(Prayer: Petition (disposed of on 11-7-1950) praying that in the circumstances stated in the affidavit filed therewith the High Court will be pleased to (1) issue a writ of prohibition against the Election Sub Committee of the A.I.C.C., the President of the A.P.C.C. and the District Congress Committee, the Presidents, Taluk and Town Congress Committees, and the Returning Officers of the various Taluks and Towns in the district of Guntur; (2) Issue an interim prohibitive order prohibiting the returning Officers of the Taluks and Towns in the District of Guntur from holding congress primary Panchayat Elections; (3) Issue directions to the various authorities to prepare the electoral rolls of Primary Congress members and qualified members as per the rules of the Constitution and circulars issued by the various authorities, and (4) Give such other directions and grant such further reliefs as the circumstances of this case warrant, and this Honble Court thinks fit.)

This is an application for the issue of a writ of prohibition against the Election Sub-Committee of the All India Congress. Committee, the President of the Andhra Provincial Congress Committee and the District Congress Committee, the Presidents, Taluk and Town Congress Committees and the returning officers of the various Taluks and Towns in the District of Guntur for the Primary Congress Panchayat elections prohibiting them from holding Congress Primary Panchayat Elections in the District of Guntur, and to issue an interim prohibitive order prohibiting the Returning Officers of the Taluks and Towns in the District of Guntur from holding Congress Primary Panchayat elections and to issue directions to the various authorities to prepare the electoral rolls of primary Congress members and qualified members as per the rules of the Constitution and circulars issued by the various authorities and give such other directions and grant such further reliefs as the circumstances of this case warrant and this Court thinks fit. The application has been filed by two persons alleging themselves to be primary members of the Indian National Congress entitled to vote at the election of the Primary Congress Panchayat in the Tenali taluk, Guntur district.

We have heard fully Mr. C.R. Pattabhiraman learned Counsel for the petitioners, on the question, whether this Court can give the relief which the petitioners pray for in the petition under any provisions of law. The learned Counsel relied upon Art. 226(1) of the Constitution as giving us the power to give the several directions which he seeks in the petition. He stressed on the wide language employed in the Article and in particular referred to the words to any person or authority and for the enforcement of any of the rights conferred by Part III and for any other purpose. He practically concededand if he had not conceded we are prepared to holdthat a writ of prohibition as understood in the English law might not be available in this Court. But learned Counsel argued that Art. 226 is not confined to the issue of recognized writs like mandamus, prohibition or certiorari. It includes other writs and orders and directions without any restriction whatsoever as to their scope. In answer to a question from us he was compelled to confess that the logical result of the construction sought to be placed by him on the language of the Article would be to enable any person aggrieved to obtain any relief by an application under this Article. Take for instance the case of money due under a promissory note to the payee of the note. Ordinarily, the only remedy available for the creditor to recover the money due to him is by way of a suit in the appropriate Court But, as the language of Art. 226(1) is very wide and refers to the issue of directions to any person for any purpose, logically, the creditor instead of filing a suit can straightaway approach this Court for a direction to the debtor to pay him the money. As the only limitation contained in Art. 226 is that the power is confined to the territories in relation to which this Court exercises jurisdiction, presumably any person in the State of Madras can approach this Court under Art. 226 for a direction against any other person in this State for any purpose. The construction of Art. 226 would practically abrogate the entire judicial system and the machinery set up for the administration of justice in the State. We do not think that Art. 226 should be construed in this manner in spite of the wide language on which the Counsel relied.

The application in question purports to be for the issue of a writ of prohibition. Ordinarily, this writ is available only against inferior Courts and Tribunals and bodies entrusted by the law of the land with powers to affect the rights of parties. No case has been brought to our notice in which this writ has issued to a private organization, however widespread and powerful it may be. Mr. Pattabhiraman stated that the respondents against whom the writ was sought were officers of the Congress party. We do not think that the Congress party could be held in law to be a public body. It may be a very powerful, if not the most powerful, political party in the land and the members of the Governments of the various States are persons belonging to that party. Nevertheless in law, it cannot be held to be a public body entrusted by the law of the land with powers and duties relating to the rights of people.

If, therefore, a writ of prohibition in the strict sense of that term cannot issue in this case, can we say that Art. 226 gives us the power to issue directions to a private association, because certain irregularities are alleged to have been committed in the conduct of election to the various branches of that organization Or should the aggrieved persons be left to pursue the ordinary remedy by way of suit and injunction In our opinion, the general rule applied to the case of writs like mandamus, prohibition and certiorari, namely, that these writs will not issue if there is another adequate remedy should apply to the issue of a direction, order or writ under Art. 226(1) in spite of the apparently wide language employed. In this case, the petitioners could well have filed a suit and obtained immediately an urgent order of injunction and thus obtained the same reliefs which they seek from this Court. Then of course the suit should be filed in the Court having territorial jurisdiction in the matter.

For these reasons, we hold that this application is not maintainable under Art. 226(1) of the Constitution and it is therefore dismissed.