Chatterji, J.This appeal arises out of a proceeding in execution of a money decree. The decree was obtained on 7th November 1924, by the respondent against the firm of Ohunilal Madan Lal in Original Suit-No. 4849 of 1922 of the Bombay High Court. On 24th September 1925, the decree-holder applied for execution in the Bombay High Court praying for arrest of Madan

The decree was passed on 7th November 1924, and the present execution was filed on 19th February 1937, that is to say, beyond 12 years.

2. The learned Subordinate Judge has held that the orders passed in the previous execution proceedings in 1925, and 1936, operate as "revivor" within the meaning of Article 183. The term "revivor" has not been anywhere defined or explain-ed in the Limitation Act, but judicial decisions have laid down that to constitute a revivor of the decree there must be expressly or by implication a determination that the decree is still capable of execution and the decree-holder is entitled to enforce it.

In other words, there must be an order Lal Srinivas, one of the partners in the firm of Ohunilal Madan Lal. On that petition an order was passed by the Court on 14th October 1925, for the arrest of Madan Lal Srinivas. The execution case, however, proved infructuous. In 1936, the decree-holder got the decree transferred to the Court of the Subordinate Judge of Motihari and filed an application in that Court on 23rd April 1936, for execution of the decree against Har Narayan ChuniLal, alleged to be one of the partners of the firm Chunilal Madan Lal. The Execution Case No. 120 of 1936, which was started on that application, was dismissed for default on 9-2-1937.

3. The present application for execution was filed on 19th February 1937, in the same Court against the same judgment-debtor, namely Har Narayan Chuni Lal. The latter opposed the application mainly on the ground that it was barred by limitation. This objection has been overruled and the execution case has been ordered to proceed. Hence this appeal by the judgment-debtor. Har Narayan Chuni Lal. The only question raised in this appeal is that of limitation. The decree under execution being passed by the Bombay High Court on its original side, the case will be governed by Article 183, Limitation Act. That Article runs as follows:

for execution which amounts to a decision I that the decree is capable of execution. It will be enough to refer here to the Full Bench decision of the Calcutta High Court in Chutterput Singh v. Sait Sumari Mal AIR (1916) Cal 488 which was approved by the Privy Council in AIR 1927 73 (Privy Council) .

4. So far as the Execution Case No. 123 of 1936 is concerned, it appears from the order sheet of that case, of which the record was called for by us, that notice under Order 21, Rule 22, Civil P.C., was issued, but it could not be served and as the decree-holder did not take any further steps the case was dismissed for default. Thus, there was no order for execution passed in that; case. The issue of a notice under Order 21, Rule 22 must be distinguished from an order for issue of execution. It cannot be said that in that case there was any decision, express or implied, that the decree was capable of execution. The proceedings in that execution case therefore do not constitute a "revivor" within the meaning of Article 183, Limitation Act. This view is supported by the decision of the Calcutta High Court in Amulya Ratan Banerjee and Others Vs. Banku Behari Chatterjee, .

5. It appears that before the decree was transferred for execution to the Motihari Court leave was obtained under Order 21, Rule 50(2), Civil P.C., from the Prothonotary and Senior Master of the Bombay High Court to execute the decree against the appellant Har Narayan Chuni Lal as a partner in the judgment-debtor firm. The effect of the leave so granted is that Har Narayan Chuni Lal is liable under the decree. In other words, he must be deemed to be a judgment-debtor. The proceeding for obtaining leave under Order 21, Rule 50 is not an application for execution, nor does the leave granted amount to any order for execution.

6. The execution case of 1925 however stands on a different footing. In that case an order was passed on 14th October 1925, for arrest of Madan Lal, one of the partners of the judgment-debtor firm. This order amounted to a determination that the decree was capable of execution. Prima facie this order would operate as a "revivor."

But it is contended by Mr. B.N. Mitter for the appellant that the execution of 1925 being taken out against Madan Lal and the order for execution being passed against him, it may operate as a "revivor" as against him but not against the present appellant Har Narayan Chuni Lal who was not a party to that proceeding.

7. The fact that in 1936 leave had to be obtained under Order 21, Rule 50(2) to execute the decree against Har Narayan Chuni Lal makes it obvious that he was not a party to the execution proceeding of 1925. The question then arises whether as against him the order dated 14th October 1925, passed in the execution proceeding of 1925, operates as "revivor." The execution was taken out, against Madan Lal and the order was passed for his arrest. The present appellant was not a party to the proceeding. He cannot be bound by any order for execution passed in that proceeding. The order dated 14th October 1925 therefore cannot be said to operate as a "revivor" so far as he is concerned. But it may be said that the decree being against the firm, the order dated 14th October 1925, which was passed against one of the partners will operate as against the other partners as well, whether they were named in the proceeding or not.

8. Mr. B.N. Mitters answer to this argument is that the position of the different partners being that of joint judgment-debtors, execution against one of them will not operate as a "revivor" within the meaning of Article 183, Limitation Act. He relies on the decision in Krishnaiya v. Gajendra Naidu AIR (1918) Mad 513 in which it was held that an order of revivor of a decree against two persons jointly, when made on an application for execution against only one of them, does not keep the decree alive as against the other. That is a decision upholding in appeal the judgment of Bake-well J. in James Russel McLaren v. U. Veeraih Naidu AIR (1916) Mad 1038 . In the latter case Bake well J., pointing out the distinction between Arts. 182 and 183, Limitation Act, observed as follows:

The fact that the Legislature has expressly provided for one case of joint debtors and omitted to make the same provision for another case appears to me to show an intention to place the two cases on a different footing.

9. In Article 182 there is a distinct provision that

where the decree or order has been passed, jointly against more persons than one, the application, if made against any one or more of them, or against his or their representatives, shall take effect against them all.,

But Article 183 makes no such provision. As a general rule nobody can be prejudicially affected by any judicial order to which he is not a party. The above stated provision in Article 182 is an exception to this general rule. A similar exception cannot be imported into Article 183 when it is silent about it. I agree with the view taken in James Russel MoLaren v. U. Veeriah Naidu AIR (1916) Mad 1038 and Krishnaiya v. Gajendra Naidu AIR (1918) Mad 513 and I think the principle will equally apply where the decree is against a firm.

10. It therefore follows that the order passed in the execution proceeding of 1925 does not operate as a "revivor" as against the present appellant. It must be observed that the execration of 1925 was taken out within one year after the passing of the decree. A notice under Order 21, Rule 22 was therefore not necessary nor does it appear to have been issued. Now from the judicial decisions bearing on the interpretation of the term "revivor" it appears that it had its origin in the old practice prevailing in the Supreme Court according to which execution could not issue upon judgments more than a year old without issuing a writ of scire facias against the defendant. The idea seemed to have been that a judgment not enforced within one year became dormant and a proceeding was necessary to revive it. The procedure for revivor of judgment was to issue the writ of scire facias which as explained in Jogendra Chuudra Roy y. Syam Das (1909) 36 Cal 543 "was a judicial writ issued for the purpose of substantiating and carrying into effect an antecedent judgment."

11. An analogous procedure for revivor of judgment was introduced into the original side of Chartered High Courts in India.

This procedure was subsequently embodied in Section 215 and 216 of Act 8 of 1859 which were replaced by Sections 248 and 249, Civil P.C., 1882 (now Order 21, Rules 22 and 23 of the Code of 1908). Under these provisions, where an application for execution of a decree more than one year old is made, a notice is required to issue to the person against whom execution is applied for calling upon him to show cause why the decree should not be executed against him. If he does not appear or does not show cause to the satisfaction of the Court, the Court orders the decree to be executed.

12. The order for execution thus made operates as a "revivor." Primarily, therefore, the term "revivor" applies to a case where the order of revivor was made in a proceeding for execution of a decree more than a year old. But, upon an examination of the reported decisions, it seems to me that the procedure for "revivor" would include all cases where notice is required to be issued against the judgment-debtor before any order for execution can be made. "Revivor," to quote the words of Woodroffe J., from the above cited case in Jogendra Chuudra Roy v. Syam Das (1909) 36 Cal 543 means "a decision holding that the decree is still capable of execution."

13. This implies that the decision must be given after notice to the judgment-debtor, Where therefore there is no provision for the issue of any notice before an order for execution can be made, there can hardly be a "revivor." No such notice was necessary in the execution proceeding of 1925. No doubt Order 21, Rule 37, Civil P.C., as amended by the rules of this Court, provides for the issue of notice before issuing a warrant of arrest, but under the rule, as it stood in 1925--and this was the rule under which the Bombay High Court passed the order for arrest dated 14th October 1925--the issue of notice was discretionary. There is also nothing to show that such notice was issued in the proceeding of 1925.

14. In the circumstances, I do not think the order for arrest passed in that proceeding can be regarded as a "revivor." However, this is a point which is not free from difficulty and in the view which I take of the case it is unnecessary to pronounce any definite opinion on it. I have proceeded on the assumption that the order dated 14th October 1925 would operate as a "revivor" so far as Madan Lal is concerned. In my view the present execution is barred by limitation. I would accordingly allow the appeal and dismiss the execution case as barred by limitation. As there is no appearance on behalf of the respondent, I would make no order as to costs.

Dhavle, J.

15. I agree.