Reginald Roe, J.

1. In this case the appellant obtained on the 13th March 1911 two decrees for rent against the respondents. These decrees were obtained by the appellant as a co-sharer landlord. The other co-sharers were not brought upon the record.

2. On the 10th March 1914, the appellant made his first application for execution. The application was registered on the 13th June 1914. It was dismissed for default on the 6th November 1914. On the 3rd of December 1914, the appellant applied under Order IX, rule 4, for the restoration of the applications to the file and on the 12th of December 1914, these applications were granted without notice to the judgment-debtors-respondents. On the 24th of February 1915, the judgment-debtors put in an objection and the cases were registered as under section 47 of the Civil Procedure Code. The objections taken by the judgment-debtors were:

(1) That there had been a grave irregularity in the manner of the valuation of the property attached;

(2) That the execution of the decrees was barred by limitation.

3. In the proceedings before the Munsif's Court apparently no argument was addressed to the learned Munsif upon the question of limitation. The learned Munsif dealt only with the question of valuation and upon that made a peremptory order that the objection of the, judgment-debtors was not made in good faith. From that order an appeal was made to the District Court and was disposed of by the Subordinate Judge. He pointed out that the question of valuation should have been treated more seriously by the learned Munsif, but decided the matter upon the question of limitation. He also pointed out that on the 13th of March 1914, the decree was dead and that unless the application of the 3rd of December 1914, could be treated as an application in continuation of the application of the 10th March 1914, the proceedings in execution were time-barred. Against that order appeals were made to this Court and have been argued upon two grounds only:--

Firstly, that the order of the 12th of December 1914, setting aside the rejection of the application of the 10th of March 1914, for default may be treated as not void but voidable, inasmuch as the Munsif's Court had jurisdiction at any rate to review its order dismissing the applications for default and the form of that order would be a question of irregularity and not of nullity.

Secondly, that inasmuch as no argument was addressed to the Munsif upon the lines taken before the Subordinate Judge, the judgment-debtors must have been held to have waived the irregularity whereby the Munsif's Court proceeded with the execution of the decree.

4. The points, therefore, for decision are:

Firstly, could the judgment-debtors waive the irregularity committed by the Munsif's Court in re-admitting the application of the 10th March 1914 for execution; if so, did they in fact waive that irregularity

5. Upon both these points the appeal must fail.

6. Since the decision in Thakur Prasad v. Fakir Ullah 17 A. 106 : 5 M.L.J. 3 : 22 I.A. 44 : 6 Sar. P.C.J. 526 it is settled law that Order IX does not apply to proceedings in execution. It is contemplated both by the old Code of Civil Procedure and by the new Code that applications for execution should, when struck off, be presented afresh and not revived as would be done in the case of plaints. Hari Charan Ghosh v. Manmatha Nath Sen 10 Ind. Cas. 683 : 41 C. 1 : 18 C.W.N. 343 is distinct authority for the proposition that any order passed under Order IX would be passed without jurisdiction in proceedings taken in execution of a decree. The words of Sir Lawrence Jenkins are: "The learned Munsif had not the jurisdiction which he purported to exercise." Where a Court has no jurisdiction its order may be treated as a nullity. The order of the Munsif of the 12th of December 1914, continuing these proceedings, must be treated as a nullity. The judgment debtors could not waive the objection that the restoration of the application of the 10th March was void, but they could waive the objection to the petition of the 3rd of December being taken as a new application for execution not barred by limitation. This, it is suggested, they did. The argument is that as there is nothing in the order of the Munsif dealing with the question of limitation, the judgment debtors most be held to have waived the question of limitation.

7. The Munsif peremptorily threw out the objection of the judgment-debtors on the ground that it was made solely to harass the decree-holders. The form of his order would indicate that there was no proper hearing of the objection. It may well be that the Pleaders employed in the Munsif's Court had failed to notice that the order of the 12th of December 1914 was passed without jurisdiction and it may have been that they failed to press the objection properly before the learned Munsif, but it is settled law that objection upon the ground of limitation may be taken at any stage of the proceeding if the facts upon which the objection is based are patent upon the face of the record. They are rightly taken and rightly decided in the Court of the learned Subordinate Judge. The orders of 12th December 1914 were made without jurisdiction. There was nothing before the Munsif's Court upon which the application of 3rd December 1914 could be taken as proceedings in continuation of the order of the 10th March 1914. Execution was from the date of the striking off of the applications of the 10th March 1915 barred by limitation, and all further proceedings must be held void.

8. The appeals are dismissed with costs.

9. Hearing fee one gold mohur in each case.