- Kakori, DistrictLucknow and as such the same are being decided by means of this common order/judgment.

2. Heard learned counsel for the applicant and Shri S.P. Tiwari, learned AGA for the State and perused the record.

3. APPLICATION U/S 482 No. 5413 of 2024 has been filed seeking following main relief:

"to set aside the impugned order dated 04.06.2024 passed by Learned Court Additional District and Session Judge, Court No. 21, Lucknow in the Session Case No. 1907 of 2023 bearing title "State of U.P. Vs Anoop Kumar Gupta & Others" arising out of charge sheet bearing No 01 dated 14.07.2020 submitted in F.I.R. No. 0271/2020, Under Section 323/504/506/307/332/353/188/270 IPC, P.S. Kakori, District Lucknow whereby the discharge application of the applicant/accused has been rejected (contained as Annexure No. 1 to theaccompanying affidavit to this application)and be further pleased to discharge the applicant/accused in the aforementioned case pending before the aforesaid court and also quash/set aside the entire proceedings pursuant to the aforesaid impugned order against the applicant/accused."

4. APPLICATION U/S 482 No. 2283 of 2023 has been filed seeking following main relief:

"to quash the impugned charge sheet bearing No 01 dated 14.07.2020 submitted in F.I.R. No. 0271/2020, Under Section 323/504/506/307/332/353/188/270 IPC, P.S. Kakori, District Lucknow along with the impugned cognizance and summoning order dated 15.11.2021 (contained as Annexure No. 1 and 2 respectively to the accompanying affidavit to this application) passed by the Learned Court of Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Court No. 30, District Lucknow and the entire proceedings arising out of it against the applicant/accused." 

5. Brief facts of the case, which are relevant for adjudication of the matter, in brief are as under:

As per FIR No. 0271 of 2020 dated 13.05.2020, on 13.05.2020, at about 20:50 hours the opposite party No.2/Sub Inspector Daya Shankar Singh (informant) was on routine checking in view of the lock-down imposed due to COVID-19 Pandemic and he was informed by the constable namely Man Singh that four persons were standing at a public place near "Joggers Park", Sitapur Bypass and on being asked the reasons of their presence they started hurling abuses and thereafter the informant reached on spot and tried to settle the issue but the efforts of the informant went in vain and all the four persons assaulted the three police men and two persons were apprehended and two managed to escape and upon inquiry the persons apprehended disclosed their particulars. In nutshell, four persons violated the lockdown guidelines and abused and assaulted the police personnel on 13.05.2020 at about 20:50 hours.

6. Considering the allegations levlled in the FIR, the same was lodged under Sections 323, 504, 506, 307, 332, 353, 188, 270 IPC against jagdish Singh S/o Ravindra Singh (applicant), Hardwari Prasad S/o Ishwardeen, Anil Kumar Gupta and one unknown person.

7. It would be apt to indicate that the applicant was released on bail in compliance of the order dated 01.06.2020 passed by the trial Court in Bail Application No. 1747 of 2020.

8. After completion of investigation, which includes reducing the statements of the witlessness of prosecution in writing, the charge-sheet no. 01 dated 14.07.2020 was filed against the applicant/Jagdish Singh S/o Ravindra Singh, Haridwari Singh S/o Iswardeen. under under Sections 323, 504, 506, 307, 332, 353, 188, 270 IPC. Subsequently, the chargesheet no. 02 dated 01.11.2020 was filed against Anoop Kumar Gupta S/o Krishna pal under Sections 323, 504, 506, 307, 332, 353, 188, 270 IPC. Thereafter the charge-sheet no. 03 dated 16.02.2021 was filed. By this charge-sheet the investigation was closed against Ajay Kumar whose name was surfaced during the investigation. Upon submission of charge-sheet(s) the cognizance was taken on 15.11.2021.

9. From the charge-sheet(s), indicated above, it is apparent that the prosecution to establish/prove its case before the trial court proposed to examine the following witnesses:

10. Before taking cognizance, vide order dated 15.11.2020 passed by the Magistrate, Registrar General of this Court, considering the facts pertaining to the FIR No. 0271 of 2020 dated 13.05.2020, Registrar General of this Court vide his order dated 19.06.2020 suspended the applicant and thereafter,  departmental inquiry no. 16/2020 was initiated by issuing a charge-sheet dated 22.06.2020.

11. The charge-sheet dated 22.06.2020 issued for conducting disciplinary proceedings, being relevant, is extracted herein-under:-

"You are hereby charged as follows:

On 13.05.2020 at 22:20, an F.I.R. under sections 323, 504, 506, 307, 332. 353. 188. 270 of the Indian Penal Code, Police Station Kakori, District Lucknow was registered against you alongwith three other persons on the fact that you alongwith three other persons were present in public place near Joggers Park, Sitapur Byepass Road, Lucknow and when police personnel enquired of you, during admist enforcement of preventive measure for COVID-19, about the reason of your presence at the spot, you and other three persons started hurling abuses, threatening and scuffling with the police personnels and strangulated police constable Sri Man Singh, who was doing his official duties and thus you were arrested and detained in judicial custody in crime number 0271 of 2020, under sections 323, 504,506,307, 332, 353, 188, 270 of the Indian Penal Code, Police Station: Kakori, District Lucknow

Thus, your above conduct is unwarranted and unbecoming of a Government Official, you thus committed 'Misconduct' within the meaning of Rule 3 of U.P. Government Servants Conduct Rules, 1956 and punishable under Rule 3 of the Uttar Pradesh Government Servants (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1999.

The evidence which is proposed to be considered in support of the charge are as follows:

1 Photocopy of FIR Dated 13.05.2020, under sections 323. 504, 506. 307, 332, 353, 188, 270 of the Indian Penal Code, Police Station Kakori, District Lucknow.

2. Photocopy of Bail order dated 01.06.2020 passed by the Sessions Judge, Lucknow in Bail Application No. 1745 of 2020 (Jagdish Singh Vs. State of U.P) Case Crime No. 0271 of 2020, under sections 323, 504, 506, 307, 332, 353, 188, 270 of the Indian Penal Code, Police Station: Kakori, District Lucknow.

3. Photocopy of your application dated 10.06.2020 for permission to resume duties.

4. Photocopy of Suspension Order No. 538 / Establishment / High Court, Allahabad Dated June 19th, 2020.

Oral evidence proposed to be recorded during the course of enquiry is as follows:

1. Sri Daya Shankar Singh, Informant/Sub-Inspector of Police. Police Station: Kakori, District Lucknow.

2 Sri Man Singh, Police Constable, Police Station: Kakori, District Lucknow.

3. Sri Mohit Singh, Police Constable, Police Station: Kakori, Districi Lucknow.

4. Sri Vivek Kumar Singh, Police Constable, Police Station: Kakon, District Lucknow.

Note: Any other necessary evidence may be considered by the undersigned during the course of enquiry after due notice to you.

The copies of documentary evidence in support of the charge are attached herewith

You are hereby required to put in written statement of your defence in reply to the charge within 15 days. You are warned that if no such statement is received from you by the undersigned within the time allowed, it will be presumed that you have none to furnish, and if you fail to appear on the prescribed date, the enquiry shall proceed exparte and orders will be passed in your case accordingly

You are further, required simultaneously to inform the undersigned, in writing whether you desire to be heard in person and in case you wish to examine or cross-examine any witness, to submit alongwith your written statement, their names and addresses together with a brief indication of the evidence which each such witness shall be expected to give.

If you desire or if the undersigned so directs, an oral enquiry shall be held in respect of such allegations as are not admitted. At that inquiry, such oral evidence will be recorded as the undersigned considers necessary and then you shall be entitled to cross-examine the witnesses."

12. From a conjoint reading of the charge-sheet no. 1 dated 14.07.2020 submitted in the criminal case and the charge-sheet issued for conducting disciplinary proceedings i.e. departmental inquiry no. 16 of 2020, it is evident that the charges and the witnesses to prove the charges of both the charge-sheets are the same except formal witnesses to be examined before the trial Court. The name of witnesses of fact are as under:

"1. Sri Daya Shankar Singh, Informant/Sub-Inspector of Police. Police Station: Kakori, District Lucknow (Informant).

2 Sri Man Singh, Police Constable, Police Station: Kakori, District Lucknow (Victim).

3. Sri Mohit Singh, Police Constable, Police Station: Kakori, Districi Lucknow (Eye-witness).

4. Sri Vivek Kumar Singh, Police Constable, Police Station: Kakon, District Lucknow (Eye-witness)."

13. In the departmental enquiry, Sri Daya Shankar Singh (Informant) (E.W.1), Sub-Inspector of Police. Police Station - Kakori, District - Lucknow, stated as under:

Examination-in-chief

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Cross-Examination

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14. In the departmental enquiry, Constable Ratan Kumar Chaudhary (Eye-witness) (E.W.3), Police Constable, Dial 112, District - Unnao stated, as under:

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15. In the departmental enquiry, Sri Mohit Singh (Eyewitness) (E.W.4), Constable, Police Station - Kakori, District - Lucknow stated as under:

Examination-in-chief

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Cross Examination

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16. In the departmental enquiry, Sri Vivek Kumar Singh (Eye-witness) (E.W.5), Constable, Police Station - Kakori, District - Lucknow, stated as under :-

Examination-in-chief

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Cross Examination

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17. In the departmental enquiry, Sri Man Singh (Victim) (E.W.2), Constable, Police Station: Kakori, District Lucknow, stated as under :-

Examination-in-chief

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Cross Examination

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18. Upon due consideration of the charges and the entire evidence available on record as also the report of the Inquiry Officer, the Registrar General of this Court, vide order dated 13.07.2021, exonerated the applicant from the charges levelled against him in the disciplinary proceedings/departmental inquiry no. 16 of 2020 and subsequently, the suspension of the applicant was revoked vide order dated 15.07.2021, which is evident from the order dated 15.07.2021, quoted herein-under:

"Under the orders of Learned Registrar General dated 13.07.2021, Shri Jagdish Kumar Singh, (Emp. No. 10834), Assistant Review Officer, High Court, Aliahabad is hereby exonerated from the charge levelled against him under Rule 3 U.P. Government Servants Conduct Rules, 1956. in Departmental Inquiry No. 16 of 2020

The suspension of Shri Jagdish Kumar Singh is hereby revoked immediately which shall be subject to outcome of criminal matter registered against him."

19. It would be apt to indicate that this Court, vide order dated 02.12.2021, passed in Writ Petition No. 25026 (M/B) of 2021 (Jagdish Singh vs. State of U.P. & Others) directed reinvestigation/further investigation in the matter. The operative portion of the order dated 02.12.2021 is extracted hereinunder:-

"When we examine the complete facts of this case, what we find is that the F.I.R. in this case has been lodged by the police personnel of Police Station Kakori, District Lucknow and investigation of the F.I.R. also appears to have been done by a police personnel belonging to the same police station.

In these circumstances, we provide that the competent officer of the police department of the Lucknow Rural shall ensure that investigation /further investigation of the F.I.R. is conducted by a police officer belonging to a police station other than the police station Kakori."

20. In compliance of the order dated 02.12.2021 passed by this Court, Investigating Officer upon due investigation submitted his report on 16.04.2022 supporting the charge sheet No. 01 dated 14.07.2020.

21. The aforesaid writ petition was dismissed as infructuous vide order dated 24.08.2022 by this Court and to recall the order dated 24.08.2022 an application for recall was preferred which was also dismissed by this Court vide order dated 30.09.2022.

22. After the aforesaid, the applicant challenged the charge sheet No. 01 dated 14.07.2020 and entire criminal proceedings arsing out of FIR No. 0271 of 2020 dated 13.05.2020 before this Court by means of APPLICATION U/S 482 No. 2283 of 2023.

23. The applicant on 28.08.2023 also preferred the discharge application before Additional District Judge-VII, Lucknow, which was rejected vide order dated 04.06.2024 and thereafter, the APPLICATION U/S 482 No. 5413 of 2024 was filed.

24. Pressing the application(s) for the relief(s) sought, learned counsel for the applicant submitted that in the departmental proceedings in which witnesses namely Sri Daya Shankar Singh, Sri Man Singh, Sri Mohit Singh and Sri Vivek Kumar Singh were examined and all these witnesses would be examined before the trial Court as is apparent from the chargesheet no. 01 dated 14.07.2020, the charge-sheet no. 02 dated 01.11.2020 and the charge-sheet no. 03 dated 16.02.2021 and after examining the statements of these witnesses in the departmental proceedings, which was initiated in the light of the allegations levelled in the FIR and the same is the basis of the pending criminal proceedings and allegations-charges in both the proceedings are same/identical, the applicant has already been exonerated by the order of the Registrar General of this Court vide order dated 13.07.2021 and subsequently his suspension was revoked vide order dated 15.07.2021 and accordingly, no useful purpose would be served in allowing the pending criminal proceedings to continue before the trial court.

25. It is stated that in the departmental proceedings, the person can be punished on the preponderance of the probability and in the criminal trial court, the prosecution has to establish/prove its case beyond doubt and when the applicant has already been exonerated on the same evidence to keep the proceedings continue before the trial Court would be futile exercise.

26. Shri S.P. Tiwari, learned AGA for the State opposed prayers sought in above noted applications.

27. Considered the aforesaid and perused the records.

28. The question which arises in the present matter for the consideration of this Court is that as to whether the proceedings arising out of Case Crime/FIR No. 0271 of 2020 which are premised on same/identical allegations on which disciplinary proceedings were initiated against the applicant are liable to be quashed once the applicant has been exonerated in the disciplinary proceedings.

29. In P.S. Rajya Vs. State of Bihar, 1996 (9) SCC 1, the appellant therein was exonerated of all the charges in the departmental inquiry conducted by the Central Vigilance Commission and the conclusion of exoneration was concurred by the Union Public Service Commission which led to the passing of final orders by the President in favour of the appellant. However, when the appellant moved the High Court under Section 482 CrPC for quashing the cognizance of the charge, the High Court dismissed the petition. The Hon'ble Apex Court formulated the following question in paragraph 3 of the judgment, which reads as under:

"3. The short question that arises for our consideration in this appeal is whether the respondent is justified in pursuing the prosecution against the appellant under Section 5(2) read with Section 5(1)(e) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 notwithstanding the fact that on an identical charge the appellant was exonerated in the departmental proceedings in the light of a report submitted by the Central Vigilance Commission and concurred by the Union Public Service Commission."...

30. The Hon'ble Apex Court answered the above formulated question and quashed the criminal proceedings by observing as under:

"17. At the outset we may point out that the learned counsel for the respondent could not but accept the position that the standard of proof required to establish the guilt in a criminal case is far higher than the standard of proof required to establish the guilt in the departmental proceedings. He also accepted that in the present case, the charge in the departmental proceedings and in the criminal proceedings is one and the same. He did not dispute the findings rendered in the departmental proceedings and the ultimate result of it. On these premises, if we proceed further then there is no difficulty in accepting the case of the appellant. For if the charge which is identical could not be established in a departmental proceedings and in view of the admitted discrepancies in the reports submitted by the valuers one wonders what is there further to proceed against the appellant in criminal proceedings.....

XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX

23. Even though all these facts including the Report of the Central Vigilance Commission were brought to the notice of the High Court, unfortunately, the High Court took a view that the issues raised had to be gone into in the final proceedings and the Report of the Central Vigilance Commission, exonerating the appellant of the same charge in departmental proceedings would not conclude the criminal case against the appellant. We have already held that for the reasons given, on the peculiar facts of this case, the criminal proceedings initiated against the appellant cannot be pursued. Therefore, we do not agree with the view taken by the High Court as stated above. These are the reasons for our order dated 27-3-19961 for allowing the appeal and quashing the impugned criminal proceedings and giving consequential reliefs."

31. In Lokesh Kumar Jain Vs. State of Rajasthan (2013) 11 SCC 130, an FIR was registered against the appellant therein alleging financial irregularities and misappropriation of Rs.4,39,617/-. In departmental proceedings with identical charges, the appellant was exonerated on the ground that it was not clear as to who received the payments for various transactions as the original and carbon copies of bills were not available. In the criminal case, the police submitted the final report to the Magistrate. The Magistrate based upon the statement of the complainant directed re-investigation. Thereafter, investigation remained pending for 12-13 years. The appellant being aggrieved approached the High Court under Section 482 CrPC seeking to quash the FIR lodged against him, but the High Court declined to quash the FIR. The Hon'ble Apex Court allowed the appeal and quashed the criminal proceedings. Relying upon the decision of P.S. Rajya (Supra), it was observed as under:

"23. In P.S. Rajya v. State of Bihar, this Court noticed that the appellant was exonerated in the departmental proceeding in the light of report of the Central Vigilance Commission and concurred by the Union Public Service Commission. The criminal case was pending since long, in spite of the fact that the appellant was exonerated in the departmental proceeding for same charge.

24. Having regard to the aforesaid fact, this Court held that if the charges which are identical could not be established in the departmental proceedings, one wonders what is there further to proceed against the accused in criminal proceedings where standard of proof required to establish the guilt is far higher than the standard of proof required to establish the guilt in the departmental proceedings.

25. Having regard to the factual scenario, noted above, and for the reasons stated below, we are of the opinion that the present case of the appellant is one of the fit cases where the High Court should have exercised its power under Section 482 CrPC. It is not disputed by the respondent that the departmental proceeding was initiated against the appellant with regard to identical charges made in the FIR......

xxxx xxxx xxxx xxxx

28. .......Considering the fact that delay in the present case is caused by the respondent, the constitutional guarantee of a speedy investigation and trial under Article 21 of the Constitution is thereby violated and as the appellant has already been exonerated in the departmental proceedings for identical charges, keeping the case pending against the appellant for investigation, is unwarranted, the FIR deserves to be quashed."

32. In Radheshyam Kejriwal vs. State of West Bengal and Anr. (2011) 3 SCC 581, the question arose that after the exoneration of the appellant in the adjudication proceedings under the provisions of Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, whether criminal prosecution on the same set of facts and circumstances can be allowed to be continued. In this factual backdrop, the Hon'ble Apex Court observed as under:

26. We may observe that the standard of proof in a criminal case is much higher than that of the adjudication proceedings. The Enforcement Directorate has not been able to prove its case in the adjudication proceedings and the appellant has been exonerated on the same allegation. The appellant is facing trial in the criminal case. Therefore, in our opinion, the determination of facts in the adjudication proceedings cannot be said to be irrelevant in the criminal case. In B.N. Kashyap [AIR 1945 Lah 23] the Full Bench had not considered the effect of a finding of fact in a civil case over the criminal cases and that will be evident from the following passage of the said judgment: (AIR p. 27) I must, however, say that in answering the question, I have only referred to civil cases where the actions are in personam and not those where the proceedings or actions are in rem. Whether a finding of fact arrived at in such proceedings or actions would be relevant in criminal cases, it is unnecessary for me to decide in this case. When that question arises for determination, the provisions of Section 41 of the Evidence Act, will have to be carefully examined.

XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX

38.The ratio which can be culled out from these decisions can broadly be stated as follows:

(i) Adjudication proceedings and criminal prosecution can be launched simultaneously;

ii) Decision in adjudication proceedings is not necessary before initiating criminal prosecution;

(iii) Adjudication proceedings and criminal proceedings are independent in nature to each other;

(iv) The finding against the person facing prosecution in the adjudication proceedings is not binding on the proceeding for criminal prosecution;

(v) Adjudication proceedings by the Enforcement Directorate is not prosecution by a competent court of law to attract the provisions of Article 20(2) of the Constitution or Section 300 of the Code of Criminal Procedure;

(vi) The finding in the adjudication proceedings in favour of the person facing trial for identical violation will depend upon the nature of finding. If the exoneration in adjudication proceedings is on technical ground and not on merit, prosecution may continue; and

(vii) In case of exoneration, however, on merits where the allegation is found to be not sustainable at all and the person held innocent, criminal prosecution on the same set of facts and circumstances cannot be allowed to continue, the underlying principle being the higher standard of proof in criminal cases.

XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX

39. In our opinion, therefore, the yardstick would be to judge as to whether the allegation in the adjudication proceedings as well as the proceeding for prosecution is identical and the exoneration of the person concerned in the adjudication proceedings is on merits. In case it is found on merit that there is no contravention of the provisions of the Act in the adjudication proceedings, the trial of the person concerned shall be an abuse of the process of the court."

33. In the case of Ashoo Surendranath Tewai (Supra) Vs. Deputy Superintendent of Police, EOW, CBI and Another, reported in (2020) 9 SCC 636, the Hon'ble Apex Court considered the report of Central Vigilance Commission (in short "C.V.C.") and the fact that in the criminal trial an order was passed on 27.06.2012 by the Special Judge, CBI (ACB), Pune, observing therein that in the facts of the case sanction under Section 197 Cr.P.C. is not required and the said order was affirmed by the High Court vide order dated 11.07.2014 and the Hon'ble Apex Court after taking note of the same and the principles related to standard of proof in departmental proceedings and criminal proceedings passed the final order and judgment dated 08.09.2020, whereby discharged the appellant from the offences under the penal code. Relevant portion of the report reads as under:

"8. A number of judgments have held that the standard of proof in a departmental proceeding, being based on preponderance of probability is somewhat lower than the standard of proof in a criminal proceeding where the case has to be proved beyond reasonable doubt. In P.S. Rajya v. State of Bihar [P.S. Rajya v. State of Bihar, (1996) 9 SCC 1 : 1996 SCC (Cri) 897] , the question before the Court was posed as follows: (SCC pp. 2-3, para 3)

“3. The short question that arises for our consideration in this appeal is whether the respondent is justified in pursuing the prosecution against the appellant under Section 5(2) read with Section 5(1)(e) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 notwithstanding the fact that on an identical charge the appellant was exonerated in the departmental proceedings in the light of a report submitted by the Central Vigilance Commission and concurred by the Union Public Service Commission.”

9. This Court then went on to state: (P.S. Rajya case [P.S. Rajya v. State of Bihar, (1996) 9 SCC 1 : 1996 SCC (Cri) 897] , SCC p. 5, para 17)

“17. At the outset we may point out that the learned counsel for the respondent could not but accept the position that the standard of proof required to establish the guilt in a criminal case is far higher than the standard of proof required to establish the guilt in the departmental proceedings. He also accepted that in the present case, the charge in the departmental proceedings and in the criminal proceedings is one and the same. He did not dispute the findings rendered in the departmental proceedings and the ultimate result of it.”

10. This being the case, the Court then held: (P.S. Rajya case [P.S. Rajya v. State of Bihar, (1996) 9 SCC 1 : 1996 SCC (Cri) 897] , SCC p. 9, para 23)

“23. Even though all these facts including the report of the Central Vigilance Commission were brought to the notice of the High Court, unfortunately, the High Court took a view [Prabhu Saran Rajya v. State of Bihar, Criminal Miscellaneous No. 5212 of 1992, order dated 3-8-1993 (Pat)] that the issues raised had to be gone into in the final proceedings and the report of the Central Vigilance Commission, exonerating the appellant of the same charge in departmental proceedings would not conclude the criminal case against the appellant. We have already held that for the reasons given, on the peculiar facts of this case, the criminal proceedings initiated against the appellant cannot be pursued. Therefore, we do not agree with the view taken by the High Court as stated above. These are the reasons for our order dated 27-3-1996 for allowing the appeal and quashing the impugned criminal proceedings and giving consequential reliefs.”

11. In Radheshyam Kejriwal v. State of W.B. [Radheshyam Kejriwal v. State of W.B., (2011) 3 SCC 581 : (2011) 2 SCC (Cri) 721] , this Court held as follows: (SCC pp. 594-96, paras 26, 29 & 31)

“26. We may observe that the standard of proof in a criminal case is much higher than that of the adjudication proceedings. The Enforcement Directorate has not been able to prove its case in the adjudication proceedings and the appellant has been exonerated on the same allegation. The appellant is facing trial in the criminal case. Therefore, in our opinion, the determination of facts in the adjudication proceedings cannot be said to be irrelevant in the criminal case. In B.N. Kashyap [B.N. Kashyap v. Crown, 1944 SCC OnLine Lah 46 : AIR 1945 Lah 23] the Full Bench had not considered the effect of a finding of fact in a civil case over the criminal cases and that will be evident from the following passage of the said judgment: (SCC OnLine Lah: AIR p. 27)

‘… I must, however, say that in answering the question, I have only referred to civil cases where the actions are in personam and not those where the proceedings or actions are in rem. Whether a finding of fact arrived at in such proceedings or actions would be relevant in criminal cases, it is unnecessary for me to decide in this case. When that question arises for determination, the provisions of Section 41 of the Evidence Act, will have to be carefully examined.’

***

29. We do not have the slightest hesitation in accepting the broad submission of Mr Malhotra that the finding in an adjudication proceeding is not binding in the proceeding for criminal prosecution. A person held liable to pay penalty in adjudication proceedings cannot necessarily be held guilty in a criminal trial. Adjudication proceedings are decided on the basis of preponderance of evidence of a little higher degree whereas in a criminal case the entire burden to prove beyond all reasonable doubt lies on the prosecution.

***

31. It is trite that the standard of proof required in criminal proceedings is higher than that required before the adjudicating authority and in case the accused is exonerated before the adjudicating authority whether his prosecution on the same set of facts can be allowed or not is the precise question which falls for determination in this case.”

12. After referring to various judgments, this Court then culled out the ratio of those decisions in para 38 as follows: (Radheshyam Kejriwal case [Radheshyam Kejriwal v. State of W.B., (2011) 3 SCC 581 : (2011) 2 SCC (Cri) 721] , SCC p. 598)

“38. The ratio which can be culled out from these decisions can broadly be stated as follows:

(i) Adjudication proceedings and criminal prosecution can be launched simultaneously;

(ii) Decision in adjudication proceedings is not necessary before initiating criminal prosecution;

(iii) Adjudication proceedings and criminal proceedings are independent in nature to each other;

(iv) The finding against the person facing prosecution in the adjudication proceedings is not binding on the proceeding for criminal prosecution;

(v) Adjudication proceedings by the Enforcement Directorate is not prosecution by a competent court of law to attract the provisions of Article 20(2) of the Constitution or Section 300 of the Code of Criminal Procedure;

(vi) The finding in the adjudication proceedings in favour of the person facing trial for identical violation will depend upon the nature of finding. If the exoneration in adjudication proceedings is on technical ground and not on merit, prosecution may continue; and

(vii) In case of exoneration, however, on merits where the allegation is found to be not sustainable at all and the person held innocent, criminal prosecution on the same set of facts and circumstances cannot be allowed to continue, the underlying principle being the higher standard of proof in criminal cases.”

13. It finally concluded: (Radheshyam Kejriwal case [Radheshyam Kejriwal v. State of W.B., (2011) 3 SCC 581 : (2011) 2 SCC (Cri) 721] , SCC p. 598, para 39) “39. In our opinion, therefore, the yardstick would be to judge as to whether the allegation in the adjudication proceedings as well as the proceeding for prosecution is identical and the exoneration of the person concerned in the adjudication proceedings is on merits. In case it is found on merit that there is no contravention of the provisions of the Act in the adjudication proceedings, the trial of the person concerned shall be an abuse of the process of the court.”

14. From our point of view, para 38(vii) is important and if the High Court had bothered to apply this parameter, then on a reading of the CVC report on the same facts, the appellant should have been exonerated.

15. Applying the aforesaid judgments to the facts of this case, it is clear that in view of the detailed CVC order dated 22-12- 2011, the chances of conviction in a criminal trial involving the same facts appear to be bleak. We, therefore, set aside the judgment [Ashoo Surendranath Tewari v. CBI, 2014 SCC OnLine Bom 5042] of the High Court and that of the Special Judge and discharge the appellant from the offences under the Penal Code."

34. In the case of J. Sekar Alias Sekar Reddy Vs. Directorate of Enforcement, reported in (2022) 7 SCC 370, the Hon'ble Apex Court concluded as under:

"20. In the said sequel of facts, the legal position as it emerges by the judgment of Radheshyam Kejriwal [Radheshyam Kejriwal v. State of W.B., (2011) 3 SCC 581 : (2011) 2 SCC (Cri) 721] is relevant in which this Court has culled out the ratio of the various other decisions pertaining to the issue involved and has observed as thus: (Ashoo Surendranath Tewari case [Ashoo Surendranath Tewari v. CBI, (2020) 9 SCC 636 : (2021) 1 SCC (Cri) 209] , SCC pp. 642-43, paras 12-14)

“12. After referring to various judgments, this Court then culled out the ratio of those decisions in para 38 as follows: (Radheshyam Kejriwal case [Radheshyam Kejriwal v. State of W.B., (2011) 3 SCC 581 : (2011) 2 SCC (Cri) 721] , SCC p. 598, para 12)

‘38. The ratio which can be culled out from these decisions can broadly be stated as follows:

(i) Adjudication proceedings and criminal prosecution can be launched simultaneously;

(ii) Decision in adjudication proceedings is not necessary before initiating criminal prosecution;

(iii) Adjudication proceedings and criminal proceedings are independent in nature to each other;

(iv) The finding against the person facing prosecution in the adjudication proceedings is not binding on the proceeding for criminal prosecution;

(v) Adjudication proceedings by the Enforcement Directorate is not prosecution by a competent court of law to attract the provisions of Article 20(2) of the Constitution or Section 300 of the Criminal Procedure Code;

(vi) The finding in the adjudication proceedings in favour of the person facing trial for identical violation will depend upon the nature of finding. If the exoneration in adjudication proceedings is on technical ground and not on merit, prosecution may continue; and

(vii) In case of exoneration, however, on merits where the allegation is found to be not sustainable at all and the person held innocent, criminal prosecution on the same set of facts and circumstances cannot be allowed to continue, the underlying principle being the higher standard of proof in criminal cases.’

13. It finally concluded: (Radheshyam Kejriwal case [Radheshyam Kejriwal v. State of W.B., (2011) 3 SCC 581 : (2011) 2 SCC (Cri) 721] , SCC p. 598, para 39)

‘39. In our opinion, therefore, the yardstick would be to judge as to whether the allegation in the adjudication proceedings as well as the proceeding for prosecution is identical and the exoneration of the person concerned in the adjudication proceedings is on merits. In case it is found on merit that there is no contravention of the provisions of the Act in the adjudication proceedings, the trial of the person concerned shall be an abuse of the process of the court.’

‘39. In our opinion, therefore, the yardstick would be to judge as to whether the allegation in the adjudication proceedings as well as the proceeding for prosecution is identical and the exoneration of the person concerned in the adjudication proceedings is on merits. In case it is found on merit that there is no contravention of the provisions of the Act in the adjudication proceedings, the trial of the person concerned shall be an abuse of the process of the court.’

In Ashoo Surendranath Tewari [Ashoo Surendranath Tewari v. CBI, (2020) 9 SCC 636 : (2021) 1 SCC (Cri) 209] , this Court relied upon the judgment of Radheshyam Kejriwal [Radheshyam Kejriwal v. State of W.B., (2011) 3 SCC 581 : (2011) 2 SCC (Cri) 721] and set aside the judgment [Ashoo Surendranath Tewari v. Supt. of Police, 2014 SCC OnLine Bom 5042] of the High Court while exonerating the appellants because the chance of conviction in a criminal case in the same facts appeared to be bleak.

21. In view of the aforesaid legal position and on analysing the report of the IT Department and the reasoning given by CBI while submitting the final closure report in RC MA1 2016 A0040 and the order passed by the adjudicating authority, it is clear that for proceeds of crime, as defined under Section 2(1)(u) of PMLA, the property seized would be relevant and its possession with recovery and claim thereto must be innocent. In the present case, the Schedule Offence has not been made out because of lack of evidence. The adjudicating authority, at the time of refusing to continue the order of attachment under PMLA, was of the opinion that the record regarding banks and its officials who may be involved, is not on record. Therefore, for lack of identity of the source of collected money, it could not be reasonably believed by the Deputy Director (ED) that the unaccounted money is connected with the commission of offence under PMLA. Simultaneously, the letter of the IT Department dated 16-5- 2019 and the details as mentioned, makes it clear that for the currency seized, the tax is already paid, therefore, it is not the quantum earned and used for money laundering. In our opinion, even in cases of PMLA, the Court cannot proceed on the basis of preponderance of probabilities. On perusal of the Statement of Objects and Reasons specified in PMLA, it is the stringent law brought by Parliament to check money laundering. Thus, the allegation must be proved beyond reasonable doubt in the Court. Even otherwise, it is incumbent upon the Court to look into the allegation and the material collected in support thereto and to find out whether the prima facie offence is made out. Unless the allegations are substantiated by the authorities and proved against a person in the court of law, the person is innocent. In the said backdrop, the ratio of the judgment of Radheshyam Kejriwal [Radheshyam Kejriwal v. State of W.B., (2011) 3 SCC 581 : (2011) 2 SCC (Cri) 721] in paras 38(vi) and (vii) are aptly applicable in the facts of the present case.

21. In view of the aforesaid legal position and on analysing the report of the IT Department and the reasoning given by CBI while submitting the final closure report in RC MA1 2016 A0040 and the order passed by the adjudicating authority, it is clear that for proceeds of crime, as defined under Section 2(1)(u) of PMLA, the property seized would be relevant and its possession with recovery and claim thereto must be innocent. In the present case, the Schedule Offence has not been made out because of lack of evidence. The adjudicating authority, at the time of refusing to continue the order of attachment under PMLA, was of the opinion that the record regarding banks and its officials who may be involved, is not on record. Therefore, for lack of identity of the source of collected money, it could not be reasonably believed by the Deputy Director (ED) that the unaccounted money is connected with the commission of offence under PMLA. Simultaneously, the letter of the IT Department dated 16-5- 2019 and the details as mentioned, makes it clear that for the currency seized, the tax is already paid, therefore, it is not the quantum earned and used for money laundering. In our opinion, even in cases of PMLA, the Court cannot proceed on the basis of preponderance of probabilities. On perusal of the Statement of Objects and Reasons specified in PMLA, it is the stringent law brought by Parliament to check money laundering. Thus, the allegation must be proved beyond reasonable doubt in the Court. Even otherwise, it is incumbent upon the Court to look into the allegation and the material collected in support thereto and to find out whether the prima facie offence is made out. Unless the allegations are substantiated by the authorities and proved against a person in the court of law, the person is innocent. In the said backdrop, the ratio of the judgment of Radheshyam Kejriwal [Radheshyam Kejriwal v. State of W.B., (2011) 3 SCC 581 : (2011) 2 SCC (Cri) 721] in paras 38(vi) and (vii) are aptly applicable in the facts of the present case.

23. Accordingly, we set aside the impugned order [J. Sekar v. SRS Mining, 2021 SCC OnLine Mad 13804] passed by the High Court. Consequently, this appeal is allowed. ECR CEZO 19/2016 including Complaint bearing No. 2 of 2017 stands quashed."

35. The settled position from the above refereed judgments is to the effect that if an accused has been exonerated and held innocent in the disciplinary proceedings after the allegations have been found to be unsustainable, then the criminal prosecution premised on the same/identical set of allegations cannot be permitted to continue. The reasoning for this conclusion/proposition in the above referred judgments is that the standard of proceedings in criminal cases is beyond reasonable doubt which is far higher than preponderance of probability, the standard of proof required in disciplinary proceedings. When the same witnesses could not be able to prove/establish the same/identical charges in the disciplinary proceeding, there is no purpose in prosecuting the criminal proceedings where the standard of proof required to establish the guilt is far higher than the standard of proof required to establish the guilt in departmental proceedings.

35. The settled position from the above refereed judgments is to the effect that if an accused has been exonerated and held innocent in the disciplinary proceedings after the allegations have been found to be unsustainable, then the criminal prosecution premised on the same/identical set of allegations cannot be permitted to continue. The reasoning for this conclusion/proposition in the above referred judgments is that the standard of proceedings in criminal cases is beyond reasonable doubt which is far higher than preponderance of probability, the standard of proof required in disciplinary proceedings. When the same witnesses could not be able to prove/establish the same/identical charges in the disciplinary proceeding, there is no purpose in prosecuting the criminal proceedings where the standard of proof required to establish the guilt is far higher than the standard of proof required to establish the guilt in departmental proceedings.

37. For the reasons aforesaid, both the application(s), indicated above, are allowed. Consequently, the entire proceedings arising out of FIR No. 0271 of 2020 dated 13.05.2020 are quashed/set aside qua the applicant/Jagdish Singh @ Jagdish Kumar Singh .

38. Office is directed to send a copy of this judgment to the trial Court forthwith.