Virender Singh, J.

1. Harjinder Kaur, Harjit Kaur, Balbir Kaur and Balwinder Kaur daughters of Daulat Ram and Kulwinder Kaur wife of Harjinder Singh are seeking quashing of FIR No. 150 dated 2.10.2001 under Sections 498-A, 506 and 406 IPC registered at police station Haryana, District Hoshiarpur and the subsequent proceedings including the summoning order dated 31.1.2003 and the order dated 15.4.2003 whereby they have been charge-sheeted for the aforesaid offences.

2. Mr.Dadwal states that in fact Kulwinder Kaur petitioner wife of Harjinder Singh is also daughter of Daulat Ram, but she was married in the year 1994.

3. Pursuant to issuance to notice of motion, the State of Punjab has filed a detailed reply to the petition.

4. I have heard learned counsel for the petitioners, the learned State counsel and with their assistance have gone through the entire available record on the file.

5. The present case was registered at the instance of Sushil Kanta against her husband Amrit Pal, father-in-law, mother-in-law, aunt (Chachi) and the present five petitioners on 1.10.2001 on a written application moved to the Senior Superintendent of Police; that after thorough investigation, the present petitioners were found innocent and consequently they were not challaned; that the charges were framed only against the husband, parents-in-law and the aunt by the trial Court; that after recording the statements of Sushil Kanta complainant, the trial Court on an application Annexures P5 moved by the Public Prosecutor summoned the present petitioners vide order. Annexure P6 to face trial alongwith the other four accused; that thereafter the present petitioners were also charge-sheeted vide Annexure P7.

6. Seeking quashing of the FIR and the subsequent proceedings, the learned counsel contends that petitioners No. 1 to 4 are unmarried sisters of Amrit Pal husband, whereas petitioner No.5 is his married sister, who is residing with her in-laws separately since 1994. Amrit Pal was married to the complainant in the year 1999; that at the time of the aforesaid marriage, petitioner No.1 was hardly of the age of 21 years, petitioner No.2 was of 18 years, petitioner No.3 was 15 years old and petitioner No.4 was the age of 24 years. The age of the petitioners has been described in para No.3 of the petition. The learned counsel then contends that petitioner No.3 Balbir Kaur, who was born on 15.6.1984 was a minor at the time of this marriage. Dwelling upon his arguments, he further contends that the complainant has not spared any sister-in-law including Kulwinder Kaur petitioner No.5, who in fact had got married five years prior to the said marriage of her brother Amrit Pal and was staying with her-in-laws separately in village Baghpur (a different place). He then contends that since the complainant and her husband were not having cordial relations with the family, the father of the petitioners had got published a public notice whereby he had disowned Amrit Pal his son. My attention has been drawn to para 4 of the petition, where a notice published in the newspaper(Jagbani) is reproduced. Due to differences between Amrit Pal and the complainant, they go separated with each other and in between also the matter was compromised between both of them vide Annexure P1 and as the couple was unable to sink its differences, the complainant has now come up with the present FIR, in which she was knitted a net wider involving the unmarried sisters and the married sister of her husband, just with an ulterior motive to harass them. The learned counsel further contends that on the face of it, the allegations levelled in the FIR appear to be improbable and are not at all appealing to the judicial conscience. IT cannot be said by any stretch of imagination that the dowry articles of Sushil Kanta were handed over to unmarried r married sisters of her husband and as such Section 406 IPC on the face of it is not attracted. This was the reason that the investigating agency after deeply probing into the matter has not challenged the present petitioners and they were consequently put in column No.2.

7. Drawing my attention to the impugned order Annexure P6 vide which the present petitioners have been summoned on an applications moved by the State under Section 39 Cr.P.C., the learned counsel contends that it appears that the learned trial Court has given more weightage to the report under Section 173 Cr.P.C. or the statements recorded under Section 161 Cr.P.C. instead of the statement of the complainant. Arguing further, the learned counsel submits that the complainant in her statement on oath before the Court could not improve her case in any better way than it was already projected by her at the time of lodging the FIR and as such there was no cogent evidence with the trial Court for summoning the petitioner under Section 319 Cr.P.C. For this reason, the order Annexure P6 is bad in the eye of law.

8. The learned counsel then submits that even otherwise, the powers envisaged under Section 319 Cr.P.C. for summoning of additional accused are to be sued sparingly and primarily to advance the cause of criminal justice but not as a handle at the hands of the complaint to cause harassment to the persons. In support of his contention, the learned counsel relies upon the decision renders in Dr.Sant Singh v. State of Punjab, 2002(3) CCC 134 (P&H): 2002 (2) RCR 719 (P&H). He also relies upon another latest judgment of this Court rendered in Shinder Pal alias Kakke v. State of Haryana, 2004 (2) RCR (Cri.) 398 (P&H).

9. On the basis of the aforesaid submissions, the learned counsel prays for quashing of the impugned FIR and all the subsequent proceedings arising therefrom.

10. Opposing the submissions made on behalf of the petitioners, the learned State counsel contends that no doubt petitioners No.1 to 4 are unmarried sisters of the husband and Balbir Kaur petitioner No.3 was minor at the time of marriage of Amrit Pal, yet it cannot be said that the present five petitioners, who are real sisters of husband of the complainant, would not interfere in the matrimonial affairs of their brother. He then contends that all the petitioners have now been summoned under Section 319 Cr.P.C. on the basis of statement of the complainant, which is recorded during trial and as such even if these petitioners were found innocent during investigation, the same would not affect the case of the prosecution. The present petitioner, thus, deserves to be dismissed.

11. After giving my thoughtful consideration to the respective contentions of learned counsel for both the sides and perusing the entire available record on the file, I am of the considered view that the present petition deserves to be allowed.

12. I have seen the allegations contained in the FIR minutely. All the allegations are vague and general in nature. So far as entrustment of dowry article is concerned, the complainant has stated in her application moved to the Senior Superintendent of Police that on her marriage a sum of Rs.3.50 lacs was spent on dowry articles and gifts. It is not stated any where in the FIR that any article of dowry were entrusted to the resent petitioners also. The only allegation levelled by the complainant is that the entire dowry articles were misappropriated by the present petitioners. On the face of it, to my mind, these allegations qua the present petitioners are bald in nature and would not attract Section 406 IPC. At the cost of repetition, it is once again observed that the other allegations qua the present petitioners are also vague. It appears that a wider net has been knitted so as to rope in the present petitioners including Balbir Kaur petitioner No.3, who was minor at the time of marriage. It is worth mentioning here that even in reply filed by the respondent, it is admitted that Balbir Kaur was minor at that time and petitioners No. 1 to 4 were unmarried.

13. In Kans Raj v. State of Punjab and others, : 2000(2) ACJ 221 (S.C.): AIR 2000 SC 2324 [LQ/SC/2000/799] , their Lordships of the Apex Court have observed that a tendency has developed for roping in all the relations in dowry cases and if it is not discouraged, it is likely to affect case of the prosecution even against the real culprits. The efforts for involving the other relations ultimately weaken the case of the prosecution even against the real accused.

14. In a recent judgment of Delhi High Court rendered in Savitri Devi v. Ramesh Chand and others, 2003(3) RCR 823 (Del), it has been observed that there is growing tendency to come out with inflated and exaggerated allegations roping in each and every relation of the husband and if one of them happens to be of higher status or of vulnerable standing, he or she becomes an easy prey for better bargaining and blackmailing. A suggestion has been given to the law making authorities to have a review of the situation and the legal provisions.

15. In another judgment of Andhra Pradesh High Court in Saritha v. R.Ramachandra, 2003(1) RCR (Cri.) 481 (A.P.) (DB), the Honble Division Bench while dealing with a case under Section 498A IPC has observed that the things have now taken a reverse trend and the women are abusing beneficial provisions of Section 498- A.

16. In the instant case, I am of the view that the prosecution agency has investigated the case in a right direction by not challenging the present petitioners. The learned trial Court in a very casual manner has summoned the present petitioners on an application moved by the State under Section 319 Cr.P.C. without finding any cogent evidence on the file. The summoning order reflects that the Court has given more weightage to the report under Section 173 Cr.P.C. or the statements recorded under Section 161 Cr.P.C. rather than appreciating the substantive evidence on the file.

17. In Dr.Sant Singhs case (supra) this Court while dealing with the scope of Section 319 Cr.P.C. has observed that the powers vested with the Court under Section 319 Cr.P.C. to summon the accused have to be used sparingly and primarily to advance the cause of criminal justice but not as a handle at the instance of the complainant, to cause harassment to the persons, who are actually not involved in the commission of crime. In my considered view, in the instant case the learned Magistrate has failed to take into account the purpose and purport for which the provisions of Section 319 Cr.P.C. have been enacted by the Legislature.

18. In another judgment of this Court in Satish Kumar and others v. State of Punjab and others, 2003(2) RCR (Crl.) 335 (P&H), this Court while relying upon Michael Machado and another v. Central Bureau of Investigation and another, 2000 (1) ACJ 404(S.C.): 2000(2) RCR (Cri.) 75 (SC), has observed that quality of evidence before the Court should be of such a type that the Court could even by hopeful that there was reasonable prospect of newly adduced accused being convicted. That cannot be the situation in this case. The impugned order of summoning, thus, deserves to be quashed.

19. No doubt, after being summoned as additional accused to face trial, charge has also been framed against the present petitioner vide Annexure P7, yet there is absolutely no bar to entertain the petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. only on the ground that the challan has been presented or even the charges have been framed. Each case has to be examined on its own facts. The Apex Court has examined the ambit and scope of the power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. only on the ground that the challan has been presented or even the charges have been framed. Each case has to be examined on its own facts. The Apex Court has examined the ambit and scope of the power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. read with Article 227 of the Constitution on the case of M/s. Pepsi Foods Ltd. and another v. Special Judicial Magistrate and another, 1998(1) ACJ 16 (S.C.): 1997(4) RCR (Cri.) 761 (SC), and observed asunder:

It is settled that High Court can exercise its power of judicial review in criminal matters. In State of Haryana and others v. Bhajan Lal and others, : JT 1990(4) SC 650 [LQ/SC/1990/744] : 1992 Supp.(1) SCC 335, this Court examined the extraordinary power under Article 226 of the Constitution and also the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code which it said could be exercised by the High Court either to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. While laying down certain guidelines where the court will exercise jurisdiction under these provisions, it was also stated that these guidelines could not be inflexible or laying rigid formulae to be followed by the Court. Exercise of such power would depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case but with the sole purpose to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. One of such guidelines is where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused. Under Article 227 the power of superintendence by the High Court is not only of administrative nature but it is also of judicial nature. This article confers vast powers on the High Court to prevent the cause of the process of law by the inferior courts and to see that the stream of administration of justice remains clean and pure. The power conferred on the High Court under Article 226 and 227 of the Constitution and under Section 482 of the Code have no limits but more the power more due care and caution to be exercised in using these powers.

20. In G.Sagar Suri v. State of U.P., 2000(1) RCR (Cri.) 707 (SC), their Lordships of the Apex Court while answering the same question and dealing with the scope of the powers of High Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C. or Article 227 of the Constitution vis-a-vis the agony of the accused during a criminal trial, referred to the decision in M/s. Pepsi Food Ltd.s case (supra) as also in Ashok Chaturvedi and others v. Shitul H.Chanchani and another, 1998 (2) ACJ 559 (S.C): 1998(3) RCR(Cri.) 801 (SC).

21. As a sequel to what is discussed hereinabove and following the ration of the aforesaid judgments. I am of the considered view that the impugned FIR and the subsequent proceedings arising therefore in the shape of summoning order and even the charge sheet are liable, to be quashed, being sheer abuse of the process of the Court. Ordered accordingly.

The present petition consequently stands allowed.