D.S. Tewatia, J.

1. Doubt as to the correctness of law laid down by the Division Bench in M.P. Bansal v. District Employment Officer (Civil Revision No. 2262 of 1981) decided on Mar. 16. 1985, reported in AIR 1985 Punj & Har 251, entertained by a Division Bench, led to the reference to Full Bench of three Civil Revision Petitioners, namely, No. 1108 of 1983 at the instance of the Division Bench itself and Nos. 2202 of 1982 and 3063 of 1984 by J. V. Gupta, J. in the wake of the said earlier reference order by the Division Bench.

2. Before the examination of the relevant legal queries that arise in regard to the law laid down in Bansals case (AIR 1985 Punj & Har 251) a brief resume of the facts of the three revision petitioners would help in viewing the said legal queries in proper perspective.

3. In Civil Revision No. 1108 of 1983, Shri Hari Mittal, Advocate, tenant-pet, had taken on rent House NO. 1278, sector 18-C, Chandigarh, on 21-11-1969, at a time when he was employed as a District Attorney on deputation with the Union Territory, Chandigarh Administration, from his landlord Shri B. M. Sikka, who too at that time was a Government employee. Shri Sikka was to retire from service on 31-43-1980. He sought eviction of the said tenant, inter alia, on the ground that the house was given for residence and the tenant has changed the user thereof by using it partly for his business as an advocate and that the landlord was retiring from service and wanted to settle down in Chandigarh and needed the house for his own bona fide use and occupation. The tenant, inter alia, took up the stand that the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949, was made applicable to the Union Territory of Chandigarh with effect from 4-11-1972 and since the tenanted premises had been used partly for the professional business of the advocate and residence before that date, therefore the ground of change of user for the purpose of eviction was not available to the landlord and further the tenanted premises being used partly for residence and partly for the business of the tenant-advocate, the building had acquired the character of a scheduled building and, therefore, the tenant could not be ejected on the ground of personal necessity of the landlord as well.

4. On the strength of Bansals case (supra) it is argued on behalf of the tenant before the Bench inter alia that although the tenant at the time when the house was given for rent was a District Attorney, but since a District Attorney too had to maintain office in the house, so it would have to be assumed that the premises had been given to him partly for non-residential purposes and, therefore, there was neither a change of user nor the tenant was liable to be evicted on the ground of personal necessity.

5. The facts of Civil Revision NO. 2202 of 1982 were that House No. 149-R, Model Town, Panipat was taken on rent by Labh singh, tenant-respondent, from landlord-petitioner Sant Parkash Singh for commercial purposes. The landlord had sought ejectment of the tenant, inter alia, on the ground of his personal necessity that is, for his bona fide use and occupation.

6. Both the Courts below had found that the residential building in dispute was let out by the landlord for commercial purposes and therefore, the said premises could not be held to be residential building and the landlord could not get it vacated on the ground of bona fide personal necessity.

7. In Civil Revision No. 3063 of 1984, the facts were that the landlord had let out one room of his residential building to the tenant. He claimed back its possession from the tenant on the ground of his bona fide personal requirement and also on the ground of change of user, as the room was allegedly given for residential purpose and the same was being used as godown without his consent. The Rent Controller held that the ground of change of user was not available to the landlord, as the given room was from the very inception given to the tenant for using it as a godown from the very inception was not challenged. In the High Court, the tenant took the plea, inter alia, that the given portion of the residential building having been let out for non-residential purposes, the same could not be got vacated on the ground of personal necessity of the landlord.

8. This revision petition came up for hearing before J. V. Gupta, J. who in view of the fact that an earlier decision of his in Kamal Arora v. Amar Singh (1980) 1 Rent CR 530 (Punj and Har) (in which his answer to the question involved was in the affirmative, that is, in favour of the landlord) had since been upheld by their Lordships of the Supreme Court, vide their judgment dt. 99-2-1984 rendered in Civil Appeal No. 934 of 1980 (reported in (1985) 1 Rent LR 643) and the further fact that Kamal Aroras case (supra) along with Janak Kundra v. Central Board of workers Education ILR (1981) P &H 90, had been overruled by the Division Bench in Bansals case (supra)-(correctness of which decision is under consideration before us)-referred the following question for consideration of the larger Bench:

"Whether a landlord is entitled to seek the ejectment of a tenant on the ground of his bona fide requirement for his own use and occupation from a building which is held to be residential building to all intents and purposes, but which was let out for business or trade"

It is thus that the aforesaid three revision petitions are before us.

9. Now the stage is set to take brief notice of the facts of Bansals case (Supra) and the proposition of law that emerged for consideration in that case as also the answer in the said case of the Banch to such legal question. In that case, residential premises in dispute were let out for the office of the District Employment Officer. The landlord sought ejectment of the tenant on the ground of personal requirement. The Rent Controller upheld the plea of the landlord and ordered ejectment. This order was, however, upset by the appellate authority, as the plea of personal necessity was negative by it. The landlord took the matter to the High Court. In that case two legal points arose from the pleas of the tenant and the landlord for consideration:

"(1) Whether a building which is constructed or used as residential on being rented wither in whole or in part will remain residential or not if let out for non-residential purpose in the wake of S. 11 of the Act (The East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949, hereinafter referred to as the Act); and (2) whether the running of the office of District Employment Officer is a business of trade in terms of S. 2(d) of the Act

On behalf of the landlord, reliance before the said Division Bench was placed in support of proposition No. (1) aforesaid on Tara Chand v. Sashi Bhushan Gupta Jagan Nath v. Sangrur Central Co-Operative Bank Ltd: (1980) 2 Ren CJ 672 (Punj and Har), whereas on behalf of the tenant reliance was placed on Rattan Lal v. Mst. Laxmi Devi, (1971) 73 Pun LR 86; chattar Sain v. Jamboo Parshad 1965 Cur LJ 143 (Punj); and Faqir Chand v. Smt. Ram Kali .

10. At this stage, relevant provisions of S. 2(a), (g) and (h) defining the building, residential building and scheduled building respectively and of S.11 of the Act deserve to be reproduced for facility of reference:

"2. In this Act, unless there is anything repugnant in the subject or context.--

(a) building means any buildings or part of a building let for that purpose whether being actually used for that purpose or not, including any land, godown, outhouses or furniture let therewith, but does not include a room in a hotel, hostel or boarding house;

x x x x x x x x

(g) residential building means any building which is not a non-residential building;

(h) Scheduled building means a residential building which is being used by a person engaged in one or more of the professions specified in the Schedule of this Act, partly for his business and partly for his business and partly for his residence:

x x x x x x x x x x x x

11. No person shall convert a residential building into a non-residential building except with the permission in writing of the Controller."

Mr. Jagan Nath Kaushal, counsel for the respondent in Civil Revision No. 1108 of 1983, who primarily argued before us to the landlords side of the case, canvassed on the strength of the decisions rendered in Janak Kundras case (ILR (1982) P&H90) (supra); Faquir Chand v. Ram Rattan Bhanot (: 1973 Ren CR 221: IR 1973 SC 921) [LQ/SC/1973/29] ; and Busching Schemitz Pvt. Ltd; v. P. T. Menghani, : AIR 1977 SC 1569 [LQ/SC/1977/139] , that a residential building, if rented out for non-residential purposes without obtaining the permission of the Rent Controller in terms of S. 11 of the Act, does not acquire the character of a non-residential building and continues to be a residential building, which could be got vacated by the landlord, inter alia, for his own occupation in terms of S. 13(3)(a)(i)(a), whereas Mr. K. P. Bhandari, who primarily argued tenants side of the case, besides heavily placing reliance on Bansals case (AIR 1985 P&H51) (supra), additionally relied on K. R. Padmavathy Ammal v. E. R. Manickam (1981) 2 Ren CJ 617 a Madras High Court decision; Shankerlal Gupta v. Jagdishwar Ra (FB); Dr. Gopal Dass Verma v. Dr. S. K. Bhardwaj, : AIR 1963 SC 337 [LQ/SC/1961/237] ; and Murlidhar Agarwal v. State of Uttar Pradesh, : AIR 1974 SC 1924 [LQ/SC/1974/205] .

11. So far as this Court is concerned, the question as to whether a residential building rented out for non-residential purpose without obtaining the permission of the Rent Controller in terms of S. 11 of the Act acquires the character of non-residential building or continues to remain a residential building or continues to remain a residential building, stands concluded in favour of the landlords by the decision of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Kamal Arora v. Amar Singh (1985) 1 Rent LR 643 rendered in Civil Appeal No. 934 of 1980 which was directed against the single Bench judgment of this Court in Kamal Arora v. Amar Singh (1980) 1 Rent CR 530.

12. The contention advanced in Kamal Aroras case before their Lordships was that--

"the definition of non-residential building as set out in S. 7(d) of the Rent Act clearly shows that a non-residential building is one which is used solely for the purpose of business or trade provided that residence in a building only for the purpose of guarding it shall not be deemed to convert non-residential building to a residential building.................. that landlord knowing full well that the premises in question is to be used for non-residential purpose, let out the same and therefore he is estopped from seeking possession on the ground of bona fide personal requirement for residence."

The premises let out was for the purpose of running a school. Their Lordships after referring to this Courts observation repelled the contention and sustained the judgment under challenge with the following observations:

"The High Court after examining the provisions of the Capital of Punjab (Development and Regulation) Act 1951 read with S. 11 of the Rent Act held that statute prohibits conversion of residential building into non-residential by act inter vivos. It was said that the landlord and the tenant by their mutual consent cannot convert a residential building into a non-residential building because that would be violative of the provision of S. 11. And it is admitted that building is situated in a sector falling within the residential zone. In this factual situation, coupled with the fact that the landlord has retired from service and genuinely needs the premises for his residence as found by all courts, we are not inclined to interfere with the judgment and order of the High Court."

We would, nevertheless examine the correctness of the contention advanced by either side on merit with reference to other decided cases relied upon by the parties.

13. Busching Schmitz Private Ltd.s case (: AIR 1977 SC 1569 [LQ/SC/1977/139] ) (supra) was a case in which the landlord had let out the premises to the tenant admittedly for commercial purpose. The landlord, a Government servant, applied for ejectment of the tenant in view of the provisions of S. 14A of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958, hereinafter referred to as the Delhi Rent Act. On behalf of the tenant it was canvassed that the building having been let out for non-residential purpose, the same acquired the character of a non-residential building and, therefore the same could not be got vacated by the landlord. The said contention was repelled and it was observed that if such a contention was allowed to prevail, then provisions of section 14A of the Delhi Rent Act would be put to a naught and frustrated by the Government employee landlord by renting out their residential premises for non-residential purpose.

14. The ratio of this decision is not attracted to the present case as the decision in this case turned on the interpretation of S. 14A of the Delhi Rent Act.

15. In Faquir Chand v. Ram Rattan Bhanots case (: AIR 1973 SC 912 [LQ/SC/1972/319] ) (supra) the facts were that the houses were built on lands given on long lease by the Delhi Improvement Trust to the rights, liabilities and assets of which the Delhi Development Authority had since succeeded. Under the terms of the lease, the lessees (the landlords of the houses) were to put up residential buildings on the leased land on the following conditions:

"Not to use the said land and buildings that may be erected thereon during the said term for any other purpose than for the purpose of residential house without the consent in writing of the said lessor (Delhi Development Authority), provided that the lease shall become void if the land is used for any purpose other than that for which the lease is granted not being a purpose subsequently approved by the lessor (again the Delhi Development Authority)".

The landlord, though had constructed residential buildings on the land, but they rented out the same for non-residential purpose. On coming to know that the land-owners of the said buildings had rented out the same for non-residential purpose, that is, for running a barbers shop and a scooter repair shop, the Delhi Development Authority gave notice to them drawing their attention to the condition of the lease extracted above and the fact that they had permitted the buildings to be used for commercial purposes contrary to the terms of the lease deed, and that the lease was thus liable to be determined and further called upon then to discontinue the use of the eland for commercial purposes, failing which they were asked to show cause why their lease should not be determined and the land, together with the buildings thereon, reentered upon without any compensation to them. After receiving this notice, the landlord initiated the proceedings for ejectment of the tenants. The question that arose for consideration was whether the landlords were estopped or otherwise prohibited from getting possession of the property from the tenants because they themselves had let it out for commercial purposes.

16. At this stage, the relevant provisions of S. 14(1) (c) and (k) of Delhi Rent Act are reproduced below to facilitate reference:

" 14(1). Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any other law or contract, no order or decree for the recovery of possession of any premises shall be made by any court or controller in favour of the landlord against a tenant--

Provided that the Controller may, on an application made to him in the prescribed manner make an order for the recovery of possession of the premises on one or more of the following grounds, only, namely-

. . . . . . . . . . . .

(c) that the tenant has used the premises for a purpose other than that for which they were let--

(I) If the premises have been let on or before the 9th day of June, 1952, without obtaining the consent in writing of the landlord, or

(ii) if the premises have been let before the said date without obtaining his consent.

(k) that the tenant has, notwithstanding previous notice used or dealt with the premises in a manner contrary to any condition imposed on the landlord by the Government or the Delhi Development Authority or the Municipal Corporation of Delhi while giving him a lease of the land on which the premises are situated."

It was argued on behalf of the tenants before their Lordships, while countering landlords effort to invoke Clause (k) of S. 14(1), that the said clause would be attracted only when the tenants had used the buildings for prohibited purpose after a previous notice from the landlord prohibiting them form using the rented premises for the prohibited purpose. But when both the landlord and the tenants were aware as to the use to which the building was rented out from the very inception, then there was no question of any notice from the landlord asking the tenants not to use the building for the given commercial purpose and that by merely issuing such notice, the landlord could not take advantage of Cl (k).

17. Their Lordships repelled the aforesaid contention with the following observations--

"If it is a case where the tenant has contrary to the terms of his tenancy used the building for a commercial purpose the landlord could take action under Cl (c). He need not depend upon Cl (k) at all. These two clauses are intended to meet different situations. There was no need for an additional provision in Cl (k) to enable a landlord to get possession where the tenant has used the building for a commercial purpose contrary to the terms of tenancy. An intention to put in a useless provision in a statute cannot be imputed to the Legislature. Some meaning would have to be given to the provision. The only situation in which bit can take effect is where the lease is for a commercial purpose agreed upon by both the landlord and the tenant but that is contrary to the terms of the lease of the land in favour of the landlord. This clause does not come into operation where there is no provision in the lease of the land in favour of the landlord, prohibiting its use for a commercial purpose...............

The Provision of Clause (k) of the proviso to sub-sec.(1) of S. 14 is something which has to be given effect to whatever the original contract between the landlord and the tenant....."

Ratio of that case, in our opinion, is clearly applicable to the present case-the ratio of the decision being that if a residential building is prohibited to be used as non-residential building-in Delhi, the injunction was contained in the lease deed executed between the Delhi Development Authority and the lessees requiring the lessees that they would construct only residential buildings on the leased land and further injuncting them that they would not use such buildings for non-residential purpose without the permission of the Delhi Development Authority and the prohibition was given statutory sanction by Cl (k) above and in the case of the buildings covered by the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, such a prohibition is statutorily incorporated in the said Act by the provision of S. 11 thereof.

18. In our opinion, the kind of purpose that clause (k) of S. 14(1) of the Delhi Rent Act served, the same purpose appears to have been intended by the Punjab appears to have been intended by the Punjab Legislature in the present case to be served by the provision of S. 11 of the Act, so far as the use of the residential building for non-residential purpose is concerned. This injunction was intended to subserve a public policy of seeing that the residential accommodation does not fall short of the communitys requirement, as the shortage of residential accommodation would tend to result in unhygienic conditions of the residential areas by accommodating more members than it could legitimately be intended or the extra population resorting to unhygienic use of the open spaces and pavements and creating social tension and health hazards to the community. In view of the above, the provisions of section 11 of the Act are mandatory in character.

19. It was then argued that if S. 11 of the Act was intended to subserve a public policy of the kind, then it would prohibit even a landlord from converting a self-occupied residential building into self-occupied non-residential building, but this Court in to Division Bench decisions referred to by the Division Bench in Bansals case (AIR 1985 P&h51) (supra), that is, Chattar Sains case (1965 Cur LJ 143) (supra) and faquir Chand case (supra), has taken the view that S. 11 is not attracted to residential building which is in the self-occupation of the landlord hence the landlord could covert it into self-occupied non-residential building without the permission of the Rent controller in terms of S. 11 of the Act.

20. We are of the opinion, with respect that Chattar Sains case (supra) and Faquir Chand v. Ram Kails case (supra) do not lay down the correct law and we, therefore, overrule them.

21. The learned judge, who decided those cases, reached that conclusion by assuming that the provisions of Act including S. 11 applied only to a building which is let out an not to a building which is not let out and is in the use and occupation of the landlord himself. Support for that assumption was sought from the definition of the expression building as defined by Clause (a) of S. 2 of the

Act.

22. While considering the import of the various definition given in S. 2 of the Act, the Court is not to overlook the guiding warning contained in the opening words thereof, namely, .........unless there is anything repugnant in the subject or context.

23. If the provision of S. 11 of the Act was merely intended to prohibit only the persons other than the landlord from converting a residential building into a non-residential building without the permission in writing of the Rent Controller, then the Legislature would not have used the expression No person......,which is of the widest import and would leave no person out of the purview of the said provision who happens to be in control or possession or occupation of the residential premises. The injunction envisaged in S. 11 of the Act, in our opinion is not limited to a tenant of the build, for the expression used is No person......... That person may be a tenant of the building, a licensee, a mortgagee, a trespasser, or the landlord himself. That the Legislature must have intended the injunction contained in S. 11 of the Act to be applicable even to the landlords becomes clear when regard is had to the public policy that the said provision was intended to serve.

24. Now coming to the analysis of the precedents cited on behalf of the tenant. The primacy is to be accorded to Dr. Gopal Dass Vermas case, (: AIR 1963 SC 337 [LQ/SC/1961/237] ) (*Supra). That was a case in which residential premises were let out for the professional use of the tenant who was a doctor. The landlord sought eviction of the tenant on the ground of personal necessity. Their Lordships examined the case of the landlord for eviction of the tenant on the ground of personal requirement in terms of S. 13(1)(e) of the Delhi and Ajmer Rent Control Act, 1952-along with its explanation-the explanation having provided that for the purpose of the said clause. rseidential premises include any premises which having been let out as a residential premises are, without the consent of the landlord, used incidentally for commercial or other purposes. Their Lordships were of the view that a residential building continues to be residential for the purpose of the said Act only if it is let out for residential purposes and the tenant had converted it to other uses or had put it up to a commercial or non-residential use but without the consent of the landlord. In other words, their Lordships held that if a residential building is either let out for a non-residential purpose or allowed to be so used, though initially let out for residential purpose, then such residential building would no longer retain its character as residential building and, therefore, could not be got vacated by the landlord for his personal necessity.

25. This view would be good only where eviction had been sought under S. 14(1) (c) or (e) of the Delhi Rent Act, but not if the eviction had been sought under S. 14(1)(k) thereof. To the latter case, the ratio of Dr. Gopal Dass Vermas case (: AIR 1973 SC 921 [LQ/SC/1973/29] ) (supra) would be attracted. In this view of the matter, the ratio of Dr. Gopal Dass Vermas case (supra) would not be applicable even to a case to which the provisions of S. 11 of the Act are attracted.

26. In the case of Murlidhar Agarwal, (: AIR 1974 SC 1924 [LQ/SC/1974/205] ) (supra), the facts were that the landlord rented out the residential premises to Messrs. Pioneer Exhibitors and Distributors Limited who used the premises for exhibiting cinematograph films. That lease stood terminated by efflux of time on 30-6-1952. The landlord, Shri Ram Swaroop Gupta, thereafter leased the premises by a deed dt. 13-10-1952 for a period of 10 years to one Ram Agyan Singh (respondent 2 before their Lordships), but there was no order allotting the said accommodation to him (to Ram Agyan Singh) under S. 7(2) of the U. P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act, 1947, hereinafter referred to as the U. P. Rent Act. Ram Agyan Singh also used the premises for exhibiting cinematograph films. Murlidhar (appellant before their Lordships) purchased the premises in question from Ram Swaroop Gupta, Vide sale-deed dt 26-3-1962. He thereafter moved an application under S. 7 of the U. P. Rent Act, read with R. 6 of the Rules made thereunder, for release of the accommodation. The question that cropped up before their Lordships was as to whether the suit filed by the appellant-landlord for recovery of the possession of the premises, on the basis of the tenancy created by Ram Swaroop Gupta, the predecessor-in-interest of the appellant Murlidhar in favour of Ram Agyan Singh, had expired to recover possession of the same, was maintainable in law in view of the fact that it was instituted without obtaining the permission of the District Magistrate under S. 3(1) of the said U. P. Rent Act. The matter reached the High Court which held that the suit was not maintainable in view of S. 3 of the U. P. Rent Act and dismissed the suit. The material part of S. 3(1) of the U. P. Rent Act in the following terms--

" 3(1) Subject to any order passed under sub-section (3) no suit shall, without the permission of the District Magistrate, be filed in any civil Court against a tenant for his eviction from any accommodation except on one or more of the following grounds.................."

Since the lease-deed in question was executed after the commencement of the U. P. Rent Act and the respondent-tenant had not obtained an allotment order under S. 7(2) of the said Act in his favour from the District Magistrate, so it was contended on behalf of the landlord that the respondent was not a tenant within the meaning of that term in S. 3, as the lease was created in violation of the provisions of S. 7(2). Their Lordships approved the Full Bench decision of the Allahabad High Court in Udhoo Dass v, Prem Prakash, : AIR 1964 All 1 [LQ/AllHC/1963/29] , in which the Full Bench took the view that a lease made in violation of the provisions of S. 7(2) of the said Act would be valid between the parties and would create the relations ship of landlord and tenant between them although it might not bind the authorities concerned and so their Lordships held the respondent to be tenants for the purpose of the protection of S. 3, even though they were in occupation of the accommodation without an allotment order and held the suit for eviction liable to be dismissed, as the same was instituted without the permission of the District Magistrate.

27. Ratio of the abovesaid judgment in Murlidhar Agarwasl case, (: AIR 1974 SC 1924 [LQ/SC/1974/205] ) (supra) is also not applicable to the present case. In that case, the primary question for consideration was as to whether a person, to whom the accommodation was leased out by the landlord on his own would or would not be considered a tenant, for the purpose of S. 3 of the Act, which provision was held to be mandatory and was intended to advance and subserve a public policy. Their Lordships were of the view that the lessee would be considered a tenant so far as the landlord was concerned, although the lease deed would not be binding on the District Magistrate, as the said tenant did not hold the accommodation under an order of allotment made by the District Magistrate, as envisaged by S. 7(2) of the U. P. Rent Act. Provision of S. 7(2) of the said Act were intended to invest an authority in the District Magistrate to see that a deserving tenant gets the premises on lease if there were more than one applicants requiring accommodation of the premises which were available for leasing out. In other words, the said provision put a restriction on the landlords choice of a tenant, and were intended to serve the interest of a tenant having a better claim for accommodation of a given building than the other intending claimants.

28. The case K. R. Padmavathy Ammal (died) (1981 Ren CJ 617) (Mad) (supra) no doubt, is identical to the present cases insofar as the proposition of law under examinations is concerned, in that the residential building was given by the landlord himself for non--residential use and S. 21 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960, hereinafter referred to as the Tamil Nadu Rent Act, which prohibits conversion of residential building the permission in writing of the Rent Controller, is pari material with S. 11 of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, and the tenant in that case had contended that the landlady having given the residential building for non-residential purpose was estopped from evicting the tenant on the ground of personal necessity for residence as the building as a result of its use as non-residential building no longer remained a residential building. The contention of the tenant prevailed with the learned Judge has based his decision on the ratio of the case of Dr. Gopal Dass Verma, (: AIR 1963 SC 337 [LQ/SC/1961/237] ) and Murlidhar Agarwal, (: AIR 1974 SC 1924 [LQ/SC/1974/205] ) (supra) and these two abovequoted authorities of the Supreme Court relied upon in that case have already been considered and distinguished. Hence, with great respect to the learned judge in K. R. Padmavathy Ammal (died) case (1981 Ren CJ 617) (Mad) (supra), we find ourselves unable to concur in the view taken in tat case. We further hold that the decision in Bansals case (AIR 1985 P&H51) (supra) in regard to the first proposition and single Benchs decision in Rattan Lals case (1971 3 Pun LR 86) (supra) do not lay down the correct law, and to the extent, we overrule these tow decisions as well.

29. As far as the second proposition arising from Bansals case (supra) is concerned, it May be observed that the said proposition does not arise for consideration from the reference order of J. V. Gupta, J. nor strictly does it arise from the reference order of the Division Bench, for such a question does not arise for consideration between the landlord and the tenant in the civil revision covered by the Division Benches reference. As already noticed, the residential premises were rented out to Hari Mittal tenant, petitioners herein, in the year 1969 for his residence, He at that time happened to be in the Government employment of the Union Territory of Chandigarh as District Attorney. The residential premises were not let out to accommodate the District Attorneys office as such and so the question as to whether the residential building let out for the office of the District Attorney would or would not acquire the character of non-residential building by virtue of the definition of the expression non-residential building is merely hypothetical. Hence, any opinion given by us in regard to the correctness of the second proposition arising in Bansals case AIR 1985 P&H 51) (supra) would be obiter dicta. We, therefore, desist from expressing any opinion thereon in the present case. The correctness of the law laid down by Bansals case (supra) in regard to the said proposition would be considered in some other appropriate case.

30. The reference made by the learned single judge is answered in the affirmative and it is held that a residential building let out for non-residential purpose by the landlord without obtaining the written permission of the Rent Controller in terms of S. 11 of the Act would continue to be a residential building and the landlord would be entitled to seek ejectment of the tenant on the ground of his bona fide personal requirement.

31. In the result, the revision petitions Nos. 2202 of 1982, 1108 of 1983 and 3063 of 1984 are remitted back to be disposed of on merits by the appropriate Benches in the light of the law laid down by the Full Bench herein. No costs.

32. Order accordingly.