R.S. Narula, C.J.

1. The questions which call for decision in this writ petition for annulment of the resolution of expulsion of the Petitioner, from the Haryana Vidhan Sabha relate to the scope, interpretation, construction and application of Article 194 of the Constitution which deals with the powers, privileges and immunities of the Indian State Legislatures and their members. A brief survey of the facts leading to the filing of the petition appear to be necessary in order to fully appreciate the questions of law on which lengthy arguments have teen addressed by both sides.

Hardwari Lal (hereinafter called the Petitioner) was an elected member of the Haryana Vidhan Sabha (hereinafter referred to as the Vidhan Sabha). On November 12, 1973, two members of the Vidhan Sabha gave to the Secretary, Vidhan Sabha, notice Annexure P-5 of the alleged breach of privilege by the Petitioner having published the booklets entitled "A Chief Minister Runs Amuck --Indian Democracy in Danger" and "Emergence of Rough and corrupt Politics in India--Anatomy of a Chief Minister", which were stated to he available in the market. The notice stated inter alia:

The contents and perusal of these booklets will reveal that derogatory remarks have been made against the Honble Speaker, House and Members of Haryana Vidhan Sabha, thereby lowering the dignity of the Honble Speaker, House and Members of Haryana Vidhan Sabha in the eyes of public.

2. Following extracts from the above-mentioned booklets were then quoted in the privilege motion:

1. The Speaker is the authority to allot flats. But a person whom Mr. Bansi Lal does not like can expect no accommodation from the Speaker in the matter. (Page 37 of the booklet A Chief Minister Runs Amuck).

2. The present Speaker is an old and close associate of Mr. Bansi Lal. He has been given a better limousine than had been given to his predecessor and he is often out on tour of the State as his predecessor used to be. It appears that the marriage between him and Mr. Bansi Lal. would last. He is being gradually made a part of the actual power-structure of the State.

(Page 40 of the booklet A Chief Minister Runs Amuck).

3. A member of the House was alleged to have said at a public meeting that the new Speaker was merely a tool of the Chief Minister. This speech annoyed Mr. Bansi Lal as being calculated to damage the position of the Speaker. But even if the allegation was true it would be an open question whether the erring Member of Mr. Bansi Lal himself has damaged the position of the new Speaker and debased the Speakers office itself. Mr. Bansi Lal cannot put up with the State Assembly and with the Speaker of the Assembly unless they are thoroughly tamed things.

(Page 70 of the booklet "Emergence of Rough and Corrupt Politics in India).

Derogatory remarks against the Assembly and its Members.

4. But who can prevent Mr. Bansi Lal from making it an

innocuous and even subservient If the... members are all right, the Vidhan Sabha can really be a convenient cover for everything that Mr. Bansi Lal may like to do with public money and Government Power.

(Page 36 of the booklet A Chief Minister Runs Amuck).

5. Chaudhri Rizak Ram, the leader of the Congress (O) Legislature Party which is the largest group in the Opposition in the Vidhan Sabha, is on Mr. Bansi Lals pay roll.

(Page 40 of the booklet A Chief Minister Runs Amuck).

6. Mr. Bansi Lal has used all the corrupt and rough methods to mould the State Assembly.

(Page 49 of the booklet Emergence of Rough and Corrupt Politics in India).

7. It was the first State where the State Assembly was made into his personal handmaid by the Chief Minister.

(Page 6 of the booklet Emergence of Rough and Corrupt Politics in India)

8. But how long could the Commission have held out after Mr. Bansi Lal had subjugated the State Assembly.

(Page 73 of the booklet Emergence of Rough and Corrupt Polics in India).

9. He thought of ways to put the Members in his pocket through corruption and appeasement. Exhibiting a large-heartedness of rare order, he invited them to share the spoils. Lucrative jobs were created for the Members who defected, at his instance, from the opposition. Improvement Trusts were created here and there and the defectors as also some of the restive Members of his own party were given good salaries as Chairmen of those Trusts. There were then Boards and Corporations. One of the defectors was appointed Chairman of State Agricultural Marketing Board, another the Chairman of Agricultural Industrial Corporation, still another as Chairman of Minor Irrigation Corporation and so on. (Page 54 of the booklet Emergence of Rough and Corrupt Politics in India).

10. Mr. Bansi Lal, then got another six or seven independent members, whom he had at his beck and call to enter Progressive Independent Group of six MLAs on the condition that the group would pursue a policy of constructive opposition. Within a few minutes of the occurrence of these developments he got the Speaker of the Assembly to recognise the Progressive Independent Group as the official Opposition and its leader as official Leader of Opposition in the Assembly although the Assembly was not in session. To throw dust into the eyes of people, Mr. Rizak Ram remained critical of this new development as long as estrangement between the six members who had been expelled from the Congress (O) at his instance, and the Congress (O) Party did not become complete. As soon as he felt that the estrangement for which he had been working was complete, he became an open supporter of Mr. Bansi Lal, though he continued to remain the Leader of Congress (O) Group. Mr. Bansi Lal appointed him as the Chairman of the Resources Committee which he specially created to accommodate him and gave him most of the facilities which go with the office of a Cabinet Minister. To Congress (O) and its Members in the Assembly Mr. Rizak Ram gave the assurance that he was their own man and had accepted the Chairmanship of the Resources Committee only to secure secrets which they could use to bring down Mr. Bansi Lal.

As Chairman of the Resources Committee, Mr. Rizak Ram recommended additional taxation at Mr. Bansi Lals suggestion at which the Congress (O) group became restive. The group expelled Mr. Rizak Ram and his one solitary associate and thus reduced its own strength to four. Mr. Rizak Ram had done his part of the job. Mr. Bansi Lal, on his part, had already taken steps to elevate Mr. Rizak Ram to something higher. The Planning Commission had advised the States to set up Planning Boards under permanent Deputy Chairman. Mr. Bansi Lal, decided to give this job to Mr. Rizak Ram. Without disclosing his intention he got the State Assembly to pass a Bill that the office of the Deputy Chairman of the proposed Board would not be an office of profit. Some time after the passage of the Bill, Mr. Rizak Ram was appointed the Deputy Chairman of the State Planning Board. This was adequate compensation for the help he had given to Mr. Bansi Lal in weakening the Congress (O) Party in the Assembly. Mr. Rizak Ram now enjoys the status and all the privileges of a Cabinet Minister. But the question of morals troubles neither him nor Mr. Bansi Lal.

The new Opposition Party of Progressive Independents into which Mr. Bansi Lal had inducted his purchased men, has also been liquidated.... And within a matter of days Mr. Bansi Lal made his men in the Independent Group (the spare tyres kept for use in the emergenices) disown the group and its leader.

(Pages 83 and 85 of the booklet Emergence of Rough and Corrupt Politics in India).

Speaker an accomplice:

11. Large sums of money are being earned by MLAs close to Mr. Bansi Lal for securing appointments for various persons. MLAs namely Parsanni Devi from Karnal district reported to have been having an average assured income of Rs. 4,000 each per mensem during last two years, (pages 64-65 of the booklet Emergence of Rough and Corrupt Politics in India).

3. It was alleged in the notice that the above-quoted derogatory-words and paragraphs in the booklets in question had lowered the dignity of the Honble Speaker, House and the Members of the Vidhan Sabha and also cast aspersions on them. It was stated that publishing of those documents had resulted in the image of the Honble the Speaker and of the Members of the House having "gone down very low in the eyes of the public". It was then added in the notice Annexure P-5 as under:

Publishing such derogatory remarks in the above-said booklets and casting aspersions on them definitely puts an hindrance in the day-to-day discharge of their duties, and also it is a breach of privilege and contempt of the Vidhan Sabha, Honble Speaker and the Members. These libellous reflections upon members have brought into disrepute the august body, i.e., the Vidhan Sabha to which they belong. Having published these two booklets containing the aforesaid libels, Shri Hardwari Lal, MLA has committed violation of rights and privileges of Haryana Vidhan Sabha which causes the obstruction in the performance of its functions by diminishing the respect of the Honble Members due to them. This specific matter is of recent occurrence and requires immediate intervention by the Honble Speaker. As a matter of proof, we are enclosing a copy of the booklets for your perusal and necessary action. Therefore, Sir, we request you that this matter may kindly be referred to the Privileges Committee at once for examination and report.

After some discussion in the Vidhan Sabha, the House referred the -above-mentioned question of privilege to the Committee of Privileges for examination and report. Copies of the booklets were supplied to all the members of the Committee and also to the Petitioner. At his request the Committee examined the Petitioner on November 22, 1973. The written interim reply filed by the Petitioner before the Committee was circulated amongst its members. In that reply the Petitioner raised objections against the admission of the privilege motion as well as against its acceptance, and also disputed having committed breach of any privilege or having committed any contempt. When the following question was put to the Petitioner by the Chairman of the Privileges Committee during the course of the recording of Petitioners own statement:

Mr. Hardwari Lal, I put before you two booklets named (1) a Chief Minister Runs Amuck, printed by the Printing Promoters,, 3338, 21-D, Chandigarh; and (2) Emergence of Rough and Corrupt Politics in India, printed at New Bharat Press, Karol Bagh, New Delhi. Do you admit that these booklets have been written by you and printed and circulated at your instance

he replied in the affirmative by saying--"Certainly Yes".

The Petitioner also admitted before the Committee that the two booklets in question had been widely circulated and that the Petitioner himself had sent complimentary copies of the booklets to the Vidhan Sabha library. He, however, prayed for more time to submit his detailed reply and his request was allowed by the Committee. The two movers) of the motion were also examined and they reiterated the allegations made by them in the privilege motion. In his final written statement before the Privileges Committee, the Petitioner took up a large number of pleas.

He pleaded inter alia that whatever he had written in the two booklets was true and correct, that the privilege motion had been admitted contrary to the rules of procedure and conduct of business of the Vidhan Sabha, that the British House of Commons recognises the right of a citizen to criticise it outside the House even in the staunchest terms, that the Petitioner had the right to criticise the conduct of the Leader of the House and the Speaker "as they had been abusing the process of the House and their executive authority as the Chief Minister and the Speaker", that as a member of the House the Petitioner had the right to attack both inside and outside the House the modus operandi of the Leader of the Opposition, that in the passages to which exception had been taken by the movers of the motion, the Petitioner in his capacity as a member of the House had stated nothing which would constitute reflections on the institution of the Vidhan Sabha.

4. After hearing the movers of the motion and Petitioner, and considering the entire material brought before it, the Committee submitted its report, dated January 7, 1975, wherein the objections against the admission and acceptance of the motion and its origin were disposed of in the following words:

The Committee cannot go into the propriety or impropriety of the Speakers admission of the motion or the acceptance of the motion by the House. It is an established principle that it is for the Speaker to decide whether there is a prima facie case of breach of privilege and after having considered the motion from that point of view, if the Speaker admits the motion and allows it to be moved in the House and the House takes a decision to refer the same to the Privileges Committee for its consideration, the matter ends there and the Privileges Committee has no jurisdiction to examine and decide as to whether the Speaker should have admitted the motion and allowed the moving of the same in the House and as to whether the acceptance of it by the House was proper or not. This Committee also does not have any power to examine whether the motion was admitted against the rules and hence this objection is overruled.

The Committee also cannot go into the question as to why and how the Privilege Motion originated, rather it takes a strong objection to the words, "the privilege motion in question had its origin in the personal animosity of Messrs Bansi Lal and Banarsi Das Gupta and in their proveable mala fides" used in para 5 of the reply by Chaudhri Hardwari Lal, dated 18th December, 1973. The imputation of mala fides on the part of the Speaker in admitting the Privilege Motion would by itself constitute a breach of privilege as it casts great reflections on the impartiality of the Speaker in the discharge of his duties as such.

5. After recording the above findings the Privileges Committee gave its final unanimous report in the following terms:

The Committee is not concerned with the purpose of the circumstances which led to the publication and circulation of the two booklets referred to in the privilege motion. The Committee admits that every citizen has a right to criticise but nevertheless the Committee is of the opinion that writing and the criticism should not interfere with due and proper procedure of the House and should not show disregard and disrespect for parliamentary decorum, practice and procedure. It should not also seek to lower in the estimation of the public the authority and dignity of the House and its Speaker. (Refer to the case of breach of privilege moved in Bombay Vidhan Sabha against Marathi newspaper "Prabhat" in 1957).

The Committee feels that the booklets have not been written with the laudable purpose which is alleged in the written statement, but with the ulterior motive to malign and blackmail the Members and the Speaker of the House. The Committee, however, feel that he could have criticised the conduct of the Chair generally without casting or suggesting any reflection on impartiality of the Chair. Writings reflecting on the impartiality and the conduct of the Chair is (are) not justified. (Refer to the motion of privilege moved in Assam Vidhan Sabha in 1954 in the case of Hareshwar Goswami, Leader of the Opposition).

Shri Hardwari Lal has laid great stress that whatever he has stated is based on facts and truthfulness. The Committee has considered this aspect of the question in depth and find it hard to accept his assertions.

At page 140 of Report from the Select Committee of Parliamentary Privileges (1967-House of Commons), it is said as under:

There is no reason to suppose that the truth of libel would have been a defence in proceeding for contempt of Parliament in the 17th and 18th Century, any more than it would have been a defence at common law in criminal prosecutions for libel. On the contrary, the fact that it was the practice in such cases for the House to decide whether the writing complained of was reliable without hearing the party/parties or any of them who had published libel proves that the truth of the libel was not a defence. It is, therefore, for those who maintain that proof of the truth of the libel is a defence in such proceeding to show that the practice has changed and this, I submit, they cannot do. The precedent goes nowhere near proving any such contention.

6. Chaudhry Hardwari Lal has tried to scandalise the whole House and the Committee is unable to find any case in which a party accused of scandalising the Speaker, the House and its Members sought to prove that his allegations were true.

7. It has been invariably held that the truth of allegations is no defence in proceeding for contempt and that the defender cannot lead evidence to establish its truth. It has rather been held further that every attempt to justify the contempt constiutes a new offence of contempt. Reference may be made to Surrender Nath Banerjees case 1883 ILC Cal Series 10 109, and Ram Mohan Lal Aggarwal 1935 All Series 411 and also the case of M.G. Kadir v. Kesri Nairain Jaitly and Ors. A.I.R. 1945 All Series 67.

8. Shri L.A. Abrahm, C.B.C.B.E; in his memorandum submitted before the Select Committee on Parliamentary Privileges stated "In my submission, the precedents afford little support for the contention that where a person is charged with contempt of the House by publishing libel on, or speaking words defamatory of, a member or members, named or unnamed, his or their capacity as such a member/ members proof of the truth of writing or words will provide a defence".

9. It would not be out of place to mention here that Defendant in the prosecution for libel was never allowed in common law to allege the truth by way of justification (refer to Halsbury Laws of England, 3rd Edition, Volume 25, page 4).

10. The Committee feel that it does not lie in the mouth of Shri Hardwari Lal to assert that since the matter written is based on truth, so no breach of privilege is involved.

11. Before examining whether the writings in question constitute breach of privilege or not, it would be proper to state succinctly the law on the point.

12. The Committee of Privileges of the House of Commons (U.K.) in the well-known Alligham case stated "it has long been recognised that the publication of imputations reflecting on the dignity of the House or any Member in his capacity as such is punishable as a contempt of the Parliament. Reflections upon Members, however, even where individuals are not named may be so framed as to bring into disrepute the body to which they belong and as such reflections, therefore, have been treated as equivalent to reflections on the House itself.

13. It is a breach of privilege and contempt of the House to make speeches to print or publish any book of libels reflecting upon the character or proceedings of the House or its Committees, or any Member thereof.

14. Reflections on the character and impartiality of the Speaker in the discharge of his duties constitute breach of privilege. (See case of Amrit Bazar Patrika and Indian News Chronicle).

15. Shri Madhu Limaye was held to have committed a breach of privilege and contempt of the House by attributing mala fides to the Speaker, Lok Sabha, in the discharge of his duties in the House. It may be of interest to note that Shri Madhu Limaye was a Member of the Lok Sabha.

16. The Committee is of the opinion that paragraphs Nos. 1, 2 and 3 under the heading Derogatory Remarks against the Hon. Speaker in the Privilege Motion quoted from the booklets published by Chaudhri Hardwari Lal, impute partiality on the part of the Speaker in the discharge of his duties as such, and also convey the impression that the Speaker does not act independently and his actions are motivated by considerations other than justice and fair play.

17. In paragraph 3, Chaudhri Hardwari Lal has repeated the words A Member of the House was alleged to have said at a public meeting that the new Speaker was merely a tool of the Chief Minister. The words underlined have already been the subject of a privilege motion against Shri Ram Lal and this Committee,--vide its Report submitted to the House on 26th September, 1973, held that the words constituted breach of privilege and contempt of the House, and, therefore, recommended that Shri Ram Lal be reprimanded.

18. The words which are printed at page 36 of the booklet A Minister Runs Amuck clearly cast reflections on the conduct of the Members of the House in the discharge of their duties as Members while taking part in the proceedings of the House. In all, paragraph 4 also conveys the impression that the Members do not act freely according to their conscience and are tools in some one elses hands.

19. Paragraph 5, the words of which are taken from page 40 of the booklet A Chief Minister Runs Amuck is highly derogatory of the then Leader of Opposition (Chaudhri -Rizak Ram) and accuse him of accepting bribe and consequently acting in a particular manner as leader of Opposition of the august House. There would not be a more serious offence than casting derogatory and damaging reflections on the person of the Leader of the Opposition.

20. The paragraphs 6, 7, 8 and 9 quoted from pages 49, 61 and 73 and 54 of the booklet Emergence of Rough and Corrupt Politics in India again cast disgraceful reflections on the working of the House as a whole.

21. The wording of the paragraphs 9,10 and 11 taken from pages 54, 83 and 85 and 65 of the booklet Emergence of Rough and Corrupt Politics in India imputes motives on the part of Members of this House in the discharge of their duties and functions as Members of this House. The Committee is of the opinion that the use of such words is highly deprecable.

22. From the reading of these paragraphs, the impression which is created in the minds of the public at large would be that the Members of this august House accept bribe to act in particular manner in the discharge of their duties as Members. Such imputations are highly libellous and constitute breach of privilege of the Members.

After recording all the above findings and making the above-quoted report, the Committee dealt with the question of punishment to be awarded to the Petitioner for the breach of privilege for which he had been held to be responsible in the following words:

The Committee might have also taken a lenient view of the whole matter if the Member complained against was remorseful and repentant of his action; but after going through the citations of the privilege motion and lengthy reply submitted to the Committee by him, the Committee is pi the view that motive of Chaudhry Hardwari Lal in publishing two booklets is to blackmail and coerce the Speaker and Members of this august House. The writings cannot be stated to be a fair comment on the working of the Vidhan Sabha. Chaudhry Hardwari Lal cannot be said to be unaware of the seriousness of the consequences of what he has written in his booklets. Since the matter is of serious nature and the writings are deliberately libellous and derogatory and the honour and reputation of the whole House is involved and the writings have brought into disrepute the high office of the Speaker and cast uncalled for reflections and preclude the Members from acting freely and independently in the discharge of their duties as Members of this august House, the Committee is of the opinion that Hardwari Lal would deserve exemplary punishment.

The Committee recommends to the House that Shri Hardwari Lal be expelled from the House and his seat be declared vacant, as in the opinion of the Committee he is guilty of breach of privilege and contempt of the House, the Members and the Speaker.

23. The report of the Privileges Committee came up for discussion before the Vidhan Sabha on January 8, 1975. After discussion, the House unanimously adopted the motion. Consequent on the adoption of the motion expelling the Petitioner from the House, the Petitioner was declared by notification Annexure P-7 of that date to have ceased to be a member of the Vidhan Sabha with effect from that day (forenoon of January 8, 1975). In the endorsement dated January 8, 1975, under which a copy of the notification Annexure P. 7 was forwarded to the Secretary, Election Commission of India, he was "requested to take steps to fill the vacancy of Shri Hardwari Lal from 45--Bahadurgarh Assembly Constituency, caused vacant."

24. On March 17, 1975, the Petitioner approached this Court by the present writ petition praying for the issuance of an appropriate writ, direction or order to the effect that:

(a) the decision of the Vidhan Sabha, dated January 8, 1975, expelling the Petitioner from the House and subsequent notification of the same date declaring the Petitioners seat as vacant be struck down and held void, mala fide, illegal unconstitutional and inoperative;

(b) the Election Commission of India (Respondent No. 1 to the writ petition) be directed not to proceed to fill the vacancy supposed to have resulted from the decision of the Petitioners expulsion from the Vidhan Sabha and to cancel the proceedings which might already have been set in motion in that regard;

(c) such other relief be granted to him as may be considered just and appropriate in the circumstances of the case; and

(d.) the costs of the petition be awarded to him as his expulsion is groundless and mala fide.

25. Besides the Election Commission of India (Respondent No. (1) the eighteen other Respondents arrayed in the petition are:

(ii) Vidhan Sabha through the Speaker; (iii) the Secretary of the Vidhan Sabha;

(iv) Shri Bansi Lal, the then Chief Minister of Haryana; (v) Shri B.D. Gupta, ex-Speaker of the Vidhan Sabha, who was at that time the Irrigation and Power Minister of Haryana;

(vi) Tikka Jagjit Singh, M.L.A. (mover No. 1 of the privilege motion);

(vii) Shri G.C. Joshi, M.L.A. (the second mover of the privilege motion);

(viii to xviii) Shri Gulab Singh and other M.L.As., who were, members of the Privileges Committee; and

(xix) the State of Haryana.

The petition has been divided into ten parts. The first part comprising paragraphs 1 to 19 contains the alleged back ground and facts of the case starting with the Petitioners career since 1962, his election to the Vidhan Sabha, a tirade against the Speaker and the Chief Minister, and ending with his writing, printing and publishing the booklet Annexure P-l, dated March 22, 1973, captioned

A Chief Minister Runs Amuck--Indian Democracy in Danger--An Appeal for Succour by Hardwarilal", and the issue and publication by him of the booklet Annexure P-2, dated August 30, 1973, under the heading "Emergence of Rough and Corrupt Politics in India--Anatomy of a Chief Minister.

26. Para II which contains only one main paragraph enumerates certain alleged features of the contentsof the privilege motion and its admission by the Vidhan Sabha on November 12, 1973, which have been claimed to "throw the illegality and mala fides of the entire performance into bold relief." The various sub-paragraphs of that paragraph are mainly in the nature of the objections against the admission and adoption of the privilege motion on merits. Part III refers to the earlier writ petition (C.W.P. 625 of 1974) filed by the Petitioner to thwart the adoption of the privilege motion wherein he had prayed for the adjudication of the existence and the extent of the privilege claimed by the Vidhan Sabha and had requested for the Privileges Committee being restrained from proceeding in the matter, which petition had been dismissed on January 21, 1974, in limine.

27. Emphasis has been laid in six separate paragraphs of part IV of the petition on the fact that the Petitioner feels terribly aggrieved at the hands of the Vidhan Sabha whose decision to expel him from the House amounts to the deprivation of his fundamental rights under Articles 14 and 19(l)(a), (f) and (g) of the Constitution, and the existence of jurisdiction in the High Court to interfere with the proceedings and orders complained against for the following amongst other reasons:

(1) There is a conflict between the abovementioned fundamental rights on the one hand and the privileges claimed by the Vidhan Sabha under Article 194 of the Constitution on the other which conflict has to be resolved by the High Court by adopting harmonious construction.

(2) The supremacy of the Indian Legislatures is subject to the fundamental rights and any action of the Vidhan Sabha in exercise of its privileges under Article 194 is liable to be struck down if such action violates any fundamental right.

(3) The High Court has the exclusive jurisdiction to construe the scope and extent of the privileges, powers and immunities as is conferred on the Vidhan Sabha under Article 194(3) of the Constitution.

(4) The proceedings of the Vidhan Sabha resulting in the Petitioners expulsion from the House suffer not only from mere irregularity but from gross illegality, as--

(a) the House has acted without having power to act;

(b) the House has contravened Article 208(1) of the Constitution and ignored the principles of natural justice;

(c) Vidhan Sabha has passed the law expelling the Petitioner which contravenes Article 13(2) of the Constitution;

(d) the action of the House expelling the Petitioner is mala fide; and

(e) in expelling the Petitioner from the House, the Vidhan Sabha has gone against the basic features and the general framework of the Constitution.

(5) It is open to the Court to examine the validity of the grounds set out in the report of the Privileges Committee on which the Petitioner has been expelled.

28. Fault has been found in 13 separate paragraphs (and various sub-paragraphs thereof) of Part V of the petition with the proceedings and report of the Privileges Committee on various grounds. In Part VI containing eleven separate paragraphs, various procedural and other objections have been raised against the proceedings in the Vidhan Sabha culminating in the passing of the impugned resolution. In paragraph 4 of Part VII reference has been made to the individual items of the privilege motion. In Part VIII the legality, validity arid constitutionality of the impugned resolution and notifications have been challenged on various grounds wherein the Petitioner has sought to show that the Vidhan Sabha has no power or jurisdiction whatever to expel the Petitioner from the House as no such power had been claimed by the British House of Commons at the time of the commencement of the Indian Constitution and the onus to show the existence of such a privilege is on the Vidhan Sabha. It has further been alleged that even if the House of Commons had at the relevant time the power to expel any of its members, Article 194(3) of the Constitution does not transfer such power to the Indian Legislature. It has also been made out that the expulsion of a duly elected member amounts to subversion of the right of his electors and to their disenfranchisement, and, therefore, the exercise of such a power comes into direct conflict with the principle of representation enshrined in Articles 170, 172 and 326 of the Constitution. Certain additional grounds attacking the validity and constitutionality of the impugned proceedings and orders have been taken up in Part IX of the petition. The contents of Part IX are mainly repetition of what has been stated at one or the other place in the earlier parts of the petition. Part IX-A contains the prayer clause to which reference has already been made.

29. The Division Bench (Sandhawalia and P.C. Jain, JJ.), who admitted the petition on March 25, 1975, after giving notice of motion to the Respondents directed that in view of the significant constitutional issues raised in the case, the petition be heard by a Full Bench of five Judges. The prayer for stay at that stage was declined. Respondent No. 1 did not take any interest in the petition and did not put in appearance to contest the same.

30. The Vidhan Sabha (Respondent No. 2) did not put in appearance in the case. The Advocate-General of Haryana, who appeared for Respondents 3 to 5 and 19, requested us to make a particular note of the fact that the Vidhan Sabha has not submitted to the jurisdiction of the Court and is not appearing in the case. This petition has, therefore, been heard ex-parte against Respondents 1, 2 and 6 to 18.

31. Large number of applications have been filed in this case by the Petitioner from time to time. Right in the beginning the Petitioner prayed to the Court that his application for staying the operation of the impugned order (CM. 1158 of 1975) should first be heard and disposed of. The contesting Respondents on the other hand filed an application (CM. 1153 of 1975, dated 30th April, 1975) praying for a direction to the Petitioner to delete certain passages in his prolix petition which were according to the Respondents scandalous and unnecessary. The hearing of the Petitioners application for stay started on May 6, 1975, and culminated in the passing of our order, dated May 7, 1975, wherein we directed that:

(i) Respondent No. 1 (the Election Commission) shall not proceed to hold the by-election in pursuance of the Haryana Assembly Secretariat notification, dated January 8, 1975 (Annexure P, 7), till the final disposal of this writ petition; and

(ii) the Petitioner would (during the pendency of the writ petition) be entitled to attend the sessions of the Haryana Legislative Assembly and sign the register for the minimum number of days to keep his seat intact, but shall not take part in the proceedings of the said Assembly or vote or draw any remuneration.

32. After the disposal of the stay application of the Petitioner, the learned Advocate General first pressed his application (CM. 1153 of 1975) for directing the Petitioner to delete or otherwise expunge certain passages in the writ petition which were described as being abusive or scandalous and wholly unnecessary for the adjudication of the; real points in controversy in the case. Ultimately it was agreed between the parties; and really at the instance of the Petitioner, that the Advocate-General may first address the Court on the preliminary objections taken up in the written statement of Respondent No. 3 to which the Petitioner would reply, and the Advocate-General would make further submissions if necessary, and that only if and after the Court decides to go into the charge of malice, arguments on that point would be heard and decision as to the necessity to expunge or delete any portion of the petition would be recorded. All the legal issues involved in the case were thereupon argued at length by the Petitioner himself on the one side and by Mr. Jagan Nath Kaushal, the then Advocate General, on behalf of the contesting Respondents before myself and Koshal, Sandhawalia, Jain, and Gujral, JJ.

33. After conclusion of the hearing on those legal points in the last week of March, the Bench fixed March 29, 1976, for deliberations on those points. Two days earlier (on March 27, 1976), I had to be transplanted as Acting Governor of Haryana consequent upon the sudden demise of Mr. B.N. Chakravarty. Before I could come back to the High Court, Koshal, J., had been transferred to Madras and Gujral, J., to Gangtok as Chief Justice of the Sikkim High Court. The Bench was thereupon reconstituted (as at present) by the order of O. Chinnappa Reddy, A. C.J., in my absence.

34. All the other miscellaneous applications of the Petitioner which were pending till December 6, 1976, with the exception of CM. 1153 of 1975, dated April 30,1975, were disposed of by us on that day (the other applications having been disposed of by the earlier Bench). On that day (December 6, 1976), when a large number of other applications of the Petitioner were disposed of by us, the Petitioner as well as the learned Advocate-General agreed that no arguments were necessary on this application, and that after taking into account the contents of the application and the written reply thereto final order on the application may be passed along with the judgment in the main case. We directed accordingly. At the fag end of the arguments of the learned Senior Deputy Advocate-General on the merits of the controversy, he made a submission to the effect that out of the various passages and portions in the writ petition to which specific objection has been taken by the contesting Respondents in the statement attached to CM. 1172 of 1975 (in which application permission of the Court was sought to allow the said statement to form part of the main application, that is CM. 1953 of 1975, which application was allowed by the order of the Court, dated May 6, 1975), he wanted to press the striking out of only those words or expressions in the sentences reproduced below which have hereunder been underlined by me:

(i) in paragraph 3 of Part I at page 1---but the Petitioner was familiar with his shady back-ground;

(ii) in paragraph 7 of Part I at pages 2 and 3---comparatively unknown and possessing an extremely shady background and no political following;

(iii) in paragraph 10 of Part I at page 3---when he started his legal practice in the tahsil town, Bhiwani, in 1956-57, the illrepute of his family and his own (reference is invited to Annexure P. 2--its pages 31, 32 and 33--Bansi Lal through the years) stood in his way;

(iv) in sub-paragraph (g) of paragraph 13 of Part I at page 9---Mr. Bansi Lal ensured (through his unhealthy association with the then Speaker---);

(v) in paragraph 15--"another and a more detailed booklet depicting, Mr. Bansi Lals shady past and exposing his current corruption and misrule---"; and

(vi) in paragraph 16(d) at page 11---Police records pertaining to Mr. Bansi Lals shady activities from 1947 to April, 1948.

35. CM. 1153 of 1975, read with the statement attached to CM. 1172 of 1975, in so far as it relates to the prayer for striking out scandalous and irrelevant allegations other than those enumerated above, is, therefore, dismissed as not pressed. The Petitioner has half-heartedly opposed even the striking out of the words or portions of sentences referred to by me above. After carefully considering the matter we are of the opinion that the learned Advocate-General is correct in submitting that the words underlined by me in the six sentences in the petition quoted verbatim by me are scandalous and irrelevant. These allegations are wholly unnecessary and even most serious allegations made in the petition relating to the alleged mala fides of the then Chief Minister stand intact without the objectionable words. The words in the above-quoted sentences to which exception has been taken in the application and pressed by the learned Advocate-General are considered by us to be wholly unnecessary for purposes of pressing and prosecuting the main petition. It appears to us that the only object of the Petitioner to put in those words in the petition was to prejudice the fair trial of the petition. We, therefore, allow CM. 1153 of 1975, to the extent of directing that ,the above-mentioned underlined words in the above-quoted sentences in the petition may be struck out. The striking out of the said objectionable words does not materially change the construction of the sentences in which they occur and no other consequential amendment in the petition is called for. CM. 1153 of 1975 stands disposed of in these terms.

36. On the merits of the controversy separate written statements, have been filed by Respondents Nos. 3 to 9, 11 to 13 and 16. In the. return of the Secretary to the Vidhan. Sabha (Respondent No. 3) various preliminary objections have been taken. It has been mainly contended that:

(i) the power and privilege, of a House of Legislature to expel its Members as a measure of punishment on the ground of an act or conduct, unbecoming of the Member and derogatory to the Speaker or Members) of the House is well-established, absolute and exclusive and is beyond question;

(ii) any matter touching the conduct of the Member and concerning the Speaker of the House can be examined, discussed and adjudged in. the House alone to which it relates;

(iii) no question other than that of constitutional existence of the powers, privileges and immunities of the House of Legislature can form the subject-matter of inquiry by the High Court;

(iv) it is not open to the Petitioner to aissail the vote of the Members of the House on the ground that his relations with the Chief Minister or with the Members of the House or of the Privileges Committee were strained, or because the members of the Committee of Privileges had poor academic qualifications or were inexperienced, or on the ground that any of the members did not exercise his right of vote independently;

(v) the vote of the House cannot possibly be described as mala fide nor can the resolution to expel the Petitioner resulting from such vote be assailed on the ground of malice;

(vi) the attack on the Chief Minister or any member of the Privileges Committee is wholly irrelevant as the expulsion of the Petitioner was the result of a unanimous vote of all the members of the House who were present at the time of the impugned decision;

(vii) the question whether the Petitioner was or was not afforded an opportunity of defending himself before the Committee of Privileges and before the House cannot be made the subject-matter of inquiry before the High Court;

(viii) the Legislature is supreme. The Speaker and Members of the Assembly are not subject to the jurisdiction of the Court and none of them can be summoned to answer the allegations made by the Petitioner in relation to the proceedings of the Privileges Committee or of the House or the resultant expulsion of the Petitioner from the House; and

(ix) the petition has not been presented bona fide.

On the merits, the pleas taken up by the Respondents are that the power and privilege to expel a Member of the House vested in the House of Commons as on January 26, 1950, and consequently vested in the Indian Legislatures, that the exercise of such power or privilege has nothing to do with the constitution of the House but is based on the power to punish a member for his misconduct, and inasmuch as there is no doubt about the existence or extent of the power of expulsion the jurisdiction of the High Court to look into the matter beyond that, that is on the basis of procedural or other errors is constitutionally barred. Respondent No. 4, the then Chief Minister of Haryana, in addition to the defence to the petition on same or similar grounds emphatically denied the charge of mala fides against him, and has prayed for the scandalous allegations made against him being struck out. Same is the position relating to the return of Shri Banarsi Dass Gupta, the then Irrigation Minister, Haryana, who was the Speaker of the Vidhan Sabha at the time of the passing of the impugned resolution, and is now the Chief Minister of the State. The pleas taken up in the written statements of the other Respondents do not require any separate mention The Petitioner did not address us at all on some of the grounds mentioned in his petition. I will be dealing with only those matters on which he addressed us after the reconstitution of the Bench.

37. Since the Advocate-General did not object to our hearing the Petitioner on the merits of his plea of mala fides subject to our decision on the preliminary legal issue on that point, we have heard the Petitioner at length on that issue as well.

38. Before dealing with the detailed arguments addressed by the parties on the legal issues raised by both sides, it appears to be necessary to notice the provisions of Articles 194 and 212 of the Constitution. Article 194 states:

(1) Subject to the provisions of this Constitution and to the rules and standing orders regulating, the procedure of the Legislature, there shall be freedom of speech in the legislature of every State.

(2) No member of the Legislature of a State shall be liable to any proceedings in any Court in respect of anything said Or any vote given by him in the Legislature or any committee there of, and no person shall be "so liable in respect of the publication by or under the authority of a House of such a Legislature or any report, paper, votes or proceedings.

(3) In other respects, the powers, privileges and immunities of House of the Legislature of a State, and of the members and the committees of a House of such Legislature, shall be such as may from time to time be defined by the Legislature by law, and, until so defined, shall be those of the House of Commons of the Parliament of the United Kingdom, and of its members and committees, at the commencement of this Constitution.

(4) The provisions of Clauses (1), (2) and (3) shall apply in relation to persons who by virtue of this Constitution have the right to speak in, and otherwise to take part in the proceedings of, a House of the Legislature of a State or any committee thereof as they apply in relation to members of that Legislature.

Article 212 reads as follows:

(1) The validity of any proceedings in the Legislature of a State shall not be called in question on the ground of any alleged irregularity of procedure.

(2) No officer or member of the Legislature of a State in whom powers are vested by or under this constitution for regulating procedure or the conduct of business, or for maintaining order, in the Legislature shall be subject to the jurisdiction of any Court in respect of the exercise by him of those powers.

39. From a plain reading of the above-quoted mandatory provisions and admitted facts it is clear and undisputed that:

(1) the Haryana Legislature has not enacted any law defining the powers, privileges and immunities of the House and its Members and Committees;

(2) in the admitted absence of such a law, as it referred to above, the powers, privileges and immunities of the Vidhan Sabha are those which were enjoyed by the House of Commons of the Parliament of the United Kingdom and its members and committees at the time of the commencement of the Constitution, subject to certain exceptions to which reference is hereinafter being made; and

(3) the proceedings of the Vidhan Sabha cannot be called in question on the grounds of a mere irregularity of procedure.

40. Before noticing the contentions of the Petitioner on which lengthy arguments have been, addressed by him it is pertinent to place on record the fact that the Petitioner has for obvious reasons expressly given up that part of his case which was based on Articles 14 and 19 of the Constitution. Had he not done so, the hearing of this petition would have been stayed till the revocation or expiry of the relevant proclamations issued by the President of India under Article 359 of the Constitution during the current emergency.

41. The first question that calls for decision is whether in the exercise of its powers under Article 226 of the Constitution this Court can at all question the legality, validity, propriety or bona fides of the impugned decision of the Vidhan Sabha expelling the Petitioner. The relevant portion of Article 226(1) of the Constitution is extracted below:

Every High Court shall have power to issue to any person or authority orders or writs for the enforcement of any of the rights conferred by Part III and for any other purpose.

The brood contention of the Petitioner is that the expression "authority" in Article 226(1) includes a House of Legislature in India even if the House is not considered to be "any person". He has sought to derive strength for this submission from the definition of the expression "the State" in Article 12 of the Constitution wherein it is provided that the expression "the State" includes (amongst others) the Legislature of each of the States and all local or other authorities. He had further argued that Clause 38 of the 44th Constitution Amendment Bill has clarified this position beyond doubt. In place of the words "for the enforcement of any of the rights conferred by Part III or for any other purpose" in the present Clause (1) of Article 226, the following three sub-clauses are being substituted by the amendment in question:

(a) for the enforcement of any of the rights conferred by the provisions of Part III; or

(b) for the redress of any injury of a substantial nature by reason of the contravention of any other provision of this Constitution or any provision of any enactment or Ordinance or any order, rule, regulation, bye-law or other instrument made thereunder; or

(c) for the redress of any injury by reason of any illegality in any proceedings by or before any authority under any provision referred to in Sub-clause (b) where such illegality has resulted in substantial failure of justice.

The argument of the Petitioner is that if Sub-clauses (b) and (c) are read together it leads to the inevitable conclusion that for the redress of "any injury" by reason of "any illegality in any proceedings" by or before any authority under any provision of any rule or regulation made under the Constitution or any other enactment or ordinance a writ would lie to the High Court. The words on which emphasis was laid by the Petitioner while addressing this argument, have been underlined by me. His submission is that "any authority" would include the State Legislature and "any rules" would include those framed by the Vidhan Sabha under Article 208 of the Constitution where such illegality has resulted in substantial failure of justice. We do not agree with the Petitioner that the scope of Article 226 has in any manner been enlarged by Section 38 of the Amendment Act either in respect of the persons to whom a writ can issue or in respect of the circumstances in which relief may be granted under that Article.

42. In any case, this limb of the Petitioners argument need not detain us in view of the law laid down by the Supreme Court in the U.P. Legislature case that at least in some circumstances a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution can be. filed against a State Legislature notwithstanding Article 194(3). The correct position in this respect is being discussed by me in a later portion of this judgment while dealing with the Petitioners precise argument regarding the jurisdiction of this Court for issuing writs or orders to the State Legislatures.

43. His next submission in this regard is that the writ jurisdiction of this Court is akin to that of the Courts in England, and inasmuch as the Courts in England can issue writs or directions to the House of Commons (for some restricted purposes), it cannot be denied that the powers of the High Courts in India are any lesser. Reference was made by the Petitioner to paragraphs 917 and 918 at page 467 of Halsburys Laws of England (Third Edition), Volume 28, which are reproduced below:

917. The position of the courts of law.--Each House claims to be the sole and exclusive judge of its awn privilege and of the extent of that privilege. In opposition to this claim the courts of law, while allowing the existence of privileges essential to the discharge of the functions of the two Houses, assert that they have judicial knowledge of the extent of privilege and that they are not bound by resolutions of either House declaratory of privileges; and they have maintained mainly in relation to the Commons that that are bound to decide questions coming before them which involve, contravention of the law of the land, even if privilege is concerned.

918. Limits of agreement regarding jurisdiction.--In spite of this dualism of jurisdiction, a large measure of agreement on the respective spheres of the two Houses and the courts has been reached, which has, since the mid-nineteenth century, prevented the direct conflict of earlier years.

Although the Houses have never directly admitted the claim of the courts of law to adjudicate on matters of privilege, they appear to recognise that neither House is by itself entitled to claim the supremacy which was enjoyed by the undivided Hindu Court of Parliament. Furthermore it is admitted by both Houses that neither House can by its own resolution claim a new privilege.

For their part the courts of law acknowledge that the control of each House over its own proceedings is absolute and not subject to judicial jurisdiction; and the courts of law will not interfere with the interpretation of a statute by either House so far as the proceedings of the House are concerned. Neither will the courts of law inquire into the reasons for which a person has been adjudged guilty of contempt and committed by either House, when the order or warrant upon which he has been arrested does not state the causes of his arrest; for in such cases it is presumed that the order or warrant has been duly issued unless the contrary appears upon the face of it.

44. The first English case to which our attention was invited by the Petitioner is Stockdale v. Hansard (1839) 9A E.I. The defence plea in an action for defaming the Plaintiff by imputing to him the publication of an obscene libel was that the documents in question had been printed by or under the orders of the House of Commons, and therefore, the grievance complained of being an act or order of the Commons, which is a Court superior to any Court of law and none of whose proceedings can be questioned in any way the action must fail. In the judgment of the Queens Bench Lord Denman, C.J., observed that the above-mentioned defence was a claim for an arbitrary power to authorise the commission of any act whatever on behalf of a body which in the same argument is admitted not to be the supreme power in the State. The learned Chief Justice further observed as below:

The supremacy of Parliament, the foundation on which the claim is made to rest, appears to me completely to overturn it, because the House of Commons is not the Parliament, but only a co-ordinate and component part of the Parliament. That sovereign power can make and unmake the laws; but the concurrence of the three legislative estates is necessary; the resolution of any one of them cannot alter the law, or place any one beyond its control. The proposition is, therefore, wholly untenable, and abhorrent to the first principles of the Constitution of England.

Patteson, J., agreed with Lord Denman, C.J., in answering in the negative the question whether an action at law will lie in any case for any act whatever admitted to have been done by the order and authority of the House of Commons. Dealing with the second question "whether a resolution of the House of Commons, declaring that it had power to do the act complained of, precludes the Court of Queens Bench from enquiring into the legality of that act", the learned Judge (Patteson, J.), made the following observations.--

As it has been shown that it is possible that the House, however unintentionally, may make illegal orders, and that, if it should do so, those who carry them into effect may be proceeded against by action at law, it follows that the Court in which such action is brought must, upon demurrer, enquire into the legality of those directory orders, and cannot be precluded from doing so by the mere fact of those orders having been made.

The proposition is certainly very startling, that any man, or body of men, however, exalted, except the three branches of the Legislature concurring, should, by passing a resolution that they have power to do an act illegal in itself, be able to bind all persons whatsoever, and preclude them from enquiring into the existence of that power and the legality of that act.

But, after all, there is nothing so mysterious in the law and custom of Parliament, so far at least as the rest of the community not within its walls is concerned, that this Court may not acquire a knowledge of it in the same manner as of any other branch of the law.

It is, indeed, quite true that the members of each House of Parliament are the sole Judges whether their privileges have been violated, and whether thereby any person has been guilty of a contempt of their authority; and so they must necessarily adjudicate on the extent of their privileges. All the cases respecting commitments by the House, mostly raised upon writs of habeas corpus, and collected in the arguments and judgments in Burdett v. Abbot (1811) 14 East 1, establish, at the most, only these points, that the House of Commons has power to commit for contempt; and that, when it has so committed any person, the Court cannot question the propriety of such commitment, or inquire whether the person committed had been guilty of a contempt of the House in the same manner as this Court cannot entertain any such questions, if the commitment be by any other Court having power to commit for contempt.

In the concluding portion of his judgment Patteson, J., held:

Upon the whole the true, doctrine appeals to me to be this: that every Court in which an action is brought upon a subject-matter generally and prima facie within its jurisdiction, and in which, by the course of the proceedings in that action, the powers and privileges and jurisdiction of another Court come into question, must of necessity determine as to the extent of those powers, privileges, and jurisdiction; that the decisions of that Court, whose powers, privileges, and jurisdiction are so brought into question, as to their extent, are authorities, and, if I may so say, evidences in law upon the subject, but not conclusive. In the present case, therefore, both upon principle and authority, I conceive that this Court is not precluded by the resolution of the House of Commons of May 1837 from inquiring into the legality of the act complained of, although we are bound to treat that resolution with all possible respect, and not by any means to come to a decision contrary to that resolution unless we find ourselves compelled to do so by the law of the land, gathered from the principles of the common law, so far as they are applicable to the case, and from the authority of decided cases, and the judgments of our predecessors, if any be found which bear upon the question.

I come then to the third question: whether the act complained of be legal or not. I do not conceal from myself that, in considering this point, the resolution of the House of Commons of 31st May, 1837, is directly called in question; but, for the reasons, I have already given, I am of opinion that this Court is not only competent, but bound, to consider the validity of that resolution, paying all possible respect, and giving all due weight, to the authority from which it emanates.

Little dale and Coleridge, JJ., having arrived at the same conclusion, the judgment of the Queens Bench was delivered for the Plaintiff who had brought the action for defamation.

45. The Petitioner also referred to the following passage in the Introduction, given by Keir and Lawson in their "Cases in Constitutional Low" Fourth Edition at page 125 on the subject of Parliamentary Privilege:

The combined effect of the decisions in Ashby v. White Patys case. Stockdale v. Hansard and the Case of the Sheriff of Middlesex is this. The courts deny to the Houses the right to determine the limits of their privileges, while allowing them within those limits exclusive jurisdiction. But the Houses have never expressly renounced the view that their claim to be judges of their, own privileges is a claim to judge both of breaches of their undoubted privileges, and of the very existence and limits of those privileges themselves. Moreover, although the courts do not and cannot recognise this claim directly, they are bound to give way whenever either of the Houses chooses to enforce it indirectly by committing the refractory litigant for contempt.

The cases of Paty and The Sheriff of Middlesex prove that the claim takes practical effect and is not merely brutum ful-men. And, by conceding to the Houses of Parliament in their capacity of superior courts the right of committing for contempt without causes shown, the Courts have really yielded the key of the fortress, by giving them the power of enforcing against the world at large their own views of the extent of their privileges.

Thus there may be at any given movement two doctrines of privilege, the one held by the courts, the other by either House, the one to be found in the Law Reports, the other in Hansard, and no way of resolving the real point at issue should conflict arise. For all practical purposes, however, a sufficient measure of tacit agreement has been reached to make the recurrence of such troubles unlikely.

46. The tacit agreement between the Parliament and the Courts in England referred to by Keir and Lawson in the above passage can best be described in the words used by Erskine, May in his treatise on the Law, Privileges, Proceedings, and Usage of Parliament Eighteenth (1971) Edition (hereinafter referred to as "May"> at page 197,--

In practice, however, there is a wide field of agreement on the nature and principles of privilege in spite of the apparent deadlock on the question of jurisdiction.

(1) It seems to be recognised that, for the purpose of adjudicating on questions of privilege, neither House is by itself entitled to claim the supremacy over the ordinary courts of justice which was enjoyed by the undivided High Court of Parliament. The supremacy of Parliament, consisting of the sovereign and two Houses, is a legislative supremacy which has nothing to do with the privilege jurisdiction of either House acting singly.

(2) It is admitted by both Houses that, since neither House can by itself add to the law, neither House can by its own declaration create a new privilege. This implies that privilege is objective and its extent ascertainable and reinforces the doctrine that it is known by the courts.

On the other hand, the courts admit:

(3) That the control of each House over its internal proceedings is absolute and cannot be interfered with by the courts.

(4) That a committal for contempt by either House is in practice within its exclusive jurisdiction, since the facts constituting the alleged contempt need not be stated on the warrant of committal.

47. The field of agreement is thus wide. With respect to rights exercisable within a House the jurisdiction of the House is complete; and it is in practice so with respect to rights exercisable outside a House in the principal way in which the Courts might come into contact with such rights, namely, in punishment for contempt or breach of privilege. The remaining opportunities for conflict with the courts are therefore, narrow.

In ultimate analysis May has stated at page 198 that "the Courts have always, at any rate in the last resort, refused to interfere in the application by the House of any of its recognised privileges."

48. Chaudhry Hardwari Lal also invited our attention to the-following passage in Wade and Phillips Constitutional Law (Sixth Edition) at page 144 in Chapter Ten relating to Privileges of Parliament:

The courts, while reluctant to enquire into the exercise of privilege, so far as it concerns the internal proceedings of either House or their relations with one another, will not admit of its extension at the expense of the rights of the" subject. For to do so would involve recognising that one House could change the law by its own resolution.

49. The last English case to which I need refer on this subject is of Bradlaugh v. (1884) 12 GLR 271. The Advocate General had relied on-the dictum of the Queens Bench in that case. According to the Petitioner the English Courts had retracted from the position taken up in Bradlaugh v. Gossett in a large number of subsequent decisions. The ratio of the judgment in Bradlaugh v. Gossett has, however, assumed importance for us in view of the fact that the same appears to have been approved by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in their recent judgment in Smt. Indira Nehru Gandhi v. Shri Raj Narain : A.I.R. 1975 SC 2299 [LQ/SC/1975/439] . The Queens Bench commented upon and approved the historic decision in Burdett v. Abbott 14 East 1448 and Stockdale v. Hansard 9 Ad. and E.I. and held that the House of Commons is not subject to the control of Her Majestys Courts in its administration of that part of that statute-law which has relation to its internal procedure only. It was observed that what is said or done within its walls cannot be inquired into in a Court of law. These are the words in which Lord Coleridge, C.J. approved of the dictum in Burdett v. Abbott (supra) and Stockdale v. Hansard (supra):

What is said or done within the walls of Parliament, cannot be inquired into in a court of law. On this point all the judges in the two great cases which exhaust the learning on the subject,--Burddet v. Abbott and Stockdale v. Hansard,--are agreed, and are emphatic. The jurisdiction of the Houses over their own members, their right to impose discipline within their walls, is absolute and exclusive. To use the words of Lord Ellenborough. They would sink into utter contempt and inefficiency without it.

The emphasis has been supplied by me to bring out clearly the fact that whatever may be said about the persons who are not members of a Legislature regarding their rights to question any action, decision or resolution of a Legislature (as was done in the U.P. Legislature case before the Supreme Court on reference by the President of India), the jurisdiction of a House of Legislature over its own members is absolute and unquestionable in Courts in the matter of imposition of discipline by the decision or resolution arrived at or adopted within the four walls of the House. The wisdom of the following question put by Stephen, J. to himself and the answer given by the learned Judge to the same in Bradlaughs case can best be appreciated by quoting the same in the Judges own language, from page 278 of the official report (the Law Reports):

The legal question which this statement of the case appears to me to raise for our decision is this:Suppose that the House of Commons forbids one of its members to do that which an Act of Parliament requires him to do, and, in order to enforce its prohibition, directs its executive officer to exclude him from the House by force if necessary, is such an order one which we can declare to be void and restrain the executive officer of the House from carrying out In my opinion, we have no such power. I think that the House of Commons is not subject to the control of Her Majestys Courts in its administration of that part of the statute-law which has relation to its own internal proceedings, and that the use of such actual force as may be necessary to carry into effect such a resolution as the one before us is justifiable.

50. The same learned Judge referred to the various previous decisions on the subject in the following passage (page 279 of the official report) in order to arrive at a conclusion that the House has exclusive jurisdiction in such matters:

Lord Denman says (1): "Whatever is done within the walls of either assembly must pass without question in any other place." Littledale, J., says (2): it is said the House of Commons is the sole judge of its own privileges; and so I admit as far as the proceedings in the House and some other things are concerned. Patteson, J., said (3): Beyond all dispute,, it is necessary that the proceedings of each House of Parliament should be entirely free and unshackled, that whatever is said or done in either House should not be liable to examination elsewhere. And Coleridge, J., said (4): That the House should have exclusive jurisdiction to regulate the course of its own proceedings, and animadvert upon any conduct there is violation of its rules or derogation from its dignity, stands upon the clearest grounds of necessity.

Reference was made by Stephen, J. to the resolution of the House to exclude a member being immune from any attack on it in a Court in the following words:

The resolution to exclude him from the House is a thing done within the walls of the House to use Lord Denmans words. It is one of those proceedings in the House of which the House of Commons is the sole Judge to use the words of Littledale, J. It is a proceeding of the House of Commons in the House and must therefore, in the words of Patteson, J., be entirely free and unshackled. It is part of the course of its own proceedings, to use the words of Coleridge, J., and is therefore subject to its exclusive jurisdiction. These authorities are so strong and simple that there may be some risk of weakening them in adding to them.

51. I will refer to the Indian cases on the subject in, so far as possible, chronological order. In Raj Narain Singh v. Armaram Govind and Anr. : A.I.R. 1954 All 319, [LQ/AllHC/1953/134] the resolution of the U.P. Legislature suspending the Petitioner till the Sitting of the House had been questioned in a writ petition under Article 226 on the ground that the resolution was void arid the order passed upon it by the Speaker was un-constitutional. The validity of the reference to the Committee of Privileges was also questioned on various-grounds. The Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court, while dismissing the writ petition, inter alia, held:

(i) Even an erroneous decision by the Speaker or the House in respect of a breach of privilege cannot be the subject matter of scrutiny by a Court of law. Finality attaches where under cover of it no new privilege is created by the House to a decision of the House in respect of a matter relating to its privileges. "This Court is not, in any sense whatever a Court of appeal or revision against the Legislature or against the rulings of the Speaker who, as the holder of an office of the highest distinction, has the sole responsibility cast upon him of maintaining the prestige and dignity of the House...

(ii) It is right and proper that judicial authorities should be free from criticism so far as their judicial work is concerned in the State Legislature or Parliament. Correct etiquette therefore requires that the judiciary on its part too should refrain from comments in regard to a matter which was exclusively within the jurisdiction and authority of the Speaker and the State Legislature....

(iii) Both the Speaker and the other officers (of the Legislative Assembly) are protected from scrutiny by a Court of law for what was done in the House...

(iv) As I have indicated there are good reasons why this Court should not interfere with the mode in which the Legislature conducts its internal affairs. In the ultimate analysis, it is as was hinted by Lord Coleridge C.J. in Bradlaugh v. Gossett (supra) in an assiduous education of the tremendous forces generated by a vast electorate that remedies against real or supposed highhandedness on the part of any particular legislature lies. With all those matters which are of a political nature, this Court has no concern.

52. In M.S.M. Sharma v. Sri Krishna Sinha and Ors. : A.I.R. 1959 SC 395, [LQ/SC/1958/164] a Bench of five Honble Judges dealt with the case popularly known as the Searchlight case. M.S.M. Sharma (hereinafter referred to as Sharma), the Editor of the Searchlight, published in the issue of his newspaper, dated May 31, 1957 a report of the speech made by Shri Maheshwar Prasad Narayan Singh, a Congress Member of the Assembly, delivered by him in the Bihar State Legislature on May 30, 1957, under the heading "Bitterest Attack on Chief Minister". On June 10, 1957, Nawal Kishore Sinha, M.L.A., gave notice to the Secretary of the Legislature to the effect that he wanted to raise a question of breach of privilege of the House to the effect that despite portions of Shri Maheshwar Prasad Narayan Sinhas speech having been expunged, the Searchlight had published the entire speech including the expunged portions and had thereby committed breach of the privilege of the House. The motion to refer the matter to the Privileges Committee of the House was carried on June 10, 1957. The Committee of Privileges did not take up the matter for consideration till the matter was raked up again in the House in June, 1958. On August 10, 1958, the Committee issued a show-cause notice to the 4 Editor, Printer and Publisher of the Searchlight. On the receipt of the show-cause notice Sharma apprehended adverse results, and, therefore, moved the Patna High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution for restraining and prohibiting the Privileges Committee of the Legislature from proceeding further with the inquiry referred to above. On September 1, 1958, Sharma withdrew his petition from the High Court with a view to avail of the fundamental right guaranteed to him under Article 32 of the Constitution. Thereafter he filed his petition under Article 32 in the Supreme Court on September 5, 1958. The Supreme Court held that in view of the clear provision made in Article 194(3) it was incorrect to deny to the Indian Legislature any power, privilege and immunity after finding that the House of Commons had the power, privilege and immunity in question at the relevant time and that adopting such a course would not amount to interpreting the Constitution, but to re-making it.

53. On the question of jurisdiction of the Court, the Supreme Court observed as under:

(i) It must not be overlooked that the provisions of Article 105(3) and Article 194(3) are constitutional laws and not ordinary laws made by Parliament or the State Legislatures and that, therefore, they are as supreme as the provisions of Part III. Further, quite conceivably ova: Constitution makers, not knowing what powers, privileges and immunities Parliament or the Legislature of a State may arrogate and claim for its Houses, members or committees, thought fit not to take any risk and accordingly make such laws subject to the provisions of Article 12; but that knowing; and being satisfied with the reasonableness of the powers, privileges and immunities of the House of Commons at the commencement of the Constitution, they did not, in their wisdom, think fit to make such powers, privileges and immunities subject to the fundamental right conferred by Article 19(1)(a)... we prefer to express no opinion as to whether there has, in fact, been any breach of the privilege of the House, for of that the House alone is the judge (paragraph 32)...

If the Legislative Assembly of Bihar has the powers and privileges it claims and is entitled to take proceedings for breach thereof, as we hold it is, then it must be left to the House itself to determine whether there has, in fact, been any breach of its privilege (Paragraph 34).

After the judgment of the Supreme Court in the above-mentioned petition (writ petition No. 122 of 1958) of Sharma under Article 32 was announced, he filed another writ petition (No. 106 of 1959) which he later withdrew. In the meantime, the Committee of Privileges of the Assembly gave notice to the Petitioner whereupon he filed a third petition in the Supreme Court (petition under Article 32 of the Constitution No. 176 of 1959). The decision by which that petition was disposed of by their Lordships of the Supreme Court is reported in M.S.M. Sharma v. Dr. Shree Krishna Sinha and Ors. : A.I.R. 1960 SC 1186 [LQ/SC/1960/166] . A Bench of eight Honble Judges held (at pages 1190-1191) that "no Court can go into those questions which are within the special jurisdiction of the Legislature itself, which has the power to conduct its own business. It was further observed as below:

It must also be observed that once it has been held that the Legislature has the jurisdiction to control the publication of its proceedings and to go into the question whether there has been any breach of its privileges, the Legislature is vested with complete jurisdiction to carry on its proceedings in accordance with its rules of business. Even though it may not have strictly complied with the requirements of the procedural law laid down for conducting its business, that cannot be a ground for interference by this Court under Article 32 of the Constitution. Courts have always recognised the basic difference between complete want of jurisdiction and improper or irregular exercise of jurisdiction. Mere non-compliance with rules of procedure cannot be a ground for issuing a writ under Article 32 of the Constitution: vide Janardhan Reddy v. State of Hyderabad : 1951 S.C.R. 344 : AIR 1951 Supreme Court 217.

54. The Petitioner has placed great reliance on various observations made by a Bench of seven Honble Judges of the Supreme Court in their Lordships opinion under Article 143 of the Constitution of India in the matter of Special Reference No. 1 of 1964. : AIR 1965 SC 745 [LQ/SC/1964/251] (referred to in this judgment as the U.P. Legislature case). The facts giving rise to that case were these: Keshav Singh, who was not a Member of the Assembly, was proceeded against by the Assembly for contempt and breach of privilege because of a pamphlet which was printed and published by him. In those proceedings a resolution was passed by the House on March 14, 1964, in pursuance of which the Speaker of the Assembly directed that Keshav Singh be committed to prison for committing another contempt of the House by his conduct in the House when he was summoned to receive the reprimand for the contempt committed by issuing the pamphlet, and also for his having written a disrespectful letter to the Speaker. In execution of the warrant issued in pursuance of the said order Keshav Singh was detained in the District Jail, Lucknow. On March 19, 1964, Mr. B. Solomon, an Advocate of the Allahabad High Court, presented a petition to that Court on behalf of Keshav Singh for the issuance of a writ in the nature of habeas corpus. The Speaker, the Chief Minister and the Superintendent of the Jail were impleaded as Respondents in the writ petition. The Court passed an order directing the release of Keshav Singh on bail on furnishing two sureties. The petition was admitted and notice was ordered to issue to the Respondents therein. When the Government Advocate asked for certain instructions (including an appropriate affidavit of the concerned persons) to enable him to file a return, the U.P. Assembly proceeded to take action against the two learned Judges who had ordered the release of Keshav Singh on bail as well as against Keshav Singh and his Advocate. On March 21, 1964, the Assembly passed a resolution to the effect that the two Judges, Keshav Singh and his Advocate had committed contempt of the House and ordered Keshav Singh being taken into custody to undergo his remaining term of imprisonment under the earlier order and directed the Judges and the Advocate to be brought in custody before the House. Keshav Singh was further directed to appear before the House after undergoing his remaining sentence of imprisonment to face the charge of having committed a second contempt by approaching the High Court on March 19, 1964. The two Judges thereupon filed a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution impugning the resolution passed by the House on the ground that it was wholly unconstitutional and violated the provisions of Article 211 of the Constitution. The contention of the Judges was that the resolution passed by the Assembly amounted to contempt of the High Court and since it was wholly without jurisdiction, it should be set aside and its implementation stayed by an interim order. The Speaker, the Vidhan Sabha and the State of U.P. were impleaded as Respondents to that petition. A Full Bench of 28 Judges of the Allahabad High Court took up the petition of the two Judges, admitted it and ordered the issue of notices against the Respondents restraining the Speaker from issuing the warrant in pursuance of the direction of the House given on March 21, 1964", and from securing execution of the warrant if already issued and restraining the State Government and the Marshal of the House from executing the said warrant. The Advocate had in the meantime filed a separate petition for almost the same type of relief though he impleaded as many as seven Respondents in his case. On March 25, 1964, the Full Bench admitted the petition of the Advocate and passed an interim order prohibiting the implementation of the resolution the validity of which had been challenged before them. Oh the same day (March 25, 1964) the Assembly passed another resolution wherein it was resolved that the question of contempt of the House by the two Judges and the Advocate etc., may be decided after giving an opportunity of explanation to the persons named in the original resolution of March 20, 1964. As a result of the second resolution the warrants issued for the arrest of the two learned Judges and the Advocate were with drawn. It Was in the above circumstances that the President of India decided to exercise his power to make a reference under Article 143(1) of the Constitution to the Supreme Court on, March 26, 1964. Out of the various questions raised before the Court in the said reference, question No. (4) was framed by the Court in the following terms:

Whether, on the facts and circumstances of the case, it was competent for the Full Bench of the High Court of Uttar Pradesh to entertain and deal with the petitions of the said two Honble Judges and Mr. B. Solomon, Advocate, and to pass interim orders restraining the Speaker of the Legislative Assembly of Uttar Pradesh and other Respondents to the said petitions from implementing the aforesaid direction of the said Legislative Assembly.

The above-mentioned question was answered in the Courts unanimous opinion in the affirmative. Gajendragadkar, C.J., who wrote the main opinion, gave the following answer to the question:

On the facts and circumstances of the case, it was competent for the Full Bench of the High Court of Uttar Pradesh to entertain and deal with the petitions of the said two Honble Judges and Mr. B. Solomon, Advocate, and to pass interim orders restraining the Speaker of the Legislative Assembly of Uttar Pradesh and other Respondents to the said petitions from implementing the aforesaid direction of the said Legislative Assembly.

In rendering the above-mentioned answer the Supreme Court specifically prefixed it with the observation that the answer is confined to cases in relation to contempt alleged to have been committed by a citizen who is not a Member of the House outside the four walls of the legislative chamber. The answer returned to question No. (4) does not, therefore, relate to contempt proceedings against a member of the House, but only to proceedings against non-Members, and cannot, therefore, be said to be of any direct avail to the Petitioner.

55. Since however the Petitioner has forcefully placed reliance on the following passage in the opinion of the Supreme Court in the U.P. Legislature case, I may quote the same verbatim:

Let us first take Article 226. This Article confers very wide powers on every High Court throughout the territories in relation to which it exercise jurisdiction to issue to any person or authority, including in appropriate cases any Government, within those territories directions, orders or writs including writs in the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto, certiorari, or any of them for the enforcement of any of the rights conferred by Part III and for any other purpose. It is hardly necessary to emphasise that the language used by Article 226 in conferring power on the-High Courts is very wide. Article 12 defines the State as including the Legislature of such State, and so, prima facie the power conferred on the High Court under Article 226(1) can, in a proper case, be exercised even against the Legislature. If an application is made to the High Court for the issue of a writ of habeas corpus, it would not be competent to the House to raise a preliminary objection that the High Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the application because the detention is by an order of the House. Article 226(1) read by itself, does not seem to permit such a plea to be raised.

56. What is stated above was the answer to the question posed by Gajendragadkar, C.J. in paragraph 28 of the Courts opinion. That question was worded as follows:

Is the House the sole and exclusive judge of the issue as to whether its contempt has been committed where the alleged contempt has taken place outside the four-walls of the House Is the House the sole and exclusive judge of the punishment which should be imposed on the party whom it has found to be guilty of its contempt And, if in enforcement of its decision the House issues a general or unspeak-ing warrant, is the High Court entitled to entertain a habeas corpus petition challenging the validity of the detention of the person sentenced by the House

It was, of course, conceded before the Supreme Court that the House has the power to inquire whether its contempt had been committed by any one even outside its four-walls and has the power to impose punishment for such contempt. All that was contested was whether it would or would not be open to the House to make a claim that its general warrant should be treated as conclusive, it is, therefore, significant that the main issue on which the Supreme Court was called upon to give its opinion and on which it dwelt at length related to the power of the High Court to examine the unspeaking and general warrant issued by a State Assembly in the course of adjudicating upon a habeas corpus petition in order to find out whether the House has or has not the power to punish the Petitioner. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court referred to the two exceptions to their jurisdiction recognised by the English Courts in favour of the Parliament, namely, (a) the exclusive jurisdiction over the internal proceedings of the House and (b) the right of either House of the Parliament to punish for its contempt (paragraph 83 of the opinion) and also to the tacit agreement between the Courts on the one hand and the Parliament on the other (in paragraph 86 of the opinion) to which I have already referred from May. The contention advanced on behalf of the U.P. Legislature that the construction placed by the House on any provision of the Constitution was itself final was rejected by their Lordships and it was held that the decision about the construction of Article 194(3) must ultimately rest with the judicature of the country. The nature, scope and effect of the power of the House, held the Supreme Court, will be determined by the Courts and not by the House (paragraph 42 of the opinion). Distinction was drawn between the sovereignty claimed by the Parliament in England and the position of the Indian Parliament and it was held that the sovereignty claimed by the British Parliament cannot be claimed by any Legislature in India in the literal absolute sense, since there is no written Constitution in England and there is one in India (paragraph 41 of the opinion). It was, however, granted to the House in paragraph 32 of the opinion that the freedom of vote and freedom of speech within the House is absolute and unfettered and that no Court can examine how the vote has been exercised and whether any speech delivered in the House violates any law of the land. In paragraph 62, it was laid down that the validity of the proceedings of the Legislature can be questioned in the High Court on the ground of unconstitutionality and illegality but not on the ground of irregularity of procedure. This is what their Lordship precisely held in that behalf while considering the effect of Article 212(1) of the Constitution:

Article 212(1) seems to make it possibly for a citizen to call in question in the appropriate Court of law the validity of any proceedings inside the Legislative Chamber if his case is that the said proceedings suffer not from mere irregularity of procedure, but from an illegality. If the impugned procedure is illegal and unconstitutional, it would be open to be scrutinised in a court of law, though such scrutining is prohibited if the complaint against the procedure is no more than this that the procedure was, irregular.

This view has not been approved in Shrimati Indira Nehru Gandhis case (infra).

57. Dealing with the inviolability of a general warrant issued by-a House in India, their Lordships observed (paragraph 125 of the opinion):

There is no doubt that the House has the power to punish for contempt committed outside its chamber, and from that point of view it may claim one of the rights possessed by a Court of Record. A Court of Record, according to Jawitts Dictionary of English Law, is a court whereof the acts and judicial proceedings are enrolled for a perpetual memory and testimony, and which has power to fine and imprison for contempt of its authority. The House, and indeed all the Legislative Assemblies in India, never discharged any judicial functions and their historical and constitutional background does not support the claim that they can be regarded as Courts of Record in any sense. If that be so, the very basis on which the English Courts agreed to treat general warrant issued by the House of Commons on the footing that it was warrant issued by superior Court of Record, is absent in the present case, and so, it would be unreasonable to contend that the relevant power to claim a conclusive character for the general warrant which, the House of Commons, by agreement, is deemed to possess, is vested in the House. On this view of the matter, the claim made by the House must be rejected.

In the same strain, it was further observed (in paragraph 128 of the opinion) that:

It would indeed be strange that the judicature should be authorised to consider the validity of the legislative acts of our Legislatures, but should be prevented from scrutinising the validity of the action of the legislatures trespassing on the fundemental rights conferred on the citizens. If the theory that the general warrant should be treated as conclusive is accepted, then, as we have already indicated, the basic concept of judicial independence would be exposed to very grave jeopardy; and so the impact of Article 211 on the interpretation of Article 194(3) in respect of this particular power is again decisively against the contention raised by the House.

58. The most important passage in the U.P. Legislature case which goes in favour of the Petitioner, is in paragraph 132 of the opinion and is couched in the following language:

It is hardly necessary to emphasise that in the enforcement of fundemental rights guaranteed to the citizens the legal profession plays a very important and vital role, and so, just as the right of the Judicature to deal with matters brought before them under Article 226 or Article 32 cannot be subjected to the powers and privileges of the House under Article 194(3), so the rights of the citizens to move the Judicature and the rights of the advocates to assist that process must remain uncontrolled by Article 194(3). That is one integrated scheme for enforcing the fundemental rights and for sustaining the rule of law in this country. Therefore, our conclusion is that the particular right which the House claims to be an integral part of its power or privilege is inconsistent with the material provisions of the Constitution and cannot be deemed to have been included under the latter part of Article 194(3).

59. The Petitioner lastly relied on the following observations contained in paragraph 138 of the opinion:

We ought to make it clear that we are dealing with the question of jurisdiction and are not concerned with the propriety or reasonableness of the exercise of such jurisdiction. Besides in the case of a superior Court of Record, it is for the court to consider whether any matter falls within its jurisdiction or not. Unlike a court of limited jurisdiction, the superior Court is entitled to determine for itself questions about its own jurisdiction. Prima facie, says Halsbury, no matter is deemed to be beyond the jurisdiction of a superior court unless it is expressly shown to be so, while nothing is within the jurisdiction of an inferior court unless it is expressly shown on the face of the proceedings that the particular matter is within the cognizance of the particular court.

60. Since the view taken on certain salient features of the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution in Sharmas case (Searchlight case) on the one hand, and in the opinion delivered by the Supreme Court in the U.P. Legislature case on the other, is not completely reconcilable, an argument was raised by the Petitioner to the effect that even if what was held in paragraph 32 of Sharmas case (supra) be not considered to be obiter dicta the same should be held to have been impliedly overruled by their Lordships opinion in the U.P. Legislature case. On the other hand, it was submitted by the learned Advocate-General that what was held in Sharmas case is law laid down by the Supreme Court and is binding on every-one under Article 141 of the Constitution, but the opinion of the Supreme Court is not covered by Article 141 and does not, therefore, bind any one. It appears to be appropriate to deal with and dispose of this question at this very stage. The judgment of the Supreme Court in Sharmas first case was delivered by a Bench of five Judges. Seven Honble Judges of the Court were parties to the opinion given in the U.P. Legislature case. If both were judgments strictu sensu and can be held to be laying down law within the meaning of Article 141 of the Constitution, it is the opinion in the U.P. Legislature case which will supersede and impliedly overruled anything not consistent therewith which may have been decided in Sharmas first case according to the guidance given by their Lordships themselves in such matters in Mattulal v. Radhe Lal A.I.R. 1974 S.C. 196, Union of India and Anr. v. K.S. Subramonian 1976 (2) SLR 519 [LQ/SC/1976/247] , and The State of U.P. v. Ram Chandra Trivedi 1976 (2) SLR 859 [LQ/SC/1976/311]

61. The contention of the Petitioner has throughout been that the opinion expressed and given by the Supreme Court under Article 143 of the Constitution is as much law laid down for purposes of Article 141 of the Constitution as is the judgment of their Lordships in any litigation. In support of his contention, the Petitioner has relied on the following cases:

(i) Syed Abdul Mansur Habibullah v. The Speaker West Bengal Legislative Assembly and Ors. : A.I.R. 1966 Cal 363 [LQ/CalHC/1965/51] ( paragraph 6);

(ii) Yeshwant Rao Meghawale v. Madhya Pradesh Legislative Assembly and Ors. : A.I.R. 1967 M.P. 95 at 98 and 99 (paragraph 10 and 11);

(iii) Chhabildas Mehta M.L.A. and Ors. v. The Legislative Assembly, Gujarat State and Ors. 1970 GLR 729 741 paragraph 4) and;

(iv) Shrimati Indira Nehru Gandhi v. Shri Raj Narain : A.I.R. 1975 S.C. 2299, paragraph 130 (at page 2344) paragraph 553 (at page 2435) paragraph 571 (at page 2441) and paragraph 594 at page 2499).

62. In Syed Abdul Mansur Habibullahs case (supra) (18), all that the learned Judge of the Calcutta High Court said in paragraph 6 of his judgment was that he was in respectful agreement with the "majority" opinion delivered by the Supreme Court. Being in respectful agreement of the opinion does not by itself amount to holding that the opinion was binding on the High Court under Article 141.

63. Similarly, the question does not appear to have been directly dealt with in paragraphs 10 and 11 of Yeshwant Raos case. It was only said therein that it was pertinent to refer to the "observations" of the Supreme Court in the U.P. Legislature case which was quoted therein and then followed.

64. Bhagwati, C.J. (as he then was) did observe in the course of the judgment prepared by him for the Gujarat High Court in Chhabildas Mehtas casa as below:

It is no doubt true that the majority opinion was expressed by the Supreme Court in its advisory jurisdiction under Article 143 but we do not see why on that account it ceases to be law declared by the Supreme Court within the meaning of Article 141. The Constitution has conferred diverse jurisdictions on the Supreme Court. There is the original jurisdiction under Article 131 : then there is the appellate jurisdiction under Articles 132, 133, 134 and 136; there is also writ jurisdiction under Article 32 : and lastly, there is advisory jurisdiction under Article 143. A point of law may arise for consideration in any of these jurisdictions and where such point of law is considered and the Supreme Court expresses what in its considered view is the correct position in regard to such point of law, it is clearly and indubitably a declaration of law by the Supreme Court. It is not material which jurisdiction provides the occasion for declaration of law. Whatever be the jurisdiction, when law is expounded by the Supreme Court, it is declared. The word declared in Article 141 must be given its plain natural meaning and so construed, it has a wide connotation. It is not limited by the requirement that there should be a decision in a lis inter parties.

65. The learned Advocate-General contended, on the other hand, that their Lordships of the Supreme Court have themselves held in clear terms that the answers returned by them to the questions posed before the Court in the reference in the U.P. Legislature case were not binding on any one. In paragraph 38 of the opinion, their Lordships held that "it may be that technically, the advisory opinion rendered by this Court on the Reference made to it by the President may not amount to judicial adjudication properly so-called and since there are no parties as such before the Court in the Reference, no-body would be bound by our answers." Distinction was drawn by their Lordships between an adjudication and an opinion. While overruling Mr. Seervais argument that the question of determining the nature, scope and effect of the powers of the House could not be said to lie exclusively within the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, they further said:

This conclusion, however, would not impair the validity of Mr. Seervais contention that the advisory opinion rendered by us in the present reference proceedings is not adjudication properly so-called and would bind no parties as such.

66. After carefully considering the contentions of both sides on this point, I am inclined to agree respectfully with the observations of Bhagwati, C.J. of the Gujarat High Court in Chhabildas Mehtas case in this respect. Even if it could be held that the opinion expressed by the Supreme Court under Article 143 of the Constitution is not "law declared" by the Supreme Court within the meaning of Article 141 and would, therefore, not be binding on all the Courts by operation of Article 141, the opinion of their Lordships would, I respectfully think, be in any case binding on all the High Courts and lower Courts in India unless there is a direct judgment of the Supreme Court to the contrary on any particular point either by a. larger Bench of the Supreme Court or after considering the relevant, part of the opinion.

67. Once again picking up the thread in the chain of Indian cases relating to the jurisdiction of the High Courts in the matter of resolutions of State Legislatures, it was held fey a learned Single Judge of the Calcutta High Court in Syed Abdul Mansur Habibullah v. The Speaker, West bengal Legislative Assembly and Ors. : A.I.R. 1966, Cal 363 at page 367 (paragraph 6) (supra), following the opinion of the Supreme Court in the U.P Legislature case that if it can be established that the proceedings inside the legislative chamber had become illegal or unconstitutional by reason of the happenings stated in the petition under Article 226, the High Court is competent to issue the mandate as prayed for. The question arose before the Calcutta High Court on a petition for a writ of mandamus filed by a member of the West Bengal Legislative Assembly against the Speaker and Deputy Speaker of the Assembly directing them to forbear and refrain from presiding over or guiding or conducting the business of the Assembly and also for directing the Assembly to refrain from conducting any business until such time as the Assembly be properly begun, and also for a declaration that the proceedings of the Assembly in so far as pretented to be held from February 8, 1965, be declared to be void, illegal and of no effect as the said Assembly had not legally begun. Nothings was found by the Calcutta High Court on the merits of the petition under Article 226 of the Constitution which was accordingly dismissed.

68. In Yeshwant Rao Meghwale v. Madhya Pradesh Legislative Assembly and Ors. : A.I.R. 1967 M.P. 95 at page 98 and 99 (paragraph 10 and 11) (supra) it was held by the Division Bench of the Madhya Pradesh High Court that since the Legislative Assembly has the power and privilege of expelling a member, the Correctness, legality or propriety of the resolution expelling the member cannot be challenged in Courts of law, and the High Court can be a judge only of the existence of the privilege or power claimed by the House qua the subsistence of such a power in the Commons in January, 1950, but once such a privilege is found to exist it is for the House to judge the occasion and the manner of its exercise. The Madhya Pradesh High Court further held that the Court cannot interfere with an erroneous decision by the House or its Speaker and that the right or privilege of the Legislature under Article 194(3) can be cut down only if it is necessary to do so for reconciling that Article with other provisions of the Constitution.

69. In State of Punjab v. Satya Pal Dang and Ors. : A.I.R. 1969 S.C. 903, the Supreme Court held that the ruling of the Speaker in the Punjab Legislative Assembly based on the wrong assumption of the date of prorogation and after the relevant ordinance, was not correct and the re-summoning of the Legislature after promulgation of the Ordinance was perfectly valid. The question then arose whether the invalid ruling of the Speaker, based on wrong assumption could be called in question before the High Court in the writ petition from the decision of which the State had gone up in appeal to the Supreme Court. That question was answered by the Supreme Court in the affirmative. As the Ordinance, which was a valid law binding on the Assembly as well as the Speaker, had already come into force, the Speaker was powerless and the adjournment of the session by him without taking the mandate of the Assembly by majority as required by Section 3 of the Ordinance was null and void and of no effect. The dictum of the Supreme Court in Satya Pal Dongs case does not appear to me to be relevant for purposes of deciding whether the resolution of a House of Legislature punishing its own member for contempt of the House is open to question "before a Court of law or not. No question of interpretation, application or validity of any law, Act or Ordinance arises in the instant case. That the ruling of a Speaker of a House which is found to "be contrary to a statute binding on the Speaker can be questioned in writ proceedings does not by itself answer the question whether punishment for contempt imposed by a House on its own member can or cannot be impugned in a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution.

70. In Jai Singh Rathi and Ors. v. State of Haryana : A.I.R. 1970 P&H 379, a Full Bench of this Court (Mehar Singh, C.J., and Harbans Singh and Mahajan JJ., as they then word) held as follows:

Article 227 gives superintendence to this Court over all courts and tribunals within its territorial jurisdiction, but the Haryana Legislative Assembly is neither a Court nor a-tribunal subordinate to the Court over which it has jurisdiction of superintendence according to that article. The power of Mr. Speaker to regulate the procedure or the conduct of business in the House or for maintaining order in it is immune from the jurisdiction of this Court, under Clause (2) of Article 212. Same or similar immunity is also available to other officers of a State Legislature,, such as its Secretary. So Mr. Speaker and the Secretary of the Haryana Legislative Assembly are unnecessary parties to this petition. No relief has been claimed against them--neither has filed any return to this petition. Although these two preliminary objections on the side of the Respondents have merit, there still remains for consideration the main controversy in this petition.

It was further held in that case that the High Court cannot question the proceedings of the Legislature on the ground of non-observance of procedure laid down in the rules framed by the Assembly. The learned Judges also observed that the House can punish its members by the use of its inherent power as the powers and privileges of the Assembly under Article 194(3) are complete and are not controlled by the rules made under Article 208.

71. The main reliance of the Petitioner on the point in issue has been on the judgment of the Division Bench of the Gujarat High Court in Chhabildas Mehtas case (supra) (20). It was held in that case that the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 extended to all persons and authorities including Houses of Legislature and that the privileges of the House of Commons regarding regulation of its internal proceedings cannot be read in Article 226 which is a stranger to constitutional paramountcy of Article 226. It was on that basis that the learned Judges observed that no provision enacted in law can exclude its jurisdiction, and that, therefore, the decision of a legislative House is not immune from scrutiny of Court even in, respect of its internal proceedings, though mere irregularities are afforded complete protection., It was held that the Court can interfere under Article 226 if the proceedings suffer from lack of power. The contention of the learned Advocate-General is that the: law relating to jurisdiction of the High Court laid down by the Gujarat; High Court has been too-widely stated and that if it is not read subject to the limitations urged by him, we should hold that the case has not been correctly decided on that point. One of the important observations made in the Gujarat case is quoted below:

We may point out that quite apart from the authority of the Supreme Court in the Presidential Reference, even on first principle it is not possible to accept the proposition that the House is the sole and exclusive Judge of its privileges and the Court has no jurisdiction to determine their istence or extent.

(Emphasis supplied by me).

There is no quarrel with the above proposition so far as it goes. The Petitioner has further relied on the following passages in the Gujarat case:

(i) But save and except in cases falling within provisions of this kind (procedural defects made immune under Article 212 of the Constitution), the absolute and unrestricted jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 must extend to all persons and authorities including the House and if the House has taken any action which is beyond its power or plainly contrary to law, the High Court would have power to examine the legality and validity of such action at the instance of an aggrieved party. That would be merely one more instance of exercise of power conferred upon the High Court under Article 226 to maintain the rule of law. The question is whether the privilege in Bradlaugh v. Gossett can fit in appropriately in this scheme of the Constitution. The privilege gives to the House the exclusive power to interpret the laws so far as the regulation of its internal proceedings is concerned and makes it the sole Judge of the lawfulness of its proceedings. * * *

* * *

Such a privilege would nullify the provisions of Article 226 in respect of this limited though it be. If that lie so, can it be said that this privilege is consistent with the basic principle underlying Constitution and its material provisions Such a privilege would clearly be a stranger in our Constitution and we do not think it can legitimately be read in Article 194(3).

(ii) We are, therefore, of the view that the privilege in Bradlaugh v. Gossett though enjoyed by the House of Commons at the commencement of the Constitution does not vest in the House or the Legislature under Article 194(3) and does not give immunity to the House from scrutiny of the Court even in respect of its internal proceedings. Of course, if there is any irregularity in the proceedings, Article 212(1) affords complete protection and the High Courts jurisdiction is excluded but if the proceeding suffers from lack of power or plain agregious violation of the law, the High Court would have power to interfere with it in the exercise of its undoubted jurisdiction under Article 226, as did the Supreme Court in Satyapals case, A.I.R. 1969 S.C. 910.

72. Mr. C.D. Dewan, the learned Advocate-General has ultimately referred to the following passage in the latest judgment of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Smt. Indira Nehru Gandhi v. Shri Raj Narain (supra) A.I.R. 1975 S.C. 130 (at page) paragraph 553 (at page 2435) paragraph 571 (at page 2441) and paragraph 594 at page 2499, and has contended on the strength thereof that anything inconsistent therewith contained in the opinion of the Supreme Court in the U.P. Legislature case or in any judgment of the High Courts must be deemed to have been impliedly overruled thereby:

(i) When a member is excluded from participating in the proceedings of the House, that is a matter concerning Parliament and the grievance of exclusion is in regard to proceedings within the walls of Parliament. In regard to rights to be exercised within the walls of the House the House itself is the judge. See Mays Parliamentary Practice 18th Ed. pp. 82-83, (1884) 12 QBD 271 at p. 285.

286. (Paragraph 69 at page 2321).

(ii) In Bradlaugh v. Gossett, (supra) Bradlaugh claimed to make affirmation instead of taking, the oath. He was permitted to make the affirmation subject to any liability by statute, and took his seat. Upon an action for penal ties it was decided finally by the House of Lords, that Bradlaugh had not qualified himself to sit by making the affirmation. On re-election, he attempted to take the-oath, but was prevented by order of the House which eventually directed the Serjeant to exclude him from the House until he undertook to create no further disturbance. Bradlaugh then brought an action against the Serjeant in order to obtain a declaration that the order of the House was beyond the power and jurisdiction of the House and void, and an order restraining the Serjeant at Arms from preventing Bradlaugh by force from entering the House. It was held that the Court had no power to restrain the executive officer of the House from carrying out the order of the House. The reason is that the House is not subject to the control of the Courts in the administration of the internal proceedings of the House.

(Emphasis supplied by me). (Paragraph 70 at pages 2321.22).

(iii) The second ground of challenge that there was no valid session of the House cannot be accepted for the reasons given above. It has also, to be stated that it is not open to the Respondent to challenge the orders of detention collaterally. The principle is that what is directly forbidden cannot be indirectly achieved. (Paragraph 87 at page 2324).

(iv) Further it is provided in Clause (1) of Article 122 that the validity of any proceedings in Parliament shall not be called in question on the ground of any alleged irregularity of procedure. All this would show that the framers of the Constitution were anxious to ensure that the procedural irregularities and other grounds like those mentioned in Clause (2) of Article 100 should not vitiate the validity of proceedings of Parliament and that it would not be permissible to call in question those proceedings on such grounds. The observations on page 456 in the case of Special Reference No. 1 of 1964, (1965) 1 SCR 413 [LQ/SC/1964/251] : : AIR 1965 SC 745 [LQ/SC/1964/251] that if the impugned proceedings of a legislature are illegal and unconstitutional and hot merely irregular, the same can be scrutinised in a court of law do not in my opinion, warrant the inference that a court can hold the proceedings of a legislature to be not valid and constitutional by going into the question as-to whether the detention of any member who was prevented from being present in the sitting of the legislature on account of his detention was or was not in accordance with law. (Paragraph 180 at pages 2343-44).

(v) (After referring to the facts of Bradlaugh v. Gossett and quoting a certain passage from the judgment of Stephen J. therein. The above passage has been cited on page 83 in Erskine Mays Parliamentary Practice, 18th Ed. with at view to show that it is a right of each House of Parliament to be the sole judge of the lawfulness of its own proceedings. It would follow from the above that the courts cannot go into the lawfulness of the proceedings of the Houses of Parliament. (Last passage in paragraph 181 at pages 2344.45).