M.P. KANADE, J.

This application is filed under section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, for quashing an order dated May 12, 1982 passed by the learned Metropolitan Magistrate, 14th Court, Girgaum, Bombay issuing process against the petitioner-accused on a complaint dated May 14, 1982 filed by the respondent No. 1-complainant on behalf of the Indian Oil Corporation (hereinafter referred to as "the Corporation").

2. The complaint filed by the respondent No. 1. in the Metropolitan Magistrates Court states that the petitioner was working as an Officer on Special Duty in the Aviation Department of the Western Region of the Corporation. He had been employed by the Corporation since May 1962 under the letter of appointment issued by the Corporation. His services were covered by the rules and regulations of the Corporation which were then in force and as amended from time to time.

3. A lease dated April 4, 1962 was executed between the Corporation and one Smt. Sheila B. Tolani in respect of Flat No. 401 situate at Prabhu Kunj, Poddar Road, Bombay, on a monthly fee of Rs. 800/- on the terms and conditions mentioned in the said lease. It is the contention of respondent No. 1 that the said lease was for a period of two years and even thereafter the Corporation continued in possession of the said flat and continued to pay the rent. Respondent No. 1 alleged that the Corporation had acquired the said flat for housing the officials and employees of the Corporation by allotment of the said flat according to their eligibility.

4. Respondent No. 1 alleges that where the Corporation leased flats, the lease fees or rental was always paid directly by the Corporation to the owners of the flats and only 10 per cent of the basic pay of such allottees was deducted from this salary. In all such cases the Corporation continued to be the owner or the lessee of the said flats irrespective of the allottees or employees occupying the same. The petitioner was accordingly allotted the flat and he was put in possession thereof on behalf of the Corporation.

5. The petitioner continued to be in possession of the said flat since 1962 till his retirement dated February 28, 1982 has an allottee by the Corporation. As per the Rules applicable to the allottees, the petitioner was bound and liable to vacate the said flat within two months from the date thereof and to hand over vacant possession of the said flat allotted to him on his retirement. The petitioner, however, failed and neglected to hand over the said flat and continued to occupy the same wrongfully, and withheld the same. It appears that the Corporation from time to time called upon the petitioner orally and in writing to hand over the said flat. The petitioner, however, did not deacce to the request of the Corporation, and continued to wrongfully withhold the said flat. Ultimately, the Corporation by its Advocates notice dated May 6, 1982 called upon the petitioner to hand over the said flat to the Corporation. The petitioner, however, has not complied with the said notice and has not handed over the flat to the Corporation. According to the respondent No. 1, the petitioner has committed an offence under section 630 of the Companies Act, 1956, and therefore, he is liable to be prosecuted and convicted in accordance with law. The learned Metropolitan Magistrate took cognizance of the complaint and issued process against the petitioner. The legality and correctness of the said order of issuing the process against the petitioner is challenged in this petition.

6. Shri. A.G. Noorani, learned Counsel appearing in support of this petition, raised three contentions, namely; (1) that in view of the provisions of section 15 of the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971 (hereinafter referred to as "the Act"), the learned Metropolitan Magistrate had no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the complaint and issue process against the petitioner; (2) that section 630 of the Companies Act applies only to the existing employees or officers of a company and it will not apply to an ex-employee or officer who has either resigned from the service of the company ; and (3) that the said section 630 is ultra vires of Article 14 of the Constitution of India as it discriminates employees of the company and other employees. It must be mentioned here that in the course of the agreements Shri. Noorani wanted to challenge the legislative competency of Parliament to enact the said section. Since the point is not raised in this petition I did not allow Shri Noorani to raise any new point which is not taken up or set out in this petition. Now I proceed to consider each of the contentions raised in this petition learned by Counsel.

7. It is contended by Shri Noorani that in view of the definition of "public-premises" given in Clause (2)(i) of section 2 (e) of the Act, the learned Metropolitan Magistrate has no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the complaint or issue process on such complaint in view of the provisions of section 15 of the Act. Section 15 of the Act bars jurisdiction of other courts to entertain any suit or proceeding in respect of matters covered by that section. Section 4 of the Act lays down that if the estate officer is of opinion that any persons are in unauthorised occupation of any public premises and that they should be evicted, the estate officer shall issue in the manner provided a notice in writing calling upon all persons concerned to show cause why an order of eviction should not be made. The notice shall specify the ground on which the order of eviction is proposed to be made. Sub-section (4) of section 4 lays down that where the estate officer knows, or has reason to believe, that any persons are in occupation of the public premises, then, without prejudice to the provisions of sub-section (3), he shall cause a copy of the notice to be served on every such person by post or by delivering or tendering it to that person or in such other manner as may be prescribed. Section 5 of the Act lays down that if after considering the cause, if any, shown by any person in pursuance of a notice under section 4 and any evidence produced by him in support of the same and after personal hearing if any, given under Clause (b) of sub-section (2) of section 4, the estate officer is satisfied that the public premises are in unauthorised occupation, the estate officer may make an order of eviction for reasons to be recorded therein, directing that the public premises shall be vacated, on such date as may be specified in the order, by all persons who may be in occupation thereof, and cause a copy of the order to be affixed on the outer door or some other conspicuous part of the public premises. The procedure laid down by section 4 is to be followed by the estate officer, and section 5 empowers him to pass an order of eviction, after hearing the parties, in respect of the public premises. As stated above, section 15 of the Act ousts the jurisdiction of all courts to entertain any application for eviction in respect of the unauthorised occupation of a person from the public premises.

8. What is contended by Shri Noorani, learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner, is that the learned Metropolitan Magistrate had no jurisdiction to entertain the complaint for eviction of the petitioner from the premises. Since a special statute is enacted for the purpose of eviction of persons and in view of the clear ouster of jurisdiction of the Court, the complaint filed by respondent No. 1 will not be maintainable in the Court of the Metropolitan Magistrate. It is further contended by Shri Noorani that by section 15 of the Act not only the jurisdiction of the civil courts is ousted but also of criminal courts. Emphasis is laid on the words "suit or proceedings in respect of the eviction of any person" of section 15. It is argued that the word proceedings should be construed to mean criminal proceedings also and it is in view of the said submission the complaint filed by respondent No. 1 is not maintainable and is liable to be quashed. Shri K.M. Desai, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of respondent No. 1, pointed out that section 11 of the Act specifically deals with cognizable offences. The said section lays down that if any person who has been evicted from any public premises under the Act again occupies the premises without authority for such occupation, he shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to one year, or with fine which may extend to one thousand rupees, or with both. Sub-section (2) of the said section 11 vests jurisdiction to entertain such complaint by a Magistrate. The said sub-section lays down that any Magistrate convicting a person under sub- section (1) may order for evicting that person summarily and he shall be liable to such eviction without prejudice to any other action that may be taken against him under the Act . Shri Desai submitted that so far as the offences are concerned, under section 11 the jurisdiction is vested in the Magistrate to deal with offences and penalties of any person who has committed such offence or offences. Accordingly, Shri Desai submitted that the word proceedings used in section 15 of the Act cannot be construed to mean and include criminal proceedings. The word proceedings must be construed with reference to a suit and not to criminal proceedings filed before a Magistrate.

9. I am unable to persuade myself to accept the submission of Shri Noorani that the word proceedings used in section 15 of the Act means and include criminal proceedings. A well-settled rule of construction of a statue is that it would be construed harmoniously so that any other provision of an Act does not become nugatory or redundant. If the word proceedings in the said section 15 is construed to include criminal proceedings, in my view, section 11 will become nugatory and redundant. Offences and penalties are covered by section 11, and therefore, the jurisdiction is vested in the Magistrate to entertain an application and record the conviction and pass sentence according to the said provisions.

10. Section 15 of the Act deals with an order of eviction against the person who is in authorised occupation of the public premises. It does not deal with any offences and penalties. Therefore, it will not be proper to construe the word proceedings used in section 15 to mean criminal proceedings also. In view of this construction of the said section, it must be held there is no ouster of jurisdiction of a criminal Court to entertain the complaint filed by respondent No. 1 in the Court of the Metropolitan Magistrate at Bombay.

11. As stated above, section 15 of the Act ousts the jurisdiction of courts in respect of eviction of any person who is in unauthorised occupation of any public premises save and except specified in that section.

12. The present complaint filed against the petitioner is under section 630 of the Companies Act. The said section does not deal with an order of eviction from public premises. The section lays down that if any officer or employee of a company wrongfully obtains possession of any property of a company; or, having any such property in his possession, wrongfully with holds it, or knowingly applies it to purposes other than those expressed or directed in the articles and authorised by the said Act, such a person shall, on the complaint of the company or any credit or contributory thereof, be punishable with fine which may extend to one thousand rupees. The offence covered by section 630 is the wrongful withholding of the property of a company by an officer or employee of the company. Sub-section (2) of the said section further lays down that the Court trying the offence may also order such officer or employee to deliver up or refund, within the time to be fixed by the Court, any such property wrongfully, obtained or wrongfully obtained or wrongfully withheld or knowingly misapplied, or in default, to suffer imprisonment for a term which may extend to two years. Sub-section (2) of section 630 thus empowers the Magistrate trying the offence to pass an order to deliver up or refund the property within the time to be fixed by the Court. For defence of the said order the Magistrate is further empowered to pass a sentence to suffer imprisonment for a term which may extend to two years. A plain reading of section 630 clearly indicates that if an officer or employee wrongfully withholds any property belonging to a company, it is an offence punishable with fine of Rs. 1,000/-. Sub-section (2) of the said section further directs the Court trying the offence to pass an order directing such officer or employee to deliver up or refund, within the time to be fixed by the Court, any such property wrongfully obtained or wrongfully withheld or knowingly misapplied. The said sub-section further makes it clear that disobedience of the order of the Court is made punishable, and the sentence to suffer imprisonment for a term of two years is provided. Although there is an order of eviction from the property within the time to be fixed by the Court and an officer or employee may not obey the order of the Court, in such eventuality the Court can pass an order of imprisonment for a term of two years. It is only the disobedience of the order of the courts is made an offence wherein imprisonment is prescribed for a period of two years. An officer or employee of a company may not vacate the premises as directed by the Court and may undergo imprisonment for a period of two years, allowing his family members to enjoy the property. In such eventuality, there cannot be any order of eviction from the property of the company under section 630. The two enactments referred to above meet with different situations. They cannot be read together. In one Act there is a power in the Court to pass an order of eviction in respect of public premises, and in the other Act if an officer or employee of the company wrongfully obtains possession of any property of the company or having such property in his possession wrongfully withholds or knowingly applies it to purposes other than those expressed or directed in the articles and authorised by the said Act, such person shall on the complaint of the company or any creditor or contributory thereof, be punishable with fine which may extend to one thousand rupees. It is in this view of the matter it cannot be said that the action or a complaint under section 630 is identical with the jurisdiction or power of a Court envisaged by section 15 of the Act. It is on this ground also the contention raised by learned Counsel for the petitioner cannot be situated. The present complaint is filed under section 630 in respect of offences different from the offences envisaged by the provisions of the said Act. It is, therefore, the contention that the complaint filed by respondent No. 1 is not maintainable cannot be accepted.

13. It is then argued by Shri Noorani that the provisions of section 630 of the Companies Act applies to only existing officers and the employees of the company and would not be applicable to ex-employees or ex-officers. Admittedly, the petitioner on the date of the filing of the complaint was not in the employment of the Corporation, since he retired on February 28, 1982. Reliance is placed by Shri Noorani on the definition of the terms officer given in section 2(30) of the Companies Act, and it is contended that the said definition is an inclusive definition and it includes all those officers who are holding the post of officer in the Corporation. According to Shri Noorani in section 630 wherever the word officer has been used it should be treated as existing officer of the company or who holds officers post in the said company. It is submitted that the company could file a complaint under section 630 against officers and employees of the company who are actually working in the company. An ex-employee as an officer cannot be prosecuted even if he wrongfully withholds any property of the company. Shri Noorani tried to persuade me to take a different view, as is taken by Kotwal, J., in his judgment dated September 11, 1980 in Criminal Revision Application No. 494 of 1980 (Harkishin Lakhimal Gidwani v. Achyut Kashinath Wagh and another)1, reported in (1982)52 Comp. Cas, at p.1. In the said case directly a question arose as to whether the provisions of section 630 of the Companies Act would apply to the present employees or the ex-employees. After going through the judgment I am in respectful agreement with the view taken by Kotwal, J., in the said case. It is held that the features and deductions which flow logically and inescapably on an analysis of section 630 are that : (i) Clause (a) of the section is self-contained and independent of Clause (b) with the capacity of creating penal liability embracing the case of an existing employee or officer of the company. (ii) Clause (b) is equally independent and distinct from Clause (a) as regards penal consequences squarely covering the case of a past employee or officer. (iii) The entitlement of an officer to the property of the company is contingent on the right and capacity of the officer by virtue of his employment which is transferred into the actual possession of the property and the duration of such right would be co-terminus with the terms of employment. Therefore, the capacity, right to possession and duration of it being features intergrally blended with the termination of the employment, the capacity and the corresponding right are extinguished with the obligation to hand over the property back to the company. If the property is held back, the retained possession would amount to wrongful withholding of the property of the company. While the existence of the capacity, right and possession would be during employment, the withholding may be event after the termination of the employment and though the possession as it precedes the act of retention or withholding may be rightful in the past affording an opportunity to withhold, the withholding may be wrongful in the present case. Kotwal, J., also considered the legislative intent of the said provision and observed that the Legislature has employed deliberately the word or which joins Clauses (a) and (b) of section 630(1) of the Companies Act and the commencing words of Clause (b), namely, "having any such property in his possession", make it manifest that the Legislature has itself contemplated a situation where the property might be in the possession of a person not necessarily co-terminus with the possession under Clause (a), which is in the present tense, and the use of the words "any such property" in sub-section (2) of section 630 also furnishes a clue, pre-qualifying the existence of three further contingencies of wrongful obtaining, wrongful withholding and knowingly misapplying and this is merely to tag a label or characterise the property as belonging to the company. With great respect, I entirely agree with the view taken by Kotwal, J. and accordingly need not elaborate this point any further.

14. This takes me to the last submission made by Shri Noorani that section 630 of the Companies Act is ultra vires of Article 14 of the Constitution of India, Ground No. 14 specifically taken in the petition is as follows :---

"The petitioner respectfully submits that section 630 of the Companies Act is ultra vires Article 14 of the Constitution of India. The section discriminates between employees of companies on the one hand and employees of privates individuals, sole proprietorship concerns and partnership on the other. The employees of the latter category face no risk of prosecution for an offence similar to that under section 630 of the Companies Act which penalises employees of the companies. Further, the said discrimination is not a reasonable criterion for differentiation reasonably connected with the objects of the Companies Act."

This is the only statement or objection taken up in the petition. Shri Noorani strongly relied upon the principles which ought to be followed in determining the validity of the classification in the cases set out in paragraph 73 of the judgment in (In re The Special Courts Bill 1978)1, reported in A.I.R. 1979 S.C. 478 and contended that on the basis of the said principles section 630 of the Companies Act can be held to be ultra vires of Article 14 of the Constitution. In the first place, it must be stated that the principle of equality does not mean that every law must have universal application for all persons who are not, by nature, attainment or circumstances in the same position as varying needs of different classes of persons often require different treatment. It is not open to charge of denial of equal protection on the ground that the Act has no application to other persons. It is well settled that the class legislation cannot be valid under Article 14 of the Constitution, but a classification on reasonable ground is permissable. The classification must be a reasonable and rational classification. The Supreme Court in numerous cases has laid down the twin test to be fulfilled, namely, (1) that the classification must be founded on an intelligible differentia which distinguishes those that are good from others, and (2) that the differentia must have a rational relation to the object sought to be achieved by the Act. There is nothing in the petition challenging the classification made by section 630. What is contended is that the section discriminates between the employees of the company on the one hand and the employees of the private individuals, sole proprietorship concerns and partnerships on the other. The employees of the latter category face no risk of prosecution for offences similar to those under section 630 which penalises employees of a company, I am unable to appreciate as to how the classification, namely, officers and employees of the company, is not founded on an intelligible differentia which distinguishes those that are put together from others. The Companies Act, 1956, deals with the companys affairs incorporated under the said Act. A classification is made in respect of officers and employees of the company. By no stretch of imagination of the said section 630 could have conceived of officers and employees of other private individuals or sole proprietorship concerns and partnerships. Those who are charged with the duty to protect and manage the affairs of the company are grouped together for their treatment in the statute, in case they commit breach of the conditions of the said section. That cannot be the case of other employees. As stated above, the principle of equality of law and equal protection of law does not mean that every law must have a universal application for all persons who are not, by nature, attainment or circumstances in service in the same position or situate in similar circumstances. In paragraph 73(4) of the judgment of the Supreme Court in the said case of In re The Special Courts Bill, 1978 it is observed by the Supreme Court that the principle underlying the guarantee of Article 14 is not that the same rules of law should be applicable to all persons within the Indian territory or that the same remedies should be made available to them irrespective of difference of circumstances. It only means that sell persons similarly circumstances shall be treated alike both in privileges conferred and liabilities imposed. Equal laws would have to be applied to all in the same situation, and there should be no discrimination between one person and another if as regards the subject-matter of the legislation their position is substantially the same. It is further observed by the Supreme Court in paragraph 73(5) that by the process of classification the State has the power of determining who should be regarded as a class for purposes of legislation and in relation to a law enacted on a particular subject. This power, no doubt in some degree is likely to produce some inequality; but if a law deals with the liberties of a number of well-defined classes, it is open to the charge of denial or equal protection on the ground that it has no application to other persons. Classification thus means segregation in classes which have a systematic relation, usually found in common properties and characteristic. It postulates a rational basis and does not mean herding together of certain persons and classes arbitrarily.

15. In view of these clear observations, it is not possible to hold that the proposition that the officers and employees of the company, classified together for the purpose of treatment under section 630 of the Companies Act, is not founded on an intelligible differentia which distinguishes from others. The second thing that has to be seen is as to whether the Companies Act has a rational relation to the objects sought to be achieved by the Act. Now, it is very clear that the object of the Companies Act, and particularly the provisions of section 630, has a direct nexus with the object to be achieved under the Companies Act. The object of the Companies Act is to control management and protect the property of a company. The intent of section 630 of the Companies Act appears to be in control the administration and protect the property of the company. If officers and employees of the company wrongfully withhold the properties belonging to the company, then there is nothing illegal to provide such a provision to protect the properties of the company. The object is very obvious that, in case, the officers and employees obtain wrongful possession of movable or immovable properties of the company, then the company must report to a legal remedy as provided by the Act. Having regard to the said provision, it is clear that there is a rational relation to the objects sought to be achieved by the Act. In my view, the principles laid down in the case of In re The Special Courts Bill, 1978 do not in any way help the petitioner. It is, therefore, the challenge to section 630 is not sustainable and accordingly the said section cannot be held to be ultra vires of Article 14 of the Constitution, and accordingly the contention cannot be sustained. It is in this view of the matter the application must fall.

16. In the result, the application is dismissed and the rule is discharged. The learned Metropolitan Magistrate, 14th Court, Girgaum, Bombay, is directed to expedite the hearing of this case as early as possible and dispose of the matter in accordance with law as expeditiously as possible.

17. At this stage, Shri Noorani, learned Counsel for the petitioner-accused, orally requests for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court, which is hereby rejected.

18. Shri. Noorani prayed for stay of the operation of this order for a period of 15 days. The operation of the order need not be stayed but the learned Metropolitan Magistrate shall not start trial of the proceedings for 15 days from today.