1. Zafeulla Khan, J.:—This is an appeal against an appellate judgment of a Division Bench of the High Court of Judicature at Patna. The appellants are zamindars holding a permanently settled estate in the district of Patna in the Province of Bihar. They instituted a suit against defendants-respondents for recovery of rent in respect of an occupancy holding: at the rate of half share of the crops. Defendants contended that by virtue of s. 178-B of the Bihar Tenancy Act, enacted by the Bihar Tenancy (Amendment) Act, (VIII of 1937), plaintiffs were not entitled to claim rent at a rate higher than nine-twentieths of the produce. Plaintiffs' case was that s. 178-B was for various reasons ultra vires of the Bihar Legislature and was in any case inoperative in respect of permanently settled estates. The High Court repelled plaintiffs' contentions, and, holding that the section in question was withjn the competence of the Bihar Legislature and was validly enacted, gave effect to its provisions in respect of plaintiffs' claim for rent against defendants.

2. In appeal before us the attack upon the validity of s. 178-B was confined to two main grounds: (i) that the section contravened the provisions of s. 299 (2) of the Constitution Act; and (ii) that the subject-matter of the section fell within the purview of entry No. 10 of the oncurrent List, and that the section itself not having received the assent of the Governor-General or of His Majesty and being repugnant to the provisions of the Bengal Tenancy Act, 1885, and the Permanent Settlement Regulation, I of 1793, was void on account of such repugnancy.

3. Counsel failed utterly to explain in what manner the impugned section was in conflict with sub-s. (2) of s. 299 of the Constitution Act. There is no question here of the compulsory acquisition for public purposes of any land etc., within the meaning of the sub-section; but it was contended that the impugned section in some way contravened the spirit of the sub-section. We are unable to see any force in this contention and need not pursue it any further.

4. As regards the second ground of objection, it was argued that the Permanent Settlement, in addition to settling the jama which the zamindar was liable to pay to Government, incorporated a contract between the zamindar and the ryot, charging the latter with liability to pay rent at the rate of 22 ½ seers out of every maund of produce. It was contended that the impugned section purported to modify this contract which was a “special form of contract” within the meaning of that expression as used in entry No. 10 of the Concurrent List. The entry runs as follows:

“Contracts, including partnership, agency, contracts of carriage, and other special forms of contract, but not including contracts relating to agricultural land”.

5. The reasons advanced by counsel for describing the contract with regard to the rate at which rent was payable by the tenant to the landlord (assuming that such a contract was incorporated in the Permanent Settlement Eegulation) as a special form of contract, were (a) that there were three parties to the contract, viz., the Government, the landlord, and the tenant, instead of the usual two, viz., the landlord and the tenant, and (b) that the contract was in writing and was embodied in the Regulation. We do not consider that these reasons would in any event be sufficient to convert a contract for payment of rent into a special form of contract. The distinction drawn in entry No. 10 is between contracts (whether special forms of contract or not) relating to agricultural land and contracts not relating to agricultural land. There can be no question that a contract between a landlord and a tenant for payment of rent in respect of agricultural land, irrespective of the form in which it might be clothed, is a contract relating to agricultural land and is excluded from the scope of that entry. It follows that the subject matter of s. 178-B of the Bihar Tenancy Act, even in respect of permanently settled estates, does not fall within the purview of entry No. 10 and no question of repugnancy to the provisions of any existing Indian law can thus arise.

6. The subject matter of the impugned section is fully covered by entry No. 21 of the Provincial List, which comprises “land, that is to say, rights in or over land, land tenures, including the relation of landlord and tenant, and the collection of rents etc.” It was argued that the effect of the Permanent Settlement Regulation was to convey permanently settled estates to the zamindars in fee simple and that such lands were not subject to the legislative authority of Indian Legislatures, whether Central or Provincial, the British Parliament alone being competent to legislate with respect to them. We were in other words invited to construe the expression “land” in entry No. 21 of the Provincial List as “land other than permanently settled lands”. As held by this Court in Hulas Narain Singh v. Province of Biha the Permanent Settlement Regulation is an ordinary piece of Indian legislation and did no more than give an assurance to the zamindars that the jama assessed upon their lands was to remain fixed in perpetuity and would not be liable to enhancement. It is true that the Regulation declared that the zamindars would be full owners and proprietors of their estates, but this declaration could not possibly be construed as excluding or in any manner restricting or cutting down the authority of the appropriate Legislature in respect of these lands. Nor canwe discover in the provisions of the Constitution Act any warrant for the proposition advanced before us.

7. Our attention was invited to the concluding portion of Article I of Eegulation II of 1793, where it is stated, “No power will then exist, in the country, by which the rights vested in the landholders by the Regulation can be infringed or the value of landed property affected”. It was suggested that this amounted to a declaration that among other matters the right of the zamindar to collect rent at the rates prevailing at the date of the Eegulation would not at any subsequent date be adversely affected by any exercise of executive or legislative authority. Having regard to the context in which this sentence occurs we do not think that it is capable of bearing that interpretation. The Regulation is described in the title as one “for abolishing the Courts of Maal Adawlut or Revenue Courts, and transferring the Trial of the Suits which were cognizable in those Courts to the Courts of Dewanny Adawlut; prescribing Rules for the conduct of the Board of Revenue and the Collectors”. Article I sets out the object of the Regulation at considerable length. After stating that for the purpose of securing improvement in agriculture, the property in the soil had been declared to be vested in the landholders and the revenue payable to Government from each estate had been fixed for ever, the Article goes on to describe the procedure that had theretofore been followed in making assessment, determining the share of the landholder in the produce of the lands and for the settlement of disputes relating to these matters. It then declares that henceforth revenue officers would no longer be competent to exercise judicial functions for the purpose of determining disputes of this kind. “Government must divest itself of the power of infringing, in its executive capacity, the rights and privileges which, as exercising the legislative authority, it has conferred on the landholders. The revenue officers must be deprived of their judicial powers”. It is in this context that the sentence relied upon by counsel occurs. It obviously means no more than that the privileges which had been conferred upon and secure to the landholders would not be liable to encroachment by revenue officers, and that any disputes concerning them that might arise would be determined by courts of judicature and not by the revenue officers themselves. It was also contended that the indirect effect of the impugned section was to affect adversely the landholders' capacity to meet their obligation under the Permanent Settlement in respect of the payment of the jama and that this amounted to an abrogation of the Permanent Settlement. The short answer is that even if the impugned section had this effect, that would be no reason for holding that the section was either ultra vires of the Provincial Legislature or was invalid. We do not however consider that the impugned section has in any manner affected assurances given to the landholders by the Permanent Settlement Regulation. Indeed, the first part of Article VII of the Regulation itself contemplates the possibility of legislation of the kind to which objection is now being taken. It is there declared, “It being the duty of the ruling power to protect all classes of people, and more particularly those who from their situation are most helpless, the Governor-General in Council will, whenever he may deem it proper, enact such Regulations as he may think necessary for the protection and welfare of the dependent talookdars, ryots, and other cultivators of the soil; and no zamindar, independent talookdar, or other actual proprietor of land, shall be entitled on this account to make any objection to the discharge of the fixed assessment which they have respectively agreed to pay”. It has been suggested that the “protection of ryots” contemplated in this passage is only against the imposition of abwabs and other illegal exactions. We see no reason for thus limiting the general reference to the “protection and welfare” of ryots. Indeed abwabs and illegal exactions have been expressly dealt with in Articles LIV and LY of Regulation VIII of 1793 of the same date. The impugned section is thus not only not in conflict with any provision of the Permanent Settlement Regulation but is in consonance with the intention and spirit of Article VII of the Regulation.

8. We hold that s. 178-B of the Bihar Tenancy Act was within the competence of the Bihar Legislature and was validly enacted and is operative as much in respect of lands comprised within the permanently settled estates as in respect of lands outside these estates. This appeal is dismissed.

9. Defendants-respondents did not enter an appearance in this Court. The Advocate-General of Bihar appeared and addressed us on behalf of the Province of Bihar in response to a notice issued by this Court. In these circumstances, and in accordance with the usual practice of this Court, we make no order as to costs.