Ross, J.This is an appeal by Jagdish Narain Singh, an insolvent, against the order of the District Judge of Gaya refusing an application to reconsider an order of attachment issued against him in respect of a sum of Rs. 4,000 deposited in the High Court as security for the costs of an appeal to His Majesty in Council.

2. It appears that on 15th September 1908 and again on 2nd May 1911 the appellant executed mortgages in favour of Kesari Mull and others upon which a decree was obtained on 23rd December 1915. The appellant was adjudged insolvent on 10th September 1916. The mortgagees executed their decree in 1922. The receiver in the insolvency refused to intervene and it was found that it was not necessary for him to do so. The appellant contended in these execution proceedings that the execution was barred by time and the learned Subordinate Judge on 18th July 1922 decided in his favour; but this decision was reversed by the High Court on 17th July 1923.

3. The appellant desired to appeal to the Privy Council against this order, but the receiver refused to provide the necessary security or to become a party to the appeal. The appellant then obtained Rs. 4,000 from his stepbrother Haldhar Prasad Singh and the appeal was. presented. On 11th December 1925 Kesari Mull purchased in execution of the decree two properties which had been mortgaged to him, namely, Reola and Abhaipur, both of which were subject to a prior mortgage; and a compromise of the appeal pending before the Privy Council was. attempted to be entered into in February 1926 by an agreement between the appellant and the decree-holder and Haldhar Prasad Singh, by which Haldhar Prasad Singh undertook to pay off the prior charges on both the villages amounting to Rs. 4,200 and to purchase Reola for Rs. 9,000, to be made up of this Rs. 4,200, the Rs. 4,000 deposited as security for costs of the appeal and Rs. 800, in cash, while the decree-holder retained Abhaipur which thus became free from eneumbranees.

4. The contesting respondent to this appeal is Mt Ramsakal Kuer and her interest arises in this way. On 21st April, 1905 a will was executed by Jagarnath Prasad Singh, the father of Ramsakal Kuer, by which he left all his properties to his stepbrothers, one of whom was, the father of the appellant, and to his nephew. The will also provided that the legatees should pay a sum of Rs. 7,000 to the testators daughter, that is, Rs. 1,400 each. The testator died in 1905 and his will was proved in 1907. The appellant, original share in this debt was only Rs. 700, but this has accumulated on account of interest, the rate of which was fixed in the will itself. On 19th August 1916, Mt. Ramsakal Kuer presented a. petition in the insolvency claiming that she was a secured creditor in respect of Rs. 4,562-10-0 and stating that she would stand upon her security.

5. Again on 8th April 1926 she filed a petition as a secured creditor applying for the attachment of Rs. 4,000 in question in this appeal and, on her application, the learned District Judge directed that the Registrar of the High Court be requested not to pay this, money to Kesari Mull unless and until he satisfies the Court that the money had; not vested in the receiver u/s 28(4), Provincial Insolvency Act, and this order has in effect been confirmed by the order now under appeal.

6. The first contention on behalf of the appellant is that as the respondent claimed to be a secured creditor she is not entitled to attach this money and must proceed against the property. It is clear, however, on a perusal of the will that no charge was created thereby and that Ramsakal Kuer is not a secured creditor and she is therefore, in my opinion, entitled to proceed against this personal property.

The second point taken was that, on the decisions, Section 28(4) of the Act is subject to the proviso that after acquired property can be dealt with by the insolvent before the intervention of the receiver and that the property in question in this appeal has been so dealt with. Reliance was placed on the decisions in Alimahamad Abdul Husain v. Vadilal Devaahdnd [1919] 48 Bom. 890 and on Chhote Lal Vs. Kedar Nath and Others, . These decisions apply the doctrine of Cohen v. Mitchell [1890] 25 Q.B.D. 262, to which statutory effect has been given in England by Section 47(1), Bankruptcy Act 1914; and what was decided was that after-acquired property of an insolvent before discharge can be transferred by him provided the transaction is bonafide and for value and is completed before the intervention of the Official Assignee. A different view was taken in Ma Phaw v. Maung Ba Thaw AIR 1926 Rang. 179 where it was held that the insertion of the word "forthwith" in Section 28(4) of the Act had the effect of sweeping away these earlier decisions which were based on the language of Section 7 of the Act to consolidate and amend the law relating to insolvent debtors in India (2 and 12 Victoria, C. 21) where the words were "do vest in the Official Assignee." But with all respect, I am unable to hold that the language of the present section is stronger than that of the old Section 7. I should hold that this money was not liable to attachment if it had been effectively parted with before the receiver intervened. But that does not seem to be the fact. Kesari Mull has withdrawn from the compromise because of the attachment; and the argument of the learned Counsel for the appellant therefore fails on the facts.

8. The last argument was that this money is not liable to attachment as being money which is in the hands of an officer of the Court, under the decisions referred to in Halsburys Laws of England, Vol. 14, p. 94 and under the provisions of Section 28(5), Provincial Insolvency Act read with Section 60, Civil P.C. The argument is that this is not property over which the insolvent has a disposing power which he may exercise for his own benefit. This argument is clearly sound so far as it goes. There are two possible contingencies. The appellant may succeed in his appeal in the Privy Council, or he may fail. If he fails, then this Rs. 4,000 will have to meet the expenses of the successful respondent; but if he succeeds, the 4,000 will be at his own disposition and ought therefore to be available for his creditors and he should be prevented from dealing with it in any such manner as is proposed by the compromise referred to above. The proper order to make therefore would be an order attaching the Rs. 4,000 subject to the result of the appeal. If the appellant becomes entitled to a return of this money as the result of the appeal, the attachment will take effect, but not otherwise. A limited attachment of this kind was made in Karuthan v. Subramany [1886] 9 Mad. 203. There will be no costs of the appeal.

Das, J.

I agree.