CHANDRA REDDY, CJ.

( 1 ) THESE three revision petitions raise a common question as to the meaning of the word cloth used in the Madras General Sales Tax Act, 1939 and the Hyderabad General Sales Tax Act, 1950. T. R. C. No. 20 of 1959 deals with the tormer Act while the other two revisions deal with the latter Act.

( 2 ) T. R. C. No. 20 of 1959.-The respondents, a firm of merchants, are dealers in cloth. They sold fine and superfine printed sarees during the year 1956-57, and the turnover amounted to Rs. 25,949-11-0 in this behalf. The Deputy Commercial Tax officer, Vijayawada, treating the sales as falling under item i of subsection 2-A of section 3 of the Madras General Sales Tax Act imposed sales tax at the rate of one anna six pies for every rupee of the turnover. The appeal of the assessee to the deputy Commissioner of Commercial Taxes proved unsuccessful. The assessee went in further appeal to the Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal. The Tribunal accepted the contention of the assessee that sarees and dhoties would not embrace the definition contained in item 1 of section 3 (2-A) of the Madras General Tax Act and allowed the appeal: the Department seeks to revise this order under section 22 (1) of the Act and rule 40 of the Rules. It is contended on behalf of the petitioner that the distinction made by the Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal between cloth and articles of clothing covering sarees and dhoties is not borne out by the language of item 1 and that the word cotton-cloth is a generic term comprehending dhoties, sarees and other varieties of cloth. On the other hand, the stand taken by the assessee is that the expression cloth is confined to fabric that is sold by yard and cannot extend to the fabric that is sold as a unit and that any material that is used for a specific purpose cannot be described as cloth.

( 3 ) SUPPORT is sought for this proposition in Firm Jaswant Rai Jai Narain v. Sales Tax Officer, (1955) 6 S. T. C. 38

6. The question there was whether a dealer in printed cloth, both handloom and mill-made, was entitled to the benefit of a notification which exempted the sale of cloth manufactured on handlooms with artificial silk, linen, flax and cotton or wool from sales-tax. The dealer took handloom and mill-made cloth and then printed it and sold it as sarees, lihafs, fards, bed-covers, etc. A Bench of the Allahabad High court ruled that the word cloth was to be distinguished from clothes or garments and that what was exempted under the notification was cloth and not clothes. The learned judges added that what the applicant did was to take handloom cloth and either cut it into specific sizes or to have them manufactured into specific sizes, so that the pieces could be used as sarees, bed covers, lihafs, etc. , and then to print them so that they could be readily used for the purpose for which they were meant and that the articles in which the applicant dealt were clothes or garments and not cloth. The principle laid down by the learned Judges lends some support to the theory propounded by the learned counsel for the assessee. With great respect to the learned Judges, we are unable to subscribe to the proposition so broadly stated. In our opinion, cotton cloth is comprehensive enough to take in sarees or dhoties. We feel that the legislature has used it in a general sense. In. common parlance, the word cloth is used to denote every fabric used for any purpose including the use as a wearing apparel. The words ought to be understood in the widest sense and not in a narrow sense. Courts should adopt the meaning of a word which harmonizes with the context and advances the policy of the Act. There is no obstacle here in giving the fullest meaning, especially when it carries out the object of the Act. If we interpret the word in a narrow and restricted sense as invited by the learned counsel for the respondents, it would be practically rendering item i otiose. It would exclude from its purview, if this test is applied, towels, bed-sheets, table cloths, curtain cloth, napkins and cloth used for every purpose sold as a unit. We do not think that such an intention could be attributed to the Legislature. That will be practically reducing item i to a dead letter.

( 4 ) THIS view of ours accords with the meaning given by various dictionaries to the word cloth. Almost every dictionary that we have consulted shows that this word is used in a general sense. We will first refer to the Oxford English Dictionary, volume II. The following meanings are given : "a piece of pliable woven or felted stuff, suitable for wrapping or winding round, spreading or folding over, drying, wiping or other purpose ; a swaddling or winding cloth, wrap, covering, veil, curtain, handkerchief, towel, etc. ""a name given, in the most general sense, to every plain fabric woven, felted, or otherwise formed of any animal or vegetable (or even mineral) filament, as of wool, hair, silk, the fibres of hemp, flax, cotton, asbestos, spun glass, wire, etc. But when used without qualification or contextual specification, usually understood to mean a woollen fabric such as is used for wearing apparel. A wearing apparel. "

( 5 ) IN Websters New International Dictionary, the following meanings are given : " a pliable fabric woven, felted or knitted from any filament ; commonly, fabric or woven cotton, woollen, silk, rayon, or linen, fibre, used for garments, etc. The dress ; raiment ; also a garment; A piece of fabric of definite quantity ; The Canvas for a painting ; Livery ; Uniform . " in the Chambers Twentieth Century Dictionary, the following meanings are given : " Woven material from which garments or coverings are made ; a piece of this material ; Clothing ; the usual dress of a trade or profession . " it is thus seen that any fabric or material used for garments or wearing apparel falls within the definition of cloth. The judgment of Subba Rao. , C. J. , (as he then was) and Viswanatha Sastri, J. , in Kosuri Subba Raju v The State of Andhra, 1956 An. W. R. 709 : 7 S. T. C. 479, does not render any assistance to the respondents. There, the question was whether nawar-tape was included in the term cloth and the Bench answered it in the negative. It was pointed out by Subba Rao, C. J. , that cloth designates the fabric used for garments, coverings and such other purposes. The learned Chief Justice also observed that cloth was used in a wider sense and also in a narrower sense, that in a wider sense it might take in every fabric woven of yarn or other material and that in a narrow sense it connoted a woven material used for garments or clothing. In our opinion, this statement of law in a way supports the view we have taken.

( 6 ) THE very passage in Bindras Interpretation of Statutes occurring at page 78 cited by Sri Ram Mohan Rao furnishes an answer to his contention. The learned author refers to the rule stated by Crawford in his Interpretation of Statutes in these words :"it is also a basic rule of construction that general words should be given a general construction, that is, they should be given their full and natural meaning, unless the statute in some manner reveals that the legislative intent was otherwise. Such a contrary intent may be found in the purpose and subject-matter for example, a statute which provides for the taxation of all property of a certain kind, means all of such property that is within the jurisdiction of the taxing power. Nevertheless the general rule may be announced that in the construction of statutes, general words are to be considered more broadly than specific words, and specific words more narrowly than general words. "

( 7 ) INDISPUTABLY , the word cloth is usrd in a general sense and, therefore, it has to be construed broadly. We are of opinion that the word cloth is of wide connotation embracing dhoties, sarees, etc. We do not think that there is any warrant for limiting it to fabrics sold in yards. A cloth does not cease to be cloth merely because it is used as a dhoti or a sari. The use to which saris and dhoties are put falls within the scope of the expression for wrapping or winding round. It is clear from the meanings given in the dictionaries that raiments and dress fall within the ambit of cloth. It follows that sarees and dhoties of a superfine variety are attracted by the definition contained in item 1 of section 3, sub-section 2-A of the Madras General Sales Tax Act. For these reasons, we allow the revision case of the Department with costs. T. R. C. Nos. 23 and 24 of 1959.-The principle enunciated in T. R. C. No. 20 of 1959 covers these revisions also. Section 6, clause (v) of the Hyderabad General sales Tax Act, 1950, is analogous to item i of section 3 (2-A) of the Madras General sales Tax Act, 1939, though the rate under the former Act is less than that under the latter Act. Clause (v) reads :"so much of the turnover as is attributable to transactions in all cotton cloth made in mills or woven on power-looms-other than coarse and medium cloth costing less than Rs. 2-8-0 per yard- shall be taxed at six pies in the rupee at the first point of sale and at three pies at subsequent points. "

( 8 ) HERE also the expression used is cotton cloth and there is no reason why it should be interpreted differently from that of item i of section 3 (2-A) of the Madras general Sales Tax Act. Sri Venkatramayya, counsel for the respondents in T. R. C. No. 24 of 1959, invites our attention to certain notifications issued by the erstwhile government of the Hyderabad State exempting from the payment of sales-tax hand-loom dhoties and handloom sarees costing less than Rs. 3 per yard, to substantiate his contention that the word cloth does not take in sarees. The notification runs thus :"in exercise of the powers conferred by section 7 of the Hyderabad General Sales Tax Act, 1950 (XIV of 1950) and in supersession of the Finance Department Notification No. 146/200/55-56/tax, dated 12th March 1956, (Page 441, Part I-D, dated 22nd March, 1956), the Rajpramukh hereby exempts with effect from the first day of April 1956, the following goods from the payment of sales-tax : Handloom dhoties and handloom sarees costing less than Rs. 3 per yard. "

( 9 ) WE do not think that this notification throws much light on the construction of clause (v) of section 6 of the Hyderabad General Sales Tax Act. We cannot also overlook the fact that on the same day another notification was issued exempting lungies, rumals, towels, bed-sheets and table cloth made on hand-looms and not stitched and costing Rs. 4 or less per piece. These two notifications between themselves practically exhaust all the varieties of handloom cloth. If all these types of handloom cloth were excluded from the definition of cloth we do not know what remains of the content of cloth. We think that these notifications were issued more by way of clarification. Further, section 6 cannot be construed with reference to the notification issued under section 7 of that Act. In our opinion, the disputed turnover in these cases which covers sales of sarees, falls within the mischief of clause (v) of section 6 of the Hyderabad General Sales Tax Act. T. R. C. No. 23 of 1959 is therefore allowed. There will be no order as to costs.

( 10 ) SO far as T. R. C. No. 24 of 1959 is concerned, Sri Venkataramayya, learned counsel for the respondents, urges that the case of his clients was that a good part of the cloth sold by them was less than Rs. 2-8-0 per yard and as such a part of the turnover has to be excluded from the purview of clause (v) of section

6. Since this matter has not been investigated by the Tribunal , it has to go back to the Tribunal.

( 11 ) IF the Tribunal feels that the matter- should be investigated into by the Department, it could send the matter to the assessing authority. There will be no order as to costs in T. R. C. No. 24 of 1959. These Tax Revision Gases having been set down for being mentioned on this day, the Court made the following order. No costs in T. R. C. Nos. 23 and 24 of 1959. In T. R. C. No. 20 of 1959 the advocates fee is fixed at Rs. 100. T. R. C. Nos. 20 and 23 of 1959 allowed. T. R. C. No. 24 of 1959 remanded.