K.C. Agrawal, J.
1. This is petition under Article 226 of the Constitution directed against the judgment of the I Addi. District Judge, Allahabad dated March 28, 1978.
2. Premises No. 12, Tagore Town were in the tenancy of one Ft. Lt. A.R. Solanki. The house was vacated by him. The Rent Control and Eviction Officer thereafter notified the vacancy and a number of persons applied for allotment Amongst those were R.C. Grover, Respondent 1, Smt. Girja Shukla and Sri Gyan Prakash. By an order dated May 2, 1977 the premises was allotted to Stop Girja Shukla. Against the aforesaid order, a revision was filed by R.C. Grover, Respondent No. 1. Another revision was filed by Cyan Prakash, who was also an applicant for allotment. These revisions were allowed by the District Judge on July 21, 1977. By the said order the District Judge set aside the allotment order made in favour of Suit. Girja Shukla and remanded the case to the Rent Control and Eviction Officer to make an order of allotment afresh. On August 6, 1977 Indian Farmers Fertiliser Cooperative Limited known as "IFFCO" applied for the allotment of the accommodation in its favour. The Petitioner claimed that it was a society established for "Public purpose" and required the accommodation for residence of its officers which was also a public purpose is entitled to the benefit of category No. 1 of Rule 11 of the rules framed under U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972. The Rent Control and Eviction Officer held that the Petitioner was a Cooperative Society of cultivators and that its purpose being limited and not for general public, it did not fall in the first category and as such was not entitled to claim allotment on the basis of Sub-rule (1) of Rule 11. In his opinion, as an application for the release of the premises in the tenancy of Respondent 1 had been filed by its owner and landlord under Section 21 of U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972, the Respondent 1 being a person falling in category No. 2 was entitled to allotment. Aggrieved by the order of the Rent Control and Eviction Officer, a revision was filed by the Petitioner before the District Judge. The revision was transferred to the I Additional District Judge, Allahabad who dismissed it on March 28, 1978. Feeling aggrieved by the said order, the present petition was filed by the Petitioner in this Court.
3. Shri K.M. Dayal, learned Counsel for the Petitioner raised two contentions before me. The first was that the Petitioner being engaged in manufacturing fertiliser which was a commodity for public consumption, the purpose of the residence of the employees of the Petitioner was a public purpose and as such the courts below committed an error In not treating the Petitioner to be entitled to the benefit of Sub-rule (1) of Rule 11. The second submission was that the Rent Control and Eviction Officer as welt as the Additional District Judge erred in holding that R.C. Grover, Respondent 1 was entitled to be kept in the second category and as such had a preferential claim of allotment over the Petitioner
4. The Petitioner is a Cooperative Society having its registered office at New Delhi. In persuance of the provisions of the Multi-Unit Cooperative Societies Act (Act No. VI of 1942), the Indian Farmers Fertiliser Cooperative Society, New Delhi was registered as a Multi-Unit Co-operative Society under the Bombay Cooperative Societies Act as extended to the Union Territory of New Delhi. The objects of the Petitioner are to promote economic interests of its members by undertaking manufacture of chemical fertilisers and allied products/bye-products and their conversion, storage, transportation and marketing. The membership of the Petitioner is open to:
(i) National Cooperative Federation of agriculture credit/marketing/processing/supply and other agricultural cooperative societies;
(ii) State level cooperative federations of agricultural credit/marketing/processing/supply and other agricultural cooperative societies;
(iii) District, regional and primary cooperative credit/marketing/processing/supply and other agricultural cooperative societies including Cane Unions;
(iv) Primary agricultural cooperative credit, service, multi purpose, cane, irrigation, farming societies and other village agricultural societies;
(v) National Cooperative Development Corporation;
(vi) Government of India.
5. The authorised share capital of the Petitioner was Rs. 200/- crores made-up of the following categories:
(i) 16,000 shares with face value of Rs. 1 lakh each, to be allotted generally to the Government of India, the National Cooperative Development Corporation, National/State/Regional/Federations and large processing cooperatives such as cooperative sugar mills etc.;
(ii) 20,000 shares with face value of Rs. 10,000 each to be allotted generally to District and Primary Marketing/Processing/Supply and other Cooperative Societies including Cane Unions;
(iii) 2,00,000 shares with face value of Rs. 1,000/- each to be allotted generally to Primary Societies at the village level.
Provided that the Societies mentioned in Sub-clause (i) which have taken at least one share of Rs. 1 lakh and societies mentioned in Sub-clause (ii) which have taken at least one share of Rs. 10,000/- are eligible to take shares of lower denomination as well.
Provided also that Societies mentioned in Sub-clause (ii) and (iii) are eligible for the allotment of higher denomination shares.
6. In the back ground of the facts stated above, the learned Counsel for the Petitioner contended that since the Petitioner was engaged in the production of fertilisers which was a commodity needed by public for production of foodgrains and others, the courts below should have held that the premises required by the Petitioner for the residence of its officers was one for public purpose.
7. The word "public purpose" as pointed out by Mahajan, J. in State of Bihar v. Kameshwar Singh AIR 1952 SC 311, is not capable of a precise definition and has set a rigid meaning. It can only be defined by a process of a judicial inclusion and exclusion. The further observations made by him in this connection were "whatever furthers the general interest of the community as opposed to the particular Interest of the individual must be regarded as a public purpose."
8. This would show that the underlying idea behind the concept of public purpose is the good of the general public or the general interest of the community. A public purpose should serve some public good or utility as stated above. Black in his legal dictionary has stated that:
A public purpose or public business has for its objective the promotion of public health, safety, morals, general welfare, security, prosperity and contentment of all the inhabitants or residents within a given political division, as for example, State the soverign powers of which are exercised to promote such public purpose or public business. An action taken for achieving public purpose must therefore benefit the public as opposed to an individual.
9. Dealing with the scope of expression "public purpose" in Musanigan Imam Haidar Bux Razvi v. State of Gujarat : AIR 1971 Guj 158 [LQ/GujHC/1969/110] , the High Court observed:
The test which has come therefore to be applied is whether the purpose is one which is primarily and pre-dominantly one for the general interest of the community or it is mainly or primarily to serve the interest of a few individuals, is the emphasize on the general benefit of the community or is it on the benefit of some specified individuals If it is the former, it would be a public purpose but not so, if it is the latter. That is the only way in which the line can be drawn to distinguish a public purpose from a private purpose.
10. It, therefore, appears that when a thing is done by a body for the general good of the public, the same amount to public purpose, but if the purpose for which an action is taken or a thing ii done is not for the good of the public or for achieving the object of the company engaged in doing a job of public good, the purpose cannot be considered as a public purpose, such will be a case of private purpose Recently, Supreme Court considered this controversy in State of Karnataka v. Ranganatha Reddy AIR 1978 SC 238 and observed:
If the purpose is for servicing the public, as Governmental purposes ordinarily are, then everything desiderated for subserving such a public purpose falls under the broad and expanding rubric. The nexus between the taking of property and the public purpose springs necessarily into existence if the former is capable of answering the latter. On the other hand, if the purpose is a private/or non-public one, the mere fact that the hand that acquires or requires is Government or a Public corporation, does not make the purpose automatically a public purpose. Let us illustrate. If a fleet of cars is desired for conveyance of public officers, the purpose is a public one. If the same fleet of cars is sought for fulfilling the tourist appellate of friends and relations of the same public officers, it is a private purpose.
11. Reverting to the facts of the present case, it would be found that the application was filed by the Petitioner for allotment of the premises in dispute for the purpose of making it available to its employees. The Petitioner wanted to have the premises for the residence of an individual officer which is, in my opinion, apparently a private purpose as opposed to the public purpose. The provision made in the Rule 11 does not entitle the authority concerned to allot a house or an accommodation to an individual on the basis of the claim of public purpose without reference to the public use to which it is to be applied. The public purpose employees occupation and enjoyment of the house by the public or public agents. The purpose should have direct tendency to advance public objects. It should not be influenced by the motive of private good. The allotment sought by the Petitioner company would thus not benefit either the Petitioner or the community. It would benefit only an individual. In Hamabai Framjee Petit v. Secretary of State for India AIR 1914 PC 20, it was observed:
Held, the phrase "public purpose" roust include a purpose, i.e. an object or aim, in which the general interest of the community as opposed to the particular interests of an individuals is directly and vitally concerned.
12. If the allotment of the premises would have been sought by the Petitioner for its own need, position might have been different. Accordingly it appears to me that the view taken by the courts below that the purpose of allotment was not a public purpose is correct and the allotment sought for its employee would dearly be an allotment for the private purpose.
13. Sri K.M. Dayal, learned Counsel for the Petitioner cited a number of authorities where the concept of "public purpose" has been considered, These authorities, in my opinion, are distinguishable In Ram Swarup v. District Land Acquisition Officer, Aligarh AIR 1972 SC 2230 relied upon by the learned Counsel for the Petitioner, the acquisition was made under Land Acquisition Act for the construction of residential quarters for the members of Aligarh Co-operative Housing Society Ltd. Aligarh. In that case since acquisition was for the purpose of residential quarters of the members of Co-operative Housing Society and not for an individual, the Supreme Court held that the same was a public purpose. At this place, I wish to make it clear that while holding that an individual purpose would not amount to a public purpose I did not intend to say that the purpose for which a piece of land is acquired for action is taken for a large number of the members of a cooperative society or community in general that would not be a public purpose, I confined my consideration to the question of allotment of a house for an individual officer working in a cooperative society. Learned Counsel for the Petitioner also cited a number of authorities referred in Pandit Jhandu Lal v. State of Punjab : AIR 1961 SC 343 [LQ/SC/1960/271] , State of Gujrat v. Musamigan Imam Haider Bux Razvi : AIR 1977 SC 594 [LQ/SC/1976/177 ;] ">AIR 1977 SC 594 [LQ/SC/1976/177 ;] [LQ/SC/1976/177 ;] ">AIR 1977 SC 594 [LQ/SC/1976/177 ;] ">AIR 1977 SC 594 [LQ/SC/1976/177 ;] [LQ/SC/1976/177 ;] [LQ/SC/1976/177 ;] , State of Bombay v. Ali Gulsan AIR 1955 Bom. 810 and Jhandu Lal Budh Ram v. State of Punjab : AIR 1959 P&h 535 . In all these cases, it would be found that the acquisitions were made under the Land Acquisition Act for either to the benefit of the workers of an industry or for constructing houses for the members of a cooperative society or for similar other purposes. These cases, therefore, are not helpful to us in deciding the controversy involved in the present cases. As already observed above, had the Petitioner filed an application for allotment of the premises for its own purpose, the applicant could have been possibly entitled to the benefit of Rule 11, but where, as here, the application was made for the residence of an individual officer, the purpose cannot be considered to be a public purpose within the meaning of that expression used in Rule 11.
14. The next submission made in this connection was that as the Petitioner was a "public sector corporation" within the meaning of that term defined in Section 3(p) of the Act, the learned Counsel contended that this Court is bound to presume that the house required by it for the residence of an officer is a public purpose. The definition is as under:
Public sector corporation means any building belonging to or taken on lease or requisitioned by or on behalf of the Central Government or State Government (including the Government of any other Mate), and includes any building belonging, or taken on lease by or on behalf of any local authority or any public sector corporation.
15. Shri S.N. Verma, learned Counsel appearing for Respondent 2 urged that the Petitioner being cooperative society could not be considered to be a corporation within the meaning of that word used in Section 3(p), hence the Petitioner could not be a "public sector corporation". The submission made does not appear to be correct. A corporation is a legal persona, separate and distinct from its members. After incorporation the effect of registration of a society under the Act is to convert it into a body corporate. A body corporate is a separate legal entity or separate persona called corporation which has a legal persona just as much as an individuality and if a man trust such corporation, he trust that legal persona. It is not correct that only a company after incorporation under the Companies Act becomes a corporation and not a society. The effect of registration of a society under the Act is the same as that of a company incorporated. I am, therefore, not prepared to accept this broad submission of the learned Counsel for Respondent 2.
16. The question that next arises is whether the Petitioner is a corporation owned or controlled by the Government inasmuch as simply because it is a corporation that would not bring it within the purview of the word "public sector corporation" defined in Section 3(p). As I have held above that the purpose for which the allotment was sought by the Petitioner was not for its benefit, the question whether it was owned or controlled by the Government looses all its significance. The said question does not arise for consideration in the present writ petition. Assuming that the Petitioner fulfils the requirement of being a public sector corporation, that would not bring its case in category 1 of Rule 11 of the rules framed under the Act. For attracting category 1 the allotment should be for the use of public and the benefit accrued therefrom should in greater or less degree for the public. That is not the fact in the present case.
17. The next question that arises for consideration is that whether the application of the Petitioner could be rejected because it was not entitled to be brought in category of the law laid down in Rule 11. Rule 11 was framed by the State Government in exercise of its power conferred by Sections 34(8) and 16 of the Act. Section 34(8) provides that for the purposes of any proceedings under this Act, the authorities shall follow such procedure principles of proofs, rules of limitation and guiding principles as may be prescribed. Rule 11 carries out the purpose of the aforesaid Sub-section (8) of Section 34. This rule lays down the order of priorities which have to be observed in allotment of residential buildings, The relevant provision of Sub-rule (1) of Rule 11 is quoted below:
In making allotment of residential building, the following order of priorities shall be observed:
Firstly, for public purposes:
Secondly, for accommodating a person against whom an order has been passed for eviction under Section 21 not being a tenant referred to in Explanation (1) to Section 21(1), or a decree has been passed in a suit filed with the permission of the District Magistrate under Section 3 of the old Act (or such suit or application is pending) and who are members of whose family do not own or hold as tenants any other residential building in the same city, municipality, town area or notified area;
Thirdly for accommodating others;
And in each of the above categories subject to the provisions of Sub-rule (2), the principle "First come, first served" shall be followed.
18. It would be found from the judgments of the appellate authority that having found that the Petitioner was not entitled to be kept in first category, the allotment order made by the Rent Control and Eviction Officer in favour of Respondent 1 was upheld. According to the view of the Rent Control and Eviction Officer, as an application had been filed against the said Respondent by the landlord of the house in which he was residing, the Respondent 1 was entitled to be kept in the second category mentioned in Rule 11. In this view of the matter, the Rent Control and Eviction Officer held that the Respondent 1 was entitled to the benefit of category 2 whereas the case of the Petitioner could fall in category 3. The question that arises is whether the Respondent 1 was entitled to be kept in second category- The submission advanced on behalf of the said Respondent was that as an application under Section 21 was pending against him, his case clearly falls within the scope of the words "for such suit or application is pending". It was urged on behalf of Respondent 1 that it is not only a person against whom an order under Section 21 has been passed for eviction that alone is entitled to be kept in this category but also a person as against whom an application has been preferred under Section 21. The submission made is not tenable. Rule 11 contemplates two classes of persons who are entitled to be brought under the said provision, (1) a person against whom an order has been passed under Section 21(1) against whom a decree has been passed in a suit filed with the permission of the District Magistrate under Section 3 of the Act. It is after the second category of the persons that the words "(or such suit or application is pending)" were inserted. The attempt of Respondent 1, as already stated, was to bring his case within the brackets. The words "such suit" refer to a suit filed under Section 3 of the U.P. Rent Control and Eviction Act. Immediately after the words "such suit" that we find the word "or" followed by the word "application". The word "Application" draws its colour and meaning from the word "suit" used before the word "or". The suit talked of is one which is pending on the basis of the permission obtained under Section 3 of U.P. Control of Rent and Eviction Act. The word "application" also to my mind, refers to a proceeding which has been commenced on the basis of permission under Section 3 of the Act and is pending. It is not possible to interpret the word "application" as an application filed under present Act. The reason ;for obtained, there is practically no defence available to a tenant, whereas in a case of an application under Section 21 of the new Act tenant has several pleas available to him to defeat the application. In fact, an application under Section 21 cannot succeed unless (i) the landlord established his bonafide requirements of the premises, (ii) that his need is greater than that of the tenant. It appears, therefore, to me that the meaning of the word "application" used within the brackets has to be confined to the application pending on the basis of the permission obtained under Section 3 of the Act. It does not appear possible that even in a case where an application under Section 21 is filed the tenant becomes entitled to be kept in second category over those falling in the third category, as mere filing of an application does not raise any immediate apprehension of eviction in the proceedings started against him. Therefore, there would be no reason to keep such person in the second category. A case of a person, as against whom a permission has been obtained under Section 3 of the old Act stands on a different footing than the one against whom an application under Section 21 has been filed. Form A framed under Rule 10(1), which is form prescribed for filing an application for allotment, only requires the mention of the fact whether a decree or order for eviction has been passed against the applicant in a suit filed with the District Magistrates permission under Section 3 of the old Act or under Section 21 of the present Act. Had it been intended that an applicant against whom an application under Section 21 is pending was also entitled to claim priority, the form would have laid down that requirement. This shows that an applicant like Respondent No. 1 can be placed under third category.
19. There is yet another approach to reach the same conclusion. The use of the word "such" used within brackets before the word "suit" indicates that the suit talked of will have characteristics which have been indicated earlier in the same sentence. The suit earlier mentioned in the sentence is a one which has been filed with the permission of the District Magistrate. Accordingly, the word "suit" used within the bracket refers to the suit filed on the basis of the permission of the District Magistrate. The difference may be only that in one case such suit has been decreed whereas in the other it Is pending. Now immediately after the word "suit" used in the bracket, we find the word "or" followed by the word "application". The use of word "or" suggests an alternative which generally corresponds to the word "either". It, therefore, appears that the "application" is only an alternative to the "suit." It would therefore, mean that in order to attract the provision of this clause, it is necessary that an application filed on the basis of the permission under Section 3 of U.P. Control of Rent and Eviction Act is pending. It would, thus, not cover a case of Section 21, but a case of permission obtained under Section 3 of the old Act.
20. The view taken by me is also supported by the Hindi version of Rule 11. The Hindi version of the words "or such suit or application is pending" is:
Ya aisa vaad ya aavedanpatra vicharadhin ho." These words make it clear that the application is only a substitute of suit. The application has been used only as an alternative to the suit.
21. For these reasons I find that the Rent Control and Eviction Officer as well as the appellate authority committed an error in giving the benefit of category 2 to Respondent 1. Consequently, the Petitioner and Respondent 1 should have been kept in the third category and their applications for allotment should have been considered in accordance with it. As the permission was allowed to Respondent 1 on the basis of category 2, the order of allotment would be liable to be set aside. The Rent Control and Eviction Officer will nave to consider this question afresh. At this place I wish to make it clear that while setting aside the order of allotment made in favour of Respondent 1, I do not wish to convey that the premises cannot be allotted to him afresh even if he makes out a case for such an allotment under Entry-3. The requirement of the principle "first come, first served" and of other matters which are laid down in Rule 11 will have to be observed by the Rent Control and Eviction Officer while reconsidering the question of allotment.
22. For these reasons the writ petition succeeds and is allowed. The judgments of the 1st Additional District Judge dated 28-3-1978 and that of the Rent Control and Eviction Officer dated 8-12-1977 are partly set aside and the Rent Control and Eviction Officer is directed to decide the question of allotment afresh in the light of the observations made above. There shall be no order as to costs.
Indian Farmers Fertilizers Corporation Limited v. Ramesh Chandra Grover And Others
Indian Farmers Fertilizers Corporation Limited v. Ramesh Chandra Grover And Others
(High Court Of Judicature At Allahabad)
Writ Petition No. 3552 Of 1978 | 16-08-1978
Advocate List
- For Petitioner : K.M. Dayal, Adv.
- For Respondent : S.N. Verma, D. Kacker
- Prakash Kaushik, Advs.
Bench
- HON'BLE JUSTICE K.C. AGRAWAL, J.
Eq Citations
- 1978 ARC 424
- 1978 AWC 772 ALL
- LQ/AllHC/1978/525
Head Note
Allahabad Rent Control and Eviction Act, 1972 — Allotment of tenanted premises — Petitioner society seeking allotment — Whether purpose of residence by employees of society amounted to public purpose — Held, no — Allotment sought was for individual officer of society and hence amounted to private purpose — Petition, dismissed\n(Paras 5 to 13)\n
