Hari Prasad Agarwalla
v.
State Of Bihar
(High Court Of Judicature At Patna)
Civil Writ Jurisdiction Case No. 67 Of 1973 | 25-07-1975
(1.) This application under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitu- tion of India has been filed by the certificate debtor in Certificate Case No. 7 of 1971-72 pending in the court of the District Certificate Officer, Monghyr, respondent No. 4, praying to quash the proceedings in the aforesaid certificate case. The notices and orders in the aforesaid case issued to the petitioner have been marked Annexures 1 to 4 to this application. The aforesaid certificate case is said to have been initiated against the petitioner by respondent No. 4 on a requisition purported to have been made by the Divisional Forest Officer, Monghyr, respondent No. 2.
(2.) The facts relevant for the dis-posal of this application may be shortly stated. There was an agreement for the purchase of Kendu leaf from lot No. 179 for a period of three years at an annual price of Rs. 13,600. The petitioner has asserted that the aforesaid agreement was subject to a provision that the Forest Department of the State of Bihar, respondent No. 1, would not allow anyone else to cut Kendu trees from the aforesaid lot. During the period of settlement, the petitioner deposited a sum of Rs. 3,400 by way of security and also paid one years price for the settlement, the sum being Rs. 13,600. The petitioner enjoyed usufructs of the subject-matter of settlement peacefully and uninterruptedly during the year 1967-68. It is alleged in the petition that for the years 1968-69 and 1969-70 the Forest Department accorded sanction to Messre. Bengal Paper Mills to cut timber from the lot in question including this timber of the trees yielding Kendu leaves. The aforesaid Mills, under such illegal sanction, started cutting the trees with the result that no Kendu leaves were left for exploitation by the petitioner. The petitioner thereafter requested the Divisional Forest Officer, respondent No. 2, for a refund of the security money deposited by Mm to the tune of Rs. 3,400 aforesaid. His request was not acceded to. The petitioner alleges that, without any notice to him by the D.F.O. the Certificate Officer, Monghyr, respondent No. 4, presumably, at the instance of the Divisional Forest Officer, respondent No. 2, issued a notice to the petitioner which he duly received and by which he was asked to pay a sum of Rs. 12,275. When the petitioner came to know about the certificate case, he filed an objection on the 23rd of June, 1971 that there has been no service of notice on him under Section 7 of the Bihar and Orissa Public Demands Recovery Act, 1914 (hereinafter to be referred to as the Act). The petitioner has also asserted in his writ petition that no requisition under Section 5 of the Act had been made by the Divisional Forest Offi-cer and as such the issuance of a notice under Sections 4 and 6 under the signature of the Certificate Officer, respondent No. 4, a copy whereof has been marked Annexure 2 to the application, was wholly illegal. Of course, in the writ petition the petitioner has also denied his liability for any payment on ground, inter alia, that, since the Forest Department represented by respondent No. 2 had committed breach of agreement and the petitioner had not been allowed to appropriate the usufructs during the balance two years of the period of settlement, he could not be fastened with any liability for those two years. We were, however, not invited by learned counsel for the parties to go into this question. In a counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents, there is, of course, a denial with regard to the petitioners plea of breach of agreement and of his non-liability to pay. It has also been stated in paragraph 12 of the counter-affidavit that the necessary requisition for instituting the certificate case against the petitioner by respondent No. 2 was duly filled up and signed and was sent along with letter No. 1622 dated 12-4-71. It has, however, been submitted in paragraph 12 aforesaid that the Divisional Forest Officer was a representative of the Collector and the requisition was sent under Section 4 of the Act and as such the requisition was proper and the certificate proceeding was valid, since a requisition was made by a representative of the Collector. The only point on which our decision was invited by learned counsel for the parties was as to whether a requisition duly filled up and signed by the requisitioning officer, namely, respondent No. 2, had been sent to the Certificate Officer, respondent No. 4, and, if not so, then whether it can be held that the certificate issued against the petitioner under Section 4 (Annexure 2) could be said to be legal and valid or not.
(3.) While the question aforesaid was debated at the Bar, learned counsel for the petitioner asserted with vehemence, as was the statement of the petitioner in the writ petition, that no requisition under Section 5 of the Act in Form 2 appended to the Act was at all sent to the Certificate Officer. On the contrary, on the basis of the statement, somewhat vague as it is, in paragraph 12 of the counter-affidavit, it was submitted by learned Government Advocate that the records of the case would bear it out that a requisition was duly filled up and signed in Form 2 under Section 5 of the Act by the requisitioning authority, namely, the Divisional Forest Officer and was sent to respondent No. 4. When the case was heard last on the 14th of July, 1975, learned Government Advocate requested this Court to adjourn the case so that he could show to us from the original records of the certificate proceedings that such a requisition under Section 5 had been signed and sent by respondent No. 2. Learned counsel for the petitioner not having objected to such a course and rather insisting that that would be doing substantial justice between the parties, the Court adjourned the case for today. As was requested by the learned Government Advocate, on which request the case was adjourned for today, before the hearing began, he (learned Government Advocate) very fairly produced for the perusal of this Court the entire original record of the certificate proceedings. From a perusal of the entire record, we have not been able to find out any requisition in Form 2 of the appendix to the Act under Section 5 thereof either filled up and/ or signed by the requisitioning officer --the Divisional Forest Officer, respondent No. 2. The letter bearing No. 1622 referred to in para. 12 of the counter-affidavit, to which I have made a mention hereinbefore, is a letter from the Divisional Forest Officer to the Certificate Officer, Mon-ghyr, dated the 12th of April, 1971. The relevant portion of the letter reads thus :
"Sir, I have to enclose herewith necessary requisition for instituting certificate case against Shri Hari Prasad Agrawal s/o Shri Nand Lal Agrawal, village : Jhajha, P. O. : Jhajha, District : Monghyr, for Rs. 12,275 Twelve Thousand two hundred seventyfive only for favour and of early realisation". Enclosed along with the aforesaid letter is merely an order of assessment of the loss for the breach of agreement calculated by the Divisional Forest Officer as Rs. 12,275. Such on assessment order is neither in form nor does it comply with the provisions of Section 5 read with Form 2 of the appendix to the Act. Section 5 of the Act reads thus- "5. Requisition for certificate in other cases-- (1) when any public demand payable to any person other than the Collec- tor is due, such person may send to the Certificate Officer a written requisition in the prescribed form : Provided that in the case of an order framed by a liquidator under the Co-operative Societies Act, 1912, the written requisition shall be sent by the Registrar of Co-operative Societies, Bihar and Orissa. (2) Every such requisition shall be signed and verified in the prescribed man--ner, and, except in such cases as may be prescribed, shall be chargeable with a fee of the amount which would be payable under the Court Fees Act, 1870, in respect of a plaint for the recovery of a sum of money equal to that stated in the requisition as being due". Form 2, which is the form for requisition for certificate under Section 5, apart from mentioning in the columns the name of certificate-debtor, address of the certificate-debtor, amount of public demand for which this requisition is made and nature of the public demand for which this requisition is made, also enjoins that after the filling up of these columns, the requisitioning officer shall state at the end of the requisition that- "I request you to recover the above-mentioned sum of Rs ..... which I am satisfied, after inquiry, is due from the said ..... in respect of Verified by me on the .....day of ..... 19 A.B. (Designation)"
It will thus toe seen from the provisions of Section 5 as also from the form of requisition for certificate in Form 2 that every requisition made in respect of a public demand payable to any person other than the Collector shall be signed and verified in the manner prescribed and sent to the certificate officer. And, suoh a written requisition in the prescribed form should be sent to the Certificate Officer. It is of essence to the statutory requirement that the requisitioning officer while sending his requisition for certificate to the Certificate Officer must, on verification, say that he is satisfied after inquiry that the sum in respect of which the certificate is sought to be levied is due from the certificate debtor and every such requisition shall be signed and verified by the officer making the requisition. The sheet on which a calculation for the assessment of the loss for breach of agreement has been made and signed by the Divisional Forest Officer cannot be treated to be a requisi- tion for certificate either in pursuance of Section 5 or in the prescribed manner and in Form 2. I must also point out here that neither is the satisfaction of the Divisional Forest Officer, respondent No. 2, recorded in that assessment chart nor is it duly verified by him in the prescribed manner. Thus it is clear that there has been no requisition sent by respondent No. 2 to respondent No. 4 for the issuance of a certificate to the petitioner in the prescribed manner and in Form. 2. Learned Government Advocate, after going through the records of the case, had to concede that there was no requisition for a certificate made by the Divisional Forest Officer under Section 5 in the prescribed form nor was there any verification made by him of the same.
(4.) It was next contended by the learned Government Advocate that, although no requisition in the prescribed form and manner may have been sent by respondent No. 2 to respondent No. 4, the certificate, a notice with regard to which had been issued by respondent No. 4 and duly served on the petitioner, should be deemed to be in form 1 as envisaged by Sections 4 and 6 end should be deemed to be a substantial compliance with the statutory requirement under Section 5 of the Act. There is no force in this argument of learned counsel for the respondents. In the case of Gujraj Sahai v. Secretary of State for India in Council, ((1890) ILR 17 Cal 414) it was observed by the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council as follows :--
"The Act (The Public Demands Recovery Act) is an extremely stringent one; the policy of it we do not of course discuss. But we suppose it to be that, as a matter of executive convenience, demands of a public nature, the justice of which has been enquired into and certified by officials of high rank and unquestionable integrity, may properly enjoy for the enforcement of them, the very exceptional privileges accorded to them by this Act; but subject to whatever safeguards are provided by the Act by the procedure laid down in it."
And, again, at page 430 it was observed :--
"We think it absolutely incumbent on the Courts, when considering the validity of sales under this Act, to rigidly require an exact compliance with the formalities prescribed by the Legislature : to do so at least as rigidly as the Courts at home have, for instance, in copyright case and in many others, insisted on exact obedience to prescribed formalities."
In the case of Gujraj Sahai, with which the Judicial Committee was seized the certificate did not bear the signature, and it was held that in such kind of cases the matter is of infinitely greater importance, for the non-compliance with the provision prescribed by the Act prevented the Collector from being clothed with the powers conferred on him by the Act and the sale in such cases cannot be said to be under execution of a certificate duly made under the provisions of the Act and such sales would have to be struck down as absolutely void. This case has been referred to and relied on by a Bench of this Court in Nageshwar Prasad Singh v. Rai Bahadur Kashinath Singh (1958 BLJR 820). In Nageshwar Prasads case the argument put forward on behalf of the certificate debtor was that it was only the matter of substance which, if not filled in, would be fatal to the certificate. That means, it was suggested, that it had no reference to such blanks in the form which had no material bearing upon the merits of any certificate issued. Such an argument was held to be untenable by this Court, and it was held that the term matters of substance refers to the form prescribed by the Act and that remark cannot be limited to only certain items in the form. It will be noticed from the facts of those two cases that there it was merely the failure to put in signature at its due place in the form. Even so. both the Judicial Committee as well as the Bench of this Court held that in construing the provisions of the Act such omission or failure would not amount to a mere irregularity but would be fatal to the certificate proceedings which would be deemed to be void ab ini-tio. The instant case with which we are concerned stands on a footing much worse for the respondents. What to talk of no signature or verification being appended to the form, as I have already stated above, no requisition in Form 2 under Section 5 of the Act was at all sent by respondent No. 2 to respondent No. 4. The notice in Form 1 read with Sections 4 and 6 of the Act, which was sent to the petitioner by the Certificate Officer, respondent No. 4 states at the end of the certificate (Annexure 2), after all the columns had been filled up, that the Certificate Officer was satisfied that the above mentioned sum of Rs. 12,275 was payable by the petitioner to the Divisional Forest Officer , Monghyr. This satisfaction of the Certificate Officer, even treating the matter as of form only, is without any foundation, for the satisfaction of the Certificate Officer must be based initially upon the satisfaction of the requisitioning officer, namely, respondent No. 2 in the present case, who must have verified the requisition in Form 2 under Section 5 of the Act. In that view of the matter, I have no hesitation in holding that the certificate proceedings started against the petitioner were wholly without jurisdiction.
(5.) For the .aforesaid reasons, I must hold that the entire proceedings in Certificate Case No. 7 of 1971-72 of the Court of the Certificate Officer, Monghyr, respondent No. 4 are without jurisdiction and Annexures 1, 2, 3 and 4 issued by respondents 3 and 4, who are the Collector and the Certificate Officer respectively, have to be quashed. This application is accordingly allowed but in the circumstances of the case there would be no order as to cost.
Advocates List
For the Appearing Parties B.P. Rajgarhia, S.K. Sharan, Tara Kant Jha, Jagannath Jha, Advocates.
For Petitioner
- Shekhar Naphade
- Mahesh Agrawal
- Tarun Dua
For Respondent
- S. Vani
- B. Sunita Rao
- Sushil Kumar Pathak
Bench List
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE S.N.P. SINGH
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE S.K. JHA
Eq Citation
AIR 1976 PAT 217
1976 (9) PLJR 265
LQ/PatHC/1975/97
HeadNote
Civil Procedure Code, 1908 — Or. 41 Rr. 4 and 33 — Applicability of — Where appeal was preferred by all plaintiffs, Or. 41 R. 4 had no application — In the present case, lower appellate court in exercise of its power under Or. 41 R. 33 set aside decree passed in favour of appellants (defendants Nos. 6 to 10) without there being any appeal or cross-objection preferred by State and its officers (defendants 1 to 5) — Held, lower appellate court was not justified in exercising its power under Or. 41 R. 33 in interfering with decree passed by trial court in favour of appellants in an appeal preferred by all plaintiffs — Decree passed by trial court in favour of appellants restored — Evidence Act, 1872 — S. 34 — Applicability of