Chapman, J.In execution of a decree the shares of the judgment-debtors in certain properties were sold and purchased by the respondent. The sale was subsequently set aside upon the application of the judgment-debtor Section The order of setting aside the sale was upheld by the High Court on the 3rd of August 1908. The judgment-debtors applied for restoration to possession and possession was restored on the 18th December 1910. The appellants before us, some of whom are the judgment-debtors and others are persons who have purchased the rights of the judgment-debtors, made an application on the 15th of June 1914 for compensation for the period for which they were kept out of possession.

2. The application was objected to in the first Court upon the ground that the Court had no jurisdiction to grant compensation and upon the ground that the application was barred by limitation.

3. A preliminary objection has been made that no appeal lies and that an ad valorem Court-fee should have been paid. We have, however, heard the argument upon the ground of limitation and we are of opinion that the learned Court below rightly dismissed the application upon the ground of limitation: that being so, in my opinion, it would be better for us not to expressly decide whether a second appeal does lie in such a case or not. My personal inclination would be to hold that an appeal does lie, inasmuch as it was an adjudication between the parties and it was not an order against which an appeal lies as an appeal from an order [Section 2, Sub-section (2), of the Code of Civil Procedure].

4. The learned District Judge has held that the application was barred by limitation under Article 181 of Schedule I of the Limitation Act. That Article provides that applications for which no period of limitation is provided elsewhere in the Schedule or by Section 45 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, shall be barred by limitation on the expiry of three years from the date on which the right to apply accrue Section The present application, though it purported to be u/s 144 of the Code of Civil Procedure, was not strictly within the terms of that section. The other section under which the Court could have been asked to interfere would be Section 151. Though it may be argued that Section 151 does not in terms confer any jurisdiction upon the Court, yet the result of the enactment of Section 151 has been to widen the exercise of the powers of the Civil Court Section It has been held in a series of decisions, from which it would not be well at this late stage to resile, that Article 181 applies only to applications made under the CPC and that it does not apply to applications made under other Statute Section This was not an application made under another Statute and, in my opinion, it would be reasonable to hold that it was an application under the CPC or at least contemplated by the CPC and, therefore, Article 181 would apply. That being so, the right to apply would expire after three years from the date of restoration to possession. The previous in fructuous applications which are said to have been made would not help the appellant Section

5. I am also disposed to take the view that assuming that an application is addressed entirely to the discretion of the Court, the Court would exercise a right discretion in disallowing applications made after the period of limitation which would apply to suits or applications asking for a similar remedy.

6. On these grounds I would dismiss the appeal with cost Section

Roe, J.

7. I agree that Section 144 clearly does not include the application now before u Section The section only applies to cases in which a decree is varied or set aside. A decree, as defined in Section 2, distinctly excludes any adjudication from which an appeal lies as an appeal against an order. The proceedings from which the present application originated were proceedings under Rule 92, Order XXI, and an appeal lies in such proceedings as an appeal against an order. Since, therefore, the proceedings before us have been distinctly excluded from the category of decrees they have also been distinctly excluded from the operation of Section 144.

8. As to what may be the aggrieved parties real remedy in the matter, I would perfer not to express an opinion but I would say that I entirely agree with my learned brother that upon an application which in essence amounts to a claim for compensation, the Court should not attempt to do justice between the parties more than three years after the relief sought became open to the applicant.

9. I agree that the appeal should be dismissed with cost Section