Dr. B.R. Sarangi, J.

1. Indian Oil Corporation Limited, a Government of Indian Company as defined in Section 617 of the Companies Act, 1956, has filed this writ petition seeking to quash the notice dated 08.08.2013 under Annexure-9 issued by the Central Government Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour Court in I.D. Case No. 25 of 2013 in pursuance of Reference No. L3011/6/2013-IR (M) dated 06.03.2013, and the order dated 14.08.2013 passed by the said Tribunal under Annexure-10.

2. The factual matrix of the case, in brief, is that a service contract, "for maintenance and general caretaking for Indian Oil staff quarters at Unit-IV, Officers' Colony at Baramunda, Bhubaneswar and deployment of watchman at Guest House-cum-Transit at 54, Forest Park, Bhubaneswar", was executed on 29.05.2009 between OM Security & Services and Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. Accordingly, the petitioner, vide its letter dated 16.5.2011, informed the Managing Director, OM Security & Services with regard to discontinuance of services for maintenance and general caretaking for Indian Oil staff quarters at Unit- IV, Officers' Colony at Baramunda, Bhubaneswar and deployment of watchman at Gust House at 54, Forest Park, Bhubaneswar. On 10.01.2013, the Asst. Labour Commissioner (Central), Bhubaneswar sent a conciliation failure report to the Govt of India, Ministry of Labour & Employment, with regard to the dispute between the management of M/s. OM Security & Services, Bhubaneswar and All Orissa Private Security Karmachari Sangha. Such dispute, which was raised, has not whispered anything against the present petitioner.

2.1. The conciliation having been failed, the Central Government, in exercise of the powers conferred by clause (d) of Sub-section (1) and Sub-section (2A) of Section 10 of the Industrial Dispute Act, 1947, vide order dated 06.03.2013, referred the dispute to the Central Government Industrial Tribunal, Bhubaneswar for adjudication with the following reference:-

"Whether the action of management of M/s. OM Security & Services engaged by IOCL, Marketing Division, Bhubaneswar in not paying the terminal benefits to the workers as per section 25-F of I.D. Act, is legal and justified What relief the workmen are entitled to"

2.2. Upon receipt of such reference, the All Orissa Private Security Karmachari Sangha filed its statement of claim by adding the present petitioner as 1st Party Management No. 2. In the statement of claim, the prayer was made to the following effect:-

"It is therefore prayed by the All Odisha Private Security Karmachari Sangha that the Hon'ble Court may graciously be pleased to direct the Principal Employer M/s. Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. to pay the pending, payable dues towards Terminal benefits @ Rs. 34,140/-to each workman through their Contractor M/S. Om Security & Service-Management for the interest of social justice."

2.3. The Central Government Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour Court, Bhubaneswar issued notice to the IOCL on 08.08.2013 to appear on 14.8.2013 and file written statement. Again, vide order dated 14.08.2013, the learned Presiding Officer, CGIT-cum-Labour Court directed the petitioner to file written statement. Hence, this writ petition.

3. Mr. S.S. Padhi, learned Senior Advocate appearing along with Mr. Debaraj Mohanty, learned counsel for the petitioner contended that the very issuance of the notice dated 08.08.2013 to the petitioner calling upon it to appear on 14.08.2013 cannot be sustained in the eye of law, because the petitioner was not a party before the conciliation authority and even on reference also, the petitioner was not originally made a party in the reference case. But, subsequently, on the basis of the statement of claim filed by the All Orissa Private Security Karmachari Sangha, the present petitioner was impleaded as petitioner no.2. Therefore, notice has been issued to the present petitioner. It is further contended that learned CGIT-cum-Labour Court, Bhubaneswar has acted beyond its power and authority directing the present petitioner to appear and file written statement, though the present petitioner was not a party to the reference under Annexure-7 to the writ petition. More so, the CGIT-cum-Labour Court, Bhubaneswar has no power to travel beyond the reference. The present petitioner, being a Central Government Public Sector Undertaking, its right has been injured by the notice dated 08.08.2013 and order dated 14.08.2013. Therefore, he prayed for quashing of the notice dated 08.08.2009 and the order dated 14.08.2013.

To substantiate his contention, reliance has been placed on Delhi Cloth and General Mills Co. Ltd. v. The Workmen and Ors., AIR 1967 SC 469 [LQ/SC/1966/261] ; Hochtief Gammon v. Industrial Tribunal, Bhubaneswar, Orissa and Ors., AIR 1964 SC 1746 [LQ/SC/1964/122] ; Tata Iron and Steel Company Ltd. v. State of Jharkhand and Ors., (2014) 1 SCC 536 [LQ/SC/2013/1050] ; and Oshiar Prasad and Ors v. The Employers in relation to Management of Sudamdih Coal Washery of BCCL, 2015:INSC:82 : (2015) 4 SCC 71 [LQ/SC/2015/149] .

4. Mr. S. S. Kashyap, learned Central Government Counsel appearing for opposite party no.1, contended that since the dispute is between opposite party no.2 and opposite party no.3 and, as such, the matter has been referred to the competent Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour Court for adjudication and the same is subjudice before the said forum, the notice issued to the petitioner being an employer of opposite party no.2, the Union of India has no role to play in the matter.

5. Mr. B. Sahoo (1), learned counsel appearing for opposite party no.2 admitted the factum of execution of the contract between the petitioner and M/s. OM Security & Services. It was also contended that pursuant to execution of the agreement, opposite party no.2 had discharged its responsibility engaging the persons to discharge their work. Therefore, if any claim is made by the workmen and the same is pending for adjudication in a reference case by the appropriate forum, unless the matter is resolved by the appropriate forum, the present writ petition cannot be sustained.

6. Mr. P.K. Khuntia, learned counsel appearing for opposite party no.3 workmen contended that since the petitioner had engaged M/s. OM Security & Service by executing a contract, if any deviation is made thereof, the liability also transferred to the principal employer, i.e., the present petitioner, bereft of the fact that the claim may lie against opposite party no.2. Therefore, the workmen had raised an industrial dispute and the conciliation having been failed, the matter has been referred to the competent forum for adjudication. While entertaining the claim statement, when the present petitioner was made as 1st party-petitioner no.2 in the claim statement, the Industrial Tribunal is well justified in issuing notice to the present petitioner. Therefore, no illegality or irregularity has been committed in issuing such notice and, accordingly, dismissal of the writ petition is sought for.

7. This Court heard Mr. S.K. Padhi, learned Senior Advocate appearing along with Mr. D. Mohanty, learned counsel for the petitioner; Mr. S.S. Kashyap, learned Central Government Counsel appearing for opposite party no.1; Mr. B. Sahoo (1), learned counsel appearing for opposite party no.2 and Mr. P.K. Khuntia, learned counsel appearing for opposite party no.3 in hybrid mode and perused the records. Pleadings have been exchanged between the parties and with the consent of learned counsel for the parties, the writ petition is being disposed of finally at the stage of admission.

8. On careful appraisal of the factual matrix, as pleaded above, it is evident that the petitioner had entered into a service contract with opposite party no.2 for deployment of manpower in its own premises. Consequent upon such contract, opposite party no.2 deployed the manpower in the locations provided by the petitioner. Once the work has been executed by opposite party no.2, in pursuance of the contract executed between the petitioner and opposite party no.2, the employees engaged by opposite party no.2 cannot be construed to be the employee of the principal employer, namely, the present petitioner. In any case, the dispute having been raised by opposite parties no.2 and 3 and the conciliation having been failed, the matter has been referred to the competent Industrial Tribunal for adjudication, in which opposite party no.3 filed the claim statement incorporating the present petitioner as the petitioner no.2 and claiming the benefit, though the petitioner was neither a party to the conciliation proceeding initiated by the labour authority, nor was it a party to the reference made by the Central Government. Once the petitioner is not a party to the proceeding, merely because opposite party no.3 in its claim statement indicated its name describing it as principal employer, that ipso facto cannot be said to have any liability to be paid to opposite party no.3.

9. The CGIT-cum-Labour Court, without understanding the implication thereof, issued notice vide Anenxure-9 calling upon the present petitioner to appear and participate, which is without jurisdiction. As such, the order passed by the CGIT-cum-Labour Court cannot be sustained, as because the CGIT-cum-Labour Court cannot exercise its implied power under the provisions of Section 18(3)(b) of the Industrial Disputes Act to add and summon to the parties, who are not necessary to the proceeding.

10. In Hochtief Gammon (supra), which is similar to the present case, notice was issued to the Deputy General Manager of M/s Hindustan Steel Ltd. to appear before the Tribunal. In fact, pursuant to such notice issued the Dy. General Manager of the Hindustan Steel Ltd. appeared before the Tribunal and urged that the Hindustan Steel Ltd. was not concerned or interested in the dispute and should not be added as a party to the reference. In paragraph-19 of the said judgment, the apex Court held as follows:-

"The next contention raised by Mr. Chatterjee is that M/s Hindustan Steel Ltd. is a necessary party because it is the, said concern which is the employer of the respondents and not the appellant. In either words, this contention is that though in form the appellant engaged the workmen whom the respondent union represents, the appellant was acting as the agent of its principal and for adjudicating upon the industrial dispute referred to the Tribunal by the State of Orissa, it is necessary that the principal, viz., M/s Hindustan Steel Ltd. ought to be added as a party. In dealing with this argument, it is necessary to bear in mind the fact that the appellant does not dispute the respondent Union's case that the workmen were employed by the appellant. It would have been open to the State Government to ask the Tribunal to consider who was the employer of these workmen and in that case, the terms of reference might have been suitably framed. Where the appropriate Government desires that the question as to who the employer is should be determined, it generally makes a reference in wide enough terms and includes as parties to the reference different persons who are alleged to be the employers. Such a course has not been adopted in the present proceedings, and so, it would not be possible to hold that the question as to who is the employer as between the appellant and M/s Hindustan Steel Ltd. is a, question incidental to the industrial dispute which has been referred under s. 10(1)(d) This dispute is a substantial dispute between the appellant and M/s Hindustan Steel Ltd. and cannot be regarded as incidental in any sense, and so, we think that even this ground is not sufficient to justify the contention that M/s Hindustan Steel Ltd. is a, necessary party which can be added and summoned under the implied powers of the Tribunal under s. 18 (3)(b)."

11. On perusal of the aforementioned paragraph, it is made clear that the dispute was a substantial dispute between the appellant and M/s Hindustan Steel Ltd. and cannot be regarded as incidental in any sense. Thereby, when the present petitioner is not connected with the dispute, which has been raised between opposite party no.3 and opposite party no.2, when the matter was referred by the Government for adjudication, the CGIT-cum-Labour Court cannot and could not have gone beyond the terms of reference.

12. In Tata Iron and Steel Company (supra), the apex Court held that the Industrial Tribunal/Labour Court constituted under the Industrial Disputes Act is a creature of that statute. It acquires jurisdiction on the basis of reference made to it. The Tribunal has to confine itself within the scope of the subject-matter of reference and cannot travel beyond the same.

13. Applying the said principle to the present context, merely because the name of the petitioner has been mentioned in the statement of claim made by opposite party no.3, that ipso facto cannot give any jurisdiction to the CGIT to issue notice to the petitioner. Rather, the CGIT with all prudence should have taken note of the fact that why the petitioner has been impleaded as a party in the statement of claim, though it was not a party either before the conciliating authority of the Government of India or when the reference was made under the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act.

14. In Oshiar Prasad (supra), the apex Court in paragraph-25 of the said judgment held as follows:-

"It is thus clear that the appropriate Government is empowered to make a reference under Section 10 of the Act only when "Industrial dispute exists" or "is apprehended between the parties". Similarly, it is also clear that the Tribunal while answering the reference has to confine its inquiry to the question(s) referred and has no jurisdiction to travel beyond the question(s) or/and the terms of the reference while answering the reference. A fortiori, no inquiry can be made on those questions, which are not specifically referred to the Tribunal while answering the reference."

15. In Delhi Cloth and General Mills (supra), the apex Court in paragraph-10 of the said judgment held as follows:-

"Under s. 10(1) (d) of the Act, it is open to the appropriate Government when it is of opinion that any industrial dispute exists to make an order in writing referring "the dispute or any matter appearing to be connected with, or relevant to, the dispute....... to a Tribunal for adjudication. "Under s. 10(4) "where in an order referring an industrial dispute to a Labour Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal under this section or in a subsequent order, the appropriate Government has specified the points of dispute for adjudication, the Labour Court or the Tribunal or the National Tribunal, as the case may be, shall confine its adjudication to those points and matters incidental thereto."

16. The cumulative effect of all these judicial pronouncements, as laid down by the apex Court, is that when a reference is made by the appropriate Government, it specifies the points of dispute for adjudication. Therefore, the Labour Court or the Tribunal or the National Tribunal, as the case may be, shall confine its adjudication to those points and matters incidental thereto. In view of such position, issuance of notice dated 08.08.2013 to the present petitioner by the CGIT cannot be sustained in the eye of law.

17. In course of hearing, this Court made a query to the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner that if notice has been issued to the petitioner, pursuant thereto the petitioner can appear and explain the position and in such circumstance the CGIT on being satisfied can expunge the petitioner, but it was contended that if the petitioner is no way connected either to the conciliation proceeding or to the reference, merely because a statement is made in the statement of claim by opposite party no.3 indicating the name of the petitioner, that itself cannot suffice the purpose, rather the petitioner is unnecessarily being dragged to the litigation causing harassment, which will be prejudicial to the interest of the petitioner. To get rid of such harassment and to have a just and proper adjudication to the reference made by the appropriate government to the CGIT, it is essential to exclude the petitioner from being made as a party and allow the CGIT to proceed in terms of the reference made to it, instead of expanding the scope of litigation causing harassment to the petitioner. This Court finds ample force in the submission of learned counsel for the petitioner. In view of such position, without relegating the petitioner to the Industrial Forum, interest of justice would be best served if the Industrial Forum decides the matter on its own merit, in view of the law laid down by the apex Court, as mentioned herein before.

18. In view of the foregoing discussions, this Court, keeping in mind the law laid down by the apex Court, as discussed above, is of the considered opinion that issuance of notice to the petitioner on 08.08.2013 under Annexure-9 and the consequential order dated 14.08.2019 under Annexure-10 cannot be sustained in the eye of law. As a consequence thereof, the notice dated 08.08.2013 under Annexure-9 and the consequential order dated 14.08.2013 under Annexure-10 are liable to be quashed and are hereby quashed. The CGIT-cum-Labour Court is permitted to proceed with the I.D. Case No. 25 of 2013, which is pending before it, pursuant to the reference dated 06.01.2013 between the parties.

19. The writ petition is thus allowed. However, there shall be no order as to costs.