ORAL JUDGMENT :

1. The plaintiff seeks a perpetual injunction, restraining the defendants from using, in relation to soaps or detergents, the impugned mark “SunPlus” or the word “Sun” with any prefix or suffix or any other deceptively similar mark or the impugned labels containing the words “Sunplus” or any other deceptively similar labels so as to infringe the plaintiffs registered trademarks or so as to pass off the defendants goods as and those of the goods of the plaintiff.

2. The plaintiff is the registered proprietor of the words marks “Sun”, “Sunlight” and “Sunsilk” under class 3. The marks “Sunlight” and “Sunsilk” are associated with the mark “Sun”.

The plaintiff is also the registered proprietor of the label marks, which include prominently the word “Sunlight”. The plaintiff has admittedly not used the mark “Sun” in India, but the other marks are associated with the word mark “Sun”.

3. Defendant No.1 is a sole proprietary concern of the son of defendant No.3. Defendant No.3 one P.C. Thahir is the sole proprietor of defendant No.2 – Aghin Chemicals. The defendants have adopted the mark “SunPlus” wherein the letters “S” and “P” are in capitals. The defendants have adopted the devise of a blue cross on the letter “P”. The vertical bar of the cross is within the vertical bar of the alphabet “P”. The horizontal bar in the cross extends within the lower curve of the letter “P” and to the left goes beyond the vertical bar of the letter “P”. The plaintiff claims to have seen the defendants products in January, 2010. The label mentions the second defendants name – Aghin Chemicals – as the manufacturer.

4. The plaintiff had filed Suit (Lodg) No.567 of 2010 in this Court for similar reliefs. By an order dated 3rd March, 2010, the plaintiff was allowed to withdraw the suit with liberty as the plaintiff desired to furnish more details and information with regard to the alleged infringement of the trademarks. The plaintiff, thereafter, filed the present suit on 10th March, 2010.

5. It is necessary first to deal with a preliminary objection raised on behalf of the defendant by Mr. Safiyuddin. Mr. Safiyuddin contended that this Court has no territorial jurisdiction to decide the suit. A preliminary issue in this regard was raised. Neither side sought to lead any evidence. It was agreed that I would furnish reasons for the decision on the preliminary objection, which I answered in the plaintiffs favour, in the judgment on the other issues.

6. Mr. Safiyuddin submitted that there can be no infringement under the 1999 Act if the defendants used the mark before the Act came into force and it follows, therefore, that section 134(2) will not apply as there is no infringement in Mumbai. Mr. Safiyuddin further submitted that a person who starts a business in one place cannot, by virtue of an amendment, be sued in another place. He relied upon sections 134 and 159(5) of the Trade Marks Act, 1999, read as under :-

“134. Suit for infringement, etc., to be instituted before District Court.- (1) No suit –

(a) for the infringement of a registered trade mark; or

(b) relating to any right in a registered trade mark; or

(c) for passing off arising out of the use by the defendant of any trade mark which is identical with or deceptively similar to the plaintiffs trade mark, whether registered or unregistered,

shall be instituted in any court inferior to a District Court having jurisdiction to try the suit.

(2) For the purpose of clauses (a) and (b) of subsection (1), a “District Court having jurisdiction” shall, notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908) or any other law for the time being in force, include a District Court within the local limits of whose jurisdiction, at the time of the institution of the suit or other proceedings the person instituting the suit or proceeding or, where there are more than one such persons any of them, actually and voluntarily resides or carries on business or personally works for gain.

Explanation.- For the purposes of sub-section (2), “person” includes the registered proprietor and the registered user.”

159 Repeal and savings.- (1) …......................

(5) Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act, where a particular use of a registered trade mark is not an infringement of a trade mark registered before the commencement of this Act, then, the continued use of that mark shall not be an infringement under this Act.”

7. Section 134 only deals with the aspect of jurisdiction. It does not deal with the question of infringement. Section 134 is not relevant to the question whether the infringement has taken place or not. Section 134 only stipulates the territorial jurisdiction within which an action for infringement can be filed.

8. Mr. Safiyuddin further submitted that under section 134, a plaintiff must bring an action where the cause of action arises if it also carries on business there. In other words, a plaintiff cannot file an action for infringement in any place where it resides or carries on business or personally works for gain even if it also resides or carries on business or personally works for gain at the place where the cause of action has arisen. He relied upon the judgment of a Division Bench of the Delhi High Court in IPRS vs. Sanjay Dalia MIPR 2009 (176). The Division Bench held as under :-

“3. We have carefully cogitated upon the contentions articulated before us on behalf of the litigating adversaries. IntasPharmaceuticals Ltd. –vs- Allergan Inc., 132(2006) DLT 641(DB)lays down an important principle of law in that it interprets Section 134 of the Trade Marks Act as not whittling down the provisions of Section 20 of the CPC but providing an additional forum and a place for filing a suit in case of an infringement of a trademark. The Division Bench presided over by Dr. Mukundakam Sharma, J. (as his Lordship then was) has also opined that the words “notwithstanding anything contained in the CPC” are indicative of the position that Section 134 of the Trade Marks Act has to be read conjointly with and in addition to the provisions of Section 20 of the CPC. To those observations we may add that it is only in the event of a conflict between the provisions of Section 20 of the CPC and those of Section 134 of the Trade Marks Act that the latter would prevail. The effort of the Court must be, so far as is possible, not to curtail the role that can be played by either of the provisions acting conjointly or simultaneously. This Court in Intashad predicated its decision on the opinion of the Supreme Court in DhodhaHouse –vs- S.K. Maingi, (2006) 9 SCC 41 [LQ/SC/2005/1260] in which it has been enunciated that Section 62(2) of the Copyright Act provides an additional forum to enable the holder of a copyright to file a suit at the place of his residence, thereby insulating him from the tedium or vexatiousness of taking the fight to the doorstep of the violating Defendant. The Trade and Merchandise Marks Act, 1958 did not contain a provision akin to Section 134(2) of the Trade Marks Act, 1999 enabling the Plaintiff to enjoy the convenience of filing a suit at the place where he resides or carries on business etc. The extant provisions are indeed salutary in purpose and effect, since otherwise the legal remedy available for a breach of copyright or an infringement of trademark often remains illusory. It appears to us that the Court would be acquiescing in an assault on a general principle of law prevalent at least in all common law systems if it were to allow a lis to continue at a place where neither has the cause of action arisen nor has the Defendant have a residence or place of business. This legal principle attempts to obviate the use of litigation as a device of harassment calculated to force an adversary into succumbing into a settlement for fear of fighting a lis at an inconvenient venue. Having made this observation, we see no impediment in extrapolating this impeccable reason onto an interpretation of Section 62(2) of the Copyright Act and Section 134(2) of the Trade Marks Act, (which are verbatim to each other), by requiring the Plaintiff to file a suit at the place where it has its principal or subordinate place of business if the cause of action has arisen there. Alternatively, the Plaintiff may take recourse to the provisions of Section 20 of the CPC.

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11. The intention of the legislature is evident, inter alia, in the non-obstante clause pertaining to the CPC. The word “notwithstanding” in ordinary parlance means “inspite of”or despite. (See Concise Oxford Dictionary as well as Black’s Law Dictionary). This word does not indicate that the CPC has no role to play. In the factual matrix before us the word “notwithstanding”connotes that in addition to Section 20 of the CPC, by virtue of Section 62(2) of the Copyright Act, the plaintiff is free to choose a forum convenient to it, that is, wherever it actually and voluntarily resides or carries on business or personally works for gain, provided the cause of action arises there. This is in contradistinction to that of the defendant as prescribed by Section 20 of the CPC. It is difficult for us to conceive of a situation where the ameliorative advantage bestowed on the plaintiff by virtue of Section 62 of the Trade Marks Act or Section 134 of the Trademarks Act could be frustrated if this interpretation is given effect to. Let us assume that the cause of action has arisen in Kanyakumari. It is axiomatic that in the case of a violation of a trademark or copyright the Defendant would have some presence, that is, Section 134 of the Trade Marks Act, the law is made meaningful and expedient. This is the bounden duty of any Court which is called upon to interpret a provision of law.”

9. I will not conceal my disappointment in being unable to agree with the judgment of the Division Bench of the Delhi High Court. The judgment contains a salutary principle and advances the cause of justice. I am, however, unable to follow the judgment for it appears to be contrary to the express provisions of section 134(2) which are mandatory. That it is mandatory is clear from the use of the word “shall” and the words “notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 or any other law for the time being in force”. I am unable to pursuade myself that the Legislature was oblivious of the difficulties that may be caused to a party who neither resides in nor carries on business within the jurisdiction of the Court in which the action is filed. Nor am I able to pursuade myself that the Legislature was oblivious of the fact that no inconvenience would be caused to a party bringing the action in a place where the cause of action has arisen if such party resides in or carries on business or personally works for gain at such place. The Legislature, apart from being deemed to have been aware of the provisions of the law, was obviously aware of the Code of Civil Procedure as the Code of Civil Procedure is, in terms, referred to in section 134(2). The Legislature consciously conferred upon a plaintiff the benefit of bringing an action in a jurisdiction stipulated by the CPC or any other law or at its option in a jurisdiction stipulated in section 134(2). I do not think it is open for me to question the legislative policy by reading into the mandatory provisions, a qualification which is expressly excluded by the terms of the section.

10. In the circumstances, the preliminary objection is over-ruled.

11. Mr. Safiyuddin however, requested me not to adjourn the hearing of the Notice of Motion to enable him to challenge this finding. He requested me to proceed with the hearing of the Notice of Motion without prejudice to his rights to challenge this finding. I, accordingly, proceeded to hear the Notice of Motion on merits.

12. Mr. Safiyuddin stated that the registration of the plaintiffs mark “Sun” is no longer valid. He stated that the registration certificate produced by the plaintiff was valid only till 19th January, 2008.

13. Dr. Tulzapurkar, the learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the plaintiff produced the certificate indicating that the registration has been renewed. By an order dated 15th January, 2008, the registration of the plaintiffs mark has been renewed for a period of ten years from 19th January, 2008. The same is, therefore, valid till 19th January, 2018.

14. I permitted this certificate to be produced across the bar as this is only a Notice of Motion. The defendants are always at liberty to question the authenticity of the certificate. I would not allow a genuine claim to be defeated on such a technicality especially at the interlocutory stage.

15. On 17th June, 1997, the defendants made an application for the registration of the mark “Sunplus” in the State of Kerala. The defendants claim having used the mark “Sunplus” since the year 1997. On 1st August, 2007, the application was advertised for acceptance. The plaintiff filed an opposition in February, 2008. The opposition was heard by the Registrar. The Registrar closed the matter for orders. Thereafter, the said Suit (Lodg) No.567 of 2010 was filed, which was by the order dated 3rd March, 2010, allowed to be withdrawn with liberty to file a fresh suit. This suit was accordingly, filed on 10th March, 2010.

16. The Deputy Registrar of Trade Marks, by an order dated 29th March, 2010, dismissed the plaintiffs opposition and held the defendants to be the proprietor of the mark “SUN PLUS” under section 18(1) of the Act. He, however, held that the defendants had established their proprietorship of the trademark Sunplus label in respect of detergents in the State of Kerala. He, therefore, accepted for registration, the mark, but confined it to detergent powder under class 3 but only for the State of Kerala.

Mr. Safiyuddin placed strong reliance upon the following observations in the order :–

“................................I have considered that Trade Mark of the Applicants is Label Mark having the different features from the Opponents Marks and in my opinion the Trade Mark is different from the Opponent Trade Marks which is already been used by the Applicants and even the Honble Court has recognized the rights of the Applicants in the Trade Mark SUN PLUS in respect of the goods detergent powder. The Applicants atleast established continuous use of SUN PLUS Label mark in the State of Kerala. Hence I am not able to sustain the objection of the Opponents under Section 11(1)(a) as a Trade Mark as a whole is different to the Opponent marks.

Moreover, the Applicants has claimed the use of the mark and filed sufficient evidence to establish their concurrent use of Label mark since the adoption in respect of goods detergents. In special circumstances, the Applicants are entitled for Registration under Section 12 of the Trade Marks Act subject to the conditions as Registrar may think fit.

Lastly the Opponent has raised the objection that Applicant is not a Proprietor of the mark SUN PLUS Label under Section 18(1) of the Trade Marks Act, 1999. The rights of the proprietor can be claimed by true honesty adoption and honest use of the mark for Registration under the provisions of the Act.

I have gone through the record available before the Tribunal and come to the conclusion that the Applicants have established their rights of Proprietorship atleast in the state of Kerala on the basis of long use, where the Honble Court also recognized their Intellectual property rights under Trade Mark SUN PLUS.”

17. The observation of the Deputy Registrar that the Court had recognized the defendants rights in the trade mark Sunplus is, however, not relevant. The observation is with reference to the earlier part of the order where the Deputy Registrar considered an order passed by a Court in a proceeding filed by the defendants against a third party who had used the mark “Sunplus” or “Sun+”. Firstly, the marks impugned in those proceedings were different. Secondly, the plaintiffs rights cannot be affected by observations in those proceedings as it was not a party thereto.

18. Mr. Safiyuddin stated that in view of the observations of the Deputy Registrar, this Court cannot and, in any event, ought not to hold that the defendants mark is deceptively similar to the plaintiffs mark. He further submitted that the action for passing off is also not maintainable in view of the order of the Deputy Registrar.

19. I am unable to accept the submissions. The opposition proceedings filed before the Registrar of Trademarks in the State of Kerala have not attained finality. The plaintiff and the defendants have challenged the same. There is, therefore, no question of issue estoppel. The order is a factor which this Court may take into consideration while deciding this Notice of Motion. The order, however, by itself does not preclude this Court from considering the matter afresh. Had the matter attained finality, the defendants could have contended that the plaintiff is bound by the finding invoking the principle of issue estoppel. This contention is not open to the defendants as the issue has not been finally decided. It is pending in appeal before the IPAB.

20. Mr. Safiyuddin further submitted that in view of the order of the Deputy Registrar, the question of passing off also stands concluded against the plaintiff. In support of this submission he relied upon section 11(3) of the Act which reads as under :-

“11. Relative grounds for refusal of registration.—

(3) A trade mark shall not be registered if, or to the extent that, its use in India is liable to be prevented—

(a) by virtue of any law in particular the law of passing off protecting an unregistered trade mark used in the course of trade; or

(b) by virtue of law of copyright.”

21. Under Section 11(3), the Registrar is precluded from registering a mark if its use in India is liable to be prevented by virtue, inter-alia, of the law of passing off protecting an unregistered trademark used in the course of trade. Once the Registrar allows a mark to be registered it follows, according to Mr. Safiyuddin, that the Registrar was not merely satisfied, but must be deemed to have held that the use of the mark is not liable to be prevented by any law, including the law of passing off. A passing off action, therefore, cannot succeed in respect of a registered trade mark. Therefore, Mr. Safiyuddin submitted that once a mark is registered the Registrar must be deemed to have held in favour of the applicant even on the question of passing off. He also submitted that this would be so even if the question of passing off is not dealt with in the order of the Registrar. In that event, he must be deemed to have decided the question sub-silentio.

22. I am unable to agree. If the question of passing off is raised in opposition proceedings and is decided by the Registrar and the decision has attained finality, it may be open to the registered proprietor to raise the question of issue estoppel in other proceedings between the same parties invoking the principle of issue estoppel. Such a defence would be restricted to the very issue that is decided. There is no principle of constructive issue estoppel. My attention has not been invited to any such principle. I am unable, therefore, to dismiss this Notice of Motion on the basis of constructive issue estoppel.

23. Where a mark is registered without opposition from a party filing an action for passing off, the order of the Registrar does not and cannot affect the party nor bind the Court from considering the question of passing off. To hold otherwise would be contrary to the provisions of the Act. It would render section 34 redundant. Section 34 reads as under :-

“34. Saving for vested rights.- Nothing in this Act shall entitle the proprietor or a registered user of registered trade mark to interfere with or restrain the use by any person of a trade mark identical with or nearly resembling it in relation to goods or services in relation to which that person or a predecessor in title of his has continuously used that trade mark from a date prior -

(a) to the use of the first mentioned trade mark in relation to those goods or services by the proprietor or a predecessor in title of his; or

(b) to the date of registration of the first-mentioned trade mark in respect of those goods or services in the name of the proprietor of a predecessor in title of his; whichever is the earlier, and the Registrar shall not refuse (on such use being proved), to register the second mentioned trade mark by reason only of the registration of the first mentioned trade mark.”

24. Section 34 can be availed of in an application for registration as well as a defence to an infringement action. The first part of section 34 refers to an action for infringement. The opening part of section 34 precludes the registered proprietor from interfering with or restraining the use by a person of a trademark in the circumstances mentioned in clauses (a) and (b). This is obviously a reference to an action for infringement. The second part which appears after clauses (a) and (b) deals with registration proceedings as is clear from the words “and the Registrar shall not refuse (on such use being proved), to register the second mentioned trade mark by reason only of the registration of the first mentioned trade mark.”.

The first part of section 34 enables a party to resist an action for infringement by proving use of the impugned mark prior to the dates mentioned in clauses (a) and (b). If Mr. Safiyuddins submission is accepted, it would negate their right and render section 34 meaningless.

25. The next question is whether the defendants mark “Sunplus” is deceptively similar to the plaintiffs registered mark “Sun”.

Dr. Tulzapurkar relied upon the judgment of a Division Bench of this Court in IndchemieHealth Specialities Pvt. Ltd. v. Naxbar Labs Pvt. Ltd. 2002 (24) PTC 341. [LQ/BomHC/2001/1073] In that case, the plaintiffs mark was “Cherie” and the defendant had used the mark “Cherish”. Dr. Tulzapurkar relied upon paragraph 8 of the judgment which reads as under :

“8. In the light of the aforesaid observations of the Supreme Court the question we must ask to ourselves is; what would be the effect on the mind of the person of average intelligence and imperfect recollection. Applying this test which is established principle quoted above, there can be no manner of doubt that the respondents mark "Cherish" is deceptively similar to the appellants mark "Cheri". If we compare the words cheri and cherish they are structurally and visually similar as well as aurally similar and easily give rise to deception and confusion. It would be highly improbable to expect on ordinary person of average intelligence in the meaning of two words cheri and cherish. As there is great deal of similarity in the phonetics of these two words. This phonetic similarity taken in conjunction with the fact that there is also a similarity in the products, to our mind, undoubtedly confuse an ordinary purchaser of average intelligence and imperfect recollection and who may even be an illiterate. This is all the more manifest because entire mark of the appellants is incorporated in the mark of the respondents. We have therefore no hesitation in coming to the conclusion that the respondents mark Cherish is deceptively similar to the appellants mark "Cheri" and is likely to deceive or cause confusion. Merely because since possibility of confusion remains.”

He submitted that a person infringes the mark of another even where the registered mark forms only a part of the impugned mark.

26. After referring to this judgment in PidiliteIndustries Ltd. v. S.M. Associates, 2003 (2) LJSOFT (URC) 4, I observed in paragraph 48 as under :-

“I do not read the judgment of the Appeal Court having laid down an inflexible rule that in every case where the entire mark of the Plaintiff is incorporated/finds place in the mark of the defendant, the Plaintiff is entitled to succeed in an action for infringement of a trademark.”

There is nothing that pursuades me to take a different view even if I was entitled to do so. The question of deceptive similarity must necessarily be decided in respect of the marks in question in each case. The answer would depend upon a variety of factors, including whether the mark said to be infringed forms a dominant or significant part of the impugned mark or whether it is only an insignificant part thereof. If it is insignificant, the mere incorporation of the mark said to be infringed in the impugned mark would not deceive anybody. There are, for instance, names of places which comprise of almost a hundred letters. I cannot imagine a three letter word incorporated within such a name to deceive anybody. This may be an extreme example, but it illustrates the fallacy in the contention that as an absolute rule, the mere incorporation of the mark said to be infringed in the impugned mark constitutes infringement.

27. In the present case, however, the defendants mark is not “Sunplus” to wit the defendants mark does not comprise of one word. It comprises of two words viz., the word “Sun” and the word “Plus”. That they are used separately is clear from the fact that only the letters “S” and “P” are in capitals. Moreover, the words are also separated by the devise of a medical cross embedded essentially in the vertical bar of the letter “P”. Even if there is no space between the letters “Sun” and “Plus” as a result of these factors a consumer will, in all probability, read it as two words. Significantly, the order of the Registrar in the opposition proceedings also considered them to be two separate words. This establishes the possibility of a person associating the mark Sunplus with the plaintiffs mark “Sun” absent anything else.

28. I do not suggest that the mere use of a word mark as an independent part of the impugned mark will ipso facto constitute infringement. It would depend on a variety of factors such as the number of words in the impugned mark, the placement of the mark said to be infringed in the impugned mark and the prominence given to the mark said to be infringed in the impugned mar. This flows from the principle that marks must be considered as a whole and not in fragments.

29. The word “Plus”, however, indicates an addition to or an enhancement of a product earlier sold under the mark “Sun”. The consumer would, in all probability, consider a product sold under the mark “Sun Plus” to be an improvement of the product sold by the same manufacturer under the mark “Sun”.

30. The reference to the defendants label was to indicate that there was a substantial difference between the plaintiffs packaging and the defendants packaging in view of the added material and the entirely different get-up between the two labels. That, however, would not come to the aid of the defendant in an action for infringement.

31(A) In Ruston & Hornsby Ltd. v. Zamindara Engineering Co., 1970 2 SCR 222 [LQ/SC/1969/330] , the Supreme Court held that in an action for infringement, an injunction would issue as soon as it is proved that the defendant is improperly using the plaintiffs mark as such an action is a statutory right. The Supreme Court further held that in an action for infringement where the defendants trademark is identical with the plaintiffs mark, the Court will not enquire whether the infringement is such as is likely to deceive or cause confusion. In that case, the Supreme Court held that there was a deceptive resemblance between the word “Ruston” and the word “Rustom”. The Supreme Court held that if the respondents trademark is deceptively similar to that of the appellant, the fact that the word India is added to the respondents trademark is of no consequence and the appellant is entitled to succeed in its action for infringement of the trademark.

(B) Dr. Tulzapurakrs reliance upon the judgment of a Division Bench of this Court in M/s. Girnar Tea., Bombay & Anr. v. Brooke Bond India Ltd., Calcutta, 1990 PTC 245 is also well founded. The Division Bench held that if the essential features of the plaintiffs trademark had been adopted by the defendant, the fact that the get-up and other writing or marks on the goods or on the packets in which he offered his goods for sale show marked differences or indicate clearly a trade origin different from that of the registered proprietor of the mark would be immaterial. These aspects would be relevant in an action for passing off, if the defendant can show that the added matter is sufficient to distinguish his goods from those of the plaintiffs.

32. Despite the same, I am not inclined to grant an injunction against infringement. The plaintiffs mark was registered with effect from 19th January, 1951 as is evident from the registration certificate dated 16th August, 1954. The plaintiff has not used the mark even once since it was registered. There is nothing on record which indicates that the plaintiff intended using the mark during these 60 years. The mark has not even been used by an assignee or a licencee. In view of these facts, Mr. Safiyuddins reliance upon the judgment of a learned single Judge of this Court in CluettPeabody & Co. Inc. v. Arrow Apparel, 1998 PTC 18is well founded. In that case, the appellant had not used the mark for about 35 years. The learned Judge held thus :-

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(f) Object of the Act is to protect the right and not to be a source of monopoly. It is also to protect bonafide interests of traders from harassment by registered owners of a trade mark, apart from protection of public fraud, fraud by infringers of genuine trade mark.

(g) Registration enables the registered proprietor to sue for infringement of registered trade mark irrespective of the fact whether it is used or not used. Registration confers on the proprietor a monopoly right over the use of the mark. But, proprietary rights in a trade mark acquired by use are superior to rights obtained by registration under the Act. This is the main defence put up on behalf of the defendants in this Notice of Motion. Therefore, prior user of the marks should be protected against monopoly rights conferred by the Act. [Pages 5 & 6 of Narayanan]. A trade mark has no meaning even if it is registered unless it is used in relation to goods. Otherwise, its non-use may lead to its death. A trade mark which drops out of the use dies. Where there are no goods offered for sale, there is no use of trade mark.

(h) ….......

(I) ….......

(j) The mark can loose its distinctiveness by non-user. [Para 26 of Narayanan]. Therefore, the enforcement of the Right of exclusive use of a trade mark will depend on continuous use of the mark by the proprietor. If he fails, piracy will result and the mark will become common to the trade because there is no exclusive ownership of the symbol constituting a trade mark apart from the use of it in respect of vendible goods, particularly in context of principles governing them. Acquisition of proprietary right is different from enforcement of rights/reliefs.”

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The important point to be noticed is that the essential test for constituting the property in a trademark is that it should be used by the proprietor in his business or in connection with his vendible commodity. Delay by itself is no defence, but where by reason of non user for almost thirty years, the mark looses its distinctiveness or if the trade drops out of its use, or the mark is allowed to die for non user, then certainly delay in the context of the above facts provides a very strong defence for refusing injunction in favour of the plaintiffs. It is well settled that lapse of time may bring about a change in the state of things in such a manner that to grant injunction in favour of the plaintiffs would be harsh and it may cause irreparable damage or harm to the rights of the defendants.

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However, the owners of a trademark should not adopt a sort of rip van winkle policy of registering their mark and not putting the mark to use for thirty years because the effect of delay is on the grant of relief. Delay may effect the nature of relief granted. The Court may refuse interlocutory injunction if the mark is not used for a long period or if the mark has lost its distinctiveness in the Indian market by non user for a long period. The above observations are prima facie observations. Evidence will have to be led ultimately to prove the question of user or non user by the plaintiff. At this stage, it is repeated that the defendants have made out a strong prima facie case against grant of injunction. It is true that the defendants should have inspected the Register before putting the mark to use in 1985, but as pointed out by the learned counsel for the defendants, the goods were never in use in India and, therefore, user from 1985 by the defendants cannot be treated as dishonest. In the present case, the order passed by this Court is not based on abandonment or acquiescence on the part of the plaintiffs. This order is only based on the footing that user of the mark by the defendants from 1985 till 1997 has affected the nature of relief and it is for this reason that this Court is not inclined to grant injunction because it would totally disrupt the organized business of the defendants in India. It is true that registration of the mark confers proprietary rights even if the mark is proposed to be used and it is not actually used but if the mark is registered and it is not prima facie used for thirty years, the Court should be slow in granting injunction.

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31. The object of the Trade Marks Act is to protect the proprietary right of a registered trademark holder. However, if the mark is registered and not used for thirty years, depending on the facts, prima facie, it becomes a source of monopoly which is not the object of the Act. Just as the right of customers or the purchasers of the goods are required to be protected so also traders who are in business over a long period of time, cannot be harassed by threat of litigation by registered proprietors, particularly when after registration, they have not used the mark for long period. In the present case, prima facie, I am satisfied that there is no user of the mark in India, particularly when there is no evidence of the date on which the reputation of the mark travelled into India. This again, is only my prima facie observation in the context of the nature of relief which this Court should grant depending on the facts of the present case. The entire Order is based only on facts of this case.”

33. I do not suggest for a moment that mere non user of a mark in India denies the registered proprietor the right to protection against infringement. That would also depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case. The facts of the present case indicate that there never was an intention to use the mark, which is entirely different from mere non user. Registration predicates either use or the proposed use of a mark as is evident from Section 18(1) which reads as under :-

“18. Application for registration.—(1) Any person claiming to be the proprietor of a trade mark used or proposed to be used by him, who is desirous of registering it, shall apply in writing to the Registrar in the prescribed manner for the registration of his trade mark.”

If, therefore, it is demonstrated that the registered proprietor neither used nor proposed using the mark or had consciously abandoned any intention to use permanently the mark, he will be denied the benefits of the registration of his marks and an injunction against infringement thereof.

34. Dr. Tulzapurkars reliance upon the judgment of a Division Bench of this Court dated 14th September, 1987 in Primus-Sievert Atkiebolag v. Pamus Burner Manufacturing Company – Appeal No.192 of 1984 in Notice of Motion No. 222 of 1983 in Suit No.224 of 1982 is, therefore, of no assistance to the plaintiff. The Division Bench held that the mere fact that the goods are not available in India would not, in any manner, reduce the effect of the registration of the trade mark. In that case, the mark was renewed from time to time and it was not in dispute that the goods manufactured by the appellant were sold all over the world. The Division Bench held that it was not permissible to use a deceptively similar mark merely because the goods manufactured by the appellant were not “presently” available in the country. It is important to note that in that case, the goods were not available in India only for about five years, which was due to import restrictions imposed by the Government of India. Thus, it could not have been said that the appellants had no intention of using the mark in India. As I mentioned earlier, there is nothing in the present case to indicate any valid reason for the plaintiff not having used the mark for over 60 years since it was registered.

35. Faced with this, Dr. Tulzapurkar relied upon the provisions of section 16 and 55 of the Act which read as under :-

“16. Registration of trade marks as associated trade marks.— (1) Where a trade mark which is registered, or is the subject of an application for registration, in respect of any goods or services is identical with another trade mark which is registered, or is the subject of an application for registration, in the name of the same proprietor in respect of the same goods or description of goods or same services or description of services or so nearly resembles it as to be likely to deceive or cause confusion if used by a person other than the proprietor, the Registrar may, at any time, require that the trade marks shall be entered on the register as associated trade marks.

(2) Where there is an identity or near resemblance of marks that are registered, or are the subject of applications for registration in the name of the same proprietor, in respect of goods and in respect of services which are associated with those goods or goods of that description and with those services or services of that description, subsection (1) shall apply as it applies as where there is an identity or near resemblance of marks that are registered, or are the subject of applications for registration, in the name of the same proprietor in respect of the same goods or description of goods or same services or description of services.

(3) Where a trade mark and any part thereof are, in accordance with the provisions of sub-section (1) of Section 15, registered as separate trade marks in the name of the same proprietor, they shall be deemed to be, and shall be registered as, associated trade marks.

(4) All trade marks registered in accordance with the provisions of sub-section (3) of Section 15 as a series in one registration shall be deemed to be, and shall be registered as, associated trade marks.

(5) On application made in the prescribed manner by the registered proprietor of two or more trade marks registered as associated trade marks, the Registrar may dissolve the association as respects any of them if he is satisfied that there would be no likelihood of deception or confusion being caused if that trade mark were used by any other person in relation to any of the goods or services or both in respect of which it is registered, and may amend the register accordingly.

….................

55. Use of one of associated or substantially identical trade marks equivalent to use of another.—(1) Where under the provisions of this Act, use of a registered trade mark is required to be proved for any purpose, the tribunal may, if and, so far as it shall think right, accept use of a registered associated trade mark, or of the trade mark with additions or alterations not substantially affecting its identity, as an equivalent for the use required to be proved.

(2) The use of the whole of a registered trade mark shall, for the purpose of this Act, be deemed to be also use of any trade mark being a part thereof and registered in accordance with sub-section (1) of Section 15 in the name of the same proprietor.

(3) Notwithstanding anything in Section 32, the use of part of the registered trade mark in subsection (2) shall not be conclusive as to its evidence of distinctiveness for any purpose under this Act.”

36. Mr. Safiyuddin rightly submitted that section 55 does not apply to a Court and would only apply to proceedings before the Tribunal i.e. the Registrar or the Appellate Board. This is evident from section 55 which confers the discretion contained therein upon the tribunal. The term “tribunal” is defined in section 2(ze) of the Act under :

“Section 2. Definitions and interpretation .-

(ze) “tribunal” means the Registrar or, as the case may be, the Appellate Board, before which the proceeding concerned is pending;”

37. Dr. Tulzapurkar submitted that principles analogous to section 55 ought, in any event, to be applied. Dr. Tulzapurkar submitted that otherwise there would be an anomalous situation in that before the Registrar, the principle can be invoked, but not in a High Court although before the Registrar it will be used even regarding a question under section 11(2).

38. I will presume the submission to be correct. Section 55 is, however, not mandatory. It only entitles the Tribunal and if Dr. Tulzapurkars submission is correct, the Court to accept the use of the registered associate trade mark as an equivalent for the use required to be proved.

39. I am not inclined to exercise this discretion in the plaintiffs favour in the present case for more than one reason. I do not suggest that any one reason dissuades me from doing so. It is considering all the factors together that I refrain from exercising my discretion in the plaintiffs favour.

The defendant has been using the mark since the year 1997. The defendant has developed a reputation in the market on its own in the State of Kerala. There is nothing to suggest that in the State of Kerala, the mark “Sunlight” had acquired such a reputation that the plaintiff derived advantage merely by trading on the same. The mark “Sun” has not been used for over 60 years. There is a possibility that if the plaintiffs mark had acquired reputation in Kerala, it would have come across the plaintiffs mark which has been widely advertised in a variety of ways, including on television channels, hoardings and in magazines. In that event, the plaintiff would have noticed the defendant mark and adopted proceedings earlier. As it is, the defendants have used the mark for almost fifteen years now.

40. In the result, the plaintiffs action for infringement of the registered mark “Sun” cannot succeed. Nor can the action for passing off in respect of the mark “Sun” succeed as admittedly it has never been used.

41. The next question is whether this action can succeed in respect of the mark “Sunlight”.

42. I do not consider the defendants mark “Sunplus” to be deceptively similar to the plaintiffs mark “Sunlight”. The mere fact that the marks are prefixed by the letters “Sun” would not indicate deceptive similarity. To hold otherwise would, as rightly contended by Mr. Safiyuddin, confer upon the plaintiff a monopoly in respect of the words “Sun” and “Light”. The marks “Sunlight” and “Sunplus” are phonetically and visually distinct. Moreover, the word SunPlus is written in the stylized manner, I have described earlier, reducing the possibility of confusion. Further, in both the marks the suffix is pronounced and distinct from the prefix.

43. Moreover, Exhibits C-1 and C-6 of the plaint furnish sales figures of the products bearing the “Sunlight” word only upto the year 2006. The suit was filed on 10th March, 2010 i.e. three years later. There is nothing to indicate any use of the mark “Sunlight” from the year 2006. No sales figures from the year 2006 onwards have been furnished. The plaintiffs would not, therefore, be entitled to succeed on the basis of passing off qua the “Sunlight” mark.

44. Thus, on the one hand, the word “Sun” has not been used for over 60 years and on the other, there is no deceptive similarity between the words “Sunplus” and “Sunlight”. Thus, even if inspection had been taken by the defendants of the records of the Registrar of Trade Marks, it would have made no difference.

45. Mr. Safiyuddin submitted that the application for injunction ought to be rejected on the ground that the plaintiff made a false statement in the plaint that it came to know of the defendants product for the first time only in January, 2010. It is admitted that the plaintiff, in fact, came to know of the same in the year 2008 as is evident from the fact that the plaintiff filed an opposition to the defendants application for registration. The defendants affidavit in reply to the opposition extensively refers to the use by the defendants of the mark on its wrappers, advertisements, television, bill-boards etc.

46. I am not inclined to accept this submission merely on the ground that in paragraph 11 of the plaint, it is stated that in or about January, 2010, the plaintiff for the first time came across the defendants product. Coming across a product is different from knowledge of the use of the mark. Secondly, the question of suppression or of the plaintiff having made a false statement does not arise. The contention was based on the disclosure by the defendant in the affidavit in reply to the opposition proceedings. It is pertinent to note that there is a full and complete disclosure of the opposition proceedings in paragraph 10. The plaintiff has also expressly stated that it came to know about the defendants mark “Sunplus” vide the Trade Mark Journal 1373 which was advertised on 25th October, 2007. There was, therefore, no intention to suppress a material or to make any false statement.

47. In the circumstances, the Notice of Motion is dismissed with costs fixed at Rs.10,000/-.