Kanhaiya Singh, J.

(1) In this ease, we are concerned with the lease of the tolls of twenty-five ferries. Petitioner Jagat Singh has moved this Court for a writ in the nature of certiorari and mandamus under Article 226 of the Constitution of India quashing the settlement of the tolls of the disputed ferries with Ramphal Singh, opposite party No. 3, and commanding the District Board, Patna, opposite party No. 2, to hold a fresh public auction according to law.

(2) The ferries in question have been declared by the State Government to be public ferries under Section 6, Bengal Ferries Act, 188

5. By virtue of the powers conferred on it under Section 35 of the Act, the State Government has vested the management of the disputed ferries in the District Board, Patna, which consequently has all the powers vested in the Magistrate of the District under (Ms Act except the powers specified in Sections 7, 17 and 3

2. Accordingly, the Chairman of the District Board leases the tolls of these ferries by public auction. These femes had been settled for one year 1954-55 for Rs. 66,000/-. The Chairman announce ed by notification in the official gazette that the lease of the ferries in question for the year 1955-56 would be made by public, auction at 2 P. M. on 22-3-1955, in the meeting hall of the District Board. The conditions imposed by the advertisement wore that (i) intending bidders would deposit as security one-fourth of the last year lease-money; (ii) the contractors of the District Board who were in arrears were disqualified to bid; (iii) the auction sale would be cancelled if the bidder would he found unreliable; and (iv) the Chairman was not bound to accept the highest bid. The petitioner wanted to bid at the public auction, and in accordance with the terms of the advertisement, he deposited Rs. 16,500/-, being one-fourth of the amount of the preceding settlement in the District Board office as security money. The deposit of the security money was accepted by the Chairman. It is alleged that on the date of the auction sale, the petitioner was forbidden by the Chairman to bid at the auction on the ground that his relations were fighting cases with Rampal Singh and others, the present threadars of the District Board. The petitioner made a representation to the Chairman challenging the correctness of those allegations and characterising them as false and baseless, but the Chairman refused to re-consider his order and did net permit the petitioner to bid at the auction. With the petitioner left out, there were only two bidders at the auction, including opposite party No.

3. The latter offered the highest bid of Rs. 35,000/-, and the lease was knocked down in his favour. The petitioner asserts that the Bengal Perries Act and the rules made thereunder imposed no restrictions on any member of the public intending to bid and complying with the conditions precedent to the making of the bid; and that the order of the chairman prohibiting him from taking part in the bid was null and. void and without jurisdiction, and that the Chairman contravened the provision of Section 9 of the Act in debarring him from bidding at the auction. On these allegations the petitioner has moved this Court for the grant of a writ of certiorari quashing the said order of the Chairman and also a writ of mandamus directing him to make a fresh settlement by public auction according to law.

(3) It is admitted that the tolls of the disputed ferries were advertised to be leased by public auction at 2 P. M. on 22-3-195

5. It is further admitted that in pursuance of the terms of the advertisement, the petitioner deposited Rs. 16,500/- as security money. There is further no dispute that this deposit of the security money was accepted by the Chairman of the District Board, Patna. It is also the. admitted case of the parties that the petitioner fulfilled all the conditions laid down in the notification for settlement of the ferries. It is also admitted that on the date appointed for conducting the auction sale, the petitioner was not permitted by the Chairman to bid, his protest notwithstanding. The existence of disputes between the petitioner and the present Thicadars of the District Board, including opposite party No. 3, is advanced as a reason for disallowing the former to offer any bid. While challenging the truth of the imputations against him, the petitioner urged with some vehemence that in acting as he did, the Chairman exceeded the powers conferred upon him by the Bengal Ferries Act, 1885 and transgressed the duty imposed on him by Statute in withholding permission for the petitioner to bid. The contention involves an interpretation of the relevant sections of the Bengal Ferries Act. Section 8 of the Act provides:

"The immediate superintendence of every public ferry shall be vested in the Magistrate of the district in which such ferry is situated or in such other officer as the State Government may, from time to time, either by name or by official designation appoint. And such Magistrate or officer shall, except when the tolls at such ferry are leased, make all necessary arrangements for the supply of boats for such ferry, and for the collection of the authorised tolls leviable thereat."

Section 9 enacts:

"The tolls of any public ferry may, from time to time, be leased by public auction, for such term as the Magistrate of the district in which such ferry is situated may, with the approval of the Commissioner, direct. The Magistrate of the district or the officer authorised by him to conduct such auction may, for sufficient reason to be recorded in writing, refuse to accept the offer of the highest bidder, and may accept any other bid, or may withdraw the tolls from auction".

The other provisions of Section 9 are not relevant, for the present purpose. As staged earlier, the powers exercisable by the Magistrate of a district under this Aet have been conferred upon the District Board under Section 35 of the Act. Two options are open to the Chairman, District Board. He. may manage the ferry khas or he may settle them with any person. When he decides to lease the tolls of the ferries, he has to proceed under Section 9 which lays down the manner in which the lease is to be made. The settlement of the ferries has to be made by public auction and not by private treaty. Section 9, no doubt, vests in the District Board a discretion to refuse to accept the after of the highest bidder and to accept any other bid or to withdraw the tolls from auction, but this he can do only when there is sufficient reason which must be recorded in writing. These powers, though very wide, come into play only alter the auction is field. Section 9 or, for the matter of that, any provision of the Bengal Ferries Act, does not confer any power upon the District Board to debar any person from bidding at the auction. It is open to the Chairman of the District Board to refuse to accept the highest bid, of course, for sufficient reason to be recorded in will ting. In such a case he may either accept any bid howsoever low it may be, or may withdraw the tolls from auction and manage the ferries khas. He has, however, no authority to determine, before the auction is held; the suitability or otherwise of the intending bidders and to select those who, in his judgment, are fit, howsoever sound and justifiable his decision may be. The conferment of such large powers without prescribing the principles or rules for their exercise, even if any, apart from being unconstitutional because of the possibility of discrimination between different bidders would have defeated the very object which the legislature intended to achieve by an auction held publicly and after due publicity. In debarring the petitioner from making any bid, the Chairman violated the provisions of Section 9 and altered the manner prescribed by the statute for conducting the auction. It is clear, and is well settled by authorities, that when a statute directs that a power is to be exercised in a certain manner, that power should be exercised in that particular manner and in no other manner. The discretion vested in the Chairman under Section 9 to refuse to accept the offer of the highest bidders is intended to secure the revenue of the State, which is likely to be seriously affected by any collusive bid or by the bidder being financially unsound, and even this discretion is not unfettered, but is to be exercised judicially according to well-known principles for sufficient reason to be recorded in writing". For these very reasons it was not open to the Chairman to oust any intending bidder from making a bid. In almost similar circumstances the Supreme Court observed, in the case of -- K.N. Guruswamy v. State of Mysore, AIR 1954 SC 592 [LQ/SC/1954/106] (A) which was an Excise Act case, as follows: "The sale of these licenses forms such a lucrative source of revenue that State legislatures have deemed it wise not to leave the matter to unfettered executive discretion; accordingly legislation has been enacted in most parts of India to regulate and control the licensing of these trades. Acts are passed and elaborate Rules are drawn up under them. It is evident that there is a policy and a purpose behind it all and it is equally evident that the fetters imposed by legislation cannot be brushed aside at the pleasure of either Government or its officers". Where any enactment is made by the legislature with respect to the State revenue, it is clear that the procedure specified is the enactment should be strictly followed. The action of the Chairman in preferring the other prospective bidders to the petitioner ran counter to the provisions of Section 9 and was, therefore, arbitrary and without jurisdiction.

(4) It was contended, by, the learned Advocate-General that when the Chairman had the discretion to refuse to accept the officer of the highest bidder and to accept any bid, it made 110 difference in law or equity whether the offer of the petitioner was refused after the auction, which the Chairman had the discretion to do, or he was disallowed to bid before the auction was held. He urged that in either case result would be the same and even if the petitioner had been allowed to bid, his offer would not have been accepted by the Chairman for the very reasons which impelled him to prevent him from bidding at the auction. I do not agree. A person qualified to bid but prevented from bidding by an arbitrary act of the Chairman is not exactly in the same posision as a person whose bid after the auction has not been accepted. While in one case his discretion is circumscribed by the legal requirement of assigning sufficient reasons, in the other there is no such limitation on his powers. As to whether the refusal to accept the highest bid for inadequate reasons is justiciable, I need express no conclusive opinion, though as at present advised I incline to the view that it is so. Such a course, obviously, runs counter to the policy of the State embodied in Section 9, Bengal Ferries Act. If every person had not the unfettered freedom to bid at the auction the very object of the legislature, namely, to secure the State revenue would be easily frustrated. The discretion vested in the Chairman to refuse to accept any bid after the auction is held, does not entitle him to anticipate the results of the auction and to prevent persons who, in his wisdom, were not desirable from bidding at all. This arbitrary action of the Chairman resulted in the instant ease is considerable reduction of the revenue. The highest bid for last years lease was Rs. 66,000/-, whereas the highest bid of opposite party No. 3 for the current year came to only Rs. 35,000/-. I do not mean to cast any aspersions upon the Chairman. He might have acted in perfect bona fides and in the interest of the public as he took it to be. But his conduct was none the less illegal. Howsoever laudable the object may bo, his action which is violative of the statutory provisions cannot be upheld. Post-auction justification of refusal of any bid cannot regularise a pro-auction illegal act. As observed by the Supreme Court in the case above referred to, "arbitrary improvisation of an ad hoc" procedure to meet the exigencies of a particular case is ruled out". I should not be understood to say that the refusal of the bid of the petitioner after the auction was held would, for the reasons given by the Chairman, have been justified. The affidavits sworn to by both the parties do not agree on this point, and I refrain from making any pronouncement upon the merits of the case. The fact remains that the Chairman did not act in the manner specified in Section 9 of the Act, and thus violated the statute in forbidding the petitioner to bid at the auction.

(5) It follows that the petitioner is clearly clothed with a right to bid at the auction for the settlement of the tolls of the disputed ferries --a right which, by virtue of his conforming; to the terms of the notification, is his personal right under the Act, as distinguished from the general right as a member of the public and is thus entitled to a writ under Article 226 of the Constitution to enforce the performance of a duty imposed by the statute on the Chairman so that he may not exceed his powers.

(6) Dr. Sultan Ahmed appearing on behalf of Ramphal Singh, opposite party No. 3, argued that no writ can appropriately issue against him and the settlement with him cannot be annulled. This argument is unsubstantial. It is undeniable that ho writ can legally issue against Ramphal Singh, but when the impugned order of the Chairman is set aside, all actions and proceedings taken subsequently in consequence of the said illegal order must automatically fall with it, or the position will be simply anomalous and the writ will be ineffectual. A similar argument was advanced by him in the case of -- Ram Bharose Singh v. State of Bihar, AIR 1953 Pat 370 [LQ/PatHC/1953/94] (B) and was negatived by this Court. In my opinion, the settlement with the opposite party No. 3 being clearly without jurisdiction must be set aside.

(7) For these reasons, the application must be allowed and a writ in the nature of a writ of certiorari should issue quashing the order, of the Chairman debarring the petitioner from offering a bid at the auction and all proceedings subsequent to the said order including the settlement of the tolls at the disputed ferries with opposite party No.

3. A writ in the nature of mandamus will also be issued to the Chairman commanding him to hold a fresh public auction after necessary notification and to lease out the tolls of the diluted ferries according to law. The petitioner will be entitled to the costs of the application; hearing fee Rs.100.00 (hundred) only.