Rakesh Kumar Jain, J.

The following questions of law are involved in this revision petition:-

1. Whether a landlord can seek eviction of a tenant from a non- residential premises on the ground of bonafide necessity of his son and whether sons requirement is also covered by the word used "his own occupation"

2. Whether son of the landlord, for whose benefit the nonresidential premises is sought to be got vacated, if not the landlord or the owner himself, is also required to plead the ingredients of Section 13(3)(a)(i) of the Act in the eviction petition

3. Whether the landlord who though pleaded bonafide need of the non-residential premises for his son who has not pleaded that he does not possess another nonresidential premises in the urban area concerned or had not vacated such a building without sufficient cause after coming into force of the Act, but would it be sufficient if he had appeared and deposed on oath that he does not possess another non-residential building in the urban area concerned nor had vacated such a building without sufficient cause in the same urban area after coming into force of the Act

4. Whether the tenant can raise the question of noncompliance of mandatory provisions of Section 13(3)(a) (i) of the Act even if he did not question it in his reply nor ask for any issue in this regard for the purpose of trial

The tenant is in revision against the order of eviction passed by the Courts below on the ground of personal necessity.

2. In short, the landlords filed a petition under Section 13 of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949 [for short "the Act"] in order to seek eviction of the tenant from shop No. 22, situated in Hall Bazar, Muktsar [hereinafter referred to as "demised premises"]. The eviction was sought, inter alia, on the ground of personal necessity and the averments made in that regard are as under :-

"That the petitioners require the shop in dispute for their personal use and occupation. The shop is very old and built in old style. The petitioners will demolish the shop, reconstruct it in a modern fashion, providing all modern facilities and thereafter Jaskaran Singh son of the petitioner No. 3 will start business in it, he is a young boy and has no work, he is to be provided work and settled in business. He will start business in the shop in dispute. The petitioners do not own or possess any other nonresidential building nor have they vacated any such building after coming into force of Act-III of 1949."

3. In the written statement, the aforesaid paragraph was replied as under :-

"That this para of the application is incorrect as stated. This is all concoction and a made up story to make a ground for ejectment of the respondent without any right. The petitioners have no link with the Muktsar City. The shop in dispute is in a good condition and has not become unfit and unsafe for human habitation as alleged. The present application has been filed only to harass the respondent with a malafide intention and the present application is speculative."

4. Though we are not concerned with other grounds of eviction in the present case, yet on the pleadings of the parties, following issues were framed by the learned Rent Controller :-

"1. Whether the respondent has not paid rent w.e.f. 19.11.1985 OPP.

2. Whether the shop in dispute has become unfit and unsafe for human habitation OPP.

3. Whether the petitioners required the shop in dispute for their personal use and occupation OPP.

4. Whether the petitioners are entitled for eviction order and to get possession of the shop OPP.

5. Whether the present application has been filed just to harass respondent OPD.

6. Relief."

5. The landlords examined R.D. Sharma, approved Chartered Engineer as PW1, Brijinder Singh as PW2 and Jaskaran Singh as PW3, whereas the tenant examined Gurbaj Singh (attorney of respondent) as RW1, Jita Singh, Civil Engineer as RW2, Balwinder Singh, Registration Clerk, as RW3 and Ram Ji Dass, Deed Writer, as RW4.

6. It may be pertinent to mention here that the landlords have projected the bonafide necessity of Jaskaran Singh son of landlord Brijinder Singh (petitioner No. 3 in the eviction petition). The said Jaskaran Singh had appeared as PW3 and deposed that he is B.Sc. (Non-medical). He has undergone training of medical transcription based upon latest computer technology and since there is no Medical Transcription Center at Muktsar, therefore, he intended to open such a center as it would have good prospects. He also deposed that it would be only a training center which would help the youth of the area in getting employment. He further deposed that he does not own any shop in the urban area of Muktsar nor has vacated any after coming into force of the Act. He further deposed that he is in dire need of the demised premises to run his own business.

7. Vide its order dated 19.02.2009, the learned Rent Controller ordered eviction of the tenant and granted him three months time to vacate the demised premises. The appeal filed by the tenant was dismissed by the learned Appellate Authority on 12.08.2010 again granting him three months time to vacate the demised premises.

8. Aggrieved against the aforesaid orders of eviction, the present revision petition has been preferred in which the only case set up by the tenant is that the landlords have not pleaded the ingredients of Section 13(3)(a)(i) of the Act in their eviction petition, which are mandatory in nature in view of the Full Bench decision of this Court in the case of Banke Ram v. Shrimati Sarasvati Devi, 1977(1) R.C.R.(Rent) 595 : 1977 PLR 112 and a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Ajit Singh and another v. Jit Ram and another, 2008(4) R.C.R.(Civil) 390 : 2008(2) R.C.R. (Rent) 328 : 2008(5) Recent Apex Judgments (R.A.J.) 388 : 2008(4) Civil Court Cases 528.

9. The main contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the demised premises is not required by the landlords for their own use and occupation but for the use and occupation of the son of respondent No. 3, namely, Jaskaran Singh, for the purpose of settling him in business, whereas the son of landlord/respondent No. 3 did not plead that he does not own and possess another non-residential building in the urban area concerned and has also not vacated any such building without sufficient cause after the commencement of the Act, therefore, the eviction petition could not have been allowed by the Courts below in view of the Full Bench decision of this Court in Banke Rams case (supra) and the decision of the Supreme Court in Ajit Singh and anothers case (supra) in which it has been held that when the premises is being got vacated on the ground of its use by the son of the landlord, then in the eviction petition, the son of the landlord must plead that he was not occupying another building in the same urban area and has not vacated such building without sufficient cause after the commencement of the Act and in the absence of such pleadings, no eviction order could be passed for the bonafide necessity of the son of the landlord.

10. On the contrary, learned counsel for the respondents has submitted that in Section 13(3)(a), the word used by the Legislature is that "a landlord may apply" to the Controller for an order directing the tenant to put the "landlord in possession" and for that purposes, there is no dispute that the persons who had filed the eviction petition are the landlords who have claimed the demised premises for their personal use and occupation. He further submitted that the word "for his own occupation" would cover the requirement of the son of the landlord as well which has been interpreted by the Supreme Court in the case of Joginder Pal v. Naval Kishore Behal, 2002(1) R.C.R.(Rent) 582 : 2002(2) Civil Court Cases 633. He further submitted that the landlords have categorically alleged in the eviction petition that they do not own or possess another nonresidential building in the urban area concerned nor have vacated any such building without sufficient cause after coming into force of the Act, therefore, they have complied with all the mandatory requirements of Section 13(3)(a)(i) of the Act. It is also alleged that in reply, the tenant did not contradict the averments made in the eviction petition in this regard nor asked for any issue, therefore, it cannot be agitated as a question of law in this revision petition. It is also argued that the decision of the Full Bench of this Court in Banke Rams case (supra) has been further diluted by this Court in the case of Daulat Ram son of Harnam Mal Aggarwal v. Girdhari Lal son of Kira Mal Aggarwal, 1980 PLR 182 wherein it has been held that even if the landlord had failed to plead all the ingredients of Section 13(3)(a)(i) but led evidence to that effect, the non-pleading of ingredients would not be fatal. In support of his submission that the tenant has failed to take objection in the reply, he has relied upon a decision of this Court in the case of Sat Parkash Chaudhary v. Kewal Krishan Malhotra, 2011(2) R.C.R.(Civil) 828 : 2011(1) R.C.R.(Rent) 340 : 2010(4) PLR 622. He also relied upon the decisions of this Court in the cases of Parkash Ram v. Yashpal Sharma, 2007(1) R.C.R. (Rent) 186, Baldev Raj v. Ram Lal, 2006(2) R.C.R.(Rent) 193, Mukesh Kumar v. Rishi Prakash, 2009(2) R.C.R.(Rent) 485 and M/s British Motor Car Company Pvt. Ltd. v. Sewak Sabha Charitable Trust (Regd.), 2003(2) R.C.R.(Rent) 606. It is argued by learned counsel for the landlords that the decision of the Supreme Court in Ajit Singh and anothers case (supra) is distinguishable on facts and is not applicable to the facts and circumstances of the present case. Consequently, the learned counsel for the landlords prayed for dismissal of the revision petition.

11. Taking up the first question, which has been framed in the beginning of this judgment, it would be relevant to refer to the decision of the Supreme Court in Joginder Pals case (supra) where the word "his own use" in regard to non-residential building has been interpreted as under:-

"(1) The words "for his own use" as occurring in Section 13(3)(a)(ii) of the Act must receive a wide, liberal and useful meaning rather than a strict or narrow construction.

(2) The expression - landlord requires for "his own use" is not confined in its meaning to actual physical user by the landlord personally. The requirement not only of the landlord himself but also of the normal "emanations" of the landlord is included therein. All the cases and circumstances in which actual physical occupation or user by someone else, would amount to occupation or user by the landlord himself, cannot be exhaustively enumerated. It will depend on a variety of factors such as interrelationship and interdependence - economic or otherwise, between the landlord and such person in the background of social, socio-religious and local customs and obligations of the society or region to which they belong.

(3) The tests to be applied are : (i) whether the requirement pleaded and proved may properly be regarded as the landlords own requirement; and, (ii) whether on the facts and in the circumstances of a given case, actual occupation and user by a person other than the landlord would be deemed by the landlord as "his own" occupation or user. The answer would, in its turn, depend on (i) the nature and degree of relationship and/or dependence between the landlord pleading the requirement as "his own" and the person who could actually use the premises; (ii) the circumstances in which the claim arises and is put forward; and (iii) the intrinsic tenability of the claim. The court on being satisfied of the reasonability and genuineness of claim, as distinguished from a mere ruse to get rid of the tenant, will uphold the landlords claim.

(4) While casting its judicial verdict, the court shall adopt a practical and meaningful approach guided by the realities of life.

(5) In the present case, the requirement of the landlord of the suit premises for user as office of his chartered accountant son is the requirement of landlord "for his own use" within the meaning of Section 13(3)(a)(ii)."

12. The decision in Joginder Pals case (supra) has been further approved by the Supreme Court in the case of Ajit Singh and another wherein it is held that the requirement of non-residential premised by the landlord would also include the requirement of the said premises by his son. Thus, the first question is answered accordingly.

13. In respect of the second question, the word used by the Legislature in Section 13(3)(a) is that "a landlord may apply" to the Controller for an order directing the tenant to put the "landlord in possession", meaning thereby it is bonafide requirement of the landlord who would be competent to apply and has to prove the three ingredients of Section 13(3)(a)(i) of the Act, which are reproduced as under for the ready reference :-

"(a) he requires it for his own occupation;

(b) he is not occupying another residential building in the urban area concerned; and

(c) he has not vacated such a building without sufficient cause after the commencement of this Act, in the said urban area."

14. In the case of Ajit Singh and another (supra), which has been basically relied upon by learned counsel for the tenant, the facts were that the appellants before the Supreme Court were both father and son, out of whom, appellant No. 1 (son) became the owner of the shop involved in that case on the basis of a family partition dated 26.08.1998 and appellant No. 2 (father) was both the landlord and the owner prior to 26.08.1998. The eviction was sought from the shop in dispute, inter alia, on the ground of subletting, non-payment of rent and for bonafide requirement of the personal use and occupation of appellant No. 1 (son). In reply, it was alleged that personal necessity of the shop in dispute for the use and occupation of appellant No. 1 (son) was not available. The learned Rent Controller ordered eviction only on the ground of subletting which was challenged by the tenant by way of appeal and by the landlords by way of cross-objections. The learned Appellate Authority allowed the appeal of the tenant as well as the cross-objections of the landlords and ordered eviction on the ground of personal necessity. The tenants challenged the order passed on cross-objections by way of Civil Revision in the High Court which was allowed and the order of eviction was set aside on the ground that the appellant No. 2 (father) was the landlord of the said shop, but he had failed to plead ingredients as required under Section 13(3)(a)(i) of the Rent Act. It was held that the averments made in the eviction petition were only to the extent of personal requirement of appellant No. 1 (son), but such pleadings did not relate to the personal requirement of appellant No. 2 (father) who was also the landlord of the said shop and in the absence of pleadings of averments in the eviction petition to the extent of personal requirement of appellant No. 2 (father), the High Court held that the order of eviction passed by the Appellate Authority could not sustain. Against that order, appeal was filed before the Supreme Court in which it has been held that the requirement of the shop in the said case was made for the son who admittedly became the owner by virtue of family partition dated 26.08.1998 and also became the landlord and since the appellant No. 1 (son) had pleaded all the mandatory requirements of Section 13 (3)(a)(i) of the Act, therefore, it was held that even the mandatory pleadings do not relate to the appellant No. 2 (father) who was also a landlord would be of no consequence, resultantly, the Supreme Court reversed the order of the High Court. Thus, a close reading of the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Ajit Singh and another (supra) shows that the person who maintains an eviction petition on the ground of bonafide necessity, has to be a landlord and has to plead all the mandatory ingredients of Section 13(3)(a)(i) of the Act in the eviction petition and even if the premises is required by the landlord for use and occupation of his son, the son of the landlord is not required to plead all the ingredients of Section 13(3)(a)(i) of the Act if he himself is not the landlord of the premises. Hence, the second question is also answered accordingly.

15. In respect of third question, it is pertinent to mention that it has already come on record that Jaskaran Singh son of the landlord Brijinder Singh (respondent No. 3) had appeared in the witness box and had deposed on oath that he does not own or possess another non-residential premises in the urban area of Muktsar nor had vacated the same after coming into force of the Act. In view thereof, it has now been well settled by this Court in Baldev Rajs case (supra), Parkash Rams case (supra) and Daulat Rams case (supra) that if the landlord failed to plead the ingredients of Section 13(3)(a)(i) of the Act but had led evidence to that effect, then non-pleading of the ingredients would not be fatal to warrant dismissal of the application for ejectment. Hence, the third question is also answered accordingly.

16. The fourth and last question is rather involved in many cases where the tenant do not challenge the averments made in the eviction petition on the issue of non-pleading of mandatory ingredients of Section 13(3)(a)(i) of the Act nor they ask for any issue in that regard, yet after loosing the case before the Courts below , the said plea is taken as a question of law before this Court. In this regard, reference could be made to the facts of this case where the specific pleadings have been taken, though with regard to the landlord and not with regard to the son, as alleged by the counsel for the tenant now before this Court, but he did not take any objection about the non-pleading of the mandatory ingredients of Section 13(3)(a)(i) of the Act by the son in his written statement as a result of which there was no issue framed. This Court in the case of Sat Parkash Chaudhary (supra), while dealing with a similar controversy, has observed that "there is no dispute to the proposition of law as enunciated in the Full Bench judgment relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner. But, at the same time, the Court cannot be oblivious to the fact that mere non pleading of a fact, which is enshrined in the statute, can always be rectified if a relevant objection is taken at the initial stage. The petitioner failed to take any such objection in his reply to the petition. The pleadings have to be considered broadly in a rent petition where it is not captive to the strict law of interpretation which may be the situation in a civil suit. In rent proceedings, the Rent Controller is merely obliged to hold an inquiry to look into the averments which have been made in the petition". Besides these observations, as per Order 8 Rule 5 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, every allegation of fact, if not denied specifically, is taken to be admitted except as against a person under disability. Hence, this fourth and last question is also decided accordingly.

17. In view of the above discussion, the present revision petition is found to be totally devoid of any merit and as such, the same is hereby dismissed though without any order as to costs.

Petition dismissed.