1. This is an application for leave to appeal to His Majesty in Council against the judgment of this Court in Hulas Narain Singh v. Deen Mohammad Mian. The applicant, who is a zamindar of Bihar, instituted the original suit for recovery of rent from some of his ryots, on the footing thatby the custom of the estate he was entitled to a half share of the produce by way of rent. In 1937, the Bihar Legislature had enacted section 178-B of the Bihar Tenancy Act; limiting the rent to nine-twentieths of the produce. The plaintiff contended that this provision was inoperative and ultra vires the Bihar Legislature. The contention was rejected by the High Court at Patna and by this Court also.

2. It is true that the question raised in the litigation is one affecting a large number of people, both zamindars and ryots, in the Province of Bihar. But the points of law are by no means substantial. The whole argument in support of the appeal was based upon the effect and implications of the Permanent Settlement; and this Court as well as the Courts in Bihar held that the Permanent Settlement had not deprived the Provincal Legislature of the power to enact measures calculated to regulate the rights and liabilities, of landholders and ryots inter se in the Province. In support of the application, reliance was placed on the fact that leave to appeal had recently been granted to one of the Taluqdars of Oudh. The position there was different. The circumstances attending the settlement with the Taluqdars gave scope for certain contentions based on the Crown Grants Act and on the doctrine that the Crown cannot derogate from its own grant. No such contention is available in this case. There was also the fact that the questions there raised had so far not been dealt with in any judgment of their Lordships of the Judicial Committee. As regards the Permanent Settlement however, we have clear pronouncements. As early as 1874, their Lordships of the Judicial Committee explained that the expression “proprietor” had been used in the Permanent Settlement only as denoting the person who is directly liable to pay the revenue to Government [See Collector of Trichinopoly v. Lekkamani. The effect and implications of the Permanent Settlement were fully discussed by their Lordships in Prabhatchandra Barua v. King Emperor . This Court has dealt with the question not merely in this appeal, but also in Hulas Narain Singh v. Province of Bihar . As pointed out in the judgment sought to be appealed against, the power of the Legislature to enact measures for the protection and welfare of ryots and other cultivators was expressly referred to and reserved at the time of the Permanent Settlement itself. This application is accordingly dismissed.

We would add the following remarks:—

3. After the last hearing before this Court and before judgment was delivered an attempt was made by the appellant to persuade the members of this Court to reconsider the case by forwarding direct to the Court further matter not brought to their notice by counsel arguing the case at the hearing. This action on the part of the appellant appears to have been taken on legal advice. Again during the interval between the date when this application was heard and today, the appellant has approached members of this Court direct in the same way and apparently for the same purpose and again these approaches appear to have been made on legal advice. It is surely hardly necessary to state that this Court looks to counsel at the hearing to put their client's case and that direct approaches to the Court outside the hearing are most improper and quite useless and that if it has been done under legal advice legal practitioners are acting most improperly in assisting in the preparation of or encouraging any such action on the part of lay clients.