MacDermott, J.

1. The only question for determination by the Board is whether, in the circumstances, Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act affected the appellants mortgage. It was conceded, and rightly, in the opinion of their Lordships, that this mortgage was executed during the pendency of suit No. 229, that it" transferred or otherwise dealt with" the land in question within the meaning of the section, and that the expression" decree or order" therein includes a decree or order made pursuant to agreed terms of compromise. Collusion was not suggested, and it was admitted that the mortgage had not been made with the authority of the court. It may, indeed, be that the mortgagor had no chance to seek such authorization, for it does not appear that he was aware of the suit when he mortgaged on the day following its commencement. In the opinion of their Lordships there can be no doubt that in suit No. 220 a right to immovable property--the leasehold on which the cinema was erected-was, in the words of the section," directly and specifically in question "both on the claim for specific performance and the alternative claim for the declaration of a charge in respect of the sum advanced. The broad purpose of Section 52 is to maintain the status quo unaffected by the act of any party to the litigation pending its determination. The applicability of the section cannot depend on matters of proof or the strength or weakness of the case on one side or the other in bona fide proceedings. To apply any such test is to misconceive the object of the enactment and, in the view of the Board, the learned Subordinate Judge was in error in this respect in laying stress, as he did, on the fact that the agreement of June 8, 1932, had not been registered. Had the question now under consideration fallen to be determined before the compromise and final decree in suit No. 229 the appellants mortgage would clearly have been subject to the provisions of the section as, whatever course the suit might ultimately have taken, no one could then have said, without prejudging the issue, that the mortgage would not affect the decretal rights which the plaintiffs might yet obtain in the proceedings.

2. It was, however, contended on behalf of the appellant that in the circumstances of the present case the position had to be regarded in the light of the compromise decree. The argument raised two distinct points. First, it was said that this decree accorded rights which were not claimed in the plaint and was, so to speak, outside the scope of the litigation. Their Lordships are unable to accede to this submission. It may well be that Section 52 does not contemplate a decree or order which is entirely alien to the issues raised between the parties. The wording is -" any decree or order which may be made therein," that is, in the suit or proceeding. But it applies to a compromise decree and inch a decree cannot, by reason of its very nature, be expected invariably to reflect the precise relief claimed. Here the plaint sought, as an alternative to specific performance, a charge on the property in question. In substance the compromise decree provided for that relief, and the fact that the plaintiffs, by the terms of the compromise, relinquished their rights under the agreement of June 8, 1932, cannot, in the view of the Hoard, lead to a different conclusion.

3. The second point turned on the construction of the compromise and was to the effect that the parties thereto had agreed that the appellants mortgage should have priority that it, accordingly, did not conflict in any way with the rights flowing from the compromise decree. This point was rested on Clause 12 of the compromise, which stated that, subsequent to the agreement of June 8, 1932, there was no mortgage on the property in question save the appellants. Had it mentioned the date of the mortgage and used language apt to indicate that the parties regarded it as entitled to priority, the case for implying a modification of the terms of Clause 6, which expressly provided that the decretal dues should be a first charge, would be appreciably stronger. As Clause 12 stands, however, their Lordships cannot agree that it suffices to qualify the clear and emphatic provisions of Clause 6 or to preclude those now representing the plaintiffs in suit No. 229 from taking advantage of such infirmities as have attached to the appellants security.

4. For these reasons their Lordships are of opinion that the decision of the High Court was right and should be affirmed. They will therefore humbly advise His Majesty that the appeal be dismissed The respondents did not appear and there will be no order as to the costs of the appeal.