Charles Sargent, Kt., C.J.

1. The question in this case arises out of the following facts. At the close of 1866, the applicant having called on the opponent, as the representative of one Ardeshirji Dhanjisha, for the sum of Rs. 1,15,068-14-2 as the amount of six installments alleged to be due on two mortgages executed in the Samvat years 1889 and 1903, the matter in dispute was submitted by the parties on the 18th October, 1866, to arbitration. The arbitrators made their award on 3rd December, 1866, and the same was filed by the First Class Subordinate Judge on 20th December, 1866. Several applications for execution of the award were subsequently made and granted. The last darkhast, however, No. 19 of 1880, was rejected by the Subordinate Judge, Rav Bahadur Mangeshrav Balvant, on the ground that no judgment had been passed in terms of the award, and that there was no decree to execute. The order rejecting the darkhast was confirmed by the High Court, on appeal, on 28th September 1882. Whatever differences of opinion may have existed as to the proper mode of procedure under Section 327 of Act VIII of 1859, and the corresponding Section 526 of the Code of 1877, it must be considered to have been well settled in this High Court, at the latest since the circular order was issued in 1880, that the proper course is to have judgment passed in terms of the award, to be followed by decree, as provided by Section 325 of Act VIII of 1859. The applicants, finding themselves arrested in their execution proceedings, applied to the Subordinate Judge to pass judgment in terms of the award, but he refused the application on the ground that all the proper parties were not before the Court, and also that it was barred by Article 178, Schedule II of the limitation Act, XV of 1877, not having been made within three years from the 20th December, 1866. With respect to this second ground of refusal, it was contended for the applicants that the application to file the award became converted into a suit by the direction contained in Section 327 of Act VIII of 1859, that the application "shall be numbered and registered as a suit between the applicant as plaintiff and the other parties as defendants." It was argued also that the provisions in Section 325 as to the Court passing judgment in terms of the award and a decree following on it are incorporated in Section 327 by the words of the latter, which enable the award when filed to be "enforced as an award under the provisions of the chapter," and that it was the duty of the Court to pass judgment on the award after it had been filed, or, at any rate, that it was not necessary for the Court to be set in motion in order to do so, and that in either case, and whether the application was or was not converted into a suit, the application to pass judgment was not one within the contemplation of the second schedule of the Statute 'of Limitations of 1877. In Shree Ram Chowdhry. Denobundhoo Chowdhry I.L.R. 7 Cal 490 and Mana Vikerama v. Mallichery Kristnan Nambudri I.L.R. 3 Mad. 68 [LQ/MadHC/1970/12] it was held that an application to file an award, under Section 525 of the Civil Procedure Code of 1877, was only converted into a suit for administration purposes and for classification of business of the Court, and that an order refusing to file an award was not appealable under the Civil Procedure Code of 1882. In Ramadin v. Mahesh I.L.R. 2 All 471 however, an order made by the Court, previous to passing judgment according to the award, was held to be not appealable, because it was only an interlocutory order in a suit, and not included in Section 588, Act X of 1877, thus showing that the Court regarded the application as a suit, after it had been registered as such, for other purposes than mere classification. Both Mr. Justice Pontifex, and Mr. Justice Field, in the judgments in Shree Ram Chowdhry v. Denobundhoo Chowdhry I.L.R. 7 Cal 490 rely on the absence of similar words to those which are to be found in Section 331, viz., that the Court shall "proceed to investigate the claim in the same manner and with like power as if a suit for the property had been instituted by the decree-holder against the claimant under the provisions of Chapter V." The learned Judges say that these words would have been unnecessary if the effect of the words, "shall be numbered and registered as a suit", were to convert the application into a suit to all intents and purposes. Assuming that to be so, we think that the same effect should be given to the language of Section 327 of the Code of 1859, and that of Section 526 of the Code of 1877. In both cases the object is clearly to explain the course to be pursued; and whether the Court be told to proceed to investigate the claim in the same manner as if a suit had been instituted, or that it shall order the award to be filed, and that the award "shall take effect" as an award made under the provisions of this chapter"--that is, as appears by Section 522, by "judgment being passed according to the award followed by decree" (a term only applicable to a proceeding in a suit)--the effect of such directions, in construing the words "shall be numbered and registered as a suit", ought, we think, to be the same. The present case, however, arises under Section 327 of the Civil Procedure Code of 1859, in which the language is "that if no sufficient cause be shown against the award, the award shall be filed, and may be enforced as an award made under the provisions of this chapter." These latter words have been construed by this Court, and indeed by most Courts, as directing that the same procedure should follow as in, the case of an award under Section 326. The conclusion to be drawn as to the meaning of the words "shall be numbered and registered as a suit" is necessarily the same. Moreover, in construing a code of procedure, we ought, we think, to give the framers of it credit for using a particular form of words in the same sense throughout the Code, unless the context clearly shows that it was intended to be used in a different or more restricted sense. As we do not find any evidence of such intention, either in Section 327 of the Code of 1859, or in Sections 525 and526of the Code of 1877, we think that the view taken by the Allahabad High Court is the correct one, and should be followed. If, then, the application be regarded as a suit, the proceedings in which, according to Section 526 of the Code of 1877, are to be identical, after the award has been filed, with those provided by Section 522, it would appear that it was the duty of the Court to proceed to pass judgment according to the award as soon as it was ordered to be filed. Now, it may be that it would be usual, as a matter of practice, for the plaintiff to ask the Court to pass judgment according to the award; but looking at the language of Section 325 of the Civil Procedure Code of 1859, and of Section 522 of the Code of 1877, we cannot think that any application would be necessary. The validity of the award had been either not disputed, or had been established--see Dandekar v. Dandekars I.L.R. 6 Bom. 663 and all that remained to be done was to pass judgment according to the award, and an application to do so was no more necessary than it would be to ask the Court to "pronounce judgment" after it has tried a suit on its merits, as it is enjoined to do by Section 198 of the Civil Procedure Code. If this be a correct view of the duty of the Court, we think that any application which may be made to it to pass judgment can only be regarded is drawing the attention of the Court to the provisions of the section. We agree with the ruling of the Madras Court in Kylasa Goundan v. Ramasami Ayyan I.L.R. 4 Mad. 172 followed by this Court in Vithal Janardan v. Vithojirav Putlajirav I.L.R. 6 Bom. 586 that "the provisions of the Limitation Act relating to applications must be held to apply to applications for the exercise, by the authority to which the application is addressed, of powers which it would not be bound to exercise without such application", and are, therefore, of opinion that the application in this case was not one within the contemplation of the Statute. It was said, however, that the language of Section 327 of the Code, of Civil Procedure of 1859, under which this case falls, is different from that of Section 526 of the Code of 1877. We think, however, that, looking at Sections 325, 326 and 327, the words in question must be construed so as to agree with what is expressed by the latter words oil Section 326, where it is said that the "provisions of the chapter should be applicable to the enforcement of the award". In other words, the expression "may be enforced" ought, we think, to be read as "shall be enforced", so far as it applies to the Court, although, of course, the enforcement by execution of the decree would be permissive, as regards the plaintiff. We think, therefore, that the difference in the language of Section 327 of the Code of 1859 cannot affect the conclusion already arrived at on Sections 522 and 526 of the Code of 1877, and that the plaintiff's application, to pass judgment according to the award, was not one within the contemplation of the Statute of Limitations.

2. We have been asked to allow the defendants leave to show cause against filing the award, on the ground that they were only served with notice on 18th December, 1866, and the award was filed on the 20th December, 1866. It is not, however, denied that the 20th December was the day named in the notice; and we see no reason, and after the lapse of sixteen years during which time the above objection has never been taken, although the award has been several times executed, we should certainly not be disposed, even if we had the power which may well be doubted, to interfere with the filing of the award.

3. The Subordinate Judge must, therefore, be directed "to proceed to pass judgment according to the award" to be followed by decree, and to afterwards proceed to dispose of the plaintiff's darkhast rejected on 28th September, 1882. We do not think we ought to accede to plaintiff's application that such decree should be made tunc pro tune, as the delay cannot, we think, be said to be the exclusive act of the Court.

4. Parties to pay their own costs of this application.