BILAL NAZKI, J.

( 1 ) THIS second appeal has come up before us by way of a reference by the learned single Judge. The learned single Judge found that the main ground on which the substantial question has been framed was that the appellate Court had not framed points for determination. The learned counsel for the appellant submitted that since the points for determination had not been framed by the appellate Court therefore the judgment could not sustain in view of order 41, Rule-31 of Code of Civil procedure. The learned Counsel for the appellant had relied on a judgment of this court reported in Viyyapu Danayya v. Peethala Appa Rao, 1997 (3) ALT 266. [LQ/TelHC/1997/242] The learned single Judge could not persuade himself to accept the views expressed in the judgment referred to above, therefore, the matter has been referred to Division Bench.

( 2 ) THE only question which has to be answered by this Court is, whether Order 41, rule 31 is mandatory and if so what are the parameters of this rule. Rule 31 of Order 41 states: order 41, Rule 31 contents, date and signature of judgment - the judgment of the appellate Court shall be in writing and shall state (a) the points for determination; (b) the decision thereon; (c) the reasons for the decision; and (d) where the decree appealed from is reversed or varied, the relief to which the appellant is entitled; and shall at the time that it is pronounced be signed and dated by the Judge or by the Judges concurring therein. "As a matter of fact there cannot be any dispute that the judgment of appellate court should be in writing and should also state the points of determination and decision thereon. The judgment shall also state the reasons for the decision and as such, we do not think that the rule is not mandatory. But, whether it is necessary that the judge should specifically state as to what are the points of determination and then go on one by one to decide them and give the decision and reasons for such decision as during trial the Courts are expected to frame issues for determination and then decide those issues for reasons.

( 3 ) VARIOUS judgments have been cited before us by both the sides. Let us examine the first judgment to which a reference has been made in the reference order. The judgment is Viyyapu Danayya v. Peethala Appa Rao (supra). In this case the point framed for consideration by the appellate court was. "Whether the judgment and decree of the learned District Munsif, Bheemunipatnam in O. S. No. 15179 is liable to be set aside. "The Court on interpretation of Order 41, Rule 31 was of the opinion. "Any appellate Court must address itself to the dispute and so frame the points for determination. At any rate, the point for determination cannot be as to whether the trial Court is justified in its conclusions. It should not appear to anyone that goes through the judgment in appeal that the lower appellate Court has not addressed itself to the points in issue and when there is a specific provision in the Civil Procedure code, the lower appellate Courts must necessarily acquaint themselves with the nature of the dispute between the parties and so frame the points for determination. If, a bald point for determination as framed by the lower appellate Court is framed, one is justified to comment that the lower appellate court has not addressed itself to the real issues in controversy. As such, I am of the opinion that the lower appellate Court has abdicated its duty in framing the correct point for determination and decide the same". "There is another judgment of the learned single Judge of this Court reported in Midakanti Nagabhushana Reddy v. Midakanti Yellaiah, 1999 (4) ALD 41. [LQ/TelHC/1998/717] In this judgment the learned single Judge while discussing the import of Order 41, Rule 31 had relied on the following observations made by Bombay high Court in Smt. Anita M. Harretto v. Abdul Wahid Sanaullah, AIR 1985 Bom. 98 [LQ/BomHC/1984/448] . "Merely asking the question as to whether the judgment of the Court below is correct, legal and valid is hopelessly an inadequate method of meeting the requirement of this legal provision. "Thereafter the learned Judge held that the appellate Judge has to consider all the disputed questions of fact and law and record his findings thereon.

( 4 ) THE learned Counsel for the appellant also relied on a Madras High Court judgment reported in Subramanian v. Saraswathiammal, 1999 (1) MLJ 730. [LQ/MadHC/1998/1483] In this judgment also the Madras High Court held that the provisions of Order 41, Rule 31 are mandatory and it cannot be said that the failure to comply with the provisions is merely an irregularity.

( 5 ) THE learned Counsel for the respondents has however drawn our attention to the judgment of Privy Council reported in Firm Gokul Chand v. Firm Nand ram, AIR 1938 PC 292 [LQ/PC/1938/64] . In this case, the same provision was at issue but related to signing of the judgment by the Judge. It was contended before the Privy Council that the judgment of the High Court was not a valid judgment because it had failed to comply with Order 41, Rule 31 CPC. The relevant facts of the case were that, the matter was heard by two Judges of the High court Harrison and Agha Haider, and the judgment was delivered by Justice Harrison the latter agreeing. The judgment was delivered on 22nd February, 1933 but Harrison, J went on leave before signing the judgment which was signed by Agha Haider,. The Deputy Registrar appended a note that Harrison, had gone on leave before signing the judgment he delivered. It was contended that Order 41, Rule 31 requires that the judgment of appellate Court shall be in writing and shall state various matters and shall at the time that it is pronounced be signed and dated by the Judge or by the Judges. The Privy Council found that the rule does not say that if its requirements are not complied with the judgment shall be a nullity. This judgment was by five Judges of the Privy Council.

( 6 ) THE learned Counsel for the respondents also relied on Girijanandini v. Bijendra Narain, AIR 1967 SC 1124 [LQ/SC/1966/149] . In this case, the Supreme Court held: we are unable to hold that the learned Judges of the High Court did not, as is contended before us, consider the evidence. It is not the duty of the appellate Court when it agrees with the view of the trial Court on the evidence either to restate the effect of the evidence or to reiterate the reasons given by the trial Court. Expression of general agreement with reasons given by the Court decision of which is under appeal would ordinarily suffice. "The learned Counsel also referred to another judgment reported in V. Venkataswami v. G. Venkataswami, air 1954 Mad. 9 [LQ/MadHC/1953/130] (Vol. 41, C. N. 3 ). The madras High Court found that, where the appellate Judge had failed to frame points and discuss each point separately and record the finding separately but had adopted the easier method of stating that he agreed with the conclusions of the Subordinate Judge, that was no doubt not a very satisfactory way but on that ground the High Court would not reverse the decision of the lower appellate Court. The learned Counsel has also relied on various judgments including Katta Nageswar Rao v. Reddi saraswathi, 1992 (1) ALT 256 [LQ/TelHC/1991/370] , Chakala Anjappa v. Betappagari Anjaneya, 1992 (1) alt 544 [LQ/TelHC/1990/136] , Asst. Commissioner, Tumkur v. K. N. Nagaraja, AIR 1983 Karn. 1111, and also a judgment of Division Bench of this court reported in Ali Mohamood v. Spl. Court under A. P. Land Grabbing (Prohibition) Act, 2000 (4) ALT 673. [LQ/TelHC/2000/431] In paras 9 and 10 of the judgment (supra) the division Bench held: "9. The idea behind Order 41, Rule 31 code of Civil Procedure is that the Court while passing the judgment shall apply its mind to the evidence made available on record and secondly, whether both the parties did understand on what point they have to submit their case. While in some cases the courts have held that non-compliance of anyone of the requirements of Order 41, rule 31 C. P. C. vitiates the proceedings but in some cases the Courts have taken the view that non-compliance of anyone of the requirements of Order 41, Rule 31 C. P. C. does not vitiate the proceedings. The purpose of framing the points for consideration by the lower appellate Court is to clear up the pleading and focus the attention of the Court and of the parties on the specific and rival contentions which arise for determination. Time and again it is said that is not necessary that the judgment should record all the facts in detail and should deal mechanically with all points. It would be sufficient if the Court renders its independent judgment". "10. A reading of the judgment of the lower appellate Court reflects application of mind on its part and failure to frame points for consideration at best can be said to be only a technical defect or a procedural irregularity which can be cured if the judgment is in substantial compliance of all other requirements. In other words, it is desirable that the first appellate Court should comply with all the requirements of Order 41, rule 31 C. P. C. but if there is any slight deviation that itself is not a ground to hold that the judgment is vitiated. "

( 7 ) ORDER 41, Rule 31 has to be read within the scheme of Order 41. Order 41 deals with Appeals from Original decrees and Rule 1 lays down that; Every appeal shall be preferred in the form of a memorandum signed by the appellant or his pleader. . . . Then, it also lays down what should a memorandum contain. Order 41, rule 1 (2) lays down that; The memorandum shall set forth concisely and under distinct heads, the grounds of objection to the decree appealed from without any argument or narrative, and such grounds shall be numbered consecutively. Rule 2 of Order 41 lays down the grounds which may be taken in appeal. It states; "the appellant shall not except by leave of the Court, urge or be heard in support of any ground of objection not set forth in the memorandum of appeal, but the appellate Court, in deciding the appeal, shall not be confined to the grounds of objections set forth in the memorandum of appeal or taken by leave of the Court under this rule; Provided that the Court shall not rest its decision on any other ground unless the party who may be affected thereby has had a sufficient opportunity of contesting the case on that ground. If these Rules 1 and 2 are read along with Rule 31 it becomes clear that the judge while hearing an appeal is obliged to decide all the grounds taken in the memorandum of appeal without mentioning them in his judgment point by point and decide the appeal, if the Judge considers and decides all the grounds taken in the memorandum of appeal Order 41, Rule 31 would be substantially complied with. It is true that, generally the appellate Judges are framing only one question as to whether the judgment of the trial Court can sustain or not, but, while dealing with the appeal they are deciding all the questions which are raised. During our experience we have, however, found that the memorandum of appeals are so defective that one memorandum of appeal can be used in any number of appeals. Generally the memorandum contains the general grounds that the judgment under appeal cannot sustain, that the trial Court has erred in appreciating the evidence and law. Therefore, if the Courts find from reading whole judgment of the first appellate Court that the grounds urged in the memorandum of appeal have been considered by the appellate Court and a decision thereon has been given with reasons, that judgment would be in conformity with provisions of order 41, Rule 31.

( 8 ) IN the light of the judgments cited, and in view of the discussions hereinabove, we hold that the judgment Viyyapu Danayya v. Peethala Appa Rao (supra) does not lay down the correct law and the correct position may be summarized as follows: even without framing specific points for determination, if the appellate Court in its judgment deals with all the grounds taken in the memorandum of appeal and gives decision on those grounds with reasons that would be sufficient compliance of Order 41, rule 31.

( 9 ) THE reference is accordingly answered. The learned Counsel for appellant submits that there are many other grounds urged in his memorandum of appeal. Therefore, the matter is referred back to the learned single Judge who may consider other grounds.

( 10 ) THE learned single Judge while making the reference has pointed out that the appellate Court had considered all the points urged before him although he had not framed points for consideration. Therefore, on this question the appeal could not be admitted. However, other questions, if any raised, may be raised before the learned single Judge.