Richard Garth, C.J.

1. This suit was brought by the raja or Chief of the Stateof cherrapoonjee in the Khasia Hills to establish his title to, and to recoverpossession from the defendant of two villages, viz., mauzas Futtehpore andAugarpur, situated in the district of Sylhet, upon the following allegations:

It is said that these two villages formerly belonged to theRaja or Chief of Jyntia (whose territories in the plains were confiscated bythe British Government in 1835); that in or about the year 1810 they were cededby the then Raja of Jyntia to the Chief of Cherrapoonjee in consideration ofcertain assistance rendered to him by the latter Chief in a war between theRaja of Jyntia and a third Chief, the Raja of Khyram; that from that date thevillages in question formed part of the State of Cherrapoonjee and were in thepossession of successive Chiefs of that State down to the death of Raja RamSing on the 12th Bysak 1282; that during the reign of Ram Sing the defendantwas appointed Jubraj or heir-apparent, and in that capacity had the managementof these villages; and that on the plaintiffs accession he, the defendant,being disappointed at not being himself elected raja refused to make over thesevillages to the Raj and retained them in his own possession.

2. The defence is, that the villages in question were neverthe property of the Cherrapoonjee State as such, but were granted to the Chiefof that State as his own private property; and that in Bhadro 1249,(corresponding with September 1842) the then Chief Sobha Sing by a hibanamah,or deed of gift, transferred them to the defendant; and that from that time thedefendant has been in possession.

3. Eleven issues were framed in the lower Court, but theessential points in the case appear to be three only:

(1) Whether the villages in suit were the public property ofthe State of Cherrapoonjee, or the private property of the Chief to whom theywere given

(2) Whether, supposing them to be the property of the State,they could be alienated by grant from the Chief and

(3) Whether, assuming them to be the property of the State,the defendant has been in adverse possession for more than twelve years beforethe institution of this suit, and the plaintiffs suit is thus barred bylimitation

4. The lower Court, in a very lengthy and elaboratejudgment, has found for the defendant both on the merits and on the plea oflimitation. The Subordinate Judge comes to the conclusion that the villages insuit were the private property of the Chief, and that they were granted to thedefendant by Sobha Sing, and have been in his exclusive possession since thedate of that grant.

5. The plaintiff is accordingly the appellant in this Court.

6. Before entering on the particular questions involved inthe case, it may be useful to consider a few facts relating to the history andcircumstances of the Rajas or Chiefs of Cherrapoonjee.

7. Cherrapoonjee is one of several small semi-independentStates situated in the Khasia and Jyntia Hills, which separate the valley ofthe Brahmaputra from the Bengal districts of Sylhet and Cachar. The State isgoverned by a Raja or Chief (called in the Khasia language the Leem), acting inconjunction with the heirs (or Jubrajes), the ministers (or muntries), and theheadmen (or doloys). The succession to the Raj or Chiefship is regulated partlyby inheritance and partly by a system of election. The ordinary rule ofinheritance is based on descent through the female line; or, in other words,succession to property is traced through females, and not through males. If amale dies possessed of property which he has acquired, it will go, if he isunmarried, to his mother and her issue; if married to his wife and her issue;and if there is no issue to her, mother and her mothers issue. An exception ismade in the succession to the Raj and the Chief offices of State, the reason forthe exception probably being, that such offices must be held by a male. Buteven in these cases the succession is not from father to son, but through themother; that is to say, a deceased Raja is succeeded by his uterine brother, orthe son of his maternal aunt or his sisters son. All persons standing in suchrelationship to the reigning Chief are possible heirs and are styled Jubrajes,and on the death of a Chief, his successor is elected from among the Jubrajesby the twelve doloys or headmen of the State. Thus the succession to the Raj,although confined to one family, and ordinarily to an established rule ofinheritance in that family, is nevertheless subject to a power of veto vestedin the doloys, who can apparently pass over the nearest heir in favour of onemore remote. It has been contended for the defendant in this case that thispractice of election has been introduced only recently by the BritishGovernment, but from a consideration of the agreements with the Chiefs of theKhasia Hills, published in Aitchisons Treaties (vol. 1, pp. 88, 95, 99,&c.,) and other evidence, we think that all that the British Government hasdone has been to attempt to give validity and permanence to customs of oldstanding, and we find good grounds for supposing that the practice of electingthe Chief from among the Jubrajes is a custom of old standing.

8. The genealogical table annexed has been drawn up from theoral evidence taken in the case. This table will be found useful not only asindicating generally the manner in which the succession to the Raj has beepregulated, but as showing particularly the relationship which exists betweenthe parties to this suit. In respect of one or two of the details shown in thetable, the evidence is somewhat contradictory, but on the whole the table issufficiently accurate for all practical purposes. It appears that Roy Sing, whowas the reigning Chief at the time these mauzas were acquired from the Raja ofJyntia, was succeeded by his sisters son, Dewan Sing. Dewan Sing died before1830, and was succeeded by his sisters daughters son, Sobha Sing. Sobha Singdied in 1856/1263, and was succeeded by his sisters son Ram Sing. On RamSings death in 1875/1282, the nearest heir would appear to have been thedefendant Bur Sing, who is Ram Sings mothers sisters son; but Bur Sing hadembraced Christianity; and the doloys, therefore, vetoed his succession, andelected the plaintiff, Hajon Manick, who, it will be seen, belonged to a moredistant branch of the family, his maternal grand-mother being a sister of RamSings maternal grand-mother. We are inclined to attach

considerable importance to this circumstance, and we thinkthat it has not been sufficiently taken into account by the lower Court. TheSubordinate Judge seems to have thought that the plaintiff and the defendantstood in the same degree of relationship to the late Chief Ram Singh, but thiswas not so. The plaintiff, it will be seen, belongs to a branch of the familyquite distinct from that to which Sobha Sing, Ram Sing, the defendant Bur Singand his witness Sing Manik belonged. And this fact will be found to be of greatimportance, when we come to consider how far the defendant held and managedthese mauzas in his own right, or in conjunction with, and on account of, thereigning Chiefs Sobha Sing and Ram Sing. It is in evidence, that Sobha Sing,Ram Sing, the defendant and Sing Manik all lived together, whereas theplaintiff belonging as he did to a different branch of the family livedelsewhere. It is true that during the lifetime of Sobha Sing, Dhon Manick wasan heir and Jubraj, and used to take a part in the management of affairs, buthe seems to have died before Sobha Sing, and after his death the Jubrajes wereRam Sing and the defendant. And it further appears from the evidence of one ofthe defendants own witnesses (p. 258) that Ram Sing lived generally in thehouse of his fathers sister at some distance and only came occasionally toCherra, the business of the State being chiefly conducted by the defendant. Andthe defendant seems to have retained this position during Ram Sings reignbeing occasionally assisted by Ram Sings nephew, Sing Manick. This at onceexplains the reason, why the defendant should be in a position to adduceevidence of his possession of the mauzas in dispute before the plaintiffsdecision ; and why the plaintiffs evidence of the possession of hispredecessors in the Raj should be far less satisfactory. The persons whocollected the rents were all practically in the employ or acting under ordersof the defendant.

9. Before proceeding, however, to deal with the case on itsmerits, it will be convenient to dispose of two preliminary objections thatwere raised at the hearing on the part of the respondent.

10. The first objection is, that the present suit will notlie under the provisions of Section 431 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Thatsection enacts that " a foreign State may sue in the Courts of BritishIndia, provided that (a) it has been recognized by Her Majesty or the Governor-Generalin Council, and (6) the object of the suit is to enforce the private rights ofthe head or of the subjects of the foreign State." It is contended thatwhen the object of the suit is to recover Immovable property for the State,such suit cannot be said to be brought for the enforcement of a private right.But this contention appears to us to be based on a misapprehension of thesection in question. The "private rights" there spoken of do not meanindividual rights as opposed to those of the body politic or State; but thoseprivate rights of the State which must be enforced in a Court of justice, asdistinguished from its political or territorial rights, which must, from theirvery nature, be made the subject of arrangement between one State and another.They are rights which may be enforced by a foreign State against privateindividuals, as distinguished from rights which one State in its politicalcapacity may have as against another State in its political capacity.

11. The rule laid down in Section 431 is only an enactmentof that which prevails in England; and as the plaintiff here represents theGovernment of an independent State, recognised as such by Her MajestysGovernment, and is suing to recover from a private individual in this country thosemauzas, which (although situate in British territory) are claimed to belong tothe plaintiff as the head of the State, we consider that this case comesclearly within the rule see Emperor of Austria v. Day 30 L.J. Ch. 690 : 2 Giff.628; United States of America v. Wagner L.R. 2 Ch. App. 582.

12. The second objection taken was to the effect that theproperty in suit being situated in British India, the rule of successionapplicable to it must be that laid down in the Indian Succession Act (Section5), and not a rule of a foreign State which is repugnant to the laws of BritishIndia.

13. This point was argued by Baboo Mohini Mohun Roy for thedefendant with great ability, and at some length, and it is admitted that therewould be considerable force in it, if the mauzas in question were found to bethe property of a private individual. In that case the succession to theproperty would no doubt be governed by the lex loci. If, for example, these twovillages were found to be the private property of the defendant, and he shoulddie intestate, the villages would probably pass to his heirs, as defined by theIndian Succession Act, and not to those who would be his heirs under the ruleof succession obtaining in the Khasia States. But if, as the plaintiff contends,the villages in question are the property of the Cherrapoonjee State, we thinkthat the objection ought not to prevail. As Mr. Evans has pointed out, theState must be regarded as a quasi corporation, which continues to exist as aState so long as it is recognized as such by Her Majesty, whatever the rule ofsuccession to it may be, and whatever may be its form of government. See TheUnited States of America v. Wagner.

14. So far as we are aware, there is nothing to prevent aforeign or feudatory State from holding land in British India. The Baja ofTipperah holds land in British India, as well as in Independent Tipperah; andit has been decided that the property which he holds in British India followsthe succession to the Tipperah Baj, and is not governed by the British law ofsuccession Neelkisto Deb Burmono v. Beerchunder Thakoor 12 Moo. I.A. 523;Beerchunder Manikkya v. Rajcoomar Nobodeepchunder Deb Burmono I.L.R. 9 Cal.535; Maharajah Beerchunder Manikkya v. Ishanchunder Thakur 3 I.L.R. 417. We thinkthis is the true view of the matter, and we are confirmed in this view by aconsideration of the document at p. 122 of the printed book. That is a receiptor release executed by Raja Ram Sing in favour of the British Governmentacknowledging that he had received two villages, Gosainpur and Burnugar,situated in British territory, in exchange for certain lands at Cherrapoonjee,which he had ceded to the British Government, and the document goes on tosay:-- "I and my heirs and successors to the Raj will own and possess thelands of those mauzas as zemindars under the British Government"; that isto say, the mauzas are declared to appertain to the Raj as represented by theBaja for the time being. The question of intestate succession, therefore, does notarise, and this objection falls to the ground.

15. We proceed now to consider the case on its merits, andwe will first deal with the title set up by the defendant.

16. His case is that the mauzas in suit were a gift to RoySing personally, for services which he had personally rendered, and that theydescended to Sobha Singh as his private property. He then says, that in orabout the year 1840 the British Government assessed them with revenue, as partand parcel of the Jyntia State, which had been confiscated. Upon that, SobhaSingh, he says, wanted to appeal, but he was unable to do so for want of funds.He accordingly called all his nephews together and told them: "I am unableto defray the expenses of the case, you had better prosecute the litigation andpay the expenses" (pp. 176, 239). The defendant, however, according to hisown account, was the only one of them willing to undertake the business, and,accordingly, he says, with the consent of the others, the deed of gift printedat page 261 was executed in his favour. This deed runs as follows:

To the well-behaved Bur Sing Raja, inhabitant ofCherrapoonjee: I, Sobha Sing Raja, of the above place, do execute thishibanamah to the following effect:

The Deputy Collector of Sylhet having assessed rent, as includedin the territory of the Jyntia Raj, upon my two bustis of Augarjore andFuttehpore, appertaining to my Raj of Cherrapoonjee, I have preferred an appealto the Revenue Commissioner of Dacca in dissatisfaction of the said order.Whereas you are my sisters son and an heir presumptive to my throne, and as Icannot conduct the said litigation, and defray the expenses thereof, I,therefore, of my own accord, make a gift to you of all the lands of the saidtwo bustis Augarjore and Futtehpore; you will defray the expenses of the saidlitigation from your own pocket, and, after the case is decided, takepossession of the said two bustis, and continue to enjoy the same with, powerto alienate by sale or gift. To this, I relinquish my own right and bestow it onyou; you and your heirs will be entitled to alienate it by sale or gift and toenjoy the same. To this purport, I execute this hibanamah, dated Bhadro 1249B.S.

17. Having obtained this deed, the defendant proceeded toborrow money from Colonel Lister, the Political Agent, and his sherishtadarManick Chunder Hoom, and went to Dacca to get the mauzas exempted from paymentof revenue. Notwithstanding the statement, that none of the other nephews wouldundertake the business, it is admitted (pp. 177, 242, 258) that Ram Sing onthis occasion accompanied the defendant, and it is also a significant feet thatthe proceedings were conducted, not in the defendants name, but in the name ofSobha Sing. The appeal was successful, the mauzas were declared to be revenue-free,and a sum of about Rs. 4,000 was refunded as mesne profits. From this moneyColonel Lister and Manick Chunder Hoom were repaid, and a certain amount wasadmittedly paid to Sobha Sing. The defendant says that he paid him the profitsaccruing prior to the date of the gift. But Manick Chunder Hoom gives adifferent account of what took place. He says: "Bur Sing Raja went toSobha Sing Raja with that money. The next day I also went there. Sobha SingRaja had contracted with me in writing that he would pay me a 6-anna share ofthat money. Sobha Sing and Bur Sing were both present, and they paid me my 6annas share. Sobha Sing paid some money to Charkha Dolay as reward. Theremaining 10 annas share he took to Cherrapoonjee. Out of that the Colonel Sahebsloan was repaid" (p. 258). Charkha Dolay also says (p. 242) that it wasSobha Sing who repaid Colonel Listers loan. From that time to the present thedefendant says that he has been in possession of these mauzas.

18. In support of these allegations the defendant has filed,among other documents,

(a)--a purwanah, dated 5th May 1851, addressed by thePolitical Agent to Sobha Sing, which purports to show that the Agent at thattime recognized these villages as the property of the defendant (p. 268);

(b)-- an account and receipt of Manick Chunder Hoom formoneys said to have been paid to him by the defendant on account of the appealat Dacca (pp. 270, 271);

(c)--some reports which are filed to show that even afterthe cession of these mauzas to Roy Sing, they continued to be part and parcelof the Jyntia State, and were never incorporated with the Cherra Raj (pp. 272to 275); and

(d)--a large number of zamindari papers and accounts,showing that for some years past the rents have been paid to the defendant.

19. The execution of the deed of gift by Sobha Sing has notbeen seriously disputed in this Court, nor is it denied that the defendant hasbeen in ostensible possession and receipt of the rents. But it is contendedthat the gift was not intended to operate as an alienation of the property fromthe State; that the defendant was at the time a Jubraj with every chance ofsucceeding to the Raj. And it has been argued by Mr. Evans, with considerableforce, that this deed was really only executed in order to enable the defendantto raise money for the purpose of prosecuting the appeal and of appearing inperson before the Commissioner as the appellant, and not with the intention ofcreating in him any rights antagonistic to those of the State.

20. As regards his possession, it is contended that it waspermissive and not adverse to the reigning Chief, and that the defendant asJubraj and heir was allowed to manage the properties, but that the realbeneficiary owner was the State.

21. We now proceed to examine the plaintiffs case, which isto the effect

(1)--that the mauzas in suit are the property of the State;

(2)--that, as such, they could not be alienated by any Chieffor the time being; and

(3)--that the defendants possession was only the possessionof a Jubraj on behalf of the State, and not adverse thereto.

(1) On the first point it seems to us that these landshaving been ceded by the Raja of Jyntia for services rendered to him in time ofwar by the Cherra-poonjee Raja and his followers, the probability is that theywere ceded to the Cherra State, and were not a gift to the Chief personally. Itappears, moreover, that these mauzas were held by Dewan Sing and Sobha Sing assuccessive Rajas, whereas there is evidence to show that, had they been Roy Singsprivate property they would have descended to other heirs. It is admitted bythe witnesses on both sides that there is one rule of succession to the privateproperty of a Chief, and another to the property of the State, and, clearlythis must be so, inasmuch as the State property must follow the rule ofsuccession to the Raj or State itself, and that rule, as we have seen above, isfirst subject to the condition that the Chief must be a male; and secondly, tothe principle of election. As regards the private property of a Raja, however,the rule of succession is stated to be as follows:--The property wouldordinarily go to a sister and her daughters; in default of daughters, to a sonfor life, and after him to the Raja. If the deceased Raja left no sister orsisters issue, the property would descend to his successor in the Raj (pp. 82,86, 91, 93, 101, 109, 113). Now, there is evidence on the record (pp. 97, 101,247) that Roy Sing left female heirs, who would have succeeded to these mauzashad they been private property. But be this as it may, there can be no doubtthat even if they descended properly to Dewan Sing as private property, DewanSing left sisters daughters surviving him (pp. 82, 86, 97, 101), Ka Jat and KaPah would, under ordinary circumstances, have been Dewan Sings private heirs.This is admitted by the defendant (pp. 175,176) and Sing Manik (p. 248), butthey try to get over the difficulty by pretending that the sisters hadseparated from Dewan Sing, and so were incapacitated from succeeding. We areunable to consider this explanation either sufficient or satisfactory.

22. In the next place there is evidence to show that thesemauzas were deall with as an appanage to the State. The official documentsprinted at pp. 120, 272, 275, of the paper-book, show conclusively that SobhaSing claimed these villages as part and parcel of his territorial dominions,and there is oral evidence to show that he and his predecessors had exercisedsovereign jurisdiction therein down to the year 1838(pp. 13, 23, 35, etc.). Inthe deed of gift itself we have the villages described by Sobha Sing as"appertaining to my Raj of Cherrapoonjee,"

23. On the whole evidence, therefore, we have no hesitationin corning to the conclusion that the two villages in suit were the property ofthe Cherra Raj, and not the private property of Sobha Sing.

24. Then the question arises, was Sobha Sing capable ofalienating these villages by gift or otherwise And on this point we must alsofind for the plaintiff. Putting aside the mass of oral evidence upon the point,it seems clear that if the mauzas were ceded to the State, as many of thewitnesses say they were, and as we find to be the fact (pp. 81, 84, 88, 93, 96,103), and if the Chief is, as we have already decided, an elected Chief (thoughalways elected from the same family), he would have no authority to alienatethese lands, and confer them as private property on another member of thefamily. An attempt has been made to prove that other Rajgi lands have beenalienated by various Chiefs; but we think the attempt has failed. The grants tothe British Government were either made in exchange for other lands, or forother consideration. The alleged grant of Chandpur by Dewan Sing to his sonSowargiri is not a case in point, for the defendant admits that this property(though acquired by Dewan Sing himself) descended to Sobha Sing and Ram Singand is now in the plaintiffs possession (pp. 178, 179, 250). The Bimanna landssaid to have been given by Ram Sing to his daughter were lands purchased byhimself (pp. 238, 243). The Chakla lands given by Ram Sing to his son weresimilarly acquired, and improved out of his private means (pp. 238. 245), andit also appears that rent is paid to the State in respect of those lands (p.250). On the whole, we consider the defendant has failed to prove any otherinstance in which Rajgi property has been alienated by the reigning Chief; andlooking at the constitution of the State as described above, and the limitedpower possessed by the Chief, we concur with the lower Court in finding that hehad no authority to alienate the property of the State.

25. Then, lastly, we come to the question of limitation. Andas to this we must hold that the defendants possession has not been apossession in his own right adverse to the State. In the first place we thinkthat the hibanamah was not intended to alienate these properties from theState. We have seen that at that time the defendant occupied the position ofJubraj and presumptive heir to the Raj. We have seen that Ram Sing accompaniedhim to Dacca to procure the release of these properties from the assessmentthat had been imposed upon them by the British Government, and we have alsoseen that the defendant was all along living in the same family with thereigning Chief, and that up to the death of Ram Sing it was apparently expectedthat he would himself one day succeed to the Raj. Moreover, we find that evenafter the deed of gift, Sobha Sing and Ram Sing treated these mauzas as if theywere the property of the State.

26. For instance, the official documents printed at pp. 115to 118 show that it was Sobha Sing, and not the defendant, who moved theCollector in 1846-47 to have the river Kapua included within the limits ofmauza Futtehpur, and so also it was Ram Sing and not the defendant whoprosecuted the cases regarding Mr. Howards tea garden, Mr. Foleys garden andother claims to lands said to be included within these mauzas (pp. 123 to 140).It seems to be admitted, even by the defendants own witnesses (pp. 231, 223),that those cases were not only conducted in Ram Sings name, but by hisservants, and, amongst others, by one Bongo Chunder Sen, who was admittedly theRajas Am-Muktear.

27. Everything in fact was done in the Rajas name (p. 258).In the document printed at p. 122, the defendant is himself described as theattorney for Ram Sing. It is admitted that Ram Sing himself used at times tovisit these mauzas. The persons who collected and remitted the rents admittedlycollected and remitted the rents both of the Rajgi property and of thedefendants private property (Nowagaon and Sandorgaon). The only evidence thereis of the defendants possession is, the use of his name in the zamindaripapers; and of this, we think, there is a sufficient explanation. Themanagement of these estates was entrusted to him as Jubraj; he was living withRam Sing, and his acts were no doubt looked upon as Ram Sings acts. The paperswere all in his custody, and he could keep back or make away with any that didnot favour his own pretensions. On the other hand, the plaintiff, as we haveseen, belonged to a different branch of the family, and though a possible heir,it is not proved that he took any part in the management of affairs before hiselection to the Raj. It is most difficult for him, therefore, to produce papersor give any evidence that Ram Sing was actually in possession or shared, as wequite believe he did, the rents and profits of these mauzas.

28. Then we have the fact that on the occasion of SobhaSings sradh, the tenants from these villages, as from other villages belongingto the Raj, attended at Cherrapoonjee with presents of goats and other things.This fact is admitted (pp. 177, 246), although the defendant attempts to puthis own interpretation upon it, but it seems to us that the natural inferenceto be drawn from it is, that these villages were at that time recognized as anappurtenance to the Raj, and that the tenants attended with their offerings onthat occasion as the tenants of the Raj a, and not as the tenants of thedefendant.

29. The lower Court seems to have been of opinion that ifthe mauzas in suit were really the property of the State, the defendantspossession might be taken to be the possession of the Chief.

30. In paragraph 49 of his judgment, the Subordinate Judgesays: "Then the plaintiffs pleader contends, that when it appears fromthe evidence on the side of the defendant, that Sobha Sing had granted the hibawith the consent of Ram Sing Raja, then the possession of the defendant, evenif such possession be granted for arguments sake, being held with the consentof Ram Singh Raja, and a period of 12 years not having elapsed since the timewhen the plaintiff became the Raja in immediate succession to Ram Sing, theplaintiff, under these circumstances, cannot be barred by the possession of thedefendant." It appears to me that this argument of the pleader for theplaintiff would have been to a great extent effective, if the disputed propertyhad been proved to be a part and parcel of the state of Cherrapoonjee. Butwhen, for the reasons alluded to above, the property in question, instead ofbeing an integral portion of the Cherrapoonjee State, has been proved to be theexclusive estate of the Rajas in their individual rights, and that the same wascapable of transfer, then such consent on the part of Ram Sing served only toextinguish his own rights, and the plaintiff on this ground cannot derive muchbenefit from that argument. We have, however, arrived at the conclusion, forthe reasons which we have already given, that the mauzas in suit were theproperty of the Raj and not the personal property of the Chief, and that theChief had no power to alienate them by deed of gift. We find, too, upon theevidence that the defendant was in possession as Jubraj in trust for, and onbehalf of, the reigning Chief, and that the plaintiff is, therefore, not barredby such possession from recovering the properties. We accordingly reverse thefinding of the lower Court and decree the plaintiffs claim to these twomauzas.

31. The only question which remains is as to the costs.

32. Under ordinary circumstances as the plaintiff is thesuccessful party, we should have given him his costs. But this is a peculiarcase. The circumstances under which the grant was made to the defendant, theform of the grant itself ("to him and his heirs"), the fact of itsbeing made with the consent of the other members of the reigning family, andthat the defendant has had the management, and probably shared the profits ofthe property from that time to the present, might well have induced him honestlyto suppose that he had a right to retain possession, at any rate during his ownlife. He had, moreover, good reason to expect that he himself would have becomethe Raja on the death of Ram Sing, and the change in his religion appears tohave been the only reason why his claims have been set aside. It seems to us,therefore, that he was fully justified in taking the opinion of the Court,before giving up the property; and, as the judgment of the Subordinate Judgewas in his favour, he should not be made responsible for the costs of thisappeal.

33. We think, therefore, that this case should be made anexception to the general rule, and that each party should pay his own costs inboth Courts.

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Hajon Manick vs. BurSingh (30.07.1884 - CALHC)