Sunil Ambwani, CJ.
1. We have heard learned counsel appearing for the parties.
2. A preliminary objection has been taken by the respondents to the maintainability of the intra-court D.B.Special Appeal against the judgment passed by learned Single Judge in a writ petition filed under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, arising out of a landlord-tenant dispute decided by the Rent Tribunal and an appeal thereafter decided by Appellate Rent Tribunal under the Rajasthan Rent Control Act, 2001.
3. On 15.7.2015, the appellant was given time to examine as to whether a Special Appeal will be maintainable against the order of learned Single Judge passed in a petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, under Rule 134(i) of the Rajasthan High Court Rules, 1952 (for short, "the Rules of 1952").
4. The relevant Rule 134 of the Rules of 1952 is quoted as below:-
"134(i) Appeal to the High Court from Judgment of Judges of the Court:- An appeal shall lie to the High Court from the Judgment or a final order (not being a Judgment passed in the exercise of appellate Jurisdiction in respect of a decree or order made in the exercise of appellate Jurisdiction by a Court subject to the superintendence of the High Court and not being an order made in the exercise of revisional Jurisdiction and not being a sentence or order passed or made in the exercise of the power of superintendence or in the exercise of criminal Jurisdiction) of one Judge of the High Court.
(ii) Special appeal.- A person desiring to prefer a special appeal from the judgment of the Single Judge shall present a duly stamped memorandum of appeal within sixty days from the date of such judgment. Where such appeal is presented after the period mentioned above, it shall be accompanied by an application supported by an affidavit explaining the cause of delay and it shall be rejected unless the appellant satisfied the court that he had sufficient cause for non preferring the appeal within the aforesaid time.."
5. Rule 134(1) of the Rules of 1952 clearly provides, without any doubt or ambiguity that where the High Court renders a judgment or final order in the exercise of its power of superintendence, an appeal to the High Court from the judgment of learned Single Judge (D.B.Special Appeal) will not be maintainable.
6. In the present case, an application was filed under section 9 of the Rajasthan Rent Control Act, 2001 (for short, "the Act of 2001") for eviction of the appellants from the leased premises, on the ground that the premises in question were leased to the predecessor-in-interest of the non-applicant-Caltax (India) Limited under a registered lease deed dated 15.10.1967 with effect from 1.2.1968 for a period of 20 years and could be renewed at the option of the lessee exercised prior to the expiry of the lease for two periods of ten years. It was submitted that the lease was not renewed after expiry of 20 years as per contract by way of an appropriate renewal deed drawn and registered. In defence, it was stated that even though two contractual renewals of 10 years each as visualised under Clause 3(g) of the lease deed dated 15.10.1967, were not formally obtained by way of execution of lease deeds afresh and registration thereof, yet the continuation of the non-applicant in the leased premises was based on the consent of the applicant on payment of enhanced rent as per the lease and was contractual in nature. The Rent Tribunal, Ajmer decided the issues against the tenant and consequently, directed the vacant possession to be given to the landlord. A statutory appeal under the Act of 2001 filed before the Appellate Rent Tribunal, Ajmer, was dismissed on 8.10.2013.
7. S.B.Civil Writ Petition No.4195/2014 was filed by Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Limited challenging the orders of the Rent Tribunal as well as the Appellate Rent Tribunal, under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. The writ petition was titled as "S.B.Civil Writ Petition Under Article 227 of the Constitution of India". In paragraph 11 of the writ petition, it was stated as follows:-
"11. That the Petitioner has got no other equally efficacious alternate remedy except to approach this Honble Court under extra-ordinary jurisdiction of this Honble Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India."
Prayers were made to quash the orders passed by the Appellate Rent Tribunal and Rent Tribunal. The Rent Tribunal and Appellate Rent Tribunal were not impleaded for the reason that learned Single Judge had passed orders on 15.1.2014 in S.B.Civil Writ Petition No.120/14 directing the Registry to delete the Rent Tribunals and Appellate Rent Tribunals as party respondents to the writ petitions.
8. Learned Single Judge proceeded to decide the writ petition filed under Article 227 of the Constitution of India stating in opening paragraph of the judgment dated 23.2.2015 that "This petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India impungs the judgment dated 8.10.2013 passed by the Appellate Rent Tribunal, Ajmer....."
9. It is submitted by learned counsel appearing for the respondents that Rule 134(i) of the Rules of 1952 clearly bars a Special Appeal against the judgment or final order passed or made in exercise of the power of superintendence of High Court. Under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, the High Court exercises the powers of superintendence over all Courts and Tribunals through out the territories in relation to which it has jurisdiction and thus, the Special Appeal is not maintainable. He has relied on the judgment of the Supreme Court in Shalini Shyam Shetty v. Rajendra Shankar Patil ((2010) 8 SCC 329 ) followed in Jacky v. Tiny Alias Antony and ors. ((2014) 6 SCC 508 ).
10. In Shalini Shyam Shetty v. Rajendra Shankar Patil (supra), the Supreme Court held in paragraph 48 as follows:-
"48. The jurisdiction under Article 226 normally is exercised where a party is affected but power under Article 227 can be exercised by the High Court suo motu as a custodian of justice. In fact, the power under Article 226 is exercised in favour of persons or citizens for vindication of their fundamental rights or other statutory rights. The jurisdiction under Article 227 is exercised by the High Court for vindication of its position as the highest judicial authority in the State. In certain cases where there is infringement of fundamental right, the relief under Article 226 of the Constitution can be claimed ex debito justitiae or as a matter of right. But in cases where the High Court exercises its jurisdiction under Article 227, such exercise is entirely discretionary and no person can claim it as a matter of right. From an order of a Single Judge passed under Article 226, a letters patent appeal or an intra court appeal is maintainable. But no such appeal is maintainable from an order passed by a Single Judge of a High Court in exercise of power under Article 227. In almost all the High Courts, rules have been framed for regulating the exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226. No such rule appears to have been framed for exercise of High Courts power under Article 227 possibly to keep such exercise entirely in the domain of the discretion of High Court."
11. In Jacky v. Tiny Alias Antony and ors. (supra) decided on 9th April, 2014, the Supreme Court, after referring to the judgment in Jai Singh v. MCD (2010) 9 SCC 385 ) and Shalini Shyam Shetty v. Rajendra Shankar Patil (supra) held that the maintainability of the writ petition in the matter of landlord-tenant dispute was considered by the Supreme Court in Shalini Shyam Shetty v. Rajendra Shankar Patil (supra) and in that case, the Court noticed the scope of interference by the High Court in civil matters/private disputes under Article 226 of the Constitution of India and held that the High Court committed an error in entertaining the writ petition in a dispute between landlord and tenant and where the only respondent is a private landlord. Paragraphs 12 to 16 of the judgment in Jacky v. Tiny Alias Antony and ors. (supra) are quoted below:-
"12. The maintainability of writ petition in a matter of landlord-tenant dispute was considered by this Court in Shalini Shyam Shetty and another v. Rajendra Shankar Patil. In the said case, this Court noticed the scope of interference by the High Court in civil matters/private disputes under Article 226 of the Constitution of India and held that the High Court committed an error in entertaining writ petition in a dispute between landlord and tenant and where the only respondent is a private landlord.
13. Nature and scope of power under Article 227 of the Constitution of India was considered by this Court in Jai Singh v. MCD. In the said case, this Court held (SCC pp.390-91, para 15):
"15. We have anxiously considered the submissions of the learned counsel. Before we consider the factual and legal issues involved herein, we may notice certain well-recognised principles governing the exercise of jurisdiction by the High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. Undoubtedly the High Court, under this article, has the jurisdiction to ensure that all subordinate courts as well as statutory or quasi-judicial tribunals, exercise the powers vested in them, within the bounds of their authority. The High Court has the power and the jurisdiction to ensure that they act in accordance with the well-established principles of law. The High Court is vested with the powers of superintendence and/or judicial revision, even in matters where no revision or appeal lies to the High Court. The jurisdiction under this article is, in some ways, wider than the power and jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. It is, however, well to remember the well-known adage that greater the power, greater the care and caution in exercise thereof. The High Court is, therefore, expected to exercise such wide powers with great care, caution and circumspection. The exercise of jurisdiction must be within the well-recognised constraints. It can not be exercised like a "bull in a china shop", to correct all errors of judgment of a court, or tribunal, acting within the limits of its jurisdiction. This correctional jurisdiction can be exercised in cases where orders have been passed in grave dereliction of duty or in flagrant abuse of fundamental principles of law or justice."
14. The question whether the one or other order procured by the appellant against the 2nd respondent was with the intention to harass the 1st respondent is a question of fact which can be determined on the basis of evidence. There is no such issue framed nor any evidence brought on record to suggest Ex. P2 and P3 the orders obtained by the appellant against the 2nd respondent with intention to misuse the same and harass the 1st respondent. If the 1st respondent was aggrieved against the orders contained in Ex.P2 and P3 which were passed by the courts in one or other suit against a third party (2nd respondent) and to which 1st respondent was not a party, he was not remediless and could have challenged the same before an appropriate forum.
15. A petition under Article 226 or Article 227 of Constitution of India can neither be entertained to decide the landlord-tenant dispute nor it is maintainable against a private individual to determine an intense dispute including the question whether one party harassing the other party. The High Court under Article 227 has the jurisdiction to ensure that all subordinate courts as well as statutory or quasi-judicial tribunals, exercise the powers vested in them within the bounds of their authority but it was not the case of the 1st respondent that the order passed by the Munsiff Court was without any jurisdiction or was so exercised exceeding its jurisdiction. If a suit is not maintainable it was well within the jurisdiction of the High Court to decide the same in appropriate proceedings but in no case power under Articles 226 and 227 of Constitution of India can be exercised to question a plaint.
16. For the reasons aforesaid, we set aside the impugned judgment and order dated 27.10.2011 passed by the High Court of Kerala at Ernakulam in Tiny v. Jacky and allow the appeal"
12. It is submitted that the Division Bench of this Court in Sukh Dev v. Prakash Chandra ( 2010 (2) WLN 113) had held in the same terms that the intra-court Special Appeal as per Sub-rule (i) of Rule 134 of the Rules of 1952, as amended by Notification dated 28.6.2005, is not maintainable against any order passed by the High Court (Single Judge) in supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India.
13. Learned counsel for the appellant, on the other hand, has relied on the judgment of the Full Bench of this Court in Ramesh Chand Tiwari v. Board of Revenue and ors. (AIR 2005 Raj. 208 ), in which the Full Court answered the questions referred to it in paragraph 29 as follows:-
" 29. We sum up our conclusion, thus:-
(i) The power of superintendence conferred on the High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution is always in addition to the revisional jurisdiction. It is wider than one conferred by Article 226 in the sense that it is not subject to those technicalities of procedure or traditional fetters which are to be found in certiorari jurisdiction. Jurisdiction under Article 227 is not an original jurisdiction but it is akin to appellate, revisional or corrective jurisdiction.
(ii) Any person desiring to prefer intra-court appeal from the judgment/order of the Single Judge, may present the same before the Division Bench but if the Division Bench finds that the judgment/order of the Single Judge was rendered purely in exercise of revisional jurisdiction, the intra-court appeal shall stand dismissed as not maintainable. Judgments/orders passed by the Single Judge in exercise of wider supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 are amenable to intra-court appeals."
14. Reliance has also been placed by learned counsel for the appellant on the judgment of the Supreme Court in M.M.T.C. Limited v. Commissioner of Commercial Tax and Ors. (AIR 2009 SC 1349 ) and the Division Bench judgment of this Court in Kartar Singh v. Board of Revenue & ors. (AIR 2010 Raj.136 ), which had distinguished the judgment of this Court in Sukh Dev v. Prakash Chandra (supra). It is submitted that the High Court may not go merely by the nomenclature of the writ petition filed under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution of India, but It should consider the controversy involved and the prayers sought and where the prayers were made to quash the impugned order passed by the Tribunal, the Special Appeal was maintainable. The judgment arising out of the orders passed by the Assistant Commissioner, Commercial Taxes was held to be amenable both under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution of India and the Court should see the substance of the case and not the nomenclature of the petition. The Supreme Court in M.M.T.C. Ltd. v. Commissioner of Commercial Tax & ors. (supra) held as follows:-
"In addition, the High Court seems to have gone by the nomenclature, i.e. the description given in the writ petition to be one under Article 227 of the Constitution. The High Court did not consider the nature of the controversy and the prayer involved in the writ petition. The prayer was to quash the order of assessment passed by the Asstt.CCT levying purchase tax as well as entry tax. Therefore, the order of the High Court that LPA was not maintainable was erroneous and not justified; same, therefore, set aside."
15. We have considered the submissions and find that there is a clear bar of filing intra-court Special Appeal under Rule 134(i) of the Rules of 1952, against the judgment or final order (not being a Judgment passed in the exercise of appellate Jurisdiction in respect of a decree or order made in the exercise of appellate Jurisdiction by a Court subject to the superintendence of the High Court and not being an order made in the exercise of revisional Jurisdiction and not being a sentence or order passed or made in the exercise of the power of superintendence or in the exercise of criminal Jurisdiction) of one Judge of the High Court. The Rule is more than clear that where the High Court had exercised the power of superintendence in a writ petition, which is vested in it under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, in a matter arising out of the orders of the Rent Tribunal and Appellate Rent Tribunal in a landlord-tenant dispute, the exercise of power would be under Article 227 and not under Article 226, as in the case of power under Article 226 of the Constitution, the High Court, in view of the pronouncements of the Supreme Court in Shalini Shyam Shetty v. Rajendra Shankar Patil (supra) and Jacky v. Tiny Alias Antony and ors. (supra), could not have entertained such prayers under Article 226 of the Constitution.
16. The legal position, In view of the judgments of the Supreme Court in Shalini Shyam Shetty v. Rajendra Shankar Patil (supra) and Jacky v. Tiny Alias Antony and ors. (supra), is now settled and thus, since the appeal is not a matter of right and can be filed only if there is a statutory provision, the intra-court Special Appeal against the order of learned Single Judge passed in exercise of the power of superintendence under Article 227, is not maintainable, in view of Rule 134(i) of the Rules of 1952, which clearly bars the filing of Special Appeal against the judgment of the High Court rendered in exercise of power under Article 227 of the Constitution.
17. The Special Appeal is held to be not maintainable, and is accordingly dismissed.
Appeal Dismissed.