J B Pardiwala, J. - This Second Appeal under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure is at the instance of the original plaintiff and is directed against the judgment and order dated 23rd March 2018 passed by the 8th Additional District Judge, Surat, in the Regular Civil Appeal No.66 of 2011 arising from the judgment and decree passed by the 2nd Additional Senior Civil Judge, Surat, dated 20th September 2010 in the Special Civil Suit No.171 of 1996.

2. For the sake of convenience, the appellant herein shall be referred to as the original plaintiff and the respondent herein shall be referred to as the original defendant.

3. The facts giving rise to this Second Appeal may be summarised as under :

4. For better adjudication of the dispute between the parties, the family chart enumerated below will make the picture more clear :



5. The plaintiff instituted the Special Civil Suit No.171 of 1996 with respect to the suit property bearing Revenue Survey No.9/2/1, Block No.14/A, situated at village Vedchha, SubDistrict Choryasi, District Surat.

6. The plaintiff prayed for the following reliefs in the suit filed by her:

"(1) To partition half of the share of the ownership of the plaintiff and the land from the land bearing Revenue Survey No.9/2/1, Block No.14/A of village Vedchha, Sub-District Choryasi, District Surat, and to order accordingly in favour of the plaintiff.

(2) To declare that the defendant has no right in the aforesaid half of the suit land of the ownership of the plaintiff.

(3) Whatever the benefits and income the defendant has derived till date from the aforesaid suit land, the plaintiff is entitled to half of his share from the mesne profit along with interest.

(4) By way of permanent injunction, the defendant be restrained from carrying on any activity or interfering in the agricultural activities carried on by the plaintiff in half of the land of his ownership bearing Revenue Survey No.9/2/1, Block No.14/A of village Vedchha, Taluka Choryasi, District Surat, and to further restrain the defendant from transferring the said land by way of sale, mortgage, gift, rent, exchange or otherwise and mutating in the ownership right of the plaintiff."

7. Thus, the plaintiff claims to have 50% share in the suit property and she prays for a declaration to that effect and partition.

8. The defendant who happens to be the step brother of the plaintiff, contested the suit by filing his written statement vide Exh.20. In the written statement, the defendant clarified that the plaintiff cannot claim 50% share in the suit property but she has share only to the extent of 1-Acre and 9-Guntha of the suit land. According to the defendant, the plaintiff is entitled only to 1-Acre and 9-Guntha of the suit land by virtue of the family arrangement deed (registered partition deed) dated 9th September 1950 (Exh.113).

9. The defendant pointed out that way back in the year 1950, a family arrangement was entered into in writing duly signed by his father Ramanbhai and Indumatiben, i.e. the mother of the plaintiff. According to the defendant, the plaintiff cannot go behind the family arrangement deed or resile from the same having derived the benefit of the same with regard to the other properties. According to the defendant, the other properties which came to the share of the plaintiff were dealt with by her in accordance with the family arrangement deed and she cannot now raise any dispute with regard to the suit property. It is the case of the defendant that the family arrangement deed, which is a registered document and almost more than 30 years old, cannot be disputed or questioned by the plaintiff in any manner. It is also the case of the defendant that the plaintiff has suppressed material facts and should have been fair enough to disclose about the family partition deed reduced into writing of the year 1950. It is also the case of the defendant that the plaintiff is in knowledge of the family arrangement deed since 1965 and the same is not in dispute.

10. Having regard to the pleadings of the parties, the trial court framed the following issues vide Exh.85 :

"1. Whether the plaintiff proves that she has 1/2 share in the suit property bearing R.S. No.9/2/1, Block No.14/2 of village-Vedchha, Taluka Choryasi, Dist. Surat and she is entitled to get a decree of partition of her share

2. Whether plaintiff is entitled to accounts and mense profit

3. Whether plaintiff is entitled to get relief as claimed

4. What order and decree "

11. The issues framed by the trial court came to be answered as under :

"1. In the affirmative.

2. In the negative.

3. Partly in the affirmative.

4. As per final order."

12. The trial court, on the overall appreciation of the oral as well as documentary evidence, came to the conclusion that the family partition deed (Exh.113) has not been proved by the defendant in accordance with law and the same is not binding to the plaintiff. The trial court proceeded to allow the suit filed by the plaintiff on the premise that the daughter has an equal share in the ancestral property.

13. The defendant, being dissatisfied with the judgment and decree passed by the trial court, preferred the Regular Civil Appeal No.66 of 2011 in the District Court at Surat. The lower appellate court, upon re-appreciation of the entire oral as well as documentary evidence on record, allowed the appeal and thereby quashed and set-aside the judgment and decree passed by the trial court.

14. In such circumstances referred to above, the plaintiff, being dissatisfied with the judgment and order passed by the lower appellate court, has come up with this Second Appeal under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

15. The following questions have been formulated as the substantial questions of law in the memorandum of the Second Appeal :

"A. Whether, in the facts and circumstances of the case, the learned Appellate Court was justified in modifying the Judgment and Decree dated 20.9.2010 passed by the trial Court in Special Civil Suit No.171 of 1996 and thereby holding that the plaintiff is only entitled for 1-Acre 9-Guntha share instead of 1/2 (half) share in the suit property

B. Whether, in the facts and circumstances of the case, the learned Appellate Court was justified in holding that the permission under Section 8 of the Guardian & Wards Act is not required at the time of execution of Partition Deed (Exh.113)

C. Whether, in the facts and circumstances of the case, the learned Appellate Court was justified in holding that the document produced at Exh.113 was only a document with regard to the partition of immovable property and it was a family arrangement and, therefore, the permission under Sections 7 & 8 of the Guardian & Wards Act was not required

D. Whether Ld. Appellate Court has erred in allowing the application of the Respondent herein under Ord.41 R.27, whereby additional documents are produced by Respondent herein

E. Whether the Ld. Appellate Court has erred in relying upon partition deed Exh.113, in light of fact that Ld. Trial Court has specifically observed and held that Defendant failed to prove the legality of the said document

F. Whether the Ld. Appellate Court has erred in relying upon Section 90 of Indian Evidence Act, as regards Partition Deed which is executed on behalf of minor in absence of permission under Section 8 of Guardian & Wards Act "

16. Mr.Amit Thakkar, the learned counsel appearing for the appellant - original plaintiff, vehemently submitted that the lower appellate court committed a serious error in disturbing the judgment and decree passed by the trial court. The learned counsel would contend that the lower appellate court committed a serious error in looking into the family arrangement deed (Exh.113). According to the learned counsel, the family arrangement deed (Exh.113) has no legal force for two reasons; first, the date on which the same came to be executed, Ramanbhai, i.e. the father of the defendant, was a minor. In such circumstances, any contract with a minor would be a void transaction. Secondly, the document (Exh.113) is hit by Section 8(2) of the Hindu Minority & Guardianship Act, 1956. The submission of the learned counsel appearing for the plaintiff proceeds on the footing that, it is not permissible for the natural guardian without the previous permission of the court to mortgage, charge, transfer by sale, gift, exchange or otherwise, any part of the immovable property of the minor. The learned counsel would submit that even if the court deems fit to grant permission to the natural guardian to do any of the acts enumerated in sub-section (2), the same is permissible only in case of necessity or for an evident advantage to the minor.

17. In such circumstances referred to above, the learned counsel prays that there being merit in this Second Appeal, the same may be admitted and allowed.

18. On the other hand, this Second Appeal has been vehemently opposed by Mr.Kapadia, the learned counsel appearing for the original defendant on caveat. Mr.Kapadia would submit that no error, not to speak of any error of law, could be said to have been committed by the lower appellate court in allowing the appeal and thereby modifying the decree passed by the trial court.

19. According to Mr.Kapadia, the stance of the plaintiff is dishonest. She should not be permitted to approbate and reprobate. Having taken advantage and derived the benefit with regard to the other properties on the strength of the very same family arrangement deed, it is now not permissible for the plaintiff to go back and assert that the family arrangement deed is not binding to her. The learned counsel would submit that that the family arrangement deed is a registered document duly proved in the course of the trial. The deed is of the year 1950. The plaintiff was very much in knowledge of the said family arrangement deed and at no point of time she questioned the legality and validity of the same until the suit came to be filed in the year 1996. Mr.Kapadia further submitted that Section 8(2) of the Act, 1956, has no application in the facts of the present case. Mr.Kapadia in the last submitted that the submission canvassed on behalf of the plaintiff that Ramanbhai, i.e. the father of the defendant, was a minor at the time when the deed came to be executed, is absolutely erroneous. In the deed itself, the age of Ramanbhai has been shown to be 20 years. Even otherwise, this being a disputed question of fact, the same should not be looked into in this Second Appeal. In such circumstances referred to above, the learned counsel appearing for the defendant prays that there being no merit in this Second Appeal, the same need not be admitted and it deserves dismissal in limine.

20. Mr.Kapadia submitted that in fact the suit should have been dismissed solely on the ground that the plaintiff failed to amend the plaint as well as the prayer clause with respect to the family arrangement deed (Exh.113). According to Mr.Kapadia, the defendant, having once produced the family arrangement deed and relied upon the same, then in such circumstances, without amending the prayer for the purpose of cancellation of the document or even atleast for a declaration that the deed is not binding upon the plaintiff, the suit should have been dismissed in view of Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act.

21. Having heard the learned counsel appearing for the parties and having considered the materials on record, the only question that falls for my consideration is, whether any substantial question of law is involved in this Second Appeal.

22. Before adverting to the rival submissions canvassed on either side, let me look into the findings recorded by the two courts below. The trial court, while allowing the suit filed by the plaintiff, recorded the following findings :

"As per this partition deed, the share of the mother of the plaintiff is 01 acre, 09 gunthas. The rituals after the death of the mother of the plaintiff were performed by the defendants. At the time of death of Indumatiben, the plaintiff was residing at Vadodara and Indumatiben had informed Gordhanbhai while she was alive that after her death, all the rituals have to be performed by Harshadbhai only and these two bigha land will also be given to Harshadbhai.

Accordingly, the defendant received the suit land. Therefore, the plaintiff has no right. This witness has been cross examined by the plaintiff and in the cross-examination, he corroborates the fact that the plaintiff has 01 acre, 09 guntha share in the suit land. It is further stated that he does not have any documentary evidence that the plaintiff has waived his right share. He has further stated that as Vasanjibhai Akhabhai has not prepared any will or testament with respect to the suit land while he was alive, the names of the mother of the plaintiff and the father of the defendant were entered as successors. This witness has further admitted in the cross-examination that after Induben Vasanji died, the name of the plaintiff was entered as per succession right in block no. 14-A. He does not know as to whether entry was made in the revenue record regarding the division made on the basis of partition deed dated 9/9/1950. He has further admitted that at the time of executing partition deed dated 9/9/1950, his father was a minor and the plaintiff was also a minor and he does not know whether sanction was obtained from District Court as per law before executing this partition deed. Except this, no other evidence has been produced for the defendant.

9. On taking into consideration the oral and documentary evidences of both the parties, it is found that the suit land was registered in the name of the original owner Vasanji Akhabhai and after his death, the names of Indumatiben mother of the plaintiff and Ramanbhai father of the defendant were entered in record as per succession rights and after their deaths, the names of the plaintiff and the defendant were entered into the revenue record. During the process of amalgamation as per law, the land was given block number. Looking to Exh 90 to 102, it is found that entries regarding all these effects were made in revenue record at various times. Looking to this documentary evidence, it is found that the names of the plaintiff and defendant are registered in the record of suit land of block no. 14 - A legally as per succession rights. Looking to the facts of partition deed produced vide Ex-113 for defendant, no effect has been made in Revenue record in connection with partition of the disputed property in accordance with the facts of the registered deed and defendant stated the said fact in deposition. Under the given circumstances, if partition is done among the parties and no effect has been made in Revenue record in this regard, the same cannot be considered ordinarily. Further, the said partition deed was executed in 1950. Considering evidence of defendants deposition at that time, the executor of deed, defendants father, was minor at that time and as per law, if the said deed was executed without obtaining permission from District Court, the same does not hold any legal value. Further, plaintiff-Ilaben was minor at the time of execution of the deed. Under the given circumstances, as minor Ilaben held right in succession property, her mother cannot waive the same by executing the said deed. Considering defendants deposition and pleadings, it appears from the record that defendant admits the share admeasuring 01 acre, 09 guntha of plaintiff in the land. Under the given circumstances, it appear prima facie from documentary evidence that plaintiff legally holds half share in the suit land.

Looking to the fact that defendant cultivated the land and received yield as per the statement of plaintiff side, plaintiff has not produced any cogent evidence on record that defendant has been cultivating the land and receiving yield. Under the given circumstances, as there is no record as to which crop was cultivated and how much was earned by the defendant, plaintiff does not become entitled to receive yield.

10. Learned Advocate Shri Banatvala for Plaintiff has submitted that plaintiff is entitled for half share in the disputed land by way of succession right and defendant also states the same in pleadings. Considering the same, plaintiff holds the right in the suit land. Original suit land belonged to Vasanji Akha. After his death, the said land was transferred in the names of plaintiffs mother- Induben and Harshadbhais father- Ramanbhai by way of succession right. After their deaths, names of plaintiff and defendant were entered by way of succession right. Considering entries on record and documentary evidence, the said facts have been proven. Defendant has produced partition deed vide Ex-113. The same was produced after depositions of plaintiff and defendant. Since, its legality could not be proved, the same does not appear credible. As plaintiff is entitled to receive share under the Hindu Succession Act and considering deeds from Ex-90 to 102 in revenue record, it was ordered to confirm the suit of plaintiff. Authority produced in corroboration of submission-

(1) Anaradevi Vs. Parmeshvaridevi, (2006) 3 GLH 442.

(2) (2009)6 Supreme Court Cases Page no.800. It has been held by the Honble Supreme Court in both these authorities that as per the Hindu Succession Act, the daughter is also entitled to get her due share from Ancestral Property. Thus, under such circumstances, the Court believes that the plaintiff is entitled to get the benefit of directive principles of the said authority.

In spite of giving sufficient opportunities and serving the notice, the defendant side has not appeared or made arguments. Hence, its right to argue is closed. Under such circumstances and on the basis of above discussed reasons, I accept the arguments made on behalf of the plaintiff and give my reply to the issue No. 1 in affirmative, Issue No. 2 in negative and Issue No. 3 partly in affirmative and pass order as under in connection with the Issue No. 4 by holding that the plaintiff is entitled to get half share of the land in suit."

23. The operative part of the judgment and order passed by the trial court reads as under :

" -: ORDER :-

The plaint of the plaintiff is partly allowed.

The plaintiff is hereby declared as an owner of 1/2 part of the said suit land registered vide Block No. 14 - A of Revenue Survey No. 9/2/1 situated at village - Vedchha, Taluka - Choryasi, Dist - Surat.

The interim stay order passed by this Court on 30/12/1998 directing that the defendant shall not transfer or cause to transfer the said property and he shall not create any encumbrance or right or cause to create any encumbrance or right in connection with the said suit property till apportionment of 1/2 part of the plaintiff, is hereby confirmed.

The Collector, Surat, is hereby ordered to get 1/2 part of the land parted through his subordinate officers after payment of necessary prescribed fees from the plaintiff in connection with the said suit property by considering the legal provision in this regard.

At the present stage of the suit, preliminary decree be drawn as per the order till the plaintiff is given his share of land by the Collector, Surat. Separate final decree be drawn in the present case, after apportionment of 1/2 part of the suit land in favour of the plaintiff by the Collector, Surat."

24. The findings recorded by the trial court did not find favour with the lower appellate court. The findings recorded by the lower appellate court are enumerated as under :

Facts recorded by the appellate court are as under :

"As per the undisputed and admitted facts ::

The suit property is ancestral property

The name of the plaintiff has been entered in the revenue record of the suit property after the death of Induben Vasanji i.e. the mother of the plaintiff in the year 1990, and that entry was also certified by the revenue authority.

The physical possession of the suit property with the defendant.

Plaintiff is residing at Vadodara

The document at Mark 22/1 to 22/ 62 are produced by defendant/appellant in the appeal. All the documents are mostly the revenue records and Others are copy of registered sale deed copies.

The defendant did not examine any person to prove those documents

The plaintiff did not get right to rebut these documents.

The plaintiff and her mother have had use the document Exh. 113 for sale of the property in which they got share as per this partition deed.

The defendant did not take dispute regarding the document Exh. 113 with which the plaintiff got benefit in her favour in written statement of his pleading in the suit.

Neither the plaintiff nor her mother has challenged this Deed Exh. 113 in the court after getting knowledge.

Exh. 113 is 30 years old document.

The plaintiff and her mother has got knowledge about the Reg. Civil Appeal No. 66/ 2011 37 Judgment document Exh. 113 - Partition Deed document.

The plaintiff has not challenged the document Exh. 113 - Partition Deed, after attaining the age of majority, till today.

At the time of execution of document Exh. 113, plaintiff and defendant were minor."

"(35) Hence, as per the provisions of law, my predecessor in office has allowed the application of the applicant, and granted permission for the production of documents, and accordingly, the documents are produced at Mark 22/1 to 22/60. But, so far reading the said documents as evidence is concerned, my predecessor in office has passed order to decide that aspect at the time of arguments so far evidentiary value of the said documents is concerned. From the said documents, it is an admitted fact that those documents are certified copies, some are certified sale deeds and Others are revenue record of the property. But so far that aspect is concerned, as per the written statement filed by the defendant, he has not taken any plea or dispute or fact that, the plaintiff and her mother, by using document of Partition Deed, got benefited from the property. She has also sold out the property of joint properties mentioned in the Partition Deed. Moreover, the defendant has not examined any person for proving that document at the appellate stage. Looking to the principles of equality before law, both the parties have equal rights and equal opportunity in the case. By allowing the documents, the rights of other party of disproving it, cannot be avail to the plaintiff in this case. So, by mere production of additional evidence, the appellant/ defendant failed to prove that document in the appeal, more particularly these documents are against the pleadings of written statement in this case.

(36) From the appeal, it is also admitted fact that, Partition Deed produced at Exh. 113 is more than 30 years old. As per Sec.19 of Indian Evidence Act, it is regarding presumption of the document of 20 years old. It is presumpted in the evidence the documents which are more than 20 years old. The document Exh. 113 is a registered document.

(37) Here, in this case, the learned Trial Court has allowed the suit of the plaintiff mainly on the ground that, plaintiff is the daughter of Induben and her name was entered in the revenue record in the year 1990. As per the ancestral property, the plaintiff and defendant have equal share in the suit property. Partition Deed was not proved legally by the defendant, and as per Hindu Succession Act, the plaintiff is entitled to equal share in the ancestral property. So far the document Exh. 113 is concerned, the learned Trial Court has not considered the said document mainly on the ground that, at the time of execution of that document, plaintiff and defendant were minor. At the time of executing the document Exh. 113, under the Guardian & Wards Act, permission of court has not been taken by the maker of the document i.e. grandfather of the plaintiff. Also the plaintiff has denied the execution of document Exh. 113 in the evidence, and through that document, no revenue entry was executed. Effect of that partition deed was not given in the revenue record, and so, the Trial Court has not considered this document.

(38) As per written arguments of the learned Advocate for the defendant of this appeal, and so far the factual aspect of the suit is considered, it is admitted fact that, in the crossexamination of the plaintiff, she has replied to the question of defendant that, she has knowledge regarding execution of document Exh. 113. After 15 years of its execution, the document Exh. 113 was executed on 9-9-1950. So, the plaintiff and her mother got knowledge regarding execution of the document in the year 1965, but she did not file any complaint or not given any written notice or not given written objection before any authority. The plaintiff raised the plea that, the signature of her mother was obtained by force on this document, meaning thereby, without her consent. However, after getting knowledge of that thing in the year 1965, and thereafter, she or her mother has not filed any proceeding under the law regarding the document Exh. 113 in regard to the document being forged, false or for any other thing. Even after attaining majority, she has not challenged the Partition Deed before any Authority or Court about its legality.

(39) The defendant in his written arguments, so far the rights regarding the property is concerned, submits that, along with rights of minor, after attaining the age of majority, and then within 3 years, she has to avail her rights. So, limitation period starts from the date of attaining age of majority. As per evidence in the suit, the plaintiff has not filed any suit, complaint or any other proceeding regarding forged document or obtaining signature of her mother falsely on the said document till the filing of the suit , and after knowing that fact in the suit, she has not challenged the Partition Deed. So, according to the provisions of law, under such circumstance, document Exh. 113 is binding to the plaintiff.

(40) Moreover, it is a registered Partition Deed. So, as per provisions of Sec. 19 of Evidence Act, it is presumed that this is a genuine document. Here, in this case, in the crossexamination of the plaintiff, she has admitted that, she got knowledge regarding document Exh. 113. So considering that aspect, she got knowledge of that document in the year 1965. When she has not challenged the document till the appeal, under such circumstances, as per Sec. 115 of Evidence Act, plaintiff is barred by the principles of estoppel regarding Partition Deed Exh. 113 in this case.

(41) As per the provisions of Sec. 7/8 of Guardian & Wards Act, it is relating to the rights of the minor. This provision is mainly regarding regarding the permission before selling the share of the minor in the property. So, the rights of the minor cannot be prejudiced. Here, it is an admitted fact that, at the time of execution of document Exh. 113, the plaintiff and defendants father were minors. But the document Exh. 113 is for the benefit of minors. Under such circumstances, as per the provisions of law, permission of court for the partition of the property is not necessary. Hence, the observation made by the learned Trial Court that, at the time of executing document Exh. 113, permission of the District Court is necessary. It is against the law and illegal. So, the finding given by the Trial Court is against the law, and therefore, it cannot be considered in the eye of law.

(42) So, as per the document Exh. 113, the share of plaintiff is Acre 1 9 Gunthas only. So, the observation and finding of the learned Trial Court that, without considering this document, granted 1/ 2 share of the suit property in favour of plaintiff, is against the facts and law, which requires to be set aside. In view of above discussion and observations, it appears that the learned Trial Court has committed error and illegality in holding that the plaintiff is entitled to one-half share in the suit property. Accordingly, Point No. 1 is answered partly in the affirmative."

25. The operative part of the judgment and order passed by the lower appellate court reads as under :

"FINAL ORDER

Appellants present appeal is hereby partly allowed. The Judgment and decree passed by 2nd Addl. Sr.Civil Judge, Surat in Special Civil Suit No.171 of 1996 on dt. 20/09/2010 is hereby partly modified, to the extent that, the plaintiff is entitled to get the share in the suit property bearing Rev. Survey No.9/2/1, Block No.14/A of village Vedchha, Taluka Choryasi, District Surat to the extent of land admeasuring 01Acre-09Gunthas.

Parties shall bear their own costs of this appeal. Preliminary decree to be modified accordingly."

26. There is no doubt that the stance of the plaintiff is dishonest. For some reason or the other, may be with an oblique motive or upon instigation of someone, she has disowned and resiled from the registered family arrangement deed (Exh.113).

27. At this stage, let me give a fair idea about the family arrangement deed (Exh.113), more particularly, the distribution of various ancestral properties between the plaintiff and the father of the defendant.

I. Details of family immovable property :

1. Residential house situated at Desai Colony of Surat District, Surat Sub District, Taluka Choryasi, Village Saniya (Hemad) alongwith shed and land of yard.

2. Lands situated at the sim of Surat District, Surat Sub District, Taluka Choryasi, Village Saniya (Hemad).

Survey No.

Acre - Guntha

Assessment Rs. A.Pa.

9 paiki (Farm)

2-24

19-2-0

18 paiki

3-35

28-8-0

48 paiki (Moravani Khedan)

3-30

24-8-0

72 paiki (Moravani - Grassy (Ghasiya))

2-24

16-0-0

189 paiki (Near Kankra Dubadvada)

1-11

9-12-0

7 (Kaliya)

2-7

17-2-0

3. Lands situated at Surat, District, Surat Sub-District, Taluka Kamrej, Village Chhedachha.

Survey No.

Bigha - Vasa

Assessment Rs. A.Pa.

59 (of Goman Kasan)

6-5

21-5-0

58 paiki (with house)

8-12

35-12-0

4. Land situated at Surat District, Surat Sub-District, Taluka Choryasi, Village Vedachha.

Survey No.

Acre - Guntha

Assessment Rs. A.Pa.

9

13-27

62-0-0

Amongst (paiki) 9

6-33 1/2

31-0-0

5. Lands situated at Surat District, Surat Sub-District, Taluka Kamrej, Village Kosmada.

Survey No.

Acre - Guntha

Assessment Rs. A.Pa.

241/1 (Soapy)

13-6

45-5-0

258

13-0

42-4-0

II. Properties that came to the share of the Second Part i.e. Indumati & Ilaben (Plaintiff) :

1. In the house and shed mentioned at No.1 above, half portion of the western part of the house and shed have been given to Bai Indumati for living and personal use until her death and after her death, the house will be of free ownership of the First Party.

2. Land situated at Village Saniya (Hemad), Survey No.7, Acre 2-7 Guntha

3. Land situated at Village Vedchha, Survey No.59, Bigha 6 Vasa 5.

4. Land situated at Village Kosmada, Survey No.241/1, Bigha 13-6 Vasa.

5. Land situated at Village Vedchha, Survey No.9, Acre 13-Guntha, Assessment Rs. 62-0-0, Acre 1 Guntha 9.

III. Properties that came to the share of the First Part i.e. Ramanbhai (Defendant) :

1. House situated at abovesaid Saniya (Hemad) Village and Kodhara has been given to Bai Indumati for personal use and rights. Except that, eastern part and that house and yard alongwith land of shed related to Kodhara in which joint use of Bai Indumati and of the second party has been kept.

2. Land situated at Village Saniya (Hemad):-

Survey No.

Acre - Guntha

Assessment Rs. A.Pa.

Price

9 paiki

2-24

19-2-0

Rs.1000/-

18 paiki

3-35

28-8-0

Rs.1200/-

48 paiki

3-30

24-8-0

Rs.900/-

72 paiki

2-24

16-0-0

Rs.800/-

189 paiki

2-11

9-12-0

Rs.700/-

3. Land situated at Village - Vedchha.

Survey No.

Acre - Guntha

Assessment Rs. A.Pa

9 paiki

5-24 1/2

25-0-0

4. Land situated at Village - Vedchha

Survey No.

Acre - Guntha

Assessment Rs. A.Pa

58 paiki

8-12

35-12-0

5. Land situated at village Kasmada

Survey No.

Bigha - Vasa

Assessment Rs. A.Pa.

258

13-0

42-4-0

28. Thus, it is apparent that the suit property is not the only property which came to be divided between the parties. Various other properties were divided and the plaintiff took benefit and dealt with all those properties in her own way which came to her share. In such circumstances, it would not lie now in her mouth to say that the agreement of family arrangement deed (Exh.113) is not binding to her.

29. In the aforesaid context, I may refer to and rely upon a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Ram Charan Das v. Girja Nandini Devi and Others, (1966) AIR SC 323, more particularly the observations as contained in paragraph 10 of the decision, which reads thus :

"10. The view that the transaction is a family arrangement is borne out by the decision of the Privy Council in Ramgouda Annagouda v. Bhausaheb, (1927) AIR PC 227, 54 Ind App 396. The facts of the case which have been correctly summarised in the head note are briefly these:

"A Hindu died in 1846, leaving a widow who survived until 1912, and a daughter. On the death of the widow A was heir to the estate. In 1868 the widow had alienated nearly the whole property by three deeds executed and registered on the same day. By the first deed she gave a property to her brother, by the second she sold half of another property to A, and by the third she sold the other half of that property to her son-inlaw. The signature of each of the deeds was attested by the two other alienees. A who survived the widow for six years, did not seek to set aside any of the alienations. After his death his son and grandsons brought a suit to recover the whole property."

Upon these facts the Privy Council held as follows:

"Their Lordships consider that the decision of this case depends upon how far the three documents can be taken as separate and independent, or so connected as to form one transaction.

The long lapse of time between the execution of the deeds and the institution of the suit has rendered it impossible to prove what actually occurred between the parties on that occasion. There is not sufficiently definite evidence to come to a conclusion as to how far any of those properties were validly encumbered, or what was done with the purchase money alleged to have passed on the two deeds of sale. But the parties to the documents included, or after so great a lapse of time may be presumed in a very real sense to have included, all persons who had any actual or possible interest in the properties-namely, the widow herself, her brother, who was a natural object of her affection and bounty, her son-in-law, who was the natural protector of the interests of her daughter and grandson, and the nearest kinsman on the husbands side and the only person from whom any opposition might be apprehended with regard to dealings by the widow concerning her husbands estate.

Their Lordships conclude that all the circumstances strongly point to the three documents being part and parcel of one transaction by which a disposition was made of Akkagoudas estate, such as was likely to prevent disputes in the future and therefore in the best interests of all the parties. The three deeds appear thus to be inseparably connected together and in that view Annagouda not only consented to the sale to Shivgouda and the gift to Basappa but these dispositions formed parts of the same transaction by which he himself acquired a part of the estate."

In our case, however, there is fortunately only one transaction and we have definite evidence to show that there were disputes amongst the members of the family and it was avowedly for settling them that the transaction was entered into. Further we have material to show that all the persons who can be said to be interested in the property were joined as parties to the transaction. In that sense this case is stronger than the one which the Privy Council had to consider. We have therefore no hesitation in holding that the plaintiff who has taken benefit under the transaction is not now entitled to turn round and say that that transaction was of a kind which Kadma Kuar could not enter into and was therefore invalid. Moreover acting on the terms of that document Gopinath paid monies to the Court of Wards for obtaining release from its management of the properties which were allotted to him. The rule of estoppel embodied in S. 115 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 would, therefore, shut out such pleas of the plaintiff. Courts give effect to a family settlement upon the broad and general ground that its object is to settle existing or future disputes regarding property amongst members of a family. The word family in the context is not to be understood in a narrow sense of being a group of persons who are recognised in law as having a right of succession or having a claim to a share in the property in dispute. In Ramgouda Annagouda case, (1927) AIR PC 227, 54 Ind App 396, of the three parties to the settlement of a dispute concerning the property of a deceased person one was his widow, other her brother and the third her son-in-law. The two latter could not, under the Hindu Law, be regarded as the heirs of the deceased. Yet, bearing in mind their near relationship to the widow the settlement of the dispute was very properly regarded as a settlement of a family dispute. The consideration for such a settlement, if one may put it that way, is the expectation that such a settlement will result in establishing or ensuring amity and goodwill amongst persons bearing relationship with one another. That consideration having passed by each of the disputants the settlement consisting of recognition of the right asserted by each other cannot be permitted to be impeached thereafter."

30. The concept of family arrangement/settlement has been explained by the Supreme Court in the case of Ranganayakamma and another v. K.S.Prakash (D) by L.Rs and Others, (2009) Supp AIR SC 1218. I may refer to the observations made in paragraph 24 thus :

"24. It may be true that although the properties were described as coparcenary property and both the branches were granted equal share but it must be remembered that the decree was passed on the basis of the settlement arrived at. It was in the nature of a family settlement. Some give and take was necessary for the purpose of arriving at a settlement. A partition by metes and bounds may not always be possible. A family settlement is entered into for achieving a larger purpose, viz., achieving peace and harmony in the family.

In Hari Shankar Singhania and Others v. Gaur Hari Singhania and Others, (2006) 4 SCC 658 [LQ/SC/2006/299] , this Court held :

"43. The concept of "family arrangement or settlement" and the present one in hand, in our opinion, should be treated differently. Technicalities of limitation, etc. should not be put at risk of the implementation of a settlement drawn by a family, which is essential for maintaining peace and harmony in a family. Also it can be seen from decided cases of this Court that, any such arrangement would be upheld if family settlements were entered into to allay disputes existing or apprehended and even any dispute or difference apart, if it was entered into bona fide to maintain peace or to bring about harmony in the family. Even a semblance of a claim or some other ground, as say affection, may suffice as observed by this Court in Ram Charan Das v. Girjanandini Devi." [See also Govt. of A.P. and Others v. M. Krishnaveni and Others, (2006) 7 SCC 365 [LQ/SC/2006/710] and Ramdev Food Products (P) Ltd. v. Arvindbhai Rambhal Patel, (2006) 8 SCC 726 [LQ/SC/2006/776] .

31. I may also refer to one another judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Amteshwar Anand v. Virender Mohan Singh and Others, (2006) AIR SC 151, more particularly, the observations made in paragraph 31 of the decision, which read thus :

"31. The validity of the assignment was however questioned by the appellants on the ground that the first two agreements were not registered. The submission is untenable. Section 17(1) of the Registration Act, 1908 in so far as it is relevant, requires under Clause (b) thereof, registration of "nontestamentary instruments which purport or operate to create, declare, assign, limit or extinguish, whether in present or in future, any right, title or interest, whether vested or contingent, of the value of one hundred rupees and upwards, to or in immovable property". Sub section (2) of Section 17 creates exceptions to the mandatory requirements of Section 17(1)(b) and (c). One of the exceptions made in Section 17(2) of the Registration Act 1908, is Clause (i). This exception pertains to "any composition deed". In other words all composition deeds are exempt from the requirement to be registered under that Act. The Composition Deed in this case was a transaction between the members of the same family for the mutual benefit of such members. It is not the appellants case that the agreements required registration under any other Act. Apart from this, there is the principle that Courts lean in favour of upholding a family arrangement instead of disturbing the same on technical or trivial grounds particularly when the parties have mutually received benefits under the arrangement. Both the courts below had concurrently found that the parties had enjoyed material benefits under the agreements. We have ourselves also rescrutinized the evidence on record on this aspect and have found nothing to persuade us to take a contrary view. Furthermore, in this case the agreements had merged in the decree of the Court which is also excepted under sub-section 2(vi) of Section 17 of the Registration Act, 1908." (See : Govind Ram v. Madan Gopal, (1945) AIR PC 74, 76.; Kale and Others v. Deputy Director of Consolidation and Others, (1976) AIR SC 807; 17(2) (vi) any decree or order of a Court except a decree or order expressed to be made on a compromise and comprising immovable property other than that which is the subject-matter of the suit or proceedings;)

PARTITION :

32. Partition is a re-distribution or adjustment of pre-existing rights, among co-owners/coparceners, resulting in a division of lands or other properties jointly held by them, into different lots or portions and delivery thereof to the respective allottees. The effect of such division is that the joint ownership is terminated and the respective shares vest in them in severalty. A partition of a property can be only among those having a share or interest in it. A person who does not have a share in such property cannot obviously be a party to a partition. Separation of share is a species of partition. When all co-owners get separated, it is a partition. Separation of shares/s refers to a division where only one or only a few among several co-owners/coparceners get separated, and Others continue to be joint or continue to hold the remaining property jointly without division by metes and bounds. For example, where four brothers owning a property divide it among themselves by metes and bounds, it is a partition. But if only one brother wants to get his share separated and other three brothers continue to remain joint, there is only a separation of the share of one brother. In a suit for partition or separation of a share, the prayer is not only for declaration of plaintiffs share in the suit properties, but also division of his share by metes and bounds. This involves three issues : (i) whether the person seeking division has a share or interest in the suit property/properties; (ii) whether he is entitled to the relief of division and separate possession; and (iii) how and in what manner, the property/properties should be divided by metes and bounds

FAMILY ARRANGEMENT :

33. The Supreme Court in Kale v. Dy. Director of Consolidation, (1976) AIR SC 807, while considering what family settlement or family arrangement is, Fazal Ali J., speaking for himself and V.R.Krishna Iyer, J., observed as follows in paras 9 and 10:

"(9) The object of the arrangement is to protect the family from long drawn litigation or perpetual strifes which mar the unity and solidarity of the family and create hatred and bad blood between the various members of the family................

(10) In other words to put the binding effect and the essentials of a family settlement in a concretised form, the matter may be reduced into the form of the following propositions:

(1) The family settlement must be a bona fide one so as to resolve family disputes and rival claims by a fair and equitable division or allotment of properties between the various members of the family;

(2) The said settlement must be voluntary and should not be induced by fraud, coercion or undue influence;

(3) The family arrangement may be even oral in which case no registration is necessary;

(4) It is well-settled that registration would be necessary only if the terms of the family arrangement are reduced into writing. Here also, a distinction should be made between a document containing the terms and recitals of a family arrangement made under the document and a mere memorandum prepared after the family arrangement had already been made either for the purpose of the record or for information of the Court for making necessary mutation. In such a case the memorandum itself does not create or extinguish any rights in immovable properties and, therefore, does not fall within the mischief of S. 17 (2) of the Registration Act and is, therefore, not compulsorily registerable;

(5) The members who may be parties to the family arrangement must have some antecedent title, claim or interest even a possible claim in the property which is acknowledged by the parties to the settlement. Even if one of the parties to the settlement has no title but under the arrangement the other party relinquishes all its claims or titles in favour of such a person and acknowledges him to be the sole owner, then the antecedent title must be assumed and the family arrangement will be upheld and the Courts will find no difficulty in giving assent to the same;

(6) Even if bona fide disputes, present or possible, which may not involve legal claims are settled by a bona fide family arrangement which is fair and equitable the family arrangement is final and binding on the parties to the settlement."

34. In a family consisting of father or mother and children, if an arrangement is made in respect of the properties either selfacquired by anyone, or owned by the joint family or in the nature of ancestral, the intention of the parties in treating those properties all along is relevant and important than going by the very nature of acquisition itself. Once the family decides to enter into an arrangement in respect of those properties and accordingly executes a document thereby clearly indicating the intention of the family as how the properties are treated and sought to be enjoyed by parties referred to therein, such intention alone should prevail over all other technical objections, if any, like nomenclature of the document, registration, etc., After all, the family has every right to decide and exhibit its intention as agreed upon by its members for prevailing peace among them. The technicalities should not stand in the way. At the end of the day, the peace in the family is the utmost requirement which is to be achieved at any cost. No doubt, in a family, at times, the emotional outburst may result on account of making an unbalanced document relating to the properties, between its members. Such document, in a given case, might confer or convey the entire property to one or more of the family members excluding the other members. After some cooling time, another document, similar in nature, might come into existence contra to the one executed earlier thereby creating rights in favour of the other members. Needless to say that these emotional outbursts in a family, are common and not unusual depending upon the conduct of parties both with their legal and moral obligations. Therefore, such conveyances may not be taken as a conclusive proof of the real intention of the family, especially when one party is fully benefited and the other party is totally denied. Therefore, in such circumstances, it is for the court to consider and decide based on the document which is benefiting all the parties without any bias or partiality, showing or exhibiting the real intention of the family thereby bringing peace among its members.

35. In the present case, Indumatiben, i.e. the mother of the plaintiff Ilaben, wanted peace to prevail in the family. Hence, by way of executing Exh.113, she joined with her stepbrother, namely Ramanbhai, and divided the various properties.

36. In the aforesaid context, I may refer to and rely upon a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Hari Shankar Singhania and Others v. Gaur Hari Singhania and Others, (2006) AIR SC 2488, wherein from paragraph 43 onwards upto paragraph 54, the Supreme Court has discussed the concept of family arrangement/family settlement. It reads thus :

"43. Another fact that assumes importance at this stage is that, a family settlement is treated differently from any other formal commercial settlement as such settlement in the eyes of law ensures peace and goodwill among the family members. Such family settlements generally meet with approval of the Courts. Such settlements are governed by a special equity principle where the terms are fair and bona fide, taking into account the well being of a family.

44. The concept of family arrangement or settlement and the present one in hand, in our opinion, should be treated differently. Technicalities of limitation etc should not be put at risk of the implementation of a settlement drawn by a family, which is essential for maintaining peace and harmony in a family. Also it can be seen from decided cases of this Court that, any such arrangement would be upheld if family settlements were entered into ally disputes existing or apprehended and even any dispute or difference apart, if it was entered into bona fide to maintain peace or to bring about harmony in the family. Even a semblance of a claim or some other ground, as say affection, may suffice as observed by this Court in the case of Ram Charan v. Girija Nandini, (1966) AIR SC 323.

45. In Lala Khunni Lal v. Kunwar Gobind Krishna Nairain, the Privy Council examined that it is the duty of the courts to uphold and give full effect to a family arrangement.

46. In Sahu Madho Das and Ors. v Pandit Mukand Ram and Anr., 1955 (2) SCR 22 [Vivian Bose, Jagannadhadas and BP Sinha, JJ.] placing reliance on Clifton v. Cockburn, (1834) 3 My&K 76 and William v. William,1866 2 LRCh 29, this Court held that a family arrangement can, as a matter of law, be implied from a long course of dealings between the parties. It was held that "..so strongly do the courts lean in favour of family arrangements that bring about harmony in a family and do justice to its various members and avoid, in anticipation, future disputes which might ruin them all, that we have no hesitation in taking the next step (fraud apart) and upholding an arrangement.."

47. The real question in this case as framed by the Court was whether the appellant/plaintiff assented to the family arrangement. The court examined that "the family arrangement was one composite whole in which the several dispositions formed parts of the same transaction"

48. In Ram Charan Das v. Girjanadini Devi, , this Court observed as follows : paragraph

"Courts give effect to a family settlement upon the broad and general ground that its object is to settle existing or future disputes regarding property amongst members of a family.........The consideration for such a settlement will result in establishing or ensuring amity and good-will amongst persons bearing relationship with one another."

49. In Maturi Pullaiah v. Maturi Narasimham, (1966) AIR SC 1836, this court held that "although conflict of legal claims in praesenti or in future is generally a condition for the validity of family arrangements, it is not necessarily so. Even bona fide disputes, present or possible, which may not involve legal claims, will suffice. Members of a joint Hindu family may, to maintain peace or to bring about harmony in the family, enter into such a family arrangement. If such an arrangement is entered into bona fide and the terms thereof are fair in the circumstances of a particular case, courts will more readily give assent to such an arrangement than to avoid it."

50. Further in Krishna Biharilal v. Gulabchand, (1971) 1 SCC 837 [LQ/SC/1971/183] , this Court reiterated the approach of courts to lean strongly in favour of family arrangements to bring about harmony in a family and do justice to its various members and avoid in anticipation future disputes which might ruin them all. This approach was again re-emphasised in S.Shanmugam Pillai v. K. Shanmugam Pillai, (1973) 2 SCC 312 [LQ/SC/1972/303] where it was declared that this court will be reluctant to disturb a family arrangement.

51. In Kale and Others. v. Deputy Director of Consolidation and Others, (1976) 3 SCC 119 [LQ/SC/1976/20] [VR Krishna Iyer, RS Sarkaria and S. Murtaza Fazal Ali, JJ.] this Court examined the effect and value of family arrangements entered into between the parties with a view to resolving disputes for all. This Court observed that "By virtue of a family settlement or arrangement members of a family descending from a common ancestor or a near relation seek to sink their differences and disputes, settle and resolve their conflicting claims or disputed titles once for all in order to buy peace of mind and bring about complete harmony and goodwill in the family. The family arrangements are governed by a special equity peculiar to themselves and would be enforced if honestly made......... the object of the arrangement is to protect the family from long drawn litigation or perpetual strives which mar the unity and solidarity of the family and create hatred and bad blood between the various members of the family. Today when we are striving to build up an egalitarian society and are trying for a complete reconstruction of the society, to maintain and uphold the unity and homogeneity of the family which ultimately results in the unification of the society and therefore, of the entire country, is the prime need of the hour........ the Courts have, therefore, leaned in favour of upholding a family arrangement instead of disturbing the same on technical or trivial grounds. Where the courts find that the family arrangement suffers from a legal lacuna or a formal defect the rule of estoppel is pressed into service and is applied to shut out plea of the person who being a party to family arrangement seeks to unsettle a settled dispute and claims to revoke the family arrangement...... The law in England on this point is almost the same."

52. The valuable treatise Kerr on Fraud at p.364 explains the position of law, "the principles which apply to the case of ordinary compromise between strangers do not equally apply to the case of compromises in the nature of family arrangements. Family arrangements are governed by a special equity peculiar to themselves, and will be enforced if honestly made, although they have not been meant as a compromise, but have proceeded from an error of all parties originating in mistake or ignorance of fact as to what their rights actually are, or of the points on which their rights actually depend." Halsburys Laws of England, Vol.17, Third edition at pp.215-216.

53. In KK Modi v. KN Modi and Others., (1998) 3 SCC 573 [LQ/SC/1998/154] (Sujata Manohar and DP Wadhwa, JJ.), it was held that the true intent and purport of the arbitration agreement must be examined- (para 21). Further the court examined that "......a family settlement which settles disputes within the family should not be lightly interfered with especially when the settlement has been already acted upon by some members of the family. In the present case, from 1989 to 1995 the Memorandum of Understanding has been substantially acted upon and hence the parties must be held to the settlement which is in the interest of the family and which avoids disputes between the members of the family. Such settlements have to be viewed a little differently from ordinary contracts and their internal mechanism for working out the settlement should not be lightly disturbed."

54. Therefore, in our opinion, technical considerations should give way to peace and harmony in enforcement of family arrangements or settlements."

Section 8 of the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act :

37. I am not impressed with the submission of Mr.Thakkar, the learned counsel appearing for the appellant - plaintiff as regards Section 8 of the Act, 1956.

Section 8 of the Act, 1956, reads as under :

"8. Powers of natural guardian.- (1) The natural guardian of a Hindu minor has power, subject to the provisions of this section, to do all acts which are necessary or reasonable and proper for the benefit of the minor or for the realization, protection or benefit of the minors estate; but the guardian can in no case bind the minor by a personal covenant.

(2) The natural guardian shall not, without the previous permission of the Court, -

(a) mortgage or charge, or transfer by sale, gift, exchange or otherwise, any part of the immovable property of the minor, or

(b) lease any part of such property for a term exceeding five years or for a term extending more than one year beyond the date on which the minor will attain majority.

(3) Any disposal of immovable property by a natural guardian, in contravention of sub-section (1) or sub-section

(2), is voidable at the instance of the minor or any person claiming under him.

(4) No Court shall grant permission to the natural guardian to do any of the acts mentioned in sub-section (2) except in case of necessity or for an evident advantage to the minor.

(5) The Guardians and Wards Act, 1890, shall apply to and in respect of an application for obtaining the permission of the Court under sub-section (2) in all respects as if it were an application for obtaining the permission of the Court under section 29 of that Act, and in particular -(a) proceedings in connection with the application shall be deemed to be proceedings under that Act within the meaning of section 4A thereof;

(b) the Court shall observe the procedure and have the powers specified in sub-sections (2), (3) and (4) of section 31 of that Act; and

(c) an appeal shall lie from an order of the Court refusing permission to the natural guardian to do any of the acts mentioned in sub-section (2) of this section to the Court to which appeals ordinarily lie from the decisions of that Court.

(6) In this section, "Court" means the City Civil Court or a District Court or a Court empowered under section 4A of the Guardians and Wards Act, 1890, within the local limits of whose jurisdiction the immovable property in respect of which the application is made is situate, and where the immovable property is situate within the jurisdiction of more than one such Court, means the Court within the local limits of whose jurisdiction any portion of the property is situate."

38. By virtue of the agreement (Exh.113), no mortgage or charge, or transfer by sale, gift, exchange or otherwise, of the properties took place. Even otherwise, any disposal of any immovable property by a natural guardian in contravention of sub-section (1) or (2) is voidable at the instance of the minor or any person claiming under him. I fail to understand on what basis Section 8 of the Act, 1956, has been pressed into service.

39. Mr.Thakkar laid much emphasis on the term exchange. According to Mr.Thakkar, the family arrangement deed is in the nature of exchange and, therefore, it is hit by Section 8 of the Act, 1956, on the erroneous premise that Ramanbhai was a minor at the relevant point of time.

40. As the issue has been raised, let me explain the position of law.

41. In Radhakrishnayya v. Sarasamma, (1951) AIR Madras 213, a Division Bench of the Madras High Court has observed as under :

"Although partition thus resembles an exchange it is not an exchange. There is no conveyance but only transformation of the property. The estate in common is transformed, that is, it takes only another form, namely, two or more estates to be possessed and enjoyed in severalty. By the partition a coPage sharer gets a separate allotment by virtue of his antecedent title as co-sharer. There is thus no acquisition of property in another independent right. It is not a conveyanceit is not an exchangeand the separate allotment is not obtained by another independent title."

42. At this juncture, it is relevant to refer to a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Ram Charan v. Girja Nandhini Devi, (1966) AIR SC 323, wherein it has been observed in paragraph No.11 as under :

"...In the first place once it is held that the transaction being a family settlement is not an alienation, it cannot amount to the creation of an interest. For, as the Privy Council pointed out in Mst.Hiran Bibis case, AIR 1914 PC 44 in a family settlement each party takes a share in the property by virtue of the independent title which is admitted to that extent by the other parties. It is not necessary, as would appear from the decision in Rangasami Gounden v. Nachiappa Gounden, (1918) AIR PC 196, 46 Ind. App 72, that every party taking benefit under a family settlement must necessarily be shown to have, under the law, a claim to a share in the property. All that is necessary is that the parties must be related to one another in some way and have a possible claim to the property or a claim or even a semblance of a claim on some other ground as, say, affection. ...."

43. In Krishna Beharilal (dead) by his legal representatives v. Gulabchand & others, (1971) AIR SC 1041, it has been observed at paragraph No.8 as under :

"... To consider a settlement as a family arrangement, it is not necessary that the parties to the compromise should all belong to one family. As observed by this Court in Ram Charan Das v. Girija Nandini Devi, (1965) 3 SCR 841 [LQ/SC/1965/144] at pp. 850 and 851 = (AIR 1966 SC 323 [LQ/SC/1965/144] at pp.328 and 329) the word "family" in the context of the family arrangement is not to be understood in a narrow sense of being a group of persons who are recognised in law as having a right of succession or having a claim to a share in the property in dispute. If the dispute which is settled is one between near relations then the settlement of such a dispute can be considered as a family arrangement. ....."

44. In Kale and Others v. Deputy Director of Consolidation and Others, (1976) AIR SC 807, it has been observed in paragraph Nos.9 and 10 as under :

"9. Before dealing with the respective contentions put forward by the parties, we would like to discuss in general the effect and value of family arrangements entered into between the parties with a view to resolving disputes once for all. By virtue of a family settlement or arrangement members of a family descending from a common ancestor or a near relation seek to sink their differences and disputes, settle and resolve their conflicting claims or disputed titles once for all in order to buy peace of mind and bring about complete harmony and good will in the family. The family arrangements are governed by a special equity peculiar to themselves and would be enforced if honestly made. In this connection, Kerr in his valuable treatise "Kerr on Fraud"at p.364 makes the following pertinent observations regarding the nature of family arrangement which may be extracted thus:

"The principles which apply to the case of ordinary compromise between strangers, do not equally apply to the case of compromises in the nature of family arrangements. Family arrangements are governed by a special equity peculiar to themselves, and will be enforced if honestly made although they have not been meant as a compromise, but have proceeded from an error of all parties, originating in mistake or ignorance of fact as to what their rights actually are, or of the points on which their rights actually depend." The object of the arrangement is to protect the family form long drawn litigation or perpetual strifes which mar the unity and solidarity of the family and create hatred and bad blood between the various members of the family. To-day when we are striving to build up an egalitarian society and are trying for a complete reconstruction of the society, to maintain and uphold the unity and homogeneity of the family which ultimately results in the unification of the society and, therefore, of the entire country, is the prime need of the hour. A family arrangement by which the property is equitably divided between the various contenders so as to achieve an equal distribution of wealth instead of concentrating the same in the hands of a few is undoubtedly a milestone in the administration of social justice. That is why the term "family" has to be understood in a wider sense so as to include within its fold not only close relations or legal lins but even those persons who may have some sort of antecedent title, a semblance of a claim or even if they have a spes succession is so that future disputes are sealed for ever and the family instead of fighting claims inter se and wasting time, money and energy on such fruitless or futile litigation is able to devote its attention to more constructive work in the larger interest of the country. The Courts have, therefore, leaned in favour of upholding a family arrangement instead of disturbing the same on technical or trivial grounds. Where the courts find that the family arrangement suffers from a legal lacuna or a formal defect the rule of estoppel is pressed into service and is applied to shut out plea of the person who being a party to family arrangement seeks to unsettle a settled dispute and claims to revoke the family arrangement under which he has himself enjoyed some material benefits.

10. In other words to put the binding effect and the essentials a family settlement in a concretised form, the matter may be reduced into the form of the following propositions:

(1) The family settlement must be a bonafide one so as to resolve family disputes and rival claims by a fair and equitable division or allotment of properties between the various members of the family.

(2) The said settlement must be voluntary and should not be induced by fraud, coercion or undue influence.

(3) The family arrangements may be even oral in which case no registration is necessary.

(4) It is well settled that registration would be necessary only if the terms of the family arrangement are reduced into writing. Here also, a distinction should be made between a document containing the terms and recitals of a family arrangement made under the document and a mere memorandum prepared after the family arrangement had already been made either for the purpose of the record or for information of the court for making necessary mutation. In such a case the memorandum itself does not create or extinguish any rights in immoveable properties and therefore does not fall within the mischief of Section 17(2) (sic) (Sec.17(1)(b)) of the registration Act and is, therefore, not compulsorily registrable;

(5) The members who may be parties to the family arrangement must have some antecedent title, claim or interest even a possible claim in the property which is acknowledged by the parties to the settlement. Even if one of the parties to the settlement has no title but under the arrangement the other party relinquishes all items claims or titles in favour of such a person and acknowledges him to be the sole owners, then the antecedent title must be assumed and the family arrangement will be upheld and the courts will find no difficulty in giving assent to the same;

(6) Even if bonafide disputes, present or possible, which may not involve legal claims are settled by a bonafide family arrangement which is fair and equitable the family arrangement is final and binding on the parties to the settlement. "

45. Thus, in view of the position of law as discussed above, Section 8 of the Act, 1956, has no application and the submission in that regard is rejected.

46. On a plain reading it appears that this Section 8 has been enacted for the protection of the minor and it provides a restriction on the power of the natural guardian to mortgage, charge or transfer by sale, gift, exchange or otherwise any part of the immovable property of the minor. It also provides that while granting such permission to the natural guardian, the court has to consider as to whether it was a case of necessity or for evident advantage to the minor. Sub-section (3) says in clear and unambiguous term that any disposal in contravention of subsection (1) or sub-section (2) of Section 8 shall be voidable at the instance of the minor or any person claiming under him. It also appears that the transactions in contravention of the aforesaid provisions shall not be void but only be voidable. Perhaps, the Parliament might have taken into consideration that if such transactions are made void, the minor may lose the benefit of such transactions, although they may be to their advantage. The transactions are to be voidable, which means that it gives an option to the minor to repudiate it or adopt it, as he so chooses. Any persons claiming under the minor can also challenge such transactions. Under Article 44 of the old Limitation Act as well as under Article 60 of the new Limitation Act, a period of three years from the date of attaining majority has been fixed as the period during which the minor must repudiate such transactions if he so chooses.

47. According to the family arrangement deed (Exh.113), the share of the plaintiff in the suit property is to the extent of 1- Acre and 9-Guntha, and in my view, the lower appellate court has rightly modified the decree passed by the trial court with regard to the same. The claim of 50% share in the suit property is not tenable in law.

48. A Division Bench of the Patna High Court in the case of Mosst. Orhulia and Others v. Prasad Yadav alias Ram Prasad Yadav and another,1975 56 ILR(Pat) 943, has observed something very apt to this case.

"Learned counsel appearing for the plaintiff-respondent then urged that if it is held that in each case before an immovable property belonging to the minor is to be transferred, previous permission of the court is to be taken, then this Section 8 of thewill be ultra vires as it amounts to a restriction on the right of the minor, to hold and dispose of property, and, as such, it is hit by Article 19 of the Constitution of India. In my view, this point is without substance and cannot be accepted even in a prima facie manner. The section treats minors as a class and purports to protect their interest. I have already pointed out that if the section had declared such transaction to be void, in many cases where transactions were for the benefit of the minor, the minors might have lost benefit thereof. But, this section only makes such transactions voidable, leaving to the minor either to repudiate it or to adopt it as he so chooses. In such a situation, it is difficult to imagine how it can be held to be an unreasonable restriction over the right of a minor to hold and dispose of property so as to attract the contravention of Article 19 of the Constitution. In my view, the provisions of Section 8 can hardly be called to be even a restriction over the right to hold and dispose of property by a minor. Choice lies with the minor after attaining majority and he has only to elect in time. It is for his advantage and, therefore, there is no question of testing as to whether restriction is reasonable or not."

49. In fact, I am of the view that the suit of the plaintiff should have been dismissed only on the ground that the plaintiff failed to amend the plaint for the purpose of challenging the legality and validity of the family partition deed (Exh.113) which came on record through the defendant. It is not in dispute that the defendant produced the family arrangement deed in the course of the trial. In such circumstances, the plaintiff was obliged to seek an appropriate amendment and question the legality and validity of the family arrangement. The plaintiff could not have just ignored the family arrangement deed saying that the same is not binding upon her. The proviso to Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act is imperative and it makes it obligatory on every court not to make any declaration in cases where the plaintiff, being able to seek further relief, omits to do so.

50. In Civil Appeals Nos.2811-2813 of 2010, [arising out of S.L.P. [C] Nos.674547/2009], Suhrid Singh @ Sardool Singh vs. Randhir Singh & Ors, the Supreme Court held as follows: "where the executant of a deed wants it to be annulled, he has to seek cancellation of the deed. But if a non-executant seeks annulment of a deed, he has to seek a declaration that the deed is invalid, or no-nest, or illegal or that it is not binding on him. The difference between a prayer for cancellation and declaration in regard to a deed of transfer/conveyance, can be brought out by the following illustration relating to A and B two brothers. A executes a sale deed in favour of C. Subsequently A wants to avoid the sale. A has to sue for cancellation of the deed. On the other hand, if B, who is not the executant of the deed, wants to avoid it, he has to sue for a declaration that the deed executed by A is invalid/void and no-nest/illegal and he is not bound by it. In essence both may be suing to have the deed set aside or declared as non-binding. But the form is different and court fee is also different. If A, the executant of the deed, seeks cancellation of the deed, he has to pay ad-valorem court fee on the consideration stated in the sale deed. If B, who is a non-executant, is in possession and sues for a declaration that the deed is null or void and does not bind him or his share, he has to merely pay a fixed court fee of Rs. 19.50 under Article 17 (iii) of Second Schedule of the. But if B, a non-executant, is not in possession, and he seeks not only a declaration that the sale deed is invalid, but also the consequential relief of possession, he has to pay an ad-valorem court fee as provided under Section 7(iv)(c) of the. Section 7(iv)(c) provides that in suits for a declaratory decree with consequential relief, the court fee shall be computed according to the amount at which the relief sought is valued in the plaint. The proviso thereto makes it clear that where the suit for declaratory decree with consequential relief is with reference to any property, such valuation shall not be less than the value of the property calculated in the manner provided for by clause (v) of Section 7."

51. There is a clear and well marked distinction between a suit for cancellation of a deed affecting certain property and a suit for declaration that a particular document is inoperative as against the plaintiff. A suit for cancellation must be brought by a person, who was a party to the deed or by a person who is otherwise bound by it in law. But a person who is neither party to the deed nor bound by it need not sue for its cancellation. Where the plaintiff seeks to establish title in himself but, cannot do so without removing an insuperable obstacle to such a deed to which he may be a party, he must get it cancelled. However, when he seeks to establish a title and finds himself threatened by a transaction between some parties, his remedy is to get a declaration that the decree or deed or transaction is invalid so far as he is concerned. When a person is a party to the deed, he can get over the effect of such deed, only in a manner provided under the Indian Contract Act, especially when the third party interests are created. But when he is eonominee party but in law is not a party to such deed, he can seek a declaration that such a deed is not binding on him, when no third party interest is created.

52. In the aforesaid context, I may refer to a Division Bench decision of the Rajasthan High Court in the case of Sukhlal vs. Devilal, (1954) RLW 136. Wanchco C.J. [as His Lordship then was], speaking for the Bench, observed as under:

"There is a difference between a suit for the cancellation of an instrument and one for a declaration that the instrument is not binding on the plaintiff, when the plaintiff seeks to establish, a title in himself and cannot establish that title without removing an insuperable obstacle such as a decree or a deed to which he has been a party or by which he is otherwise bound then quite clearly he must get that decree or deed cancelled or declared void in toto and his suit is in substance a suit for the cancellation of the decree or deed notwithstanding the fact that the suit may have been framed as a suit for a declaration. On the other hand, when the plaintiff is seeking to establish a title and finds himself threatened by a decree or a transaction between third parties, he is not in a position to get that decree or deed cancelled in toto. The proper remedy in such a case is to get a declaration that the decree or deed is invalid so far as he himself is concerned, and, therefore, he may sue for a declaration to that effect and not for the cancellation of the decree or the deed." [See: Vellayya Konar v. Ramaswami Konar, (1939) AIR Madras 894].

53. In the overall view of the matter, I have reached to the conclusion that no interference is warranted and the judgment and order passed by the lower appellate court deserves to be affirmed.

54. In the result, this Second Appeal fails and is hereby dismissed.

55. Since the main matter has been dismissed, the connected Civil Application would not survive and the same is disposed of accordingly.