Subba Rao, C.J.Sri Abul Khasim, B. A., LL. B., was practicing as a first grade pleader in Hyderabad having enrolled himself as a pleader on 22-3-1925. His name was duly entered in the register of Pleaders maintained by the Hyderabad High Court. He was renewing his leadership certificate from year to year. His leadership Certificate was last renewed for the year 1941-42.

He was appointed as Munsif-Magistrate on 26-9-1942 and thereafter he did not renew his leadership certificate. While he was working as Munsif Magistrate, Nilanga, several complaints were lodged against him by eight pleaders of Nilanga complaining that he was corrupt and inefficient. Thereupon, the High Court initiated proceedings against him for disciplinary action and directed the Sessions Judge, Bidar, to make an enquiry and submit a report. On 11-8-1954, the Sessions Judge submitted his report, on the basis of which the following charges were framed against him :

1. Acceptance of illegal gratification and issuing orders under influence.

2. Complicity and conspiracy with S. P. O.

3. Alteration and scratching of orders, raising suspicion in the mind of the litigant public.

4. Inefficiency and poor knowledge of law.

5. Intervention in a police case resulting in the absconding of the accused; and

6. Collecting illegal and improper cost without authorization and without submitting accounts.

2. The Munsif-Magistrate fifed a written statement denying all the charges and he elected to have an oral enquiry. The enquiry was conducted by Mr. Justice Deshpande, one of the Judges of the Hyderabad High Court. He found, on the evidence that, although direct taking of bribes had not been proved, a reasonable inference could be drawn that he was likely to take bribes, that charges Nos. 2 and were established, that either the Munsif-Magistrate lacked knowledge of law or that he was personally interested in the cases and that charges 5 and 6 were not established.

The learned Judge expressed the view that the Munsif was not fit to be kept in service be should be made to retire compulsorily under R. 9 (iv) of the Hyderabad Civil Service (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules. The Chief Justice of the Hyderabad High Court sitting along with Vithal Rao Deshpande and Jaganmohan Reddy JJ., as Administrative Bench considered the report, gave a hearing to the Munsif and accepted the findings in Deshpande J.

Having regard to those findings and having regard to the previous enquiries, where he was found guilty of bribery, they held that the officer was fit to be dismissed from service. The Government, by their order dated 5-7-56, dismissed him from service on the basis of the finding of the Administrative Bench after consulting the Public Service Commission and after giving an opportunity for the Officer to represent his case. The question is whether S. Abul Khasim, who was dismissed from service for bribery and inefficiency, should be allowed to practice in the State as a first grade Pleader.

3. On merits, there cannot be two opinions. A pleader who abused his position as Judicial Officer and who was dismissed for taking illegal gratification and for inefficient obviously, should not be allowed to soil to atmosphere of the legal profession which should be the aim of any society to keep put and unsullied.

Indeed, the learned counsel for the Pleader does not contend that, in the circumstances, to the Pleader is entitled to practice in the Courts the State but questions the jurisdiction of the Court to take disciplinary proceedings under S. 13 of the Legal Practitioners Act on the ground that the pleader is not at present holding a pleaders Certificate. The material an relevant part of S. 13 reads:

The High Court may also, after such (sic) quiry as it thinks fit, suspend or dismiss a (sic) pleader or Mukhtar holding a certificate aforesaid.

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(f) for any other reasonable cause.

4. The contention is that the High Courts jurisdiction to take action against the pleader under S. 13 of the Act is conditioned by his folding a certificate as aforesaid. It is said that though Sri Abul Khasim was enrolled as a pleader in the High Court and though he held (sic)pleaders certificate and renewed it from year (sic) year till 1941-42, he ceased to get it renewed thereafter, that, at present, he does not hold certificate and that, therefore, he is not holding a certificate within the meaning of that section. The short question, therefore, is whether the pleader is holding a certificate within the meaning of S. 13.

5. Sections 6 and 7 of the Legal Practioners Act, 1879, throw considerable light on the interpretation of the phrase pleader holding a certificate. The material provisions of 6 and 7 are as follows:

Section 6: The High Court may, from time to time, make rules consistent with this Act as the following matters (namely) : (a) the qualifications, admission and certificates of proper persons to be Pleaders of the subordinate Courts and of the revenue offices (sic)uate within the local limits of the appellate jurisdiction and in the case of a High Court not established by Royal Charter, in respect of which the Indian Bar Councils Act, 1926, is not force, of such Court.

Section 7: On the admission, under S. 6, of a person as a Pleader or Mukhtar, the High court shall cause a certificate, signed by such (sic)cer as the Court, from time to time, appoints this behalf to be issued to such person, (sic)horising him to practice up to the end of the rent year in the Courts and in the case of pleader also the Revenue Offices, specified rein.

At the expiration of such period, the holder the certificate, if he desires to continue to practice, shall, subject to any rules consistent of this Act which may, from time to time, (sic)made by the High Court in this behalf, be (sic)tied to have his certificate renewed by the (sic)ge of the District Court within the local (sic)ts of whose jurisdiction he then ordinarily (sic)tises or by such officer as the High Court (sic) time to time appoints in this behalf. On every such renewal, the certificate then possession of such pleader or Mukhtar shall be cancelled and retained by such Judge or (sic)er.

6. Section 6 enables the High Court to the rules prescribing the qualifications of (sic)ders, the conditions for their admission into (sic)profession and the issue of certificates to (sic)ile them to practice. Under S. 7 of the (sic)after admission, the High Court causes a certificate duly signed by the officer appointed that behalf to be issued to the Pleader authorizing him to practice up to the end of the (sic)ent year in the Courts. The second paragraph of that section enables the holder of the certificate at the expiration of the current (sic)to have his certificate renewed in the (sic)ler prescribed. The third paragraph prescribes for the cancellation of the earlier certificate on renewal.

7. Pursuant to the power conferred under S. 6, the High Court of Hyderabad made rules in respect of the aforesaid three matters. Under R. 11.

the High Court on receiving such application may order that the applicant be admitted as a First Grade or Second Grade Pleader, and upon the applicant being admitted as a First Grade or Second Grade Pleader, the Registrar of the High Court shall cause his name to be entered in a Register and shall issue to the applicant a certificate as required by S. 7 of the Legal Practitioners Act. Such a certificate granted by the High Court shall be taken to authorize the enrolment in all the Courts subordinate to the High Court and the Revenue Secretariat.

Rule 12 provides for the renewal of the certificates by the Judicial Officer presiding over the Court in which the applicant ordinarily practices.

8. From the aforesaid provisions, it is clear that admission to the profession is not synonymous with the issue of a certificate, though without a certificate a person cannot practice as a Pleader. The two are different processes. Admission to the profession is regulated by R. 11, where under the applicants name is entered in the register. Rules 11 and 12 provide for the issue of the initial certificate and the renewal thereof every year to enable the pleader registered to practice in the Courts.

A pleader who is admitted into the profession and who has secured the initial certificate mentioned in the first paragraph of the Section, is entitled as of right to get it renewed every year following the procedure prescribed. The scheme of the Act, therefore, discloses that, on admission as a pleader an initial certificate ensuring for a year is issued to him and the holder of the certificate" is entitled as of right to get it renewed.

Till it is cancelled and renewed, he continues to be the holder of that certificate, for his right to renew the certificate depends upon his holding the certificate, though the authorisation to practice expired at the end of the year. That this should be the meaning attributable to the words "holding a certificate" in S. 13 is supported by the words in the second paragraph of S. 7, which enable the holder of a certificate, after the expiration of the period, to get it renewed thereafter.

Though the authorization to practice given under the certificate is only for one year and though the term has run out, he is described as the holder of the certificate for the purpose of renewal. We, therefore, hold that a Pleader admitted into the profession and whose name is entered in the register maintained or the enrolment of pleaders and to whom an initial certificate is issued for one year is a pleader holding a certificate within the meaning of S. 13 of the Act.

9. We are fortified in this interpretation of the provisions by an unreported decision of the Madras High Court decided as early as 1924. Therein, it was expressly held that it was a matter of no moment that the pleader has not renewed his sanad and that the High Court could take disciplinary action against him under S. 13 of the Legal Practitioners Act, 1879. This judgment stood the test of time.

Another Special Bench of the Madras High Court consisting of three Judges in the matter of a Pleader, Gudivada, 1943 2 Mad LJ 126: (AIR 1943 Mad 616) (A), followed the Full Bench judgment. There, as here, disciplinary action was taken against a pleader who did not renew his sanad. Adverting to an argument similar to that raised before us, Sir Lionel Leach C.J. who delivered the judgment on behalf of the Bench observed at page 127: (of Mad LJ): (at p. 616 of AIR) :

The respondent was registered as a legal practitioner under R. 9 of the rules framed under the Act. As a pleader he is required to renew his sanad each year and while he remains on the register he is entitled to issue of a sanad subject to good conduct

The Act applied to a holder of a certificate although he had not taken the necessary steps to have it renewed for the year in which his conduct was called into question. A solicitor in England is in the same position as a pleader here. He has to take out a certificate each year entitling him to practice but he can be struck off the rolls even if he has not renewed his certificate.

Not only are we bound by the aforesaid two decisions but we also agree with the aforesaid observations. The consequences that flow from adopting the opposite view are grave and alarming and would be subversive of the legal profession. A pleader who holds the initial certificate but does not care to get it renewed would continue to be on the register of pleaders though his moral delinquency has been demonstrably established, as in this case, by his being dismissed by a properly constituted authority having found him guilty of bribery. We are also satisfied that such a dismissal is a reasonable cause within the meaning of S. 13 (f) of the Legal Practitioners Act.

10. Learned counsel then contends that the petitioner was enrolled under the Hyderabad Legal Practitioners Act, that under that Act there was no provision for dismissing a Pleader not actually practicing and, therefore, no action could be taken against him under S. 13 of the Legal Practitioners Act, 1879, in derogation of a right vested in him under the old Act. The Legal Practitioners Act, 1879, was extended to the Hyderabad State by Act 8 of 1951. Reliance is placed upon Ss. 4 and 6 of the Act in support of the aforesaid contention. Section 4 reads:

Any reference in any Act or Ordinance specified in the schedule to a law which is not in force in a Part B State shall, in relation to that State, be construed as a reference to the corresponding law, if any in force in that State.

Section 38 of the Legal Practitioners Act says:

Except as provided by Ss. 4, 5, 7, 16, 25, 27, 32 and 36, nothing in this Act applies to advocates, vakils and attorneys admitted and enrolled by any High Court under the letter patent by which such Court is constituted, to mukhtars practicing in such Court or(sic) advocates enrolled under S. 41 of- this Act and except as provided by S. 36, nothing in the Act applies to persons enrolled as Advocates any High Court under the Indian Bar Council Act (38 of 1926).

11. Under S. 4, any reference in any Act to a law, which is not in force in a Part of State, shall be construed as a reference to the corresponding law in that State. Under S.(sic) of the Legal Practitioners Act vakils enrolled by any High Court under the Letters Pattern are not governed by the provisions of the Act except those mentioned in that section.

Basing on the said provisions, it is contended that the words any High Court under (sic) Letters Patent in S. 38 should be read as (sic) High Court of Hyderabad constituted under Royal Charter issued by the Nizam. Assuming without conceding that the Letters Patent (sic) be equated to the Royal Charter, there are (sic) insurmountable objections to this argument (i) a pleader enrolled by the High Court(sic) Hyderabad does not come under any one of the categories of Advocates, Vakils (sic) attorneys for the Act itself makes a distinct(sic) between a pleader and the said three category and (ii) the High Court of Hyderabad did not enroll pleaders under the Royal Charter but only under the Hyderabad Legal Practioners Act.

Section 38 applies only to Advocates, Va(sic) and Attorneys enrolled by the High Court under the Letters Patent and does not relate(sic) pleaders enrolled under the Legal Practitioner Act by any High Court. This argument, therefore, does not avail the petitioner.

12. Nor can we find any force in argument of the learned counsel based on of Act 3 of 1951. The material part of the section reads:

If immediately before the appointed(sic) there is in force in any Part B State any(sic) corresponding to any of the Acts or Ordinary now extended to that State, that law (sic) save as otherwise expressly provided in the Act, stand repealed:

Provided that the repeal shall not affected.

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(b) any right, privilege, obligation or (sic) lity acquired, accrued or incurred under(sic) law so repealed.

13. Relying upon this section, it is ar(sic) that the petitioners right to practice t(sic) the provisions of the Hyderabad Legal Petitioners Act is saved, notwithstanding the appeal of the Act. The question is whether petitioner had acquired any right to pra(sic) in the High Court of Hyderabad untramn(sic) by any further restrictions and uncontroller any regulations other than those that ex(sic) at the time when he was enrolled as a Pleader.

It is not necessary to consider the question IN this case whether the privilege confine a pleader to practice in a Court subject (sic) certain conditions is a right within the leaning of the said proviso, nor the question whether the provisions governing disciplinary jurisdiction of the High Court over pleaders practicing in the Courts confer a right on a pleader, for the provisions of the two Acts are practically similar in scope and content.

Whether we call it a right or a privilege, (sic)le Hyderabad Legal Practitioners Act does not (sic)nfer on him any right or privilege which is (sic)rger in content than that conferred under the legal Practitioners Act. Sections 6, 7, 12 and (sic) of Act 18 of 1879 correspond to Ss. 12, 14, (sic) and 17 of the Hyderabad Legal Practitioners (sic)ct. Rule 15 of the rules made by the High Court of Hyderabad under Act 18 of 1879 corresponds to S. 14 of the Hyderabad Legal practitioners Act.

A comparison of these provisions indicates at the provisions relating to enrolment, issue (sic) certificate and the vesting of disciplinary jurisdiction are similar under both the Acts, (sic)ere is, therefore, no scope for the argument at under the provisions of the Hyderabad legal Practitioners Act, the petitioner not having renewed his certificate, was not amenable (sic)the disciplinary jurisdiction of the High Court, notwithstanding his moral delinquency, where are, therefore, no merits in this argument.

14. The petitioner has been dismissed (sic)m the office of Munsif-Magistrate by the government on the ground of moral turpitude (sic)d inefficiency. Except stating that a writ is (sic)nding in the High Court to quash that order, (sic)thing has been said on the merits. We must, therefore, hold that the pleader is not a per-(sic) who could be retained on the register of (sic)eaders prepared by the Hyderabad High Court. We, therefore, direct that the name of the Pleader be removed from the register of pleaders.