The plaintiffs father took out an insurance policy on his life in the defendant company in 1920. The premium was payable annually, but the payment due in March 1924 was allowed to remain unpaid even after the expiry of the period of grace, i.e., even after the 2nd April. When the company gave the assured sent in the declaration Exhibit V as required by the rules of the company and the terms of the policy, according to which the policy could be revived "on furnishing satisfactory evidence of continued good health and on the payment to the company of all premiums due with the interest at the rate of 6 per cent. per annum up to the date of re-instatement". It would appear that the policy in this case had even by the date in question acquires a surrender value but it is unnecessary to base any conclusion on that circumstance because the declaration was made within the time allowed even in respect of policies which had not acquired such surrender value. The declaration and payment were accepted by the company and the policy was revived. The assured died in October 1924, and when the claim was sent in on behalf of the plaintiff, the claim was accompanied by the following certificate given by the doctor under whose treatment the assured was just before his death :

"Mr. Saranappa was suffering from acute dyspepsia from the beginning of August 1924 to the end of September 1924 and succumbed to it on the 4th October, 1924. He had slight attack of the same in the last week of January 1924 but got over it by undergoing treatment for over a month."

(Exhibit I). On receipt of this certificate, the company thought of raising the question whether at the date of Exhibit V Saranappa was justified in making the declaration that he had continued in good health, because, according to Exhibit I he had an attack of dyspepsia between January and March 1924. They according put further queries to the doctor to which he replied by the letters Exhibit II series giving more detailed in formation as required by them, but they do nod really carry the matter very farThe chief argument of Mr. Satyanarayana Rao here, on behalf of the insurance company who is the appellant, is that the statement in Exhibit V is a mis-statement on the material particular and the position must be judged of on the same principles as will govern mis-statements in the original proposal. It is unnecessary for the purpose of the present case to consider how far the observation to which Mr. Satyanarayana Rao referred from the decision reported in Handler v. Mutual Reserve Fund Life Association (90 L. T. 192) support his contention that a revival must be judged of by the same considerations as govern the original proposal, because a revival is really a new contract. He had still to show that in Exhibit V there is a wilful misstatement on a material particular. He asks us to hold that the reference to continued good health implies that there has been nothing seriously wrong with the man for a continuous period of time and not merely that at the time that he made the statement he was in good health. The form is a printed slip supplied by the company and it is not by any means very clear that persons who are called upon to sign that statement are really put upon sufficient notice as to what it is that the company expects them to state. The distinction between this kind of form and the elaborate queries which are put to any person when he makes a proposal for the first time to the company is very marked and it is scarcely fair that insurance companies should, without putting the assured on sufficient notice as to the degree of care that they are expected to the exercise in making a statement like Exhibit V or the kind of information that they are expected to give, be permitted to take advantage of any ailment that he might have had once upon a time between the date of the original policy and the date of declaration for the purpose of revival. But, even judged by the severer test which Mr. Satyanarayana Rao, requires, we are by no means satisfied that there has been any mis-statement in Exhibit V. Even according to the doctors opinion, the assured only suffered form a mild attack of dyspepsia between January and March and in the very first certificate, Exhibit I, the doctor added that the patient had "got over it by undergoing treatment, " and this is obviously shown by the fact that, as shown in Exhibit II-a, while the assured continued under his treatment up to 1st March 1924, the treatment stopped thereafter, and Exhibit V is sent more than a month after the cessation of the treatment. Under these circumstance it is not reasonable to hold that the assured had made any kind of mis-statement in Exhibit V and much less that the he had made a wilful misrepresentation. On this short ground the appeal fails and is dismissed with costs.

Appeal dismissed.