Jwala Prasad, J.These are nine analogous second appeals by the plaintiffs and arise out of the suits brought by them to recover possession of certain properties as reversionary heirs of their maternal grandfather Girwar Narain. The following is the undisputed pedigree of the family:

2. Girwar Narain was a practising Mokhtar of the District Court of Patna. He died on the 20th February, 1892, leaving him surviving a daughter Mt. Fateh Kuer since deceased and two grandsons by a predeceased daughter Pratap Narain and Jagdam Sahai, and two nephews Ram Per-shad and Sham Prasad, the sons of Sardhu Narain, the deceased brother of Girwar Narain. On the death of Girwar Narain a dispute arose between Ram Prasad and Sham Prasad on one hand and Mt. Fateh Kuer on the other as to the title to the properties which stood recorded in the name of Girwar Narain. Ram Prasad and Sham Prasad took up the position that they together with Girwar Narain formed a joint Mitakshara family of which Girwar Narain was the managing member and that the properties were joint family properties and had been acquired out of joint family funds, and that consequently they were entitled to take those properties by survivorship to the exclusion of Fateh Kuer. Fateh Kuer, on the other hand, maintained that the properties were the self-acquired properties of Girwar Narain and that she was entitled to succeed to them to the exclusion of Ram Prasad and Sham Prasad. In this dispute, Naurangi Lal, father of Pratap Narain and Jagdam Sahai who were the minors, took the side of Mt. Fateh Kuer for his sons interest obviously lay in Fateh Kuer succeeding to the properties as an heiress of her father Girwar Narain, or otherwise they would not have any chance of succeeding to the properties even if they had survived Fateh Kuer.

3. On the 22nd of September, 1892, the parties settled their dispute by means of a deed of partition (Ex. L) whereby all the properties in dispute were apportioned between the three parties. The properties in Schedules I and II to the deed were allotted respectively to Ram Prasad and Sham Prasad, first party, those set out in Schedule III to Mt. Fateh Kuer absolutely, second party, and those set out in Schedule 4 jointly to Pratap Narain and Jagdum Sahay, who were represented by their father Naurangi Lal, as third party. The properties were divided in the following proportion:--The first party obtained a share of 7 1/2 annas; the second party three annas and the third party 5 1/2 annas. The parties signed this deed which was duly registered. The deed of partition was fully given effect to, and the parties got possession of the properties allotted to them respectively and got their names registered in respect of their shares in villages in the Land Registration Department, and as regards the houses allotted to them they got their names registered in the Municipal books, without any objection from any quarter. They obtained succession certificates in order to realise the bond debts, etc., in proportion to their shares as defined in the Taksimnama and realised those debts and appropriated them. There is no dispute as to these debts. They further went on transferring their shares from 1892 the date of the Taksimnama till 1899 with the result that almost all the properties in dispute are in possession of third parties transferees and the possession has remained undisturbed for the last 25 or 26 years.

4. The properties allotted to Pratap Narain and Jagdam Sahai were also transferred to third parties. Pratap Narain become major soon after the Taksimnama in 1893, and Jagdam in 1900. The transfer deeds with respect to the properties allotted to Pratap Narain and Jagdam Sahai were executed by Pratap Narain himself and by Naurangi Lal on behalf of his minor son Jagdam Sahai. Pratab Narain is said to have taken part in the execution of the transfer deeds by Ram Prasad and Sham Prasad and Fateh Kuer with respect to the properties allotted to them, either by being a scribe to the documents or having attested others as a witness.

5. Fateh Kuer died on the 17th December, 1906, and on her death the dispute between the parties broke out afresh. Gobinda Kuer, daughter of Fateh Kuer, also become a party to the dispute and applied to have her name registered in place of her deceased mother with respect to the properties in suit and set forth in Schedule I to the Taksimnama (Ex. L). Her claim was resisted by Pratap Narain and Jagdam Sahai as objectors No. 1 and Ram Prasad and Sham Prasad as objectors No. 2. Each of the aforesaid three parties claimed to be registered in place of the deceased to the exclusion of the others. Gobinda Kuer subsequently withdrew her claim, and the dispute between Ram Prasad and Sham Prasad on the one hand and Pratap Narain and Jagdam Sahai on the other was decided by the Revenue authorities in favour of the former upon the ground that under the Taksimnama the family of Girwar Narain, Ram Prasad and Sham Prasad was prima facie joint, and hence they were entitled to be registered in preference to Pratap Narain and Jagdum Sahai who were sisters sons of Fateh Kuer. The decision of the Revenue authorities is dated the 19th December, 1907 and 21st January, 1908.

6. On 5th August, 1916, Jagdam Sahai commenced an action by instituting suit No. 6 of 1916 in the court of the Subordinate Judge of Patna, for recovery of his half share of Sheo Rampore allotted to the share of Fateh Kuer in Schedule No. Ill to the deed of partition and half share in Mauza Jaintipur and in two houses allotted to Ram Prasad in Schedule I of the deed of partition.

7. Pratap Narain was impleaded as defendant in this case upon the allegation that he did not elect to join in the suit on account of ill-feeling between him and the plaintiff Jagdam Sahai. During the pen iency of the suit the plaintiff entered into a compromise with Ram Piasad and his sons whereby in consideration of Rs. 700 agreed to be paid to Jagdam Sahai, the plaintiff, he relinquished his claim-in respect of the properties set forth in Schedule II of the plaint. The suit was, therefore, tried only with respect to Shiva Rampore which was allotted to Mt. Fateh Kuer and with respect to which she had executed a mukarrari deed, dated the 24th August, 1894, in favour of Inderjit Mahton who had sold it to defendant No. 6, Mt. Bhagwati Kuer. The suit was decreed by the Subordinate Judge on the 31st May, 1918.

8. The suit being valued at above Rs. 5,000 the Mukamdar Mt. Bhagwati Kuer appealed to this Court. The appeal was dismissed by a decision of this Court given by Das and Adami, JJ. on the 21st June, 1921 Bhagwati Kuar v. Jagadasahay (1921) 2 P.L.T. 471. The result of this litigation is that the 8 annas of the mukarri of Mauza Shivarampur granted by Fateh Kuer to Inderjit Mahton and Bhagwati Kuer has been set aside; and as regards the 8 annas of the other properties in the suit, namely, Jaintipur and two houses allotted to Ram Prasad, Jagdam Sahai had been declared to be the absolute proprietor.

9. That case was obviously a test case brought by Jagdam Sahai, and soon after the decision of the trial court in that case, early in December, 1918, both Jagdam Sahai and Pratap Narain commenced action in ejectment with respect to the remaining properties covered by the taksimnama and hence these nine suits, five by Pratap Narain [one of which is a counter-part of the aforesaid case Pratap Narain claiming half share in the properties covered by that case.] The remaining four suits of Pratap Narain and four suits of Jagdam Sahai are counter parts of each other, Pratap Narain claiming 8 annas share and Jagdam Sahai claiming 8 annas share in the properties mentioned in the respective plaints. The tabular statement annexed hereto will show at a glance the properties covered by the suits, the persons to whom they were allotted in the deed of partition and the manner in which they were dealt with by the parties since the Taksimnama of 1892.

10. These nine suits were valued at less than Rs. 5,000 and hence the First Appeal from the decision of the Subordinate Judge lay to the District Judge. Both the courts below have dismissed the suits. The plaintiffs have therefore come to us in second appeal.

11. The Subordinate Judge framed a number of issues in each of the suits arising out of the pleas taken by the defendants. Most of these issues do not now arise in these second appeals.

12. The Subordinate Judge held that Girwar Narain was separate from his brothers and nephews, and that the properties in dispute were his self-acquired , properties. He however, held that the deed of partition (Ext. L), dated the 22nd September, 1892, was in the nature of a family arrangement arrived at with a view to settle a bona fide family dispute and the plaintiffs derived benefits thereby, and it was ratified by them after they attained majority, and they are estopped from questioning its validity, particularly when they are consenting parties to almost all the documents they want to impeach in these suits.

13. The learned District Judge in appeal differed from the Subordinate Judge as to his finding that Girwar was separate from his brother and nephews, holding that the evidence relied upon by the Subordinate Judge to prove separation was not conclusive. He, however, did not consider it necessary to determine as to whether the family was joint or separate, for according to him the principal question was not whether the family was separate or not, but as to whether the deed of partition, dated the 22nd September, 1892, was a good arrangement, and if it was a good arrangement, then no question of jointness or separation would arise. He agreed with the Subordinate Judge that the Taksimnama (Ext. L.) was a good family arrangement and settlement of serious bona fide dispute and that it was for the benefit of the family and as a matter of fact the plaintiffs were actully benefited thereby. Accordingly he dismissed the plaintiffs suits. The judgment was delivered on the 27th September, 1921 after the decision of Das and Adami, JJ., in the case of Musammat Bhagwati Kuer v. Jagdam Sahai (1921) 2 P.L.T. 471; That decision was cited before the learned District Judge as an authority for the view that the Taksimnama of 1892, is not binding on the plaintiffs. Referring to that decision the learned District Judge says:

It proceeded on its own facts. The evidence in the present case is different. So far as the judgment lays down the law on family arrangement it is of course an authority; but it is not conclusive of the question of fact in the present case, for it is a question of fact wheather this Ekrarnama is on the evidence established to be a good family arrangement.

14. We have, therefore, to see whether upon the facts found by the courts below, which are binding upon us in second appeal, the Ekrarnama or the Taksimnamawv&s a good family arrangement and binding upon the plaintiffs.

15. The courts below have found that as soon as Girwar Narain died and even before his body was removed for cremation, a dispute arose between Ram Prasad and Sham Prasad on the one hand and Naurangi Lal, father of Pratap Narain and Jagdam Sahai, and Pateh Kuer on the other, about his heritage, and the dispute reached such a climax that police aid was called in, in order to prevent a breach of the peace. The houses were locked up by the police and a police guard was stationed at Girwar Narains house for some time. The dispute, it is said, is recited not only in the deed of partition but also in all the subsequent deeds executed by the parties including the deeds executed by the plaintiff Pratap Narain and Naurangi Lal as father and guardian of his minor son Jagdam Sahai. The deed (Ext. 3) of the 3rd of October, 1896. has been referred to by the courts below to show that it recited that Ram Prasad and Sham Prasad laid claims to all the houses and all the properties as members of a joint family, and consequently Pratap Narain and Jagdam Sahai would not have got anything from the properties left by Girwar Narain had not the executants of the deed ultimately made an arrangement with Ram Prasad and Sham Prasad. Fateh Kuer claimed the properties as the self-acquisition of Girwar Narain and that he was separate from his brothers and nephews. The major portion of the properties in dispute consists of houses and Ram Prasad succeeded in occupying the largest house. There was thus a dispute between Ram Prasad and Sham Prasad on the one hand and Pateh Kuer on the other. Pratap Narain, though minor, had reached the age of discretion and was about to become major and did become major in 1893 soon after the deed of partition was executed. The courts below have held that Naurangi Lal and his two sons were almost paupers and had no means to support themselves, and there was no chance of Pratap Narain and Jagdam Sahai receiving any education. The Subordinate Judge depicts the indigent circumstances of Naurangi Lal and his sons in the following words:

We have also held that after Girwar Narains death, Naurangi was a pauper and had fallen on bad times. He had no means or any source of income to maintain and educate his sons. We found recital of his miseries in almost all the documents executed by him and plaintiffs favourite witness Kanatram has also given us the same story. Hence there cannot be the least doubt about Naurangis helplessness at that time. If Naurangi had not come to terms and settle the dispute with Ram Prasad and Sham Prasad, what would have been the fate of these poor plaintiffs can better be imagined than described. Naurangi would have then been involved in litigation and it is well-known how ruinous a litigation in India is. First of all it is difficult to say whether he could have secured sufficient funds to carry on litigation. In the next place had he succeeded in doing so, it is equally difficult to say what would have been gains to the plaintiffs. Therefore, I must say that he acted very prudently in settling the dispute with Ram Prasad and Sham Prasad at that critical juncture.

16. The District Judge says:

If litigation had resulted from the dispute the property might well have disappeared altogether and the minors Jagdam and Pratap have been left unprovided for, as it is admitted that their father had no means of livelihood of his own.

17. The courts below have further held that the dispute was not only bona fide but that its result was doubtful, The learned District Judge has referred to the evidence indicative of jointness, and says that although the evidence may not be conclusive one way or the other, it was sufficient to "establish the fact that there was a bona fide dispute as to whether the family was joint or separate," and continuing says the learned Judge--"that is all that is required to establish this deed as a good family arrangement."

18. On behalf of the respondents it is pointed out that Ram Prasad and Sham Prasad were sons of Sardhu Narain, full brother of Girwar Narain, and as such there was a presumption of jointness between Girwar and Ram Prasad and Sham Prasad; and Ram Prasad as a matter of fact lived with Girwar Narain and associated with him as his Taid in the legal profession that the former carried on. They further say that his earnings as legal practitioner and the properties in dispute purchased therewith must enure for the benefit of the joint family. In support of this they cited the following authorities:--Durvasula Gangadharudhu v. Durvesula Narasammah (1872) 7 M.H.C. 47, and the view recently taken by their Lordship of the Judicial Committee in Amarnath Gokul Chand v. Hukum Chand Nath Mal (1921) 2 Lah. 40, where in the case of a member of the Indian Civil Service it was held that the onus of proving that the training required for qualifying one for Indian Civil Service was not received at the expense of the joint family lay on the person pleading seperation. Thus, the respondents urge that the Subordinate Judge arrived at his decision that Girwar Narain was separate from his nephews and that the properties were his self-acquisitions by misplacing the onus upon the defendants. We are, however, not concerned at present with the finding of the Subordinate Judge, for his finding has not been accepted by the learned District Judge.

20. The above contentions of the respondents are, however, strong indications of what the learned District Judge has held, that the claim made by Ram Prasad and Sham Prasad as to jointness of Girwar Narain with them and the properties being the joint family properties was a serious one and the result of the dispute was doubtful and uncertain. Whatever be the truth, the finding of the learned District Judge leaves no manner of doubt that the rival claims advanced on behalf of Fateh Kuer and Naurangi Lall as father of Pratap Narain and Jagdam Sahai on the one hand and of Ram Prasad and Sham Prasad on the other were not free from doubt and that the dispute if carried into litigation would have involved the disappearance of the family properties which were not of very considerable value and that none of the parties to the agreement even if successful would have counted upon any gain. No doubt, Pratap and Jagdam had only spes succession is and would have succeeded to the properties only if they had survived Fateh Kuer; but even this chance would have been lost to them if either Ram Prasad or Sham Prasad had succeeded in obtaining the properties on the ground that they were the joint family properties and Girwar Narain died in a state of jointness with them. Equally ruinous would have been the result of the litigation for Fateh Kuer and Ram Prasad and Sham Prasad, irrespective of which of them would have been victorious, for upon the findings of the courts below the estate was in danger of disappearing altogether if litigation had resulted from the dispute between the parties.

21. Thus, the settlement of the dispute was in the interests of the estate and therefore for the benefit of all persons interested in the estate mediately or immediately. These findings of fact distinguished the present case from the decision in the case of Musammat Bhagwati Kuer v. Jagdam Sahai (1921) 2 P.L.T. 471. No doubt, the deed of partition recites that Girwar Narain was joint with Ram Prasad and Sham Prasad and acquired properties while living jointly. Whether the recital is true or not, we cannot with certainty say upon the finding of the learned District Judge. The deed, however, recites the fact that the properties were acquired in the name of Girwar Narain and that his name stood registered with respect thereto, and says that consequently a dispute was likely to arise. These recitals suppose counter claims laid by the disputants as to the properties being joint family properties of Girwar Narain and Ram Prasad and Sham Prasad, or the self-acquired properties of Girwar Narain. In the former case the entire property would belong to Ram Prasad and Sham Prasad of the first party and in the latter case the entire property would be inherited by Fateh Kuer with the possibility of the third party, Prasad Narain and Jagdam Sahai, who had identified themselves with Pateh Kuer in the dispute, succeeding as reversioners.

22. After reciting the fact as to the properties standing in the name of Girwar Narain, the deed says: "and it is supposed that a dispute will arise. If a dispute arises it will entail nothing but pecuniary loss and embarrassment."

23. The deed then purports to effect a settlement between the parties "regardless of the fact that the family is joint" to quote the words of the deed.

24. The recitals in the document referred to above and the general tenour of it support the view taken by the learned District Judge that, "There were substantially only two parties to the deed; as it is put by the witnesses. Ram Prasad and Sham Prasad were on the one side and Fateh Kuer and her sisters sons on the other. To say that the deed is bad because a reversioner has taken part in it is, in my opinion, to overlook the fact that it is family arrangement which avoided all questions of jointness and separation and consequently made it impossible to say that Jagdam and Pratap were reversioners because it is not known whether there was any reversion. It cannot be said that there was a reversioner unless it is established that the family separated and this ex-hypothesi is impossible, if the deed is otherwise good. The question is whether this deed is a good root of title to the properties dealt with therein and this depends on whether there was a fair settlement of a bona flde dispute."

25. Now, the dispute recited in the deed undoubtedly refers to the rival claims of the parties, each claiming exclusively and adversely to the other the entire estate. Ram Prasad and Sham Prasad claimed the properties on the ground that they were joint with Girwar and the properties in dispute were the joint family properties and subsequently they took by survivorship the entire estate to the exclusion of Fateh Kuer and possible reversioners. The latter claimed the properties as the self-acquisitions of Girwar Narain which devolved upon Fateh Kuer as the daughter of Girwar Narain to the exclusion of Ram Prasad and Sham Prasad.

26. The deed avoided to decide the question of jointness and separation, and settled the dispute on this score. The settlement was, therefore, upon the supposition of antecedent title claimed by the parties and this is expressed in the deed by the words "it is supposed that the dispute will arise."

27. The title claimed by the parties was also supposed in the deed to be doubtful by reciting certain facts upon which the claim as to the properties being the self-acquired properties of Girwar Narain could be made, although it recites that they were the joint family properties. Therefore, upon the supposition of title claimed by the parties and of the title being doubtful the parties entered into the settlement, abandoning their claims based upon title and taking only such of the properties as were given to them by the settlement in order to avoid pecuniary loss and harassment as is stated in the bond. Hence whether in truth the title was in one party or the other, and as a matter of fact the title must be in one of them, the parties came to the settlement in order to avoid embarking on a ruinous litigation which would, as the courts below have held, have involved not only loss to the parties but possibly total disappearance of the entire estate.

28. The question as to whether the deed is invalid on account of Pratap Narain and Jagdam Sahay joining therein and taking benefit thereunder through their father, they being minors, has been answered by the learned District Judge in the following words:

The fact that in making this settlement the principal disputants brought in the other surviving members of the family and divided the property in a particular way cannot invalidate the settlement, unless it is shown that the settlement is in itself unfair, and there is no suggestion to that effect.

29. Pratap Narain and Jagdam Sahay at that time had no title to the properties in dispute. They had possibly only a chance of succeeding if Pateh Kuer herself had succeeded to the estate on the ground of its being the separate property of her father and they had survived Pateh Kuer. They had, therefore, taken the side of Fateh Kuer and identified themselves with her interest and they were consequently interested in the settlement. They were joined as being members of the family with the chance of succession under certain contingencies referred to above. Their joining in the deed, as the learned District Judge has held, would not invalidate the document if the transaction is a fair settlement of a bona fide family dispute and not in any way unfair.

30. Both the courts have held that the Taksimnama was executed out of free will and consent of the parties, that no coercion or undue influence was brought to bear on any one of them, nor was there any fraud in obtaining it, and that the settlement was with a view to preserve the estate and was a fair settlement, and in fact no suggestion was made as to its being unfair in any way.

31. The plaintiffs case is that Girwar Narain was separate from his brothers and nephews and that the properties were his self-acquisitions, and that Fateh Kuer succeeded to the estate and after her death they have succeeded to it, in other words they claim as reversioners of the estate of Girwar Narain. Assuming that they are the reversionary heirs, they can succeed only by showing that they were not bound by the Taksimtiama in questien. Assuming that Fateh Kuer succeeded to the estate which upon the finding of the District Judge is doubtful, the estate vested in her absolutely, though she had a qualified interest only therein, and it is conceded that she had a right as representing the estate to enter into transactions for the protection of that estate. Of course, she had no right to alienate the estate or any portion thereof without any consideration, for a consideration which did not confer any benefit on the estate.

32. The question, therefore, is whether the transaction which resulted in the Taksimnama of 1892, was entered into by her with a view to preserve the estate. The principle underlying the following authorities would seem to apply:

Stapilton v. Stapilton (1739) 1 W. & T. 234. In that case Philip had two sons, Henry and Philip, and had a very considerable real estate. Both his sons were then owned as legitimate. Their father and another had lived together as husband and wife. Henry, the elder, was, however, illegitimate, and his father knew that he would be left without any provision if no agreement was made; and, on the other hand if this legitimacy should be established, then Philip the younger would have nothing. To prevent these disputes and all consequences, the father brought both his sons into an agreement to make a division of his real estate. It was found as a fact that Henry was a bastard and the agreement was sought to be set aside. The question was whether there was any valuable consideration on all sides for entering into the agreement in question by Henry and Philip. The agreement was upheld, and the dictum of Lord Macclesfield in Cann v. Cann (1721) P. Wms. 727 was affirmed. That dictum is as follows:

That an agreement entered into upon a supposition of right or of a doubtful right, though it after comes out that the right was on the other side, shall be binding and the right shall not prevail against the agreement of the parties, for the right must always be on one side or the other, and, therefore, the compromise of a doubtful right is a sufficient foundation of an agreement.

33. The courts below in the present case have held that there was supposition of right in both parties and that the right was a doubtful one. Therefore, the agreement entered into is binding upon the parties irrespective of the fact whether in truth the properties in dispute were the self-acquired properties of Girwar Narain or the joint family properties of Ram Prasad and Sham Prasad. In that very case Sir T. Plumer observed:

Undoubtedly, parties entitled under different events may, while the uncertainty exists, each taking his chance, effect a valid compromise.

34. In Maria Campbell Stewart v. Ferdinand Campbell Stewart (1839) 6 Ch. & Fin. 911, all the authorities were reviewed, and those authorities show that the courts recognise the Rule of equity as to agreements by way of compromise particularly in family arrangements and agreements entered into with good faith, honest intentions and full disclosures between the members of a family. The adjustment of the rights among themselves will not be disturbed because it is founded upon a supposition which ultimately turns out to be incorrect.

35. In Miles v. New Zealand Alford Estate Co. (1886) 32 Ch. 266 it was laid down that a bona fide compromise of a real claim is a good consideration whether the claim would have been successful or not.

36. In Holsworthy Urban District Council v. Rural District Council of Holsworthy (1907) 2 Ch. 62 an agreement having been entered into bona fide by both Councils wag not rendered invalid by the fact that one of the claims included in the compromise subsequently proved to be unfounded in law.

37. The cases in India also seem to have been governed by the aforesaid principles: vide Lala Khunni Lal v. Gobind Krishna Narain (1911) 33 All. 356. In that case effect is given to the observation in the case of Behari Lal v. Rani Mewa Kuer (1868) 3 Agra H.C. 82, where it was observed:

The true character of the transaction appears to us to have been a settlement between the several members of the family of their disputes each one relinquishing all claim in respect of property in dispute other than that falling to his share, and recognizing the right of the others as they had previously asserted it to the portion allotted to them respectively. It was in this right, rather than as conferring a new distinct title on each other, that the parties themselves seem to have regarded the arrangement and we think that it is the duty of the courts to uphold and give full effect to such an arrangement.

38. The settlement in the present case recognizes the rights of the parties previously asserted by them with respect to the properties allotted to them, each relinquishing his claim with respect to the rest of the properties in dispute.

39. In Lala Khunni Lals case (1911) 33 All. 356 their Lordships laid down that the true test to apply to a transaction, which is challenged by the reversioners as an alienation not binding on them, is whether the alienee derives title from the holder of the limited interest or life-tenant. In the present case the title of Ram Prasad and Sham Prasad, the rival claimants, is derived not from the limited owner Fateh Kuer but from Girwar Narain, the original holder thereof.

40. In the case of Rani Mewa Kuer v. Rani Hulas Kuwar (1874) 1 I.A. 157, while disposing of the question of limitation it was observed that the compromise in that case was based on the assumption that there was an antecedent title of some kind in the parties and the agreement acknowledged and defined what their title was, and the claim did not rest on contract only but upon title to the land acknowledged and defined by the contract which was part only of the evidence of the plaintiff to prove her title.

50. The case of Hiran Bibi v. Sohan Bibi (1914) 18 C.W.N. 929 seems to be exactly to the point. Harish Chandra died in 1856, leaving him surviving his widow Mt. Manki Baku, who succeeded him and 3 daughters. In 1860 she adopted Parsotam Das on the condition that she was to remain the owner of her husbands property during her life-time. On the 9th December, 1871, she made a Will by which she made allowances in favour of the said Parsotam Das and his children, and in order to perpetuate the name of her husband she dedicated and endowed 16 as. of Mauza Sheodasa to Sri Thakurji. During her lifetime she remained in possession of the propety On the 24th January, 1893, she made a Wil in which she provided that after her death her son-in-law Raghunath Das was to be the manager of the endowed property. Parsotam Das executed a document on the 29th March, 1881, recognizing and consenting to the dispositions made by Manki Bahu, and relinquished all rights and claim to the property comprised in the Will. Manki Bahu died on the 1st June, 1893. A dispute arose between her daughters on the one side and the widow and daughters of Parsotam Das on the other. In 1895 one of the daughters Mt. Puno Bibi instituted a suit against Bindesri Bahu widow of Parsotam Das and the other daughters of Manki Bahu, Mt. Bindesri Bahu set up a title that her husband Parsotam Das was the lawfully adopted son of Harish Chandra, and also under the Will of 9th December, 1871. The suit was compromised on the 27th May, 1896. By this compromise the parties divided the properties between themselves. On 15th January, 1906, Mt. Sohan Bibi, daughter of Parsotom Das, instituted a suit making the daughters of Harish Chandra as well as the widow of Parsotam Das and his other daughters parties to the suit. Her case was that Parsotam Das was the lawfully adopted son and heir of Harish Chandra and, after his death, her mother succeeded to the life estate, and after her death she and her sister would be the next reversionary heirs. She prayed for setting aside the compromise, dated the 27th May, 1896, as being without consideration and without any right. It was found that the co promise entered into by the plaintiffs moth was not fraudulent or collusive, and the compromise was signed by the plaintiffs husband: and the plaintiff was staying with her mother and was 16 or 17 years of age and able to understand the import of the discussion, and was aware of the compromise having been filed. The Privy Council dismissed the suit holding that the compromise was not an "alienation by a limited owner of the family property, but a family settlement in which each party takes a share of the family property by virtue of the independent title which is, to that extent, and by way of compromise, admitted by the other parties."

51. It was a compromise of doubtful claims of the various contending parties, and the Hindu widow was entitled to settle them by a compromise. All the existing members of the family were made parties. There was no fraud or collusion. It bore all the marks of a family settlement and was in no sense an alienation of the property.

52. The findings in the present case accord in all respects with the findings upon which the compromise in that case was upheld by their Lordships of the Judicial Committee. Here, as in that case, all the members of the family were made parties to the compromise.

53. The case of Kanhai Lal v. Brij Lal (1913) 40 All. 487 reiterates the principle governing such a compromise and family settlement and applies to the present case. Balak Ram left three sons; Badri, Bahadur Lal and Ganga Ram. The three brothers died one after the other; Bahadur Lal died last of all in 1883. Parbati was widow of Badri and Koshalya was widow of Ganga Ram and Ramdei was the widow of Bahadur Lal. Upon the death of the three brothers there arose a three-cornered dispute. Ramdei claimed the entire estate alleging that the three brothers were joint and her husband survived them all and inherited the entire estate which upon his death devolved upon her. Parbati and Koshalya, on the, other hand, asserted that the three brothers were separate and each of their widows had one-third share in the estate. Kanhaiya Lal, who was son of Rampiari, sister of Badri, asserted that he was adopted by Parbati, widow of Badri, and consequently the entire estate devolved upon him. In order to support his adoption he set up a special custom in the Agarwala caste whereby a sisters son can be adopted. After some litigation, Ramdei, widow of Bahadur Lal, brought a suit against Parbati and Koshalya for a declaration that the three brothers were joint in their lifetime and her husband succeeded by survivorship to the entire estate which after his death devolved upon her to the exclusion of the other claimants. The suit was compromised in 1892, whereby the widows and Kanhaiya Lal took one-fourth share each in the estate "as full proprietors with power of transfer."

54. The adoption of Kanhaiya Lal was thus accepted by the parties. In 1898 Parbati relinquished her share in favour of Kanhaiya Lal who brought suits claiming the entire estate as a reversioner and impugned the compromise of 1892 as being not binding upon him. His claim was dismissed. It was held that the claims made by the parties were serious. If Mt. Ramdeis claim of jointness was true, she would have succeeded to the exclusion of Kanhaiya Lal and the widows of the other brothers. If Kanhaiya Lals claim of adoption was true, then he would have succeeded to the entire estate; although as a general Rule a man cannot adopt his sisters son, the custom set up by him raised a serious dispute. These considerations influenced the parties to come to a compromise and revive the estate. Kanhaiya Lal was a party to the compromise and his claim must have induced Mt. Ramdei to alter her position by agreeing to the compromise, and under that compromise Kanhaiya Lal obtained substantial benefit which he enjoyed so long. It was held that in these circumstances Kanhaiya Lal was bound by it and could not claim as a reversioner which right had not at that time accrued to him.

55. This case bears strong resemblance to the present one, and the settlement to which Fateh Kuer agreed was influenced by the claim of jointness made by Ram Prasad and Sham Prasad by having caused serious apprehension of a breach of the peace which led to the Police to come on the spot and lock up the house and by Sham Prasad and Ram Prasad taking possession of the largest house. The reversioners in this case were given pecuniary benefit as well as Immovable properties. They realised the monies due under the bonds, appropriated them, took possession of the Immovable properties and transferred them for their own benefit. It is not open to the plaintiffs to question the validity of the transaction--call it a settlement or an alienation by Fateh Kuer.

56. In the case of Bijay Gopal Mukherjee v. Girindra Nath Mukherjee (1914) 41 Cal. 793, Sayamoni Debi succeeded to the estate of her husband Chandra Bhushan Mukherjee who died in 1832. She was a pardanashin lady and not capable of managing a large estate. Baman Das Mukherji, her husbands relative, dispossessed her, and in 1844 she brought a suit against him and his two brothers Gouri Prasad and Annoda Prasad to recover the property. This litigation lasted till 1858 when on appeal to Her Majesty her rights to the estate were finally established. Still she failed to get possession. Further difficulties were raised. Much of the property was threatened with adverse rights in the actual possessors of the lands who refused to pay rent under the pretext that the title had not been settled, and seeing that prior to 1858 adverse possession against a widow ranked as adverse possession against the reversioners the whole estate was in very serious peril. In these circumstances the widow executed, on the 7th September, 1863, an Ijara for a term of 60 years. This was part of a joint family arrangement whereby the widow divided up this family property amongst the various reversioners reserving to herself only a comparatively small annual income which may fairly be looked on as representing maintenance. The Ijara was granted to Annoda Prasad and Sarada Prasad, son of Gouri Prasad, who had died in the interval. The third brother Baman Das Mukherjee did not directly take any interest under the Ijara, but in 1863, a dar-ijara was granted to his son of a portion of the property, and a large sum due from him on account of mesne profits was remitted; so that all branches of the family shared n the settlement. The long term of 60 years was fixed as the parties realised that the term would extend beyond her life-time and thus affect the rights of the reversioners whosoever they might happen to be. This was done with the consent of all those who then represented the reversioners. They took much interest under the arrangement and continued to enjoy them so long as they lived. Annoda, who was thus principally benefited, died in 1882. Sayamoni Debi survived him 11 years and died in 1893. The appellants, four sons of Annoda, became thus entitled directly to share in the family property of which the lady was the life tenant, and they brought the action to set aside the Ijara on the ground that it was an unauthorized interference by the widow with the reversionary interest which did not belong to her. It was found on the facts of the case that the arrangement of which the Ijara formed part was in truth dictated by the necessities of the case and the choice of the term of 60 years as the term of the Ijara was made for the benefit of the estate and did not injure anyone. Lord Moulton held that the case depended entirely on the facts and that it raised no new question of law as to the powers of a Hindu widow to deal with the family property in the case of necessity with the consent of the then present reversioners. Upon the facts that from the year 1882 when Annoda Prasad died to the year 1893 when Sayamoni died, the appellants themselves took the benefits of the arrangement, their Lordships held that the arrangement had been made in good faith under circumstances of necessity as would give to the arrangement validity according to the Hindu law, under which great weight has always been attached to the sanction by expectant reversioners of an alienation of property of a Hindu widow as affording evidence that the alienation was Under circumstances which rendered it lawful and valid. Their Lordships further held that the appellants could not be permitted to stigmatise the agreement under which they enjoyed benefits as a gross fraud and to suggest that they became partisans in the agreement solely because it was profitable to them to do so.

57. In the case of Raghunath Prasad v. Bank of Bengal 1924 Patna 295, (Sir Dawson Miller, C.J. and Adami, J.), a deed of transfer was executed by Mt. Binda Kuer grandmother, Chanda Kuer mother, Debi Prasad brother of Raghunath and Raghunath himself Except Binda Kuer, the others were mere reversioners having no right in presenti. After the death of Binda Kuer, Chanda Kuer succeeded, and she along with Debi Prasad and Raghunath Prasad impugned the aforesaid deed of transfer. It was held that they having joined in the transaction and having given consent to it cannot now be permitted to successfully impugn it. If any reversioner was left out, perhaps he could do so. In the present case Pratap Narain and Jagdam Sahai through their father joined in the transaction and they cannot impugn it. To the same effect is the case of Fateh Singh v. Rukmini Ramanji Maharaj 1923 All. 387, where it was held that a reversioner, who relinquishes all his rights in a property conveyed by the widow--a limited owner, cannot after the reversion impugn the transaction. It was held that although he had no interest in the property which he could assign or relinquish, yet having given unqualified assent to the gift executed by the widow he could not impugn it. He did not transfer or relinquish his right but simply covenanted that at no time thereafter he would set up any right or claim whatever to the property in case he happens to be the successor when the succession opens out. Vide also Basappa v. Fakirappa (1922) Bom. 102 .

58. In Adhikari Kuer v. Lokanath Rai (1920) 1 Pat. L.T. 335, (Das and Adami, JJ.) it was held that the reversioners who join in a mortgage deed executed by a widow must be deemed to have consented to the alienation and cannot be heard to say that there was no legal necessity for the transaction. It is immaterial if one of the reversioners who joined in the transaction is a minor when the others including his guardian had consented.

59. No doubt, a limited owner has no right to bargain with the reversionary interest and she cannot enter into an arrangement the effect of which is to completely extinguish the reversionary interest unless it is sanctioned by the necessities to preserve the estate, as was held in the case of Amrit Narain Singh v. Gay a Singh (1917) 45 Cal. 590. In that case Jhaman Singh was succeeded by his widow Radha Kuer. Her application for registration of her name was opposed by Jhamans agnatic relations. Their objections were overruled by the revenue courts and Radha Kuers was fully entered in the Collectors register. She died in 1865 and was succeeded by her daughter Kar Kuer, the mother of the appellant. The agnates raised a fresh contest as to her right to hold the property. The matter was referred to arbitration, in which her husband Rajendra Singh represented her though there was nothing to show that he had authority to act as her agent. Before the arbitrators had taken any action a compromise was arrived at in which Rajendra purported to act both for her and her infant son, the appellant. Under this compromise Kar Kuer abandoned in favour of the agnates all her rights to the Immovable property, receiving besides some moveable property---two small fractional shares which stood in her and her mothers names. The effect of the arrangement was to extinguish completely the reversionary interest of the appellant in his grandfathers estate. The compromise was placed before the arbitrators, and an award was passed in accordance therewith. The opposite party applied to have a decree passed in terms of the compromise. Kar Kuer objected to it. She succeeded in the first court, but on appeal the District Judge directed a decree to be passed in terms of the award. She appealed to the High Court of Calcutta, but her appeal was dismissed. She applied for review of the judgment, which was also dismissed. The result was that she was dispossessed of the property. The respondents obtained possession in 1865 and got their names registered in 1877. The suit was brought on behalf of the son alleging that the award was fraudulent and entered into without knowledge and authority of Kar Kuer, and that in any event she was not bound by them. It was found as a fact that Jhaman at the time of his death was separate from his agnates and that the plaintiff was not properly represented in the arbitration proceedings and in the proceedings in the Civil Court It was also found that it did not appear from the record that the proceedings before the arbitrators ever came to the knowledge of Kar Kuer or that she ever knew of the compromise and its effects. Under these circumstances the compromise was set aside. In that case the husband of the lady and father of the infant acted without any authority and the whole proceeding was ultra vires. His action in referring the matter connected with his sons reversion to arbitration was null and void. It must be remembered that in that case the agnatic relations had failed throughout before the matter was referred to arbitration. The compromise in that case could not be said to have been entered into by Kar Kuer, the mother of the appellants in the interest of the estate. There is nothing to show that the estate was in danger of being destroyed. That case has no application to the facts found in the present case. It was distinguished in the case of Mahadeo Prasad Singh v. Mata Prasad 1922 All. 297 . In the Allahabad case Prithipal Singh died leaving a widow Mt. Gajraj Kuer and a daughter Mt. Balraj Kuer. Mt. Balraj Kuer entered into possession as limited owner in 1897. Surajpal Singh was the immediate reversioner. On 15th October, 1897, Balraj Kuer executed a perpetual lease in favour of Mata Prasad and Debi Sahay, the defendants, on payment of Nazrana of Rs. 2,000. The rent reserved was Rs. 1,255-5-2. The same was payable as Government revenue. Surajpal Singh attested the lease. On the 29th October, 190J, Mt. Balraj Kuer and Thakur Surajpal Singh executed a deed of gift of the properties in favour of the same lessees. Mt. Balraj Kuer died on the 9th September, 1906, and Surajpal Singh became entitled to the estate and got possession. He did not repudiate the deed. He died in 1909. On the 4th September, 1918, a suit was brought on behalf of his minor son to recover possession of the gifted properties by avoidance of the deed of gift, dated the 29th October, 1901. It was held that the deed was for consideration to which the reversioner had consented and was enforceable, and the case of Amrit Narain Singh v. Gay a Singh (1917) 45 Cal. 590 did not apply as in that case no case of estoppel arose or could arise against the minor reversioner.

60. Most of these cases on the subject have been fully dealt with in the case of Mt. Bhagwati Kuer v. Jagdam Sahai (1921) 2 P.L.T. 471, referred to above, and his Lordship Mr. Justice Das with his usual acumen has abstracted the principles deducible from those authorities and laid them down in his judgment in the form of propositions. These propositions of law are unimpeachable. Applying those principles to the facts found in that case, his Lordship held that the transaction in question was a complete alienation and did not recognize an antecedent title of some kind in Patch Kuer and is not binding upon the plaintiffs, inasmuch as it was not entered into, by Pateh Kuer as representing the estate. In the present case the concurring facts found by the courts below leave us no option but to hold that the settlement was a fair and good settlement arrived at by the Mt. with a view to protect the estate from the imminent danger of being wholly lost. We are bound in second appeal by those findings of fact, and the decision as to whether the transaction was within the powers of Pateh Kuer as a limited owner to enter into and whether as a matter of fact she did enter into it bona fide in order to solve a serious bona fide dispute, depends entirely upon the facts found, as Lord Moulton in the case of Bijay Gopal Mukherjee v. Girindra Nath Mukherjee (1914) 41 Cal. 793, observed that the case depended entirely on the facts and that it raised no question of law as to the powers of a Hindu widow to deal with the family property in the case of necessity with the consent of the then present reversioners. The plaintiffs were at that time the entire body of reversioners, and, as observed above, on their behalf their father as natural guardian identified himself with Mt. Pateh Kuers interest and became a party to the transaction. Their father agreed on their behalf not to question the validity of the transaction. They did not transfer any interest, and in fact they had no interest in the property, their interest being only spes successions, and under the settled law as embodied in Section 6 of the Transfer, of Property Act their chance of succession Could not in any circumstance be the subject of any transfer or relinquishment: Vide Harnath Kuer v. Inder Bahadur Singh 1922 P.C. 403 and Annada Mohan Roy v. Gour Mohan Mullick 1923 P.C. 189. But the agreement in question is not a transfer of any reversionary right or relinquishment of their chance of succession. They simply agreed not to raise any objection to the transaction and for so doing they obtained good consideration in the shape of properties having been given to them, which under no circumstance they would have got at that time. The arrangement was a family arrangement, and as members of the family considerations were shown to them. They consented to the arrangement and confirmed it, and they are bound by it, and the authorities are ample to support this view, as already referred to above.

61. The question may be asked as to why a bona fide settlement should bind not only the parties and those who derive title through them but also those who subsequently acquire interest in the property claiming through the original holder thereof. The answer is that such a settlement is prompted by the necessity to preserve the estate itself so that it may enure to the benefit of those interested in the estate without waiting to have the rival claims of the disputants determined by means of a ruinous litigation. The facts in the present case show that unless the settlement was arrived at, the property would have been altogether destroyed and lost for good to the persons ultimately found entitled to it.

62. Therefore, we agree with the view taken by the court below and hold that the Taksimnama is a good family arrangement and as such is binding upon the plaintiffs who claim as reversioners to the estate of Girwar Narain. It would further appear that Naurangi Lal and Partab Narain, who attained majority in 1893 soon after the deed of partition was executed, not only dealt with the properties which were allotted to Pratap Narain and Jagdam Sahai but also took part in almost all the transfers made by Fateh Kuer, Ram Prasad and Sham Prasad on the footing that the partition was a valid transaction. Pratap Narain attested the Mukarrart deed (Exhibit O) executed by Fateh Kuer in favour of defendant No. 7, dated the 24th August, 1894, and also the sale deed executed by defendant No, 7 in favour of defendant No. 6 with respect to Mouza Sheorampur, the subject-matter in First Appeal No. 164 of 1918 (corresponding to suit No. 6 of 1916) disposed of in (1) Naurangi Lal and Pratap Narain attested the Kabala, (Ext. G 2), dated the 19th June, 1893, executed by Sham Prasad in favour of Bodh Narain in respect of the house which is the subject-matter of Second Appeal Nos. 65 and 1401 of 1922 and 1921 respectively. Pratap Narain is the scribe of the sale deed, a dated the 25th April,1895, executed by Sham Prasad in favour of Murat Narain Chowdhury and others, the subject-matter of Second Appeals Nos. 61 and 64 of 1922. The Ijara deed, dated 3rd October, 1896, and the Kabala (Ext. E-2), dated the 7th April, 1899, with respect to the house, the subject-matter of Second Appeals Nos.60 and 63 of 1922, and the various Zarpeshgi deeds and the sale deed) Ext. G, dated the 5th October 1896 with respect to 15 dams of Mauza Raghopur the subject-matter of Second Appeals Nos. 62 and 66, were executed by Pratap Narain while major and by Naurangi Lal for Jagdam Sahai.

63. The aforesaid documents deal with all the properties involved in these appeals. True, the mere attestation of a deed by a relative does not import concurrence: Rajlakhi Devi v. Gokhul Chandra Choudhury (1869) 13 M.I.A. 209, nor does it involve any knowledge of the contents of, the deed: Banga Chandra Dhur Biswas v. Jagat Kishore Achariya (1916) 44 Cal. 186. But the finding of the Subordinate Judge is that Pratap Narain took active part in all these transactions and was the scribe in some of them, and that he was fully cognizant of them. The deed of partition was recited in all of them as conferring title on the transferors by virtue of which the donees were competent to transfer the properties in favour of the various transferees who are defendants in the several suits. Pratap Narain cannot plead ignorance of the contents of the deeds or of the deed of partition.

64. Apart from all this Pratap Narain expressly accepted the Ekrarnama as a good family settlement and as binding upon him. In the proceedings instituted by Fateh Kuer, Ram Prasad and Sham Prasad applied for certificates of succession in order to realise the debts allotted to their shares under the deed of settlement. Pratap Narain first filed objections and ultimately withdrew them by filing a petition with a Vakalatnama in the court of the District Judge of Patna. The petition runs as follows:

A petition dated 22nd May, 1893, filed by Pratap Narain-

Your petitioner at the instigation of some enemies filed objection in the above case. The settlement which Munshi Naurangi Lal, father and guardian of your petitioner, made with Mt. Pateh Kuer, Ram Prasad and Sham Prasad under the Ekrarnama dated the 22nd September, 1892, was really done with-the consent and in consultation with your petitioner. Even now when your petitioner attained majority he heartily accepts the settlement and the contents of the said Ekrarnama are true and correct. The denial of the said settlement under the said Ekrarnama is prejudicial to the interest of your petitioner. It is, therefore, prayed that the petition of objection filed by your petitioner may be rejected and a certificate under the provisions of Act VII of 1889 may be granted to Mt. Fateh Kuer, Ram Prasad and Sham Prasad and your petitioner in his own capacity and also to Jagdam Sahai, minor brother of your petitioner under the guardianship of your petitioners father Naurangi Lal, in terms of the application for obtaining certificate and the Ekrarnama....

65. The petition is signed by Pratap Narain after he attained majority and is verified as being correct.

66. Therefore Pratap Narain cannot now be permitted to question the validity of the deed of partition and the transfers made by Fateh Kuer, Ram Prasad and Sham Prasad. As to the transfers made by him along with his brother Jagdam Sahay of the properties allotted to them by the deed of partition, it is not disputed that those transfers were for good consideration. One of these properties is a house with respect to which an Ijara deed was executed by Pratap Narain and Naurangi Lal on behalf of Jagdam Sahay on the 3rd October, 1896, for Rs. 1,900. In order to pay off this mortgage, a sale deed was executed on the 7th April 1899 by the same persons in favour Babu Nilamber Prasad in the name of his nephew Bishun Dayal. Out of the consideration, Rs. 215, was left with Nilamber Babu in order that it should be paid to Jagdam Sahay for his educational expenses. Babu Nilamber Prasad was an intimate friend of Girwar Narain. The Subordinate Judge finds that Nilamber Babu from time, to time made payments out of this sum of Rs. 215 to Jagdam Sahay as necessity arose. Heaps of corespondence and acknowledgment with respect to these payments have been filed on behalf of the defendants: vide Exts. K and J series. Most of these relate to the period after Jagdam Sahay attained majority and they refer to the sale deed in question executed by Pratap Narain and by Naurangi Lal on behalf of Jagdam Sahay. In Ext. K, dated the 18th of April, 1901, Jagdam refers to the payments made to him from time to time out of the consideration money left in deposit with Nilambar Babu and concludes in the following words:

In this manner the entire consideration of the deed of sale is received. Nothing is due to me nor have I any objection to raise.

67. The sale deed in question was executed just when Jagdam Sahay was about to attain majority, and when he attained majority he did confirm the transaction and received the consideration money for the purpose of his education. The sale deed recites the deed of partition. Jagdam Sahay has, therefore received benefit arising out of the deed of settlement whereby he received the property, sold it on his behalf and appropriated the sale proceeds thereof. He cannot therefore, impugn the sale deed in question nor the deed of partition.

68. Upon these findings the court below have concurrently held that the deed of partition was binding upon the plaintiffs and they cannot be permitted to go behind it. Upon the findings of the courts below no question of transfer by the plaintiffs of their chance of succession or spes succession is can arise. Nobody can dispute the proposition that an expectancy such as the reversionary right is not capable of transfer and that it is expressly forbidden by the statutory provision contained in Section 6 of the Transfer of Property Act. It is concluded by the authorities; vide Harnath Kuer v. Indar Bahadur Singh 1922 P.C. 403. and Annada Mohan Ray v. Gour Mohan Mullick (1869) 13 M.I.A. 209, Jagannada Raju v. Prasad Ray Garu (1915) 39 Mad. 554, Annada Mohan Ray v. Gour Mohan Mallik 25 C.W.N. 49, Tilakadhari v. Khedan Lal 25 C.W.N. 49, and Sham Sundar v. Achhan Kuer (1898) 21 All. 71. The plaintiffs, as a matter of fact, have not transferred any chance of succession in the estate of their maternal grandfather Girwar Narain, but they transferred the properties of which they were made absolute owners under the deed of partition or family arrangement for valuable consideration. But for the partition they would not have acquired any right in praesenti in the properties so as to be able to deal with them. The deed allotted to them certain properties and gave them possession thereof. Therefore, the transfers made by them with respect to the properties concerned in Second Appeals Nos. 60-63 and 62-64 were valid. As held in Mohammad Hasmat Ali v. Kaniz Fatma (1915) 13 A.L.J. 110, there is nothing illegal in a person, for good consideration, contracting not to claim a share in a property in the event of his becoming entitled to it on the decease of a living person; and Section 6 of the Transfer of Property Act does not affect such a contract. In that case Khurshed Jahan through whom the plaintiffs claimed had compromised certain disputes by abandoning not only all rights which were then vested in her but also the possibility of her succeeding to the estate as one of the heirs of the deceased.

69. The cases of Kanhai Lal v. Brij Lal (1913) 40 All. 487, Khunni Lal v. Gobind Krishna (1911) 33 All. 356 and Hiran Bibi v. Sohan Bibi 18 C.W.N. 929, furnish examples of a distinction being drawn between possibilities coupled with interest and bare or naked possibility such as the hope of inheritance entertained by the heir. Every possibility with an interest is more than a possibility and is a present divisable interest.

70. The plaintiffs obtained the present interest in the property by the deed of partition and they were able to transfer the ownership and the delivery of possession which would not happen in a mere transfer of possiblity of succession. Similarly in Fateh Singh v. Thakur Rukmiani Ramanji Maharaj 1923 All. 387 it was held that a reversioner, who consented to the gift made by the limited owner, cannot impugn it after succession opens to him.

71. In the case of Diltor Kuer v. Babu Harkhu Singh (1917) 1 Pat. L.W. 760 (Sir Edward Chamier, C.J. and Jwala Prasad, J.) it was held that although the heirs expectant cannot transfer a property u/s 6 of the Transfer of Property Act, but when they come into possession they can make agreements with respect to it and a reversioner accepting the arrangement made by the life-tenant and taking possession of the property on its strength will be deemed to have re-affirmed the arrangement and they will be bound by the arrangement made by the life tenant. Now, such an acceptance may be at the time of the execution of the deed or subsequently. The findings of the courts below show that ever since the deed of partition was executed, Pratap Narain and the father of Jagdam Sahay acted under the deed. They took interests in the arrangement and continued to enjoy them throughout. They cannot be permitted to impugn the transaction nor can they be permitted to question the validity of the sale deeds in favour of the respondents executed by the parties to the several deeds of transfer including those executed by the plaintiffs. These transfers were for valuable consideration, and the transferees have ever since been in possession of the properties.

72. The decision in the case of Mussammat Bhagwati Kuer v. Jagdam Sahay (1921) 2 P.L.T. 471, relied on by the appellant refers to a Mukarrari deed executed by Fateh Kuer with respect to the properties allotted to her. Jagdam Sahay was the plaintiff in that case and claimed 8 annas share in the properties covered by the Mukarrari deed, and the case was dealt with upon its own facts. Half of those properties is concerned in the present Second Appeal No. 47 of 1922 (Original Suit Nos. 71 of 1918 and 12 of 1920) brought by Pratap Narain. In this case we have got a compromise petition filed during the trial of the suit in the court of the Subordinate Judge. By the compromise, Pratap Narain is said to have relinquished his claim to the properties mentioned in Schedules I and II to the plaint in favour of Ram Prasad and his heirs on receiving a sum of Rs. 1,000. The defendants Nos. 1 to 5, that is, Ram Prasad and his sons, are declared to be the absolute proprietors of the properties mentioned in Schedules I and II to the plaint, and they have retired from the litigation. In that petition, it is, however, stated that "the suit be tried against the other defendants in respect of Mauza Sheorampur, property No. 1, Schedule No. I of the plaint and be it known that defendants Nos. 1 to 5 (Ram Prasad and his sons) will not in any way be prejudiced or be bound by the decision of this suit as against other defendants in respect of Mauza Sheorampur".

73. Mauza Sheorampur is mentioned in Schedule I of the plaint. Consequently Ram Prasad and his sons defendants Nos. 1 to 5 have been declared absolute owners of Sheorampur. Thus, Pratap Narain has no concern at all with the village. He is, therefore, not competent to recover possession of this property, and the suit for possession must fail. Be it known that Ram Prasad and Sham Prasad had succeeded before the Revenue authorities and had obtained mutation of their names in respect of the Mukarrari held by Mt. Bhagwati Kuar defendant No. 6 by decisions of the Deputy Collector and the Collector in 1907 and 1908 respectively referred to above. They were entitled to receive as proprietors the Mukarrari rent from the defendant Mt. Bhagwati Kuer, the Mukarraridar, and the compromise has confirmed the position of Ram Prasad. By the compromise the plaintiff Pratap Narain has declared Ram Prasad to be the absolute owner of the property and has disclaimed all interests therein. His suit must therefore fail. A similar petition was filed in the case brought by Jagdam Sahay and decided by this Court (1), but there the defendants Ram Prasad and his heirs were not by the compromise declared to be the absolute owners of Mauza Sheorampur mentioned in Schedule I to the plaint. They were declared absolute owner with respect to the property in Schedule No. II only, that is, the property other than Mauza Sheorampur. We have compared the Schedules in original of properties attached to the plaints in the suits brought by Jagdam and Pratap respectively. Mama. Sheorampur is in Schedule No. 1 of both the suits. The compromise in the case of Jagdam Sahay refers to the properties in Schedule No. II only and has expressly excluded Sheorampur mentioned in Schedule No. I. In the compromise petition in the case of Pratap Narain the properties in both the Schedules Nos. I and II are declared to be the absolute properties of Ram Prasad and his heirs. Therefore, whereas in the case of Jagdam Sahay he was competent to continue his action so far as Sheorampur was concerned, in the case of Pratap Narain he is not competent after the compromise petition was filed to continue his action. Upon the view that the compromise in the case of Jagdam Sahay did not cover Sheorampur and that it was expressly excluded, the judgment of Das and Adami, JJ. is founded: Vide Mt. Bhagwati Kuer v. Jagdam Sahay (1921) 2 P.L.T. 471. Their Lordships quote the following passage from the compromise petition in that case and observe:

It may be noted that the result of the suit will not be prejudicial to the interest of either the plaintiff or the defendants Nos. 1 and 5 to 8 in respect of Mauza Sheorampur mentioned in Schedule I of the plaint of this suit. We are therefore concerned in this appeal with the properties set forth in Schedule I, as to which the appellant claims title by virtue of Mukarrari settlement made in her favour by Pateh Kuer.

74. There may be a reason for Pratap Narain agreeing not to dispute the Mukarrari granted by Fateh Kuer, for he was a witness to the transaction which purports to give a Mukarrari lease to the respondent for a Nazrana of Rs. 1,100 and the annual rental of Rs. 25. Be that as it may, the compromise concludes this litigation.

75. Therefore, the suit of Pratap Narain with respect to Sheorampur must fail, and consequently the Second Appeal No. 47 of 1922 must be dismissed upon this ground alone, apart from the common grounds which apply to all the cases referred to above.

76. The result of these two cases is that Jagdam and Pratap have allowed Taksimnama to stand good so far as the properties allotted to their relations defendants Nos. 1 to 5 are concerned, and the Subordinate Judge is, therefore, right in his view that the relations have made up their differences and have joined in a common fight with the third parties to whom they themselves transferred the properties in dispute.

77. It has already been shown that Pratap Narain could under no circumstances dispute either the deed of partition or the several deeds of transfer in favour of the defendants in the suit; far less can he impugn the deeds whereby he transferred his own interest in the properties for valuable consideration, the subject-matter of Second Appeals Nos. 60-63 and 62-66.

78. The case of Jagdam Sahay, who was minor at that time, required considerations which I have already dealt with, with the result that he also is bound by the deed of partition and cannot question the validity of the deeds of transfer whereby the defendants are in possession of the properties, nor can he question the deeds executed on his behalf by Naurangi Lal who was his natural guardian and executed the deeds for necessity and against whom nothing has been alleged or shown in evidence.

79. It may be mentioned that respondent Jadubansi Sahay in Second Appeals Nos. 47, 61, 63 and 65 died during the pendency of the appeals and no substitution was made. Similarly, respondent Kanzi Fatma in Second Appeals Nos. 62 and 66 died and no substitution was made. The aforesaid appeals against those respondents have abated.

80. The result is that agreeing with the view taken by the courts below I dismiss the appeals with costs.

Foster, J.

81. I agree.