1.  Zafrulla Khan, J.:— This is an appeal from a judgment of a Special Bench of the High Court of Judicature at Patna which was constituted to hear a suit on the Original Side, the suit having been filed in the first instance in the court of the First Subordinate Judge, Patna, and subsequently transferred by the High Court to its own file for hearing and disposal. The appellants are zamindars holding a permanently settled estate in the district of Patna in the Province of Bihar. On the 17th March, 1939, a notice was served on them by the agricultural income-tax authorities of Bihar under sections 17(2), 30 and 7 of the Bihar Agricultural Income-Tax Act (VII of 1938) (hereinafter referred to as the impugned Act) calling upon them to make a return of their agricultural income for the previous year in order that an assessment to agricultural income-tax might be made upon them. On the 7th October, 1939, they instituted this suit against the Province of Bihar calling in question the validity of the impugned Act and praying for a declaration that the Act was ultra vires of the Bihar Legislature and that the notice served upon them was invalid and ineffective. The plaint also referred to an amending Act (V of 1939), but as nothing turns on the provisions of that Act, it is unnecessary to refer to it separately in this judgment.

2. The suit was dismissed by the High Court on the 17th April, 1941, and the plaintiffs have come up in appeal to this Court.

3. The grounds set out in the plaint on the basis of which the validity of the impugned Act is questioned, are—

(a) that the impugned Act repeals, amends or is repugnant to an Act of Parliament extending to British India within the meaning of section 108(2)(a), or a Governor-General's Act within the meaning of section 108(2)(b) of the Constitution Act, that is to say, Regulation 1 of 1793 (the Bengal Permanent Settlement Regulation), and therefore required the previous sanction of the Governor-General, which was not obtained;

(b) that it constitutes a direct invasion of the Permanent Settlement Regulation inasmuch as it seeks to augment the jama on permanently settled estates which the Regulation had made unalterable for ever, and therefore required the previous sanction of the Governor under section 299(3) of the Constitution Act, which had not been obtained; and

(c) that entry no. 41 in List II of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution Act was intended to be made applicable to agricultural incomes derived from estates settled otherwise than under the Permanent Settlement Regulation, and that the impugned Act therefore cannot operate in respect of incomes derived, from permanently settled estates.

4. In the course of the argument before the High Court objection was also taken to the validity of the impugned Act on the ground that the definition of “agricultural income” adopted by the impugned Act was in some respects wider and in other respects narrower than the definition of that expression imported by section 311(2) of the Constitution Act, and that consequently the whole of the impugned Act was invalid. It would be convenient to deal with this last matter first.

5. By section 311(2) of the Constitution Act “agricultural income”, unless the text otherwise requires, means agricultural income as defined for the purposes of the enactments relating to Indian Income-tax. To appreciate the argument based upon the difference in the definition of “agricultural income” in section 2(1) of the Indian Income-Tax Act and in section 2(a) of the impugned Act, we set out the former showing the alterations made in it by the latter. The words in brackets are omitted in the Bihar Act and those in italics added.

(1) “Agricultural income” means—

(a) any rent or [revenue] income derived from land which is used for agricultural purposes, and is either assessed to land revenue [in British India] in Bihar or subject to a local cess or rate assessed and collected [by officers of the Crown as such] under any Bengal Act, or under any Bihar & Orissa Act, or under any Bihar Act;

(b) any income derived from such land by—

(i) agriculture, or

(ii) the performance by a cultivator or receiver of rent-in-kind of any process ordinarily employed by a cultivator or receiver of rent-in-kind to render the produce raised or received by him fit to be taken to market, or

(iii) the sale by a cultivator or receiver of rent-in-kind of the produce raised or received by him, in respect of which no process has been performed other than a process of the nature described in sub-clause (ii);

[(c) any income derived from any building owned and occupied by the receiver of the rent or revenue of any such land, or occupied by the cultivator, or the receiver of rent-in-kind, of any land with respect to which any operation mentioned in sub-clauses (ii) and (iii) of clause (b) is carried on:

Provided that the building is on or in the immediate vicinity of the land, and is a building which the receiver of rent or revenue or the cultivator or the receiver of rent-in-kind by reason of his connexion with the land requires as a dwelling-house, or as a storehouse, or other out building.]

6. It will be observed that the whole of paragraph (c) has been omitted in the impugned Act.

7. It has been brought to our notice that by Bihar Act I of 1942, paragraph (a) of the definition of “agricultural income” in the impugned Act has been so amended as to bring it into complete verbal conformity (except for the necessary distinction between land in British India and land in Bihar) with the definition of that expression in the Income-Tax Act. This however does not affect the determination of the question that arises for decision in the present case.

8. It was argued before the High Court that the omission of paragraph (c) of the Income-tax Act definition rendered the impugned Act invalid, as the definition in that Act was narrower than that laid down in the Income-Tax Act. This contention was not pressed before us and the short answer to the argument urged before the High Court is that entry no. 41 of List II empowers the Provincial Legislature to make laws with respect to “taxes on agricultural income” generally; and a Provincial Legislature is clearly entitled to impose a tax on some categories of agricultural income and not impose it on others.

9. The contention advanced before us with reference to the departures made in the impugned Act from the language of paragraph (a) of the definition of “agricultural income” in the Income-Tax Act may be summarized as follows: The definition in the Income-Tax Act requires that the land should be subject to a local rate “assessed and collected by officers of the Crown as such”. Local cesses and rates imposed upon land in Bihar under the authority of the various statutes in operation in that Province (so runs the argument) even where they are “assessed and collected” byofficers of the Crown, are not assessed and collected by officers of the Crown “as such”, but only as delegates and functionaries of the local bodies for whose benefit the cess or rate is imposed and collected. Hence the definition of “agricultural income” adopted by the impugned Act embraces rent or income derived from agricultural land subject to a local cess or rate even when the cess or rate is not assessed and collected by officers of the Crown as such. That income accordingly is not “agricultural income” within the meaning of the definition in the Income-Tax Act, and the departure from that definition renders the impugned Act invalid. It was conceded that the variations from “rent or revenue” to “rent or income” and from “local-rate” to “local cess or rate” were immaterial, and that the restriction of the definition in the impugned Act to rent or income derived from land in Bihar was necessary.

10. It is common ground between the parties that local cesses or rates imposed upon lands within municipal limits which are used for agricultural purposes are not assessed and collected in the Province of Bihar by officers of the Crown as such, and that the income, if any, derived from such of these lands as are revenue free would fall within the purview of the impugned Act, though such income is not “agricultural income” within the definition of that expression in the Income-Tax Act. To this extent therefore it is admitted that the definition of “agricultural income” in the impugned Act is wider than the definition of that expression in the Income-Tax Act. That being so, it was contended that the whole of the impugned Act must be held to be ultra vires of the Provincial Legislature.

11. There is no mention in the plaint of the existence in the Province of Bihar of revenue-free land within municipal limits which is used for agricultural purposes and is assessed to a local rate. No evidence was led in the suit as it was assumed that after certain admissions had been made on behalf of the defendant, the remaining questions that arose for decision were all pure questions of law. The first answer to the appellants' contention on this point, therefore, is that the existence of any such land in the Province of Bihar is not established and we are unable to hold that in fact the definition of “agricultural income” in the impugned Act embraces within its ambit anything which would not be covered by the definition of that expression in the Income-Tax Act. Nor would the Provincial Legislature consider it necessary to provide for the specific exclusion of such land from the definition if no such land was in fact in existence.

12. Assuming however the existence of such land in the Province of Bihar the most reasonable construction of sub-clause (i) of the definition in the impugned Act would make it read as follows:—

(1) any rent or income derived from land which is used for agricultural purposes, and is—

(a) either assessed to land revenue in Bihar, or

(b) subject to a local cess or rate assessed and collected by officers of the Crown as such under any Provincial Act in force in Bihar, or

(c) subject to a local cess or rate assessed and collected by any municipality under any Provincial Act in force in Bihar.

13. On this construction it is obvious that paragraph (c) would be inoperative inasmuch as it relates to income which would not be “agricultural income” as defined by the Income-Tax Act. This, however, would not affect the validity of the rest of the Act, if it is found to have been otherwise validly enacted.

14. The appellants relied upon the Attorney-General for British Columbia v. Attorney-General for Canada in support of the proposition that the inclusion in s.s. (1) of that part of the definition which we have set out above as paragraph (c) renders the whole of the impugned Act invalid. In that case the validity of a statute of the Dominion Parliament of Canada was questioned on the ground that the statute in substance invaded the provincial field. It was contended on behalf of the Dominion that such parts of the statute as were within the competence of the Dominion Parliament should be upheld and should be separated from such of the provisions of the statute as had been held to be beyond such competence. Their Lordships held that the whole texture of the Act was inextricably interwoven and that the portions within the competence of the Dominion Parliament could not be contemplated as existing independently of the rest of the. Act which had been found to be beyond such competence. They were also of the opinion that as the main legislation was invalid as being in pith and substance an encroachment upon Provincial rights, the rest of the Act must fall with it as being in part ancillary to it. We are here faced with no such contingency. The definition of “agricultural income” in the impugned Act does not in terms include income derived from land situate within a municipality, and paragraph (c) of sub-section (1) of the definition as construed by us above is a very minor part of it. The definition in the impugned Act should, in our opinion, be so read as to confine its operation to income which can be properly classified as “agricultural income” within the meaning of the definition in the Income-Tax Act, and in respect of which alone the Provincial Legislature was competent to legislate: See the recent opinion of this Court in The Hindu Women's Rights to Property Act, In r. The relevant authorities have been noticed at length in the judgment and it is unnecessary for us to refer to them here.

15. In his reply Counsel for appellants conceded that as the definition in the impugned Act did not in terms specify income derived from land situate within municipal limits the case was governed by the principle of Macleod's case and that he could not therefore contend any longer that the whole of the impugned Act was render ed invalid on account of this part of the definition being wider than the definition in the Income-Tax Act.

16. Counsel's main contention on this part of the case was that the road cess levied even upon land outside municipal limits was not assessed by the Collector but by the District Board, the latter not being an officer of the Crown. On that basis he argued that as the definition in the impugned Act did not specify that the cess or rate should be assessed and collected by officers of the Crown as such, this part of the definition also travelled beyond the scope of the definition in the Income-Tax Act inasmuch as it embraced a wider category of land than was contemplated in that definition. It was argued on behalf of the respondent that land in Bihar outside municipal limits is subject to local cesses under the Bengal Cess Act (IX of 1880), as amended and modified by subsequent Bihar legislation, and under the provisions of this Act as so amended and modified, the road cess leviable is assessed and collected not by the District Board but by the Collector as such. The Collector is admittedly an officer of the Crown, and therefore the definition in the impugned Act is in this respect identical in its effect with the definition in the Income-Tax Act. We consider that this contention of the respondent is well founded.

17. The whole scheme of the Bengal Cess Act makes it quite clear that, though the general rate of the road cess is determined in each year by the District Board, the actual assessment and collection are made by the Collector. Section 38 says:

“The road cess for each year shall be assessed and levied in each district as provided in section 6 and (subject to the maximum rate mentioned in that section) at such rate as may be determined for such year by the District Board.”

This section clearly treats the assessment and levy of the cess as processes distinct from the determination of the general rate which is to be done by the District Board. Assessment may be described as comprising the process of valuation of land and the determination in respect of each estate of the amount of cess payable by the estate on the basis of the valuation at the rate determined by the District Board. The valuation of land is dealt with in Chapter II of the Act, and has throughout to be carried out by the Collector. On the basis of this valuation the determination of the amount in respect of each estate has also to be done by the Collector (section 38). It is not disputed that the cess is collected by the Collector. There can therefore be no doubt that the road cess leviable under the Bengal Cess Act is assessed and collected by the Collector. The question, however, is whether the Collector in performing these functions acts as an officer of the Crown as such or merely as a delegate or functionary of the District Board. In this connexion our attention was drawn to section 9 of the Cess Act which provides that the proceeds of the road cess in each district shall be paid into the District Road Fund of such district as hereinafter provided. It was said that as the cess is levied for the benefit of the District Board and is to be paid into the District Road Fund and not into the Provincial exchequer, the Collector in assessing and collecting the cess must be presumed to be acting as the agent of the District Board and not as an officer of the Crown.

18. We do not think that the capacity in which the Collector assesses and levies the cess can in any manner be affected by the destination of the proceeds of the cess when Collected. The definition in the Income-Tax Act itself refers in this context to a ‘local rate’ which clearly implies that rates to be levied for the benefit of a local body were intended to be comprised in that definition. Counsel for the appellants was unable to suggest any “local rate” other than those levied for the benefit of local bodies. ‘Collector’ is defined for the purposes of the Act in section 4, and in effect means the officer in charge of the revenue administration of a district, and includes any person specially invested with the powers of a Collector for the purposes of the Act. He is ordinarily an officer of the Indian Civil Service or a senior officer of the Provincial Civil Service, and is admittedly an officer of the Crown.

19. There can be no doubt that the duties of assessment and collection are part of a Collector's official duties under the Cess Act and in performing these duties he acts as an officer of the Crown. He is subject in the performance of them to the general control and supervision of the Commissioner and of the Board of Revenue (section 105), and appeals from his orders lie to the Commissioner (sections 102, 103 and 104). He is not in any manner subject to the control of the District Board.

20. Our conclusion is reinforced by the consideration that the Cess Act provides for the levy and collection of two cesses, a road cess and a public works cess (section 5), and whereas the proceeds of the road cess are to be paid into the District Road Fund (section 9), the proceeds of the public works cess are to be paid into the public treasury (section 10). The general rate of the public works cess for each year is determined by the Provincial Government (section 39). The provisions with respect to the assessment and collection of both cesses are, however, the same, and so also the provisions with respect to the powers and authority of the Collector. It cannot be denied that the Collector in assessing and collecting the public works cess does function as an officer of the Crown as such. That being so, it would not be reasonable to hold that in respect of the assessment and collection of the road cess under the same statutory provisions he functions in any other capacity.

21. Gilbert v. The Corporation of Trinity House and Metropolitan Meat Industry Board v. Sheedy, which were cited to us do not seem to give any support to the appellants. The question at issue in the first case was whether the Corporation of Trinity House and in the second whether the Metropolitan Meat Industry Board were or were not servants of the Crown. The question that we have to consider here is not whether the District Board or its officers can be regarded as officers of the Crown, but whether the Collector, who is admittedly an officer of the Crown, acts as such in the performance of the duties assigned to him under the Cess Act. We have no doubt that he does.

22. It was also argued that by virtue of section 100 of the Cess Act which authorizes the Board of Revenue to invest at any time any person with the powers of a Collector, a person who is not the officer in charge of the revenue administration of a district may be entrusted with the assessment and collection of cesses under the Act. That undoubtedly is so, but section 100 itself provides not only that such a person must be appointed by the Board of Revenue but that the powers of a Collector are to be exercised by him under the control and supervision of the Collector, or independently of such control and supervision as the Board may direct. All his proceedings are subject to the general control and supervision of the Commissioner and of the Board of Revenue (section 105), and appeals from his orders would be to the Collector or the Commissioner (sections 102, 103 and 104). For the purposes of the Act he is in exactly the same position as a Collector and would act as an officer of the Crown as such.

23.We now turn to the contention that since the impugned Act was repugnant to an Act of Parliament extending to British India within the meaning of section 108(2)(a) of the Constitution Act, that is Regulation I of 1793, it required the previous sanction of the Governor-General before it could be introduced into the Bihar Legislature, and that as such sanction was not obtained, it is altogether invalid and ineffective. It was argued that the Governor-General in Council, who purported to enact this Regulation, possessed no legislative authority in 1793, and the Regulation was enacted by him as a delegate of the British Parliament by virtue of section 39 of 24 Geo. III c. 25, commonly known as Pitt's India Act, and it thus became a part of that Act.

24. In elaborating this part of his case Counsel cited passages from authoritative books dealing with the Permanent Settlement such as Field's Regulations of the Bengal Code, Phillips' Land Tenures of Lower Bengal, Cowell's History and Constitution of Courts and Legislative Authorities in India, and Harington's Analysis. He also quoted from the Minutes of Lord Cornwallis and Sir John Shore, and drew our attention to various sections of 13 Geo. III c. 63, commonly known as the Regulating Act, and 24 Geo. III c. 25. We do not consider that for the determination of the question under consideration, we are called upon to enter into a detailed examination of these authorities and statutes. It is sufficient to note that after the East India Company had obtained the Diwani of the Provinces of Bengal, Bihar and Orissa in 1765, annual settlements of the jama were the rule and settlements for any longer period the exception. These annual settlements caused great hardship to and resulted in grave dissatisfaction among the landholders and zamindars of these Provinces. In many cases they were dispossessed of their estates as a consequence of failure to accept a settlement or of default in the payment of the jama settled. The situation deteriorated to such a degree that Parliament was compelled to take note of it, and section 39 of Pitt's India Act laid a duty upon the Court of Directors of the Company to carry out an investigation into the complaints of landholders and zamindars and effectively to redress the same and also to give orders and instructions to the several Governments and Presidencies in India for the settling and establishing “upon principles ofmoderation and justice, according to the laws and constitution of India, the parmanent rules by which their respective tributes, rents and services shall in future be rendered and paid” to the Company. Lord Cornwallis was sent out as Governor-General with instructions to carry out the investigation and to afford the necessary relief and redress. Elaborate inquiries were made and Regulations were promulgated in 1789 and 1790, which converted the then current Settlement into a Decennial Settlement. It was also notified that the jama assessed under these Regulations would continue after the expiration of ten years and would remain unalterable for ever, provided this course should meet with the approval of the Court of Directors. This approval was forthcoming and the jama assessed under these Regulations was declared fixed for ever by a Proclamation of the Governor-General dated the 22nd March, 1793. This Proclamation was subsequently enacted into Regulation I of 1793 on the 1st May of that year, and was given force and effect from the 22nd March previous, the date of the Proclamation. A number of other Regulations were enacted on the same date all of which, including the Permanent Settlement Regulation, were formed into a Code and the courts of justice in the Provinces of Bengal, Bihar and Orissa were directed to regulate their decisions by the rules and ordinances contained in it. (See section 8 of 37 Geo. III c. 142, East India Company Act, 1797).

25. The Regulation purports to be enacted by the Governor-General in Council, who by virtue of section 36 of the Regulating Act had authority to “make and issue rules, ordinances and regulations for the good order and civil Government of the Company's settlement at Fort William and other factories and places subordinate or to be subordinate thereto”, subject to the conditions and restrictions prescribed in that section. There was some argument at the Bar with regard to the meaning to be attached to “places subordinate or to be subordinate thereto”, but we do not think that it is necessary for us to come to a definite conclusion upon that point. We may, however, invite attention to section 7 of the Regulating Act which made provision for the appointment of a Governor-General and four Councillors in whom “the whole civil and military Government of the said Presidency and also the ordering, management and government of all the territorial acquisitions and revenues in the Kingdoms of Bengal, Bihar and Orissa” was vested. It was argued on behalf of the respondent that the territorial limits of the legislative authority conferred upon the Governor-General by section 36 of the Act were the same as those of the executive authority conferred upon him by section 7. If that was indeed so, as well may have been the case, the Governor-General in Council possessed adequate legislative authority for the enactment of the Regulation. But even if there were some doubt as to the extent of his legislative authority it must be presumed to have been set at rest by the direction given that all courts in these Provinces must give effect to the provisions of these Regulations (see section 8 of 37 Geo. III c. 142). In either case the Regulation was an enactment of a subordinate legislative authority which no doubt derived its own authority from an Act of Parliament, but whose enactments did not thereby become Acts of Parliament.

26. Reliance was placed upon the observations of Sir Richard Garth, C.J. in the case of Empress v. Burah and Book Singh and upon the judgment of the Privy Council in the same case on appeal reported as The Queen v. Burah. In that case their Lordships had to deal with a question which bears no analogy, whatsoever, to the question now before us. An Act of the Indian Legislature passed in 1869 had vested in the Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal the power to apply certain provisions of the Act to certain areas at such time as he might think fit. Their Lordships held that the Act of 1869 was a familiar instance of conditional legislation and that the vesting of certain powers in the Lieutenant-Governor did not amount to the creation of a new legislative authority.

27. We are unable to accept the contention that section 39 of Pitt's India Act was conditional legislation within the meaning of that expression as used by Lord Selborne in delivering their Lordships' judgment in The Queen v. Burah. Section 39 fulfilled its purpose by giving directions to the Court of Directors on certain matters and left it to that body to give effect to those directions through the Governments and Presidencies in India, which were no doubt to employ their own executive and legislative machinery for the purpose. The, Permanent Settlement Regulation was thus an Indian law enacted like any other Indian law by the legislative machinery then in operation in India. In our opinion the expression “Act of Parliament” has been used in section 108(2)(a) of the Constitution Act in the sense of enactments actually passed by Parliament and not of laws passed by a subordinate legislative body under authority conferred upon it by an Act of Parliament. The Regulation stands in this respect on no different footing from any other Indian enactment.

28. The Queen v. Walke, Powell v. Apollo Candle Company, Willingale v. Norri and National Telephone Company v. Bake were also cited in support of the appellants' contention. Broadly speaking the proposition to be extracted from these cases is that where in pursuance of an Act of Parliament, by-laws or regulations are made, the sanction behind these by-laws or regulations is the Act of Parliament under the authority of which they are framed. That applies in the last resort to the legislative Acts of all subordinate legislatures.

29. The contention that Regulation I of 1793 had somehow become textually a part of Pitt's India Act was met by the retort that the Act had been repealed in toto by the Government of India (Amendment) Act, (6 and 7 Geo. V. c. 37), section 7(2) read with the 2nd entry in the Second Schedule without any saving or reservation, and was no longer in operation when the impugned Act was passed.

30. It was argued on behalf of the respondent that even assuming that Regulation I of 1793 was an Act of Parliament, it was not an Act “extending to British India” within the meaning of section 108(2)(a) of the Constitution Act, inasmuch as “British India” means all territories for the time being comprised within the Governors' Provinces and the Chief Commissioners' Provinces [section 311(1)], and the Regulation applies only to the Provinces of Bengal, Bihar and Orissa. In the view taken by us of the meaning of the expression “Act of Parliament” in section 108(2)(a) it is not necessary for us to decide whether “extending to British India” in that section means extending to the whole of British India, or extending to the whole or any part of British India, and we accordingly express no opinion on this point.

31. When Counsel for the appellants had concluded his reply on this part of the case, we intimated to him that we were unable to accept his contention that Regulation I of 1793 was an Act of Parliament, within the meaning of section 108(2)(a) of the Constitution Act. He then submitted that in that case the further question, whether the impugned Act was or was not repugnant to the Regulation, did not arise; and that, therefore, he did not propose to address us on that point.

32. The other points argued before the High Court having reference to the validity of the impugned Act, e.g., that the Regulation was a Governor-General's Act, that the Governor's consent under section 299(3) of the Constitution Act was necessary, and that the Governor should have reserved the bill for consideration of the Governor-General, were not raised before us.

33. It was finally argued on behalf of the appellants that in any event the impugned Act cannot on its true construction apply to income derived from permanently settled estates, and that its operation should therefore be confined to income from estates settled otherwise than under the Permanent Settlement Regulation. This contention is based on the rule of construction that general words in a later statute should not be held to repeal earlier legislation upon a particular matter as laid down by Lord Selborne in Seward v. “Vera-Cruz”, which finds support in other judgments of the House of Lords as well as of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council. Before however, any question of the applicability of this rule can arise, it must be found that both pieces of legislation deal with the same subject matter. We are unable to hold that condition is satisfied in this case. Regulation I of 1793 relates to the subject of the jama to be settled in respect of each estate, while the impugned Act operates upon the net income derived from land used for agricultural purposes. The jama is imposed directly upon the land, and is, so to speak, attached to the land, while income-tax imposed upon the net income of an individual derived from land used for agricultural purposes has no direct reference to the jama imposed upon that land whether under a permanent or a non-permanent settlement.

34. Sections 3 to 5 of the impugned Act clearly bring into charge for the purposes of the agricultural income-tax all agricultural income derived from land situated in the Province of Bihar, subject to the exemption set out in the Act; but we are clearly of the opinion that the Act does not thereby in any manner whittle down or derogate from the assurances given to zamindars and landholders by Regulation I of 1793. This question was dealt with by their Lordships of the Privy Council in Prabhatchandra Barua v. The King-Emperor, where Lord Russell of Killowen, who delivered the judgment of their Lordships, observed (p. 447) “In their Lordships' opinion, while the Regulations contain assurances against any claim to an increase of the jama, based on an increase of the zemindari income, they contain no promise that a zemindar shall in respect of the income which he derives from his zemindari be exempt from liability to any future general scheme of property taxation, or that the income of a zemindari shall not be subjected with other incomes to any future general taxation of incomes.” With these observations we find ourselves in respectful agreement.

35. It was contended that the impugned Act was not a general measure of taxation of incomes but was confined to agricultural income which in the Province of Bihar was derived mainly from permanently settled estates. This contention loses sight of the fact that owing to the division of the fiscal field between the Centre and the Provinces, which is an essential feature of the Constitution Act, the power to levy income-tax has been parcelled out between the Centre and the Provinces, the Centre having authority to legislate with regard to “taxes on income other than agricultural income” (entry no. 54 of List I) and the Provinces having authority to legislate with regard to “taxes on agricultural income” (entry no. 41 of List II). These two entries are complementary to each other, and there can be no doubt that the tax imposed by the impugned Act is within the limits of the power vested in the Provinces, a general measure of property taxation.

36. Reference may also be made to Nova Scotia Steel and Coal Company, Limited v. Minister of Finance and Customs. The appellants in that case carriedon in Newfoundland the business of exporting ore. Under an agreement with the Government, confirmed by a statute of 1910, they paid a tax on each ton of ore exported by them, and were exempt from paying any further charge or tax “upon or in respect of the said ore”. By the Newfoundland Business Profits Tax Act, 1917, an annual tax was imposed on the net profits of businesses. The appellants claimed that the agreement of 1910 exempted them from paying the profits tax. Their Lordships of the Privy Council held that the tax upon profits was not a tax “upon or in respect of” the ore exported, and that the appellants were liable to pay it. Lord Sumner, delivering the judgment of their Lordships, said (p. 179) “……but in general a tax on profits and an export tax on commodities are different imposts, financially and economically, and cannot be identified even by the indefinite expression ‘in respect of’. Taxes or charges ‘in respect of’ the ore, to which the provisions of the earlier Act would apply, may easily be suggested, as for example stamp duties or registration fees. These provisions can therefore be satisfied without extending them to the Business Profits Tax, and no question arises of reading two Acts together, so as to involve the subordination of the terms of the one to the provisions of the other, because both apply to the same subject matter, the one generally and the other particularly.”

37. The contention that the impugned Act should be so construed as not to affect agricultural income derived from permanently settled estate overlooks the contingency, which is bound to arise in at least some Provinces, that if this argument were to prevail agricultural income derived from estate settled otherwise than under the Permanent Settlement Regulation would be equally exempt from liability to agricultural income-tax during the period of a current settlement, and entry no. 41 in List II would in such Provinces be reduced to a nullity. We have in mind Provinces where the period of a settlement is by legislation fixed not permanently but for a number of years. For instance, by virtue of s. 53-A of the Punjab Land-Revenue Act (XVII of 1887), the normal period of time for which an assessment under the Act shall remain in force is forty years. Could it be argued that Provincial legislation imposing agricultural income-tax in that Province should not operate in respect of agricultural income derived from estates assessed under the provisions of the Punjab Land-Revenue Act till after the expiry of the period of the then current settlement This would leave practically nothing on which such a measure could operate and we could not accept a construction of the provisions of a statute which would lead to such a result, unless the language employed by the legislature left us no possible alternative.

38. For these reasons we are of the opinion that the Bihar Agricultural Income-tax Act (VII of 1938) is not ultra vires of the Bihar Legislature and was validly enacted. The appellants are bound to obey the notice served upon them on the 17th March, 1939, by the Agricultural Income-tax Officer, Patna, under sections 17(2), 30 and 7 of the Bihar Agricultural Income-tax Act. Their suit was rightly dismissed by the High Court and this appeal is dismissed with costs.