(Prayer: Petition (disposed of on 22-11-1944) under Ss. 435 and 439, Crl. P.C. 1898, praying the High Court to revise the order of the Court of the Additional District Magistrate, West Godavari at Ellore in C.R.P. No. 13 of 1944 dated 3-7-44 (P.R.C. No. 9 of 1943 Stationary Sub-Magistrates Court, Narsapur).)

The petition in this case is in substance to quash the commitment of the petitioners to take their trial at the Sessions Court by the Additional District Magistrate of Ellore. The charge sheet filed by the police was enquired into by the Stationary Sub-Magistrate of Narsapur under the provisions of Chap. XVIII of the Code of Criminal Procedure. But when the prosecution evidence has been led and, after hearing the arguments of both parties, he decided that no case had been made out of an offence under S. 307 and accordingly framed charges under Ss. 147, 323 and 325 of the Indian Penal Code and converted, as he says, the case to a calendar case triable by himself. The Stationary Sub-Magistrate embodied his decision to frame charges against the accused only under Ss. 147, 323 and 325 of the Indian Penal Code in an order which he passed on the 30th March 1944. The order of the Additional District Magistrate now under consideration was passed on an application to him to revise the order of the Stationary Sub-Magistrate of the 30th March 1944 and to direct commitment of the accused to the Court of Sessions for trial under the charge of attempted murder as well as the other charge.

The commitment was made under S. 213 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, and under S. 215 a commitment made under S. 213 can be quashed by the High Court only on a point of law. I propose, therefore, to say nothing of the merits of the case. The point of law taken is that the Additional District Magistrate was not competent to entertain the revision petition and to order commitment because the case before the Stationary Sub-Magistrate was still proceeding, and because as I understand the contention, the Sub-Magistrate might still elect to commit the case himself. In support of the contention I have been referred to the decision of the Bench of this Court in Gandi Appa Raju v. King Emperor (43 Mad. 330 [LQ/MadHC/1919/294] = 10 L.W. 521). This case has no application in so far as it is contended that it assists the petitioner. On the contrary, it is authority for the view that the Additional District Magistrate had jurisdiction to make the commitment of the accused which he did. The real question in Gandi Appa Raju v. King Emperor (43 Mad. 330 [LQ/MadHC/1919/294] = 10 L.W. 521), was whether a prior order made on an application to the District Magistrate precluded the Sessions Judge, when an application was made to him, from directing the commitment of the accused. It was held that it did not, because the trial of the case was at a different stage when the application was made to the District Magistrate and when it was made to the Sessions Judge and because the District Magistrate had refused to consider the application on its merits. The learned Judges who decided Gandi Appa Raju v. King Emperor (43 Mad. 330 [LQ/MadHC/1919/294] = 10 L.W. 521), however, were of the opinion that the commitment by the Sessions Judge was correct. In the case which was under consideration in Gandi Appa Raju v. King Emperor (43 Mad. 330 [LQ/MadHC/1919/294] = 10 L.W. 521), the case had been taken on file under Ss. 147 and 304 but a charge had been framed under S. 147 only. The accused, therefore, had in effect been discharged in respect of the offence under S. 304, and from the judgment of Krishnan, J. in Gandi Appa Raju v. King Emperor (43 Mad. 330 [LQ/MadHC/1919/294] = 10 L.W. 521) it appears that the Sessions Judge was held to have been competent to make the order which he did because the accused had been discharged in respect of the offence under S. 304. In the present case, both the order passed by the Magistrate and the charge which he has framed show that, as far as the charge under S. 307 is concerned, the accused was discharged. The Additional District Magistrate, in my opinion, was therefore competent to set aside this order of discharge and direct that the accused be committed to take their trial at the Sessions Court. The petition is dismissed.