1. Heard Mr. Navniti Prasad Singh, the learned Senior counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners in C.M.P.No.12 of 2022, Mr. Rahul Kumar Gupta, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner in C.M.P.No.351 of 2020, Mr. Kaushik Sarkhel, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of O.P.No.1 in both the petitions and Mr. Nawal Kishore Pandey, learned AC to S.C.(L&C)-I appearing on behalf of the respondent-State in both the cases.

2. In both the cases, a common question of fact and prayer are made that that is why both the C.M.P petitions have been heard together with the consent of the parties.

3. In these petitions, it has been prayed to recall the order dated 16.03.2020 passed in W.P.(C) No.5098/2014 by this Court relating to Misc.Case No.03/2003-04/TR No.38/2006-07 whereby the impugned order 20.12.2006 was quashed and the writ petition was allowed. A further prayer is made to dismiss the W.P.(C) No.5098/2014 and the further prayer is also made for quashing all the subsequent orders passed by the revenue authorities which was passed after the order of the writ Court.

4. Mr. Navniti Prasad Singh, the learned Senior counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner in C.M.P.No.12 of 2022 submits that in the writ petition the petitioner-Vasundhara Homes Pvt. Ltd. and petitioner nos.2 to 4, who are the Directors, who are the purchasers of the land in question were not made parties and in absence of these petitioners, the writ was decided by this Court. He submits that the land in question was purchased by these petitioners in the year 2007 and third party right has been created and in absence of these petitioners, the writ petition was disposed of which seriously prejudiced the case of the petitioner. He further submits that Thakur Mahendra Nath Sahdeo sold the land in question to Khan Bahadur Moulbi Habibur Rahman by registered sale-deed No.855 dated 19.04.1934 which is entered in Book No.I, Volume No.15 at pages 51 to 85. Khan Bahadur Moulbi Habibur Rahman applied for mutation of his name in the sherista of the Superior Landlord, which application was registered as Case No.12 of 1934-35 under section 89 of the Chhotanagpur Tenancy Act, 1908. The then Settlement Officer allowed the application for mutation and caused necessary endorsement in Khewat 2 of Village-Hatma made to the effect that ‘in Cloumn 2 of Khewat no.2, the name of Khan Bahadur Habibur

5. Rahman, son of Sheikh Nazir Ali be substituted in place of Thakur Mahendra Nath Sahdeo’. Khan Bahadur Habibur Rahman by Hukumnama dated 5.2.1935, settled the properties in favour of his son Fidaur Rahman. He submits that in the meantime, promulgation of Land Reforms Act, 1950 came and Fadaur Rahman son of Khan Bahadue Habibur Rahman was allowed to retain amongst others, the said 2.82 acres of ‘Bet Kheta’ land in Khata No.1, Khewat No.2, at Village Hatma, Karamtoli, as Raiyat. The rent fixation case was filed for the land aforesaid in the name of Fadaur Rahman, son of Khan Bahadur Rahman was mutated, the said Fidaur Rahman by way of Oral gift dated 21.06.2004 transferred the land to his son Irfanur Rahman and mutation was made in favour of Irfanur Rahman. However, one Lal Vijay Nath Shahdeo claiming himself to be grandson of Thakur Mahendra Nath Shahdeo filed an application before the Circle Officer, Sadar for correction of Jamabandi of land in question of Village Hatma, Khata No.1, Plot No.634, 635, 636, 639 and 810, total area 2.82 acres and the said application was sent by the Circle Officer, Sadar to the Deputy Collector Land Reforms, Sadar, Ranchi which was registered as Misc. Case No.03/2003-04/T.R. 38/06-07, and Irfanur Rahman intervened by filing Vakalatnama in that proceeding and after a detailed enquiry the Deputy Collector Land Reforms rejected the claim and directed the Circle Officer, Sadar to open Jamabandi in the name of Irfanur Rahman. He further submits that the title suit was also instituted by one lady namely Surji Devi in which the writ-petitioner intervened and filed a petition for intervening. In which he has disclosed that he was aware of the proceeding before the Circle Officer, paragraph no.5 and 7 of intervening petition. On these grounds, Mr. Singh, the learned Senior counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner submits that both the writ petitioners were knowing about the pending proceeding before the Circle Officer and third party right creation as the land in question was purchased by this petitioner in the year 2007 and by way of suppressing these facts as not making these petitioners respondents herein in the writ petition filed before this Court, Hon’ble writ Court disposed of the writ petition by way of allowing the prayer in absence of these petitioners. He submits that pursuant to the order of the writ Court, the revenue authorities have passed the orders against these petitioners which has caused serious prejudice to the petitioners. Mr. Singh, the learned Senior counsel appearing for the petitioners further submits that if it is brought to the knowledge of the Court that in absence of the necessary party the order has been passed, the Court is competent to recall the order and pass appropriate order. On this point, he relied in the case of Shivdeo Singh and Others v. State of Punjab and Ors., AIR 1963 SC 1909 . Paragraph no.7 and 8 of the said judgment is quoted below:

“7. The question then is whether the order of Mr. Vikram Singh could be implemented subsequent to June 15, 1952. The action which was taken against the appellant was under the notification of the Punjab Government in Relief and Rehabilitation Department No. 8689-S (Rein) dated August 29, 1951. Learned counsel points out that the rules contained in the aforesaid notification were repealed by notification No. S. R. O. 1290 dated July 22, 1952, and though R. 49 saved "anything done or any action taken in the exercise of any power conferred by any of the rules", it was the second proviso to R. 49 which prohibited the implementation of any order made under the repealed rules before May 25, 1952, unless that order was implemented or enforced on or before June 15, 1952. Rule 49 was amended on August 4, 1952 and the second proviso was deleted. The resultant position, therefore, is that the non- implementation of an order on or before June 15, l952, would not prohibit its implementation subsequent to that date.

8. The other contention of Mr. Gopal Singh pertains to the second order of Khosla, J., which in effect, reviews his prior order. Learned counsel contends that Art. 226 of the Constitution does not confer any power on the High Court to review its own order and, therefore, the second order of Khosla, J., was without jurisdiction. It is sufficient to say that there is nothing in Art. 226 of the Constitution to preclude a High Court from exercising the power of review which inheres in every court of plenary jurisdiction to prevent miscarriage of justice or to correct grave and palpable errors committed by it. Here the previous order of Khosla, J., affected the interests of persons who were not made parties to the proceeding before him. It was at their instance and for giving them a hearing that Khosla J. entertained the second petition. In doing so, he merely did what the principles of natural justice required him to do. It is said that the respondents before us had no right to apply for review because they were not parties to the previous proceedings. As we have already pointed out, it is precisely because they were not made parties to the previous proceedings, though their interests were sought to be affected by the decision of the HighCourt, that the second application was entertained by Khosla, J.”

6. He further submits that even the writ petition was not required to be entertained by the writ Court on the ground of delay and laches. He refers to the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court rendered in the case of State of M.P. v. Nandlal Jaiswal, (1986) 4 SCC 566.Paragraph nos.24and 25 of the said judgment are quoted hereinbelow:

“24. Now, it is well settled that the power of the High Court to issue an appropriate writ under Article 226 of the Constitution is discretionary and the High Court in the exercise of its discretion does not ordinarily assist the tardy and the indolent or the acquiescent and the lethargic. If there is inordinate delay on the part of the petitioner in filing a writ petition and such delay is not satisfactorily explained, the High Court may decline to intervene and grant relief in the exercise of its writ jurisdiction. The evolution of this rule of laches or delay is premised upon a number of factors. The High Court does not ordinarily permit a belated resort to the extraordinary remedy under the writ jurisdiction because it is likely to cause confusion and public inconvenience and bring in its train new injustices. The rights of third parties may intervene and if the writ jurisdiction is exercised on a writ petition filed after unreasonable delay, it may have the effect of inflicting not only hardship and inconvenience but also injustice on third parties. When the writ jurisdiction of the High Court is invoked, unexplained delay coupled with the creation of third party rights in the meanwhile is an important factor which always weighs with the High Court in deciding whether or not to exercise such jurisdiction. We do not think it necessary to burden this judgment with reference to various decisions of this Court where it has been emphasised time and again that where there is inordinate and unexplained delay and third party rights are created in the intervening period, the High Court would decline to interfere, even if the State action complained of is unconstitutional or illegal. We may only mention in the passing two decisions of this Court one in Ramana Dayaram Shetty v. International Airport Authority of India1 and the other in Ashok Kumar Mishra v. Collector. We may point out that in R.D. Shetty case, even though the State action was held to be unconstitutional as being violative of Article 14 of the Constitution, this Court refused to grant relief to the petitioner on the ground that the writ petition had been filed by the petitioner more than five months after the acceptance of the tender of the fourth respondent and during that period, the fourth respondent had incurred considerable expenditure, aggregating to about Rs 1.25 lakhs, in making arrangements for putting up the restaurant and the snack bar. Of course, this rule of laches or delay is not a rigid rule which can be cast in a strait jacket formula, for there may be cases where despite delay and creation of third party rights the High Court may still in the exercise of its discretion interfere and grant relief to the petitioner. But, such cases where the demand of justice is so compelling that the High Court would be inclined to interfere in spite of delay or creation of third party rights would by their very nature be few and far between. Ultimately it would be a matter within the discretion of the court; ex hypothesi every discretion must be exercised fairly and justly so as to promote justice and not to defeat it.

25. Here, obviously, there was considerable delay on the part of the petitioners in filing the writ petitions and in the intervening period, Respondents 5 to 11 acquired land, constructed distilleries, buildings, purchased plant and machinery and spent considerable time, money and energy towards setting up the distilleries. These circumstances would, in our opinion, be sufficient to disentitle the petitioners to relief under Article 226 of the Constitution. The petitioners however contended that they were not aware of the policy decision dated December 30, 1984 nor had they any knowledge of the fact that the right to construct distilleries and to manufacture and supply wholesale country liquor from such distilleries was granted to the existing contractors and it was only when they came to know about this that they immediately proceeded to file the writ petitions. Now, it is difficult to believe that the petitioners were not aware of the policy decision dated December 30, 1984. The consideration of this matter started as far back as July 1983 and there were prolonged and wide-ranging deliberations lasting several months, coupled with spot inspections by the Vijayvargi Committee and the Excise Department and it was after considerable discussion and deliberation that the policy decision was arrived at on December 30, 1984. The petitioners were, on their own showing, liquor contractors by profession and they were “associated with the trade of country liquor in the State since the last several years” and it would be wholly unrealistic and naive to suppose that the petitioners were not aware of the change in the policy which was being discussed at various levels over a period of almost 12 months and which was ultimately brought about by the policy decision dated December 30, 1984. Those who are in the liquor trade would immediately know what is happening and whether any change is taking place in the policy in regard to grant of licences for manufacture and wholesale supply of country liquor. It is also difficult to believe that the petitioners did not know that new distilleries were being constructed at new sites by Respondents 5 to 11. The feigned ignorance of the petitioners is completely exposed by the letter dated April 1, 1985 addressed by Sagar Agarwal to the Commissioner of Excise where it has been stated categorically:

“I have learnt that in order to prevent pollution the Government has taken a decision to transfer the distilleries from the densely populated areas and to establish them in areas having less thinner population. Government deserves to be congratulated for this decision in the face of pollution prevailing throughout the world.

For this work existing distillers have taken a decision to construct new distilleries at their own cost and they are being granted long-term permanent type licences for the same. Besides this, the existing supply areas would be kept intact with existing distillers.”

This letter clearly shows that Sagar Agarwal very well knew about the policy decision dated December 30, 1984 and that he was aware that long-term permanent licences were being granted to the existing contractors for constructing new distilleries and operating the same. It may also be pointed out that there was considerable publicity in newspapers in regard to the construction of new distillery at Village Khapri in Chhatisgarh area and information to that effect appeared in the issues of Yugdhar dated June 7, 1985, Navbharat dated June 8, 1985 and Amrit Sandesh. There was also information in regard to transfer of the Badawah distillery to Village Khodi in the issue of Nai Dunia published from Indore on July 12, 1985. Of course, the petitioners have stated in their affidavits that they did not see this newspaper publicity but it is difficult to accept their statement. We may also point out that, apart from the letter dated April 1, 1985, there was also another letter dated September 25, 1985 addressed by Sagar Agarwal to the Commissioner of Excise where he made a specific reference to the policy decision dated December 30, 1984 which shows that in any event, Sagar Agarwal knew specifically about the policy decision as far back as September 25, 1985 and yet no action was taken by him until January 24, 1986. M/s Doongaji Company also knew by April 1985 that the distilleries were being given ‘permanently’ to the existing contractors, vide their letter dated April 12, 1985 addressed to the Chief Secretary, Government of M.P. The next letter in point of time, namely, that dated May 17, 1985 addressed by M/s Doongaji & Company to the Prime Minister, also shows that M/s Doongaji & Company were aware by this time that the distilleries were being given ‘permanently’ to the existing contractors. M/s Doongaji & Company addressed another letter to the Prime Minister on November 7, 1985 in which they once again complained that the distilleries were being made ‘permanent’ to the existing contractors. Now if Sagar Agarwal and M/s Doongaji & Company knew as far back as April 1985 that the distilleries were being given in private ownership to the existing contractors, it is difficult to believe that Nandlal Jaiswal who is also in the liquor trade for years did not know about it. In fact, every person in the liquor trade would have known about this change in policy which had been made by the State Government under the policy decision dated December 30, 1984. We do not therefore see any reason to upset the finding of the High Court that the petitioners were guilty of enormous delay in filing the writ petitions and that in the meanwhile, during the intervening period, the rights of third parties had intervened in that Respondents 5 to 11, acting on the basis of the policy decision dated December 30, 1984, had incurred huge expenditure towards setting up the distilleries. If the policy decision dated December 30, 1984 were now to be set aside at the instance of the petitioners, it would work immense hardship on Respondents 5 to 11 and cause grave injustice to them, since enormous amount of time, money and energy spent by them in setting up the distilleries would be totally wasted. Obviously, Respondents 5 to 11 would not have proceeded with the work of setting up the distilleries by spending considerable time and energy and incurring huge expenditure, if the writ petitions had been filed in time, for in that event they would have known that they would be running a serious risk of losing time, money and resources in case the writ petitions were allowed. But since no writ petitions were filed by any liquor contractors challenging the policy decision dated December 30, 1984 for well nigh over 10 months, Respondents 5 to 11 could not be blamed for embarking on the task of setting up the distilleries pursuant to the policy decision dated December 30, 1984. It would be most inequitous now to tell Respondents 5 to 11 that the policy decision dated December 30, 1984 was unconstitutional and void and that all the time and energy spent and the enormous expenditure incurred by them in setting up the distilleries is therefore futile and they cannot be permitted to enjoy its benefits.”

7. He further elaborated his argument by way of submitting that the Court is required to look into as to whether the party having prejudiced and the Court may consider the review on the ground of in absence of the petitioners in the writ petition and review the order on merits, the error pointed out to the Court and to buttress his argument, he relied in the case of Grindlays Bank Ltd., v. Central Government Industrial Tribunal and Ors., 1980 (Supp) SCC 420 . Paragraph no.14 of the said judgment is quoted below:

“14. The contention that the Tribunal had become functus officio and, therefore, had no jurisdiction to set aside the ex parte award and that the Central Government alone could set it aside, does not commend to us. Sub-section (3) of Section 20 of theprovides that the proceedings before the Tribunal would be deemed to continue till the date on which the award becomes enforceable under Section 17- A. Under Section 17-A of the Act, an award becomes enforceable on the expiry of 30 days from the date of its publication under Section 17. The proceedings with regard to a reference under Section 10 of theare, therefore, not deemed to be concluded until the expiry of 30 days from the publication of the award. Till then the Tribunal retains jurisdiction over the dispute referred to it for adjudication and up to that date it has the power to entertain an application in connection with such dispute. That stage is not reached till the award becomes enforceable under Section 17- A. In the instant case, the Tribunal made the ex parte award on December 9, 1976. That award was published by the Central Government in the Gazette of India dated December 25, 1976. The application for setting aside the ex parte award was filed by Respondent 3, acting on behalf of Respondents 5 to 17 on January 19, 1977 i.e. before the expiry of 30 days of its publication and was, therefore, rightly entertained by the Tribunal. It had jurisdiction to entertain it and decide it on merits. It was, however, urged that on April 12, 1977 the date on which the impugned order was passed, the Tribunal had in any event become functus officio. We cannot accede to this argument. The jurisdiction of the Tribunal had to be seen on the date of the application made to it and not the date on which it passed the impugned order. There is no finality attached to an ex parte award because it is always subject to its being set aside on sufficient cause being shown. The Tribunal had the power to deal with an application properly made before it for setting aside the ex parte award and pass suitable orders.

8. On these grounds, Mr. Singh, the learned Senior counsel appearing for the petitioners submits that the order of the writ Court may kindly be recalled and the writ petition be restored to its original position and after hearing both the sides the writ petition may be decided.

9. Mr. Rahul Kumar Gupta, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner in C.M.P.No.351 of 2020 submits that although the petitioners were made party in the writ petition but they have not appeared and substituted notice was published in Hindi Daily Newspaper and no notice was served and they have not been able to appear in the Court. He submits that these petitioners have sold the land in question in the year 2007 to the petitioner of C.M.P.No.12 of 2022. On these grounds, he submits that the petitioner of C.M.P.No.351 of 2020 may kindly be heard in the writ petition.

10. Per contra, Mr. Sarkhel, the learned counsel appearing for the O.P.No.2 in both the cases, submits that there is no apparent error on the face of record and the writ Court has rightly allowed the writ petition and there is no illegality. He further submits that principle of natural justice cannot be allowed in a straight jacket formula. According to him, in remitting the matter to the concerned court, no fruitful purpose will be served and it will be a futile exercise as has been held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of ‘Escorts Farms Ltd. v. Commr., Kumaon Division’, (2004) 4 SCC 281 and ‘Nandlal v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Others’, (2004) 4 SCC 281 . Paragraph no.64 of the said judgment in ‘Escorts Farms Ltd.’(supra) is quoted below:

"64. Right of hearing to a necessary party is a valuable right. Denial of such right is serious breach of statutory procedure prescribed and violation of rules of natural justice. In these appeals preferred by the holder of lands and some other transferees, we have found that the terms of government grant did not permit transfers of land without permission of the State as grantor. Remand of cases of a group of transferees who were not heard, would, therefore, be of no legal consequence, more so, when on this legal question all affected parties have got full opportunity of hearing before the High Court and in this appeal before this Court. Rules of natural justice are to be followed for doing substantial justice and not for completing a mere ritual of hearing without possibility of any change in the decision of the case on merits.

In view of the legal position explained by us above, we, therefore, refrain from remanding these cases in exercise of our discretionary powers under Article 136 of the Constitution of India."

11. Relying on these judgments, he further submits that it has also been considered in the judgment of this Court in case of ‘Vivek Sahu and Ors. v. The State of Jharkhand and Ors., MANU/ JH/ 0428/ 2022. He submits that once there an order has been passed by way of writ of certiorari and that there is no illegality, it will be a futile exercise of recalling the order. He submits that the scope of review is very limited and only when apparent error is on the record then only the Court can review its own order and to buttress his argument, he relied in the case of Parsion Devi and Ors. v. Sumitri Devi and Ors., (1997) 8 SCC 715 . Paragraph nos. 8 and 9 of the said judgment are quoted hereinbelow:

“8. Again, in Meera Bhanja v. Nirmala Kumari Choudhury while quoting with approval a passage from Aribam Tuleshwar Sharma v. Aribam Pishak Sharma this Court once again held that review proceedings are not by way of an appeal and have to be strictly confined to the scope and ambit ofOrder 47 → Rule 1 → "> Order 47 Rule 1 CPC.

9. UnderOrder 47 → Rule 1 → "> Order 47 Rule 1 CPC a judgment may be open to review inter alia if there is a mistake or an error apparent on the face of the record. An error which is not self-evident and has to be detected by a process of reasoning, can hardly be said to be an error apparent on the face of the record justifying the court to exercise its power of review underOrder 47 → Rule 1 → "> Order 47 Rule 1 CPC. In exercise of the jurisdiction underOrder 47 → Rule 1 → "> Order 47 Rule 1 CPC it is not permissible for an erroneous decision to be “reheard and corrected”. A review petition, it must be remembered has a limited purpose and cannot be allowed to be “an appeal in disguise”.

12. On the same line, he also relied in the case of Aribam Tuleshwar Sharma v. Aribam Pishak Sharma and Others, (1979) 4 SCC 389 . Paragraph no.4 of the said judgment is quoted hereinbelow:

“4. In the present case both the grounds on which the review was allowed were hardly grounds for review. That the two documents which were part of the record were not considered by the Court at the time of issue of a writ under Article 226 cannot be a ground for review especially when the two documents were not even relied upon by the parties in the affidavits filed before the Court in the proceedings under Article 226. Again that several instead of one writ petition should have been filed is a mere question of procedure which certainly would not justify a review. We are, therefore, of the view that the Judicial Commissioner acted without jurisdiction in allowing the review. The order of the Judicial Commissioner dated December 7, 1967 is accordingly set aside and the order dated May 25, 1965, is restored. The appeal is allowed but without costs.”

13. Relying on this judgment and by way of referring the impugned order of the writ Court, he submits that there is no illegality as the order was passed considering that the LRDC was not having jurisdiction and submits that by way of recalling the order no fruitful purpose will be served. On the point of recalling of the order, he also relied in the case of, ‘Haryana State Industrial Development Corporation Ltd. v. Mawasi and Others’, (2012)7 SCC 200 Paragraph no.26 of the said judgment is quoted hereinbelow:

“26. At this stage it will be apposite to observe that the power of review is a creature of the statute and no court or quasi-judicial body or administrative authority can review its judgment or order or decision unless it is legally empowered to do so. Article 137 empowers this Court to review its judgments subject to the provisions of any law made by Parliament or any rules made under Article 145 of the Constitution. The rules framed by this Court under that article lay down that in civil cases, review lies on any of the grounds specified inOrder 47 → Rule 1 → "> Order 47 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 which reads as under:

Order 47 → Rule 1 → ">Order 47 Rule 1:

“1. Application for review of judgment.—(1) Any person considering himself aggrieved—

(a) by a decree or order from which an appeal is allowed, but from which no appeal has been preferred,

(b) by a decree or order from which no appeal is allowed, or

(c) by a decision on a reference from a Court of Small Causes, and who, from the discovery of new and important matter or evidence which, after the exercise of due diligence was not within his knowledge or could not be produced by him at the time when the decree was passed or order made, or on account of some mistake or error apparent on the face of the record, or for any other sufficient reason, desires to obtain a review of the decree passed or order made against him, may apply for a review of judgment to the court which passed the decree or made the order.

(2) A party who is not appealing from a decree or order may apply for a review of judgment notwithstanding the pendency of an appeal by some other party except where the ground of such appeal is common to the applicant and the appellant, or when, being respondent, he can present to the appellate court the case of which he applies for the review.

Explanation.—The fact that the decision on a question of law on which the judgment of the court is based has been reversed or modified by the subsequent decision of a superior court in any other case, shall not be a ground for the review of such judgment.”

14. On these grounds, he submits that there is no illegality in the writ Court order and this Court may not interfere and may not recall the order.

15. The learned counsel appearing on behalf of respondent State submits that the writ petitioner of C.M.P.No.351 of 2020 were made party and have been noticed and inspite of that, they have not appeared.

16. In view of the above submissions and averments of the learned counsels appearing on behalf of the parties, the Court has gone through the materials on record and finds that admittedly the land in question was purchased by the petitioners of C.M.P.No.12/2022 and the said land was transferred by the petitioner of C.M.P.No.351/2022 to the petitioner of C.M.P.No.12/2022 in the year 2007 itself. The O.P.No.1 has appeared in the pending suit. The O.P.No.1 has appeared by way of filing intervention petition in which he has disclosed that knowingness of proceeding going before the Circle Officer/ Deputy Collector Land Revenue at paragraph nos. 5 and 7 of the said petition, it is crystal clear that the land in question was purchased by the petitioners of C.M.P.No.12/2022 and which was sold to the petitioner of C.M.P.No.351/2022. Admittedly, in the writ petition the petitioners of C.M.P.No.12/2022 were not made party, however, the said land was purchased in the year 2007 and subsequently it was also mutated in their favour. Thus, the petitioners of C.M.P.No.12/2022 were the necessary party for taking the decision in the writ petition and admittedly in absence of the petitioners of C.M.P.No.12/2022, the writ petition was allowed and disposed of. Moreover, the order of the year 2006 was challenged in the year 2014 which was allowed by this Court by order dated 16.03.2020 passed in W.P.(C) No.5098 of 2014. The judgment relied by Mr. Sarkhel, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the O.P.No.1 on the point of review and recall of the order are not in dispute. It is well settled proposition of law that if the apparent error on record is there, then only the Court can exercise its power of review. It is also well settled that by way of suppression of any fact and in absence of any party, necessary to be heard in the writ petition if the order has been passed, the Court is competent to pass appropriate order as has been held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of ‘Shivdeo Singh and Others v. State of Punjab and Ors.’, and ‘Grindlays Bank Ltd., v. Central Government Industrial Tribunal and Ors.’,(supra). A reference may be made to the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of ‘Pohla Singh v. State of Punjab, (2004) 6 SCC 126, wherein it has been decided that if the decision adversely affected the interest of third party, he was not impleaded as party in the writ petition, it is always open to him to ask for recall of the judgment which has been rendered without affording any opportunity of hearing to him.

17. In view of the above discussions, reasons and analysis, this Court comes to the conclusion that the petitioners of C.M.P.No.12/2022 were the necessary party to be heard in the writ petition and in absence of them, the writ petition was disposed of. Pursuant to that, the order was passed in favour of writ petitioner, the petitioners of C.M.P.No.12/2022 has been adversely affected. Thus, the right of the petitioners has been prejudiced in view of the fact that the writ petition was disposed of without hearing the petitioners of C.M.P.No.12/2022.

18. Accordingly, the order dated 16.03.2020 passed in W.P.(C) No.5098/2014 is, hereby, recalled and the writ petition being W.P.(C) No.5098/2014 is restored to its original file. The parties appearing before this Court are already knowing about this order, they are at liberty to take appropriate steps for disposal of the said writ petition.

19. C.M.P.No.351 of 2020 and C.M.P.No.12 of 2022 are, accordingly, allowed in the above terms, and disposed of.

20. It is open to the parties to take appropriate steps for orders passed by the revenue authorities after passing the order in writ petition in view of the fact that the order of the writ Court has been recalled.