Ramratna Singh, J.

(1) The plaintiff has preferred this appeal against a decision of the Second Additional District Judge of Hazaribagh reversing a decision of the Second Additional Subordinate Judge who decreed the plaintiffs suit for declaration that an ex parte decree passed in summary suit No. 767 of 1956 by the Bombay City Civil Court on the 4th October, 1956 against him and in favour of the defendant-respondent was void, iilegal and inexecutable. The dispute between the parties arose on account of a contract entered into between them at Giridih in the district of Hazaribagh on the 8th February, 1952, under which the plaintiff was bound to sell all the Beryl and columbite minerals raised from his mines to the defendant-respondent who reserved to himself the option of purchasing minerals on cash or on credit.

(2) According to the plaintiff-appellant, he supplied under the terms of the contract beryl to the respondent of the value of Rs. 16914/6/-. Towards this price, the respondent paid Rs. 700/- in cash on the 12th February, 1954, and, thereafter, Rs. 6000/- through three cheques, each of Rs. 2000/-. As the cheques were cross-cheques, the appellant in order to facilitate collection took them in the name of Ramesh Mica Supply Company, of which he happened to be a partner. All the payments made in cash or cheque were made at Giridih. Even after this payment, Rs. 10,214/6/- remained due to the appellant from the respondents. There was a correspondence between the parties regarding this amount, and the respondent claimed to have advanced Rs. 40,000/- to the appellant, which claim the latter said was incorrect. But, without the knowledge of the appellant, the respondent instituted the suit at Bombay against Ramesh Mica Supply Co., for recovery of Rs. 6700/- on the ground that he had advanced this loan to this Company. The appellant asserted that the Bomay Civil Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit or to grant a decree.

(3) The respondent, on the other hand, asserted that out of the amount advanced by him towards the price of the minerals, Rs. 25,000/-was still due as sufficient quantity of minerals had not been supplied. The amount of Rs. 6700/-, to which the Bombay suit related, is said to have been advanced by the respondent through cheques, one for Rs. 700/- and the other for Rs. 2000/-each as loan to Ramesh Mica Supply Co., through the appellant who represented to the respondent that he was the sole proprietor of the Company. It is further said that the Bombay Court had jurisdiction to entertain the suit which was decreed.

(4) It was found by both the Courts below that Rs. 700/- was paid in cash at Giridih, and Rs. 6000/- was paid through three cheques, each of Rs. 2000/- dated the 9th December, 1954, 14th March, 1955 and 20th March, 1955, all given by the respondent to the appellant at Giridih. All the cheques were drawn at Giridih by the respondent on a Bombay Bank, and they were cashed by the appellant through the Giridih branch of the United Commercial Bank who got the cheques cashed from the Bombay Bank. The trial Court, therefore, held that the cause of action arose wholly at Giridih; but the learned Additional District Judge was of the view that, though the cause of action for Rs. 700/- which was paid in cash arose at Girdih, for payments through cheques the cause of action arose at Bombay, and, therefore, a part of the cause of action arose there and the Bombay Court had jurisdiction in the matter. The learned Additional District Judge further found that the decree passed by the Bombay Court operated as res judicata.

(5) The first question to be considered is: what is the effect of the decision of the Court in a summary suit as provided in Order 37 of the Code of Civil Procedure. This order has been amended by the Bombay High Court; and the relevant portions of Rules 2 and 3, as amended by the Bombay High Court read as follows:

"2. (1) All suits upon bills of exchange, hundies or promissory notes and all suits in which the plaintiff seeks only to recover a debt or liquidated demand in money payable by the defendant with or without interest, arising on contract express or implied ..... may, in case the plaintiff desires to proceed hereunder, be instituted by presenting a plaint in the form prescribed but the summon shall be in Form No. 4 in Appendix B or in each other form as may be from time to time prescribed. (2) In any case in which the plaint and summons are in such forms respectively, the defendant shall not defend the suit unless he enters an appearance and obtains leave from a Judge as hereinafter provided so to defend: and in default of his entering an appearance and of his obtaining such leave to defend, the allegations in the plaint shall be deemed to be admitted, and the plaintiff shall be entitled to a decree for possession and/or as the case may be for any sum not exceeding the sum mentioned in the summons, together with interest at the rate specified (if any) to the date of the decree, and such sum for costs as may be prescribed, unless the plaintiff claims more than such fixed sum, in which case the costs shall be ascertained in the ordinary way, and such decree may be executed forthwith."

"3. (1) The plaintiff shall together with the writ of summons under Rule 2 serve on the defendant a copy of the plaint and exhibits thereto and the defendant may at any time within ten days of such service enter an appearance ..... (2) If the defendant enters an appearance, the plaintiff shall thereafter serve on the defendant a summons for judgment returnable not less than ten clear days from the date of service supported by an affidavit verifying the cause of action and the amount claimed and stating that in his belief there is no defence to the suit. (3) The defendant may at any time within ten days from the service of such summons for judgment by affidavit or otherwise disclosing such facts as may be deemed sufficient to entitle him to defend, apply on such summons for leave to defend the suit. Leave to defend may be granted to him unconditionally or upon such terms as to the judge appear just. (4) At the hearing of such summons for judgment if (a) the defendant has not applied for leave to defend or if such application has been made and is refused, the plaintiff shall be entitled to judgment forthwith, or if (b) the defendant be permitted to defend as to the whole or any part of the claim the Judge shall direct that on failure to complete the security (if any) or to carry out such other directions as the Judge may have given within the time limited in the order, the plaintiff shall be entitled to judgment forthwith".

In instant case, it is admitted that the Bombay City Civil Court adopted the aforesaid procedure. The suit was instituted there on the 7th March, 1956 by the respondent against. Ramesh Mica Supply, Co., for the recovery of Rs. 6700/-, alleged to have been advanced as loan. It was decreed ex parte on the 14th June, 1956. Subsequently, however, the appellant as a partner of Ramesh Mica Supply Co., moved the Bombay Court to set aside the ex parte decree, and in fact, that decree was set aside on the 9th July, 1956. But at the same time, the appellant was ordered to deposit Rs. 2000/- as a condition precedent to his defending the suit, and, on his failure to make the deposit, the Bombay Court delivered a second judgment and passed another decree directing the appellant to pay Rs. 7548/- with interest at 4 per cent per annum till payment of the decretal dues. Though neither party filed the copies of the plaint, petitions or decrees of the Bombay Court, the said facts are admitted. It was however, contended on behalf of the plaintiff-appellant that the obligation imposed by the Bombay Court upon the appellant to deposit Rs. 2000/- was illegal, and that the Bombay Court had no jurisdiction to deliver two judgments and two decrees in the same suit. There is no substance in this contention. Sub-rule (1) of Rule 2 of Order 37 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as amended by the Bombay High Court, empowers the Bombay City Civil Court as well to exercise jurisdiction conferred by this order. The provision of Rule 2 enables a suitor to file a suit in accordance with this procedure for recovery of a debt or a liquidated demand in money. Further, Sub-rule (2) of that rule lays down that a defendant shall not defend the suit unless he enters appearance and obtains leave from the judge to defend the suit; and, under Sub-rule (3) of Rule 3, leave to defend may be granted to him unconditionally or upon such terms as the Judge may just. In view of Sub-rule (4), the plaintiff is entitled to judgment forthwith in either of the two cases, namely, when the defendant has not applied for leave to defend or his application for leave has been refused, or when the defendant fails to comply with the directions of the Judge regarding the security and other matters as a condition precedent to defend the suit. In the instant case Rs. 2000/- was required to be deposited as a condition precedent to the appellants defending the suit; and this amount admittedly not having been deposited after the original ex parte decree had been set aside, judgment was given ex parte in accordance with the provisions of Rule 4, and this became the so-called second ex parte decree. The condition precedent directing the appellant the defendant before the Bombay Court to deposit Rs. 2000/- was not illegal or arbitrary; and, in the circumstances, the ex parte decree would operate as res judicata between the parties in any subsequent suit in respect of the same subject-matter.

(6) In Baldevdas Karsondas v. Mohanlal Bapalal, AIR 1948 Bom 232, a bench decision of the Bombay High Court, the defendant filed the summary suit on the original side of the Bombay High Court on a promissory note for Rs. 5,000/-. He took out a summons for judgment, and the other party who was a plaintiff in the aforesaid case came before Chagla, J., for permission to defend the suit; and his Lordship made an order directing him to deposit Rs. 2500/- within a certain time as a condition for getting leave to defend the suit. On his failure to make the deposit, an ex parte decree was passed on the promissory note. Thereafter, the judgment-debtor filed the suit from which, the appeal before their Lordships arose for declaration that the promissory note on which the decree was based was without jurisdiction. A preliminary issue was tried before the learned Judge below, whether the plaintiffs suit was barred by res judicata, and the learned Judge observed that it was so barred and dismissed the suit. In appeal, their Lordships said that, in the case of summary suit when the plaintiff fails to make deposit or carry out the other conditions laid down by the Court before he can be allowed to appear and defend, the Court actually goes into the merits of the case; the plaintiff has got to prove his claim and on that claim being proved, a decree is passed by the Court. Their Lordships, therefore, observed that such an ex parte decree operated as res judicata, because it was a decree on merits.

(7) The principle laid down in the above Bombay Case applied to the present case; and no authority to the contrary has been cited before me. It is not the case of the appellant that any fraud was practised in obtaining the second ex parte decree; rather he has said in paragraph 15 of the plaint that he instructed his Bombay lawyer to refuse to deposit the security demanded by the Bombay Court as a condition precedent to his defending the suit. Hence, the second ex parte judgment in question amounted to a decree on merits. In other words, the Court found that the respondent had advanced the sum as loan to the appellant and that the Court had jurisdiction in the matter.

(8) The next argument advanced on behalf of the appellant was that the Bombay Court was a Court of limited jurisdiction, and its decision regarding a jurisdictional fact, namely, that it was a case of a loan advanced by the respondent to the appellant could not be binding on the civil court; and, therefore, if in the present suit it is found that it was not a case of loan, the decree of the Bombay Court is without jurisdiction. But this argument is fallacious. A Civil Court has got plenary jurisdiction as is evident from Section 9 of the Civil Procedure Code which lays down that such Courts "shall have jurisdiction to try all suits of a civil nature excepting suits of which their cognizance is either expressly or impliedly barred". In other words, a Civil Court has got jurisdiction in respect of all civil matters except those for which tribunals are constituted under special statutes; and such tribunals have limited jurisdiction, e. g., tribunals set up under the Rent Control Act, Municipal Act, Sea Customs Act, etc. The Bombay Court was not a Court of limited jurisdiction. It was an ordinary Civil Court, though it followed the summary procedure laid down in Order 37 of the Code of Civil Procedure but the procedure alone could not make it a Court of limited jurisdiction. The Bombay Civil Court is a court contemplated by the Civil Procedure Code, and the procedure adopted by it in a summary suit is the same as that of an ordinary civil suit, subject to the summary procedure laid down in some respects in Order 37 of the Code. Rule 7 of Order 37 enacts that "save as pro vided by this order, the procedure in suits here under shall be the same as the procedure in suits instituted in the ordinary manner. The power of a Civil Court adopting in certain respects of a summary procedure laid down by the Civil Procedure Code cannot, therefore, be equated with the powers of a Court, or tribunal, of limited jurisdiction. Hence the argument of the appellant must be rejected.

(9) Another argument was that the Bombay decree was without jurisdiction inasmuch as the suit could not be instituted in the Bombay Court, as no part of the cause of action arose at Bombay. It is a fact that the cause of action in respect of Rs. 700/- paid in cash arose wholly at Giridih; but the three cheques though, issued at Giridih were drawn on a Bombay Bank. It was held, in Commissioner of Income Tax, Bombay, South, Bombay v. Ogale Glass Works Ltd., Ogale Wadi, AIR 1954 SC 429 [LQ/SC/1954/71] , that a payment by negotiable instrument is a conditional payment in the sense that such payment is subject to a condition subsequent that if the negotiable instrument is dishonoured on presentation the creditor may consider it as waste paper and resort to his original demand. The payment takes effect from the delivery of the instrument, but it is defeated by happening of the condition, that is, non-payment on maturity. Similarly, a cheque, unless dishonoured, is payment, subject to the condition that it should be duly honoured at the proper date; in other words, the cheque should operate as payment unless defeated by dishonour. Hence, in respect of the payment by cheque, when the cheque is honoured by the Bank, the payment relates back to the date of the receipt of the cheque. In law, therefore, the date of payment may be either the date when the cheque is issued or the date when it is honoured; and in the latter case the date of payment relates back to the date of the issue of the cheque. Thus, the cause of action in respect of a payment by cheque would arise partly at the place where the cheque is issued or delivered and partly at the place where the cheque is honoured or dishonoured by the Bank. In the instant case, therefore, the cause of action arose partly at Giridih where the cheques were delivered and partly at Bombay where the cheques were honoured by the Bank; and it must be held that the Bom-bay Court had jurisdiction to entertain the suit. Further, the plaintiff-appellant cannot raise the plea of want of jurisdiction in the present suit, because he raised the question of jurisdiction in his objection petition (Ext. A) in the Bombay Court, but allowed the suit to be decreed ex parte thereafter. Hence, the plea regarding jurisdiction is also barred by the principles of res judicata.

(10) The appellant then attacked the finding of the Court below that the present suit, which has been instituted by the plaintiff in his individual capacity is not maintainable to challenge the decree against Kamesh Mica Co. The case of the plaintiff-appellant is that the transaction in respect of the cheques was between him and the respondent, but he took the cheques in the name of Ramess Mica Supply Co., who had an account in the Giridih Bank for the reason that he himself bad no bank account. On the other hand, the case of the respondent is that the appellant represented himself as the representative of the Ramesh Mica Supply Co. The appellant admits to be a partner of this firm; the Bombay suit was instituted and decreed against the firm; and after the appearance of the appellant in that suit, it was decreed. Hence, the finding of the Court be-low is correct.

(11) In view of the above findings, there is no merit in this appeal and it must be dismissed with costs.