Chatterji, J.This is an appeal from an order of the District Judge of Cuttack u/s 476, Criminal Procedure Code, making a complaint for the prosecution of the appellant u/s 471, Indian Penal Code.

2. The appellants brought a suit (No. 600 of 1926) in Jaipur Munsifs Court against two persons Kalindi Naik and Baidhar Samal for a declaration of their raiyati right in 9 41 acres of land appertaining to khata No. 461 of Mauza Mahakalpara, bearing touzi No, 1646 of the Cuttack Collectorate. The zemindari in the village originally belonged to one Nani Mohan Banerji from whom Kusun Naik father of one Murlidhar Naik purchased 12 annas share and the appellant Harekrishna Parida purchased the remaining four annas share.

3. Along with the plaint filed by the appellants were filed 13 rent receipts one of which is dated 23rd Magh 1320 and the other 19th Baisakh 1321. Both the receipts purported to have been granted by Narain Parida son of appellant No. 1 Harekrishna Parida as tahsildar of Shaikh Hyder Ali ijaradar of the zemindar Nani Mohan Banerji. It is these two receipts which have given rise to the present proceedings. It is stated that these two receipts could not possibly have been genuine because the malik zemindar leased out the village to Sheikh Hyder Ali from the beginning of the year 1322 Fasli and one Mr. Moore realized the rent as the ijaradar for the year 1320 and the malik Nani Mohan Banerji retained the mahal in khas possession in the year 1321.

4. During the pendency of the Suit No. 600 of 1926 in the Jaipur Munsifs Court the defendants Kalindi Naik and Baidhar Samal filed an application that the receipts were forged. After that the plaintiffs of the suit (namely, the appellants before us) filed a petition stating that the value of the suit exceeded Rs. l,000, the maximum jurisdiction of the Court and prayed to withdraw the suit for filing it in the proper Court. At the same time the defendants filed a petition praying that the documents filed by the plaintiffs should not be returned to them as they were forged. The learned Munsif returned the plaint for presentation to the proper Court, and fixed a date 1st September, 1927, by which the defendants were to prove that the documents filed by the plaintiffs were forged.

5. On 29th August, 1927, the defendants filed an application u/s 476, Criminal Procedure Code, for the prosecution of the plaintiffs and thereupon the plaintiffs were called upon to show cause why they should not he prosecuted. On 14th December 1927, the defendants withdrew their application for the prosecution of the plaintiffs and on 16th December, 1927, the Munsif dismissed the case for non-prosecution. The 13 receipts were returned on 14th December, 1927, on the application of the plaintiffs when the petition of withdrawal was filed by the defendants.

6. Meanwhile, the plaint had been re-filed in the Court of Second Munsif, Cuttack and it was eventually dismissed by the Munsif on 81st August, 1928, after contest. In that Court only 11 of the receipts were filed and the 2 rent receipts referred to above were not produced. In that suit before the Munsif of Cuttack it was pleaded by the defendants that the plaintiffs were estopped from questioning the raiyati right of the defendants because they had executed a nadabi in their favour on 10th December, 1927. The Additional Munsif who dismissed the case did not accept the contention on the ground that the consideration of the nadabi deed was the dropping of the proceeding against plaintiff No. 1.

7. Murlidhar Naik who, as I have already stated, became the proprietor of the village to the extent of 12 annas share by virtue of a purchase from the original proprietor Nani Mahan Banerji, moved the Munsif of Jaipur u/s 476, Criminal Procedure Code, for the prosecution of the appellants. He asserted that the receipts of 1320 and 1321 purporting to have been granted to the plaintiffs on behalf of Sheikh Hyder Ali as ijaradar were obviously forgeries and that the defendants Kalindi and Baidhar had been induced by the defendants to withdraw their application u/s 476, Criminal Procedure Code by the execution of a deed of sale in respect of one anna out of the defendants four annas share in the zemindari and also by the execution of a nadabi deed regarding the land which was the subject-matter of the Suit No. 600 of 1926 and that the application for withdrawal was a collusive transaction.

8. The Munsif rejected the petition on the grounds: (1) that the applicant was not a party to the original proceeding and had no locus standi to make the application; (2) that the application was for review of the order, dated 16th December, 1327, in the previous miscellaneous case but the Code of Criminal Procedure makes no provision for a review; (3) that the documents alleged to have been forged were not on the record and were said to have been destroyed, and (4) the object of the petition was to harass and blackmail the opposite party. A further ground was given by him that the suit in the Second Munsifs Court at Out-tack was still pending. But that point does not arise because the suit had been disposed of before the order under appeal was passed by the learned District Judge.

9. Section 476, Criminal Procedure Code, provides that the complaint may be made by a Court either on an application or otherwise. Therefore, it is immaterial whether the present application is made by a person who was not a party to the original suit. Besides he is a co-sharer malik of the village. There is no reason to refuse to take action because he brings the fact to the notice of the Court if it is expedient in the interest of justice that an enquiry should be made into the offence referred to. In fact, this ground is not pressed before us by the learned Counsel for the appellant.

10. The points urged by him are firstly, that the proceeding having once been dropped by the Munsif of Jaipur by his order passed on 16th December, I927, the matter cannot be re-opened, and secondly, that the documents alleged to have been forged not being on the record there is no possibility of a conviction.

11. It is undisputed that these is no provision for review in the Code of Criminal Procedure and it goes without saying that the Court cannot revise its final order except in such cases for which provision has been made in the Code, for example, in Sections 395 and 484 of the Code. But the point is: what is the scope of Section 476, Criminal Procedure Code It provides that in the matter of certain offences committed in or in relation to a proceeding in a Court such Court may make a complaint thereof in writing and shall forward the same to a Magistrate of the First Class who shall thereupon proceed according to law as if the complaint is one made u/s 200, Criminal Procedure Code. Thus, the proceeding u/s 476, Criminal Procedure Code, terminates in a mere complaint which can be taken cognizance of by the Magistrate as in the case of an ordinary complaint made u/s 200, Criminal Procedure Code. A person can change his mind as to whether he will file a complaint or not; on the same principle it may quite properly be stated that the complaining Court may also alter its mind and decide, on proper materials being placed that it would make a complaint. The crucial point to be remembered always is whether it is expedient in the interest of justice that an enquiry should be made into any particular offence. It is not a case of any final order and, therefore, no question of the absence of any provision for review in the Code of Criminal Procedure would arise.

12. In the next place, when the defendants in Suit No. 600 of 1926 filed the petition to withdraw their application u/s 476, the Court merely dismissed it for non-prosecution. The order runs as follows:

Petitioners petition dated 14th December, 1927, put up, Ordered. Allowed. The case be dismissed for non-prosecution.

13. Therefore, the Court merely dismissed the application of the defendants for the prosecution of the appellants. The learned Munsif did not apply his judicial mind to the question whether it was expedient in the interests of justice that an enquiry should or should not be made. The application of a particular party was merely dropped. This cannot, in my opinion take away the jurisdiction of the Court to make a complaint if satisfied on proper materials being placed that it is expedient in the interest of justice that the matter should be enquired into. That there is no finality to the dropping of a proceeding like this will appear from a consideration of the case of Chamari Singh and Others Vs. Public Prosecutor of Gaya, . In that case, an application u/s 476, Criminal Procedure Code, was made by a party to a proceeding u/s 83, Transfer of Property Act, for the prosecution of the opposite party who had made a deposit on the strength of a mortgage which was alleged to have been forged. The Subordinate Judge before whom the application had been made refused to take action u/s 476, Criminal Procedure Code as he held that the proceedings u/s 83, Transfer of Property Act were not judicial proceedings. After the amendment in 1923 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, on a fresh application the prosecution was ultimately ordered in spite of the previous proceeding refusing to prosecute the man. Their Lordships held in this case that the fact that no action could be taken u/s 476, Criminal Procedure Code, as it stood prior to the amendment of the Code, and the proceedings had accordingly to be dropped before an enquiry was made, did not preclude an action under the section as amended. If the proceedings could be re-opened after the amendment in spite of the previous rejection of the application u/s 476, Criminal Procedure Code, I fail to see why a Judge acting u/s 476, Criminal Procedure Code, would be debarred from making a complaint if satisfied that there is a prima facie case merely because an order was previously passed dismissing for non-prosecution the application of a particular party u/s 476. In nay opinion, the first contention is not well-founded.

14. There is no substance also in the second contention. Had the case proceeded on the basis of an alternation in the receipts, the absence of the originals would have made a successful prosecution impossible. But in this particular case, the certified copies of the receipts have been produced and as the learned District Judge points out evidence will be forthcoming that these are the correct copies of the originals. Then the list of documents filed by the plaintiffs in the original suit must be on the record. It can be proved by examining the Pleader or any other credible witnesses that the plaintiff filed the receipts in question. Whatever that may be, it cannot be said that there is no reasonable probability of a conviction. The matter is one which should go before the Criminal Court. The learned District Judge has gone carefully into the whole matter and I agree with him that it is expedient in the interests of justice, that there should be a complaint for prosecution as made by him. The appeal is dismissed.

Adami, J.

15. I agree.