S. Natarajan, J.

1. This appeal by special leave is by a tenant to challenge an order of eviction passed against him under S.10(2)(vi) and S.10(3)(a)(iii) of the Andhra Pradesh Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1960 (hereinafter the Act) by the Additional Rent Controller., Hyderabad and confirmed by the Appellate Authority and also by the High Court in revision proceedings.

2. The appellant took the suit premises viz. a malgi (shop) on lease on 21-3-1972 from one Jameelunnisa Begum on a monthly rent of Rs. 200 for a period of three years. On 6-11-1974 the respondent purchased the suit premises from the said Jameelunnisa Begum and had the tenancy attorned in her favour. In 1975 the respondent filed a petition for eviction of the appellant on three grounds. The Rent Controller ordered eviction on two grounds viz. bona fide requirement of the premises by the respondent for business purposes and secondly claim of permanent tenancy rights without bona fides by the tenant. The Appellate Authority and the High Court confirmed the order of eviction. The appellant produced additional evidence (Exhibit R-1 Sale Deed and Exhibit R-2 Plan) before the Appellate Authority to reinforce his contention that the respondent was owning a house with four malgis in it from 1970 and as such she is not entitled to seek his eviction under S.10(3)(a)(iii) of the Act. The Appellate Authority rejected the contention on the ground the malgis comprised in the house were aalso being used for residential purposes and ceased to be shops and furthermore the Malgis were situate in a non commercial area.

3. Mr. A. Subba Rao, learned counsel for the appellant contended the a the order of eviction is unsustainable as Ss.10(2)(vi) and 10(3)(a)(iii) of the Act have not been properly construed. For evaluating the counsels contentions the two provisions of the Act have to be set out. S.10(2)(vi) lays down that if the Controller is satisfied that the tenant has denied the title of the landlord or claimed a right of permanent tenancy and Such denial or claim was not bona fide, the Controller shall make an order directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession of the building. S.10(3)(a)(iii) lays down that a landlord may apply to the Controller for an order directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession of the building :-

(iii) in case it is any other non residential building, if the landlord is not occupying a non residential building in the city, town or village concerned which is his own or to the possession of which he is entitled whether under this Act or otherwise-

(a) for the purpose of business which he is carrying on, on the date of the application, or (b) for the purpose of a business which in the opinion of the Controller, the landlord bona fide proposes to commence.

4. We may now deal with the contentions of Mr. Subba Rao. In so far as the contravention of S.10(2)(vi) of the Act is concerned it is not in dispute that the appellant laid claim to permanent tenancy rights in the reply notice (Exhibit P4) sent by him to the respondent. The Rent Controller and the Appellate Authority have concurrently held that his claim was not a bona fide one and, therefore, the respondent was entitled to an order of eviction under S.10(2)(vi). Mr. Subba Rao argued that unless a tenant had denied the title of the landlord also while making a wrongful claim of permanent tenancy he cannot be ordered eviction under S.10(2)(vi). The contention is manifestly unsustainable because sub-section (2)(vi) disjunctively sets out the two grounds of eviction viz. denial of title of the landlord without bona fides and claim of permanent tenancy rights without bona fides. Consequently, either denial of title or claim of permanent tenancy without bona fides will itself be enough to attract S.10(2)(vi). The order of eviction on this ground has, therefore, to be sustained. By reason of this conclusion alone the appeal can be dismissed but since the major portion of the arguments of Mr. Subba Rao was with reference to the ground of eviction under S.10(3)(a)(iii) of the Act, we deem it necessary to deal with those contentions also.

5. Mr. Subba Rao argued that since the respondent wanted the lease premises for the business of her son and not for her own business, she is not entitled to seek eviction of the appellant because the words used in sub-section (3)(a)(iii)(a) are "business Which he is carrying on." In support of his argument the learned counsel referred to the decision in D. N. Sanghavi and Sons v. Ambalal 1974 (3) SCR 55 [LQ/SC/1974/4] : (AIR 1974 SC 1026 [LQ/SC/1974/4] ). The decision pertains to a case under the Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act, 1961 and construing the provisions of the Act it was observed that while a landlord can seek the eviction of a tenant from a residential building for bona fide occupation of a member of the family, he cannot seek eviction of the tenant from a non residential building for enabling a married daughter or a brother to start a business. Mr. Ghosh, learned counsel for the respondent controverted the submission and invited our attention to a decision in Balaiah v. Lachaiah, AIR 1965 Andh Pra 435 where it was held that a father cum Manager of a Joint Hindu Family who is in occupation of a non residential building can validly ask for eviction under S.10(3)(a)(iii) of the very Act under consideration from another non residential building in the same city belonging to the family on the ground that his undivided major son requires it for carrying on his business. The facts of this case do not evoke the controversy sought to be raised by Mr. Subba Rao because the requirement of the lease premises is for running the family business and not for the exclusive or personal business of the respondents son. It may incidentally be stated here that the appellant as well as the respondents son are both having photographic studios. The business run by the respondents son is said to be a family business and hence it is as much the respondents business as her sons. In view of this position there is no scope for contending that the respondent does not require the premises for herself but for her sons business and as such she is not entitled to an order of eviction under S.10(3)(a)(iii). Therefore, even assuming that S.10(3)(a)(iii) should be construed in a restricted manner as contended by Mr. Subba Rao we find that the respondents requirement of the premises satisfies the conditions imposed by the subsection.

6. Another argument seriously pressed before us was that when the respondent was owning a property with four malgis in the very same city she is not entitled to seek eviction of the appellant because sub-clause (iii) clearly lays down that only a landlord who is not occupying a non residential building of his own or to the possession of which he is entitled can seek the eviction of his tenant. It is no doubt true that the respondent has purchased a house in 1970 and the house comprises four shop portions also. The Rent Controller and the Appellate Authority have, however, found that the malgis were never used as shops and have all along been used for residential purposes only. They have further held that the malgis owned by the respondent are not in a business locality but in a non commercial area and this is a relevant factor to be taken note of. They have, therefore, held that the mere ownership of the malgis which are neither being used as shops nor suited for the purpose will not disentitle the respondent to seek recovery of possession of the premises from the appellant. The findings, apart from being concurrent ones, are factual in character and have, therefore, to be sustained. We may also point out that if the malgis were really suited for running the photographic studio, the respondent and her son would not be running the studio in a rented premises and using their own malgis for residential purposes. Mr. Subba Rao referred to a decision of the Madras High Court in L. Chettiar v. K. Subbarayan, AIR 1971 Mad 163 [LQ/MadHC/1970/126] and argued that when a landlord is occupying a non residential premises of his own and is carrying on his business in it, he is precluded from seeking eviction of a tenant from his business premises even if the landlord is faced with problems like shortage of space etc. Mr. Ghosh countered this argument by referring to another portion of the decision in Balaiah v. Lachaiah (supra) where it was held, that a landlord, notwithstanding his occupation of a non residential building, can still seek eviction of his tenant from his business premises if the landlord is able to satisfy the Rent Controller that the non residential building occupied by him is not sufficient or suitable for the purpose of expansion of his business or for the purpose of a new business which he bona fide proposes to commence or that the shifting of his business has become inevitable. Examining the matter we find ourselves unable to accept the contentions of Mr. Subba Rao. The fact that the respondent has been using the entire house purchased in 1970 i.e. including the malgis for residential purposes and that the respondent is forced to run the family business in a rented premises in the same locality where the lease premises are situate have weighed with the Rent Controller and the Appellate Authority to concurrently hold that the respondents requirement of the building is undoubtedly bona fide. The findings have been sustained by the High Court as well. We cannot, therefore, accept the argument of Mr. Subba Rao that the order of eviction passed by the courts below and affirmed by the High Court is vitiated because of the ownership of four malgis by the respondent. The malgis have ceased to be non residential premises from 1970 onwards and hence their mere ownership cannot preclude the respondent from seeking the eviction of the appellant under S.10(3)(a)(iii).

7. In the result the appeal fails and is accordingly dismissed but there will be no order as to costs.